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  Summary	  
Having	  identified	  a	  prevalence	  of	  the	  discipline	  to	  treat	  the	  state	  as	  a	  person,	  the	  thesis	  
critically	  engages	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  psychological	  state	  personhood	  in	  IR,	  prominently	  put	  
forward	  by	  Alexander	  Wendt.	  As	  a	  result,	  an	  alternative	  conception	   in	   the	  form	  of	   the	  
constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   suggested	  which	  argues	   that	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   best	  
understood	  as	  a	  metaphor	  and	  utilises	  constructionist	  psychology	  to	  point	  out	  that	  self	  
and	  emotions	  are	  best	  located	  at	  the	  discursive	  level.	  	  	  
In	  contrast	  to	  Wendt,	  who	  insists	  on	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  this	  thesis	  argues	  
that	   the	   state	   is	   a	   real	   social	   structure	  which	   is	  made	   intelligible	   through	   the	   idea	   of	  
state	  personhood.	  Agency	  firmly	  rests	  with	   individual	  human	  beings,	  acting	  alone	  or	   in	  
groups.	  Concepts	  such	  as	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  become	  relevant	  when	  they	  engage	  in	  the	  
production	  and	  reproduction	  of	  the	  social	  structure.	  
Wendt’s	   position	   on	   the	   role	   of	   metaphors	   and	   his	   conception	   of	   psychological	  
personhood	   are	   areas	   in	   which	   this	   thesis	   suggests	   an	   alternative	   perspective.	   It	   is	  
argued	  that	  metaphors	  are	  more	  than	  figures	  of	  speech	  and	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously	  
as	   theory-­‐constitutive	  elements	   in	   IR	   scholarship.	  Constructionist	  psychology	   is	  utilised	  
to	  present	  an	  alternative	  vision	  of	  how	  people	  make	  sense	  of	  themselves	  and	  how	  self	  
and	   emotions	   are	   created	   discursively.	   In	   this	   regard	   this	   thesis	   aligns	   itself	   with	   the	  
“emotional	   turn”	   in	   the	   discipline	   to	   argue	   against	   the	   dichotomous	   treatment	   of	  
rationality	   and	   emotions	   and	   to	   suggest	   that	   emotions	   should	   be	   treated	   as	   forms	   of	  
knowledge.	  	  
With	   the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	   this	   thesis	  presents	  an	  account	  of	   the	  state	   that	  
allows	   for	   theorising	   about	   self	   and	   emotions	   of	   states.	   With	   regard	   to	   systemic	  
interactions,	   this	   thesis	   points	   to	   the	   importance	  of	   culturally	   specific	   concepts	   of	   self	  
and	  emotions	  and,	  ultimately,	  suggests	  that	  anarchy	  is	  what	  we	  make	  of	  it.	  	  
	  
	  Acknowledgements	  
Part	  of	  this	  thesis	  draws	  on	  constructionist	  psychology	  which	  maintains	  that	  we	  acquire	  
our	  key	  psychological	  characteristics	  only	  in	  interaction	  with	  other	  people.	  In	  this	  sense,	  
I	  owe	  a	  lot	  to	  the	  people	  that	  have	  been	  part	  of	  my	  life.	  In	  the	  following,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  
acknowledge	  those	  who	  have	  been	  vital	  during	  my	  work	  on	  this	  thesis.	  	  
This	   thesis	   benefited	   tremendously	   from	   the	   encouragement	   and	   intellectual	   support	  
that	  I	  received	  throughout	  my	  time	  at	  the	  Department	  of	  International	  Politics.	  I	  am	  sure	  
that	  my	  time	  in	  Aberystwyth	  has	  shaped	  me	  in	  more	  ways	  than	  I	  can	  presently	  imagine.	  
The	   work	   would	   not	   have	   been	   possible	   without	   support	   from	   the	   Department	   of	  
International	  Politics	   in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  EH	  Carr	  PhD	  Studentship.	   I	  would	   like	  to	  thank	  
my	   supervisors,	   Prof.	   Toni	   Erskine	   and	   Prof.	   Andrew	   Linklater,	   for	   their	   patience,	  
support,	   and	   invaluable	   feedback.	   In	  addition,	   I	   am	  grateful	   to	  Dr	  Berit	  Bliesemann	  de	  
Guevara	  who,	   as	  Director	   of	   Postgraduate	   Studies,	   offered	   immense	   support.	   Last	   but	  
not	  least,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  extend	  my	  gratitude	  to	  my	  former	  teacher	  at	  the	  University	  of	  
Leicester,	  Prof.	  Geoff	  Berridge,	  whose	  support	  has	  been	  immeasurable	  in	  enabling	  me	  to	  
further	  pursue	  my	  academic	  interests.	  	  
I	  am	  grateful	   for	  the	  comments	  that	   I	   received	  presenting	  this	  work	  on	  the	  panel	  “The	  
State	   as	   Person:	   Re-­‐Assessing	   the	   Debate”	   at	   the	   2012	   Annual	   Convention	   of	   the	  
International	   Studies	  Association	   and	   at	   the	   International	   Politics	   Research	   Seminar	   in	  
Aberystwyth.	  I	  am	  also	  thankful	  to	  Prof.	  Alexander	  Wendt	  who	  took	  the	  time	  to	  discuss	  
some	  of	  my	  ideas	  in	  their	  early	  stages.	  	  
I	   would	   like	   to	   thank	   Mareike	   Jenner,	   Nadja	   de	   Oliveira,	   Rose	   McCormack,	   Erzsebet	  
Strausz,	   Ciaran	  McDonald,	   Harmony	   Dewez,	   Catrin	  Wyn	   Edwards,	   Stefani	   Dritsa,	   Tom	  
Marshall,	   Carolin	   Kaltofen,	   and	   Gillian	   McFadyen	   for	   much	   needed	   moral	   support,	  
encouragement,	   and	  wonderful	   company	  during	  breaks	   from	   the	  PhD.	   For	  making	   the	  
working	  environment	  a	  much	  more	  enjoyable	  place,	  I	  am	  especially	  thankful	  to	  my	  office	  
mates	   Sarah	   Jamal,	   Alexandros	   Koutsoukis,	   and	  Michael	   Seibold.	   For	   his	   enduring	   and	  
unfailing	  support	  throughout	  the	  last	  years,	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  Florian	  Edelmann.	  Last	  but	  
not	  least,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  my	  parents,	  Angela	  and	  Reinhard	  Höne,	  for	  enabling	  me	  
to	  follow	  my	  own	  path.	  	  
	   	  
	  Table	  of	  Contents	  
	  	  
	  
Introduction	  .....................................................................................................................................	  1	  
	  
Chapter	  1:	  The	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  IR	  theory	  ..............................................................	  13	  
Four	  observations	  on	  the	  state	  in	  IR	  ..................................................................................	  17	  
“From	  the	  state	  of	  princes	  to	  the	  person	  of	  the	  state”	  ......................................................	  25	  
The	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  IR	  theory	  .......................................................................................	  31	  
Towards	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person:	  metaphors	  that	  matter	  ....................................	  39	  
Towards	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person:	  personification	  as	  representation	  ....................	  43	  
Towards	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person:	  bringing	  emotions	  in	  ........................................	  48	  
Conclusion	  ........................................................................................................................	  51	  
	  
Chapter	  2:	  The	  Wendtian	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  .......................................................................................	  55	  
Wendtian	  constructivism:	  the	  via	  media	  and	  ideas	  not	  all	  the	  way	  down	  ..........................	  58	  
Scientific	  realist	  commitments	  ..........................................................................................	  63	  
The	  state	  as	  an	  agent,	  the	  state	  as	  a	  person	  ......................................................................	  69	  
Real	  states	  and	  real	  states-­‐as-­‐persons	  ...............................................................................	  73	  
The	  essential	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  ............................................................................................	  76	  
Conclusion	  ........................................................................................................................	  81	  
	  
Chapter	  3:	  The	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  as	  a	  metaphor	  ................................................................................	  84	  
Understanding	  metaphors	  –	  interaction	  view	  and	  theory	  constitutive	  metaphors	  ............	  88	  
An	  interaction	  view	  of	  metaphor	  ..............................................................................	  91	  
Metaphors	  to	  build	  theories	  and	  metaphors	  to	  explain	  theories	  ..............................	  98	  
Other	  perspectives	  on	  metaphor	  ............................................................................	  100	  
A	  definition	  and	  two	  distinctions	  ............................................................................	  105	  
Metaphors	  in	  IR	  theory	  ...................................................................................................	  109	  
Metaphors	  in	  Wendt’s	  work	  ...........................................................................................	  115	  
Constructing	  a	  metaphor:	  source	  domain	  selection	  and	  structural	  mapping	  ....................	  126	  
Relating	  mind	  and	  world:	  is	  the	  (metaphorical)	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  real?	  .............................	  132	  
Conclusion	  ......................................................................................................................	  142	  
	  
Chapter	  4:	  A	  psychological	  and	  emotional	  turn	  in	  IR	  .....................................................................	  145	  
Psychology,	  emotions,	  and	  the	  discipline	  ........................................................................	  149	  
Possibilities	  for	  utilising	  psychology:	  the	  cognitive	  bias	  of	  the	  researcher	  .......................	  154	  
Possibilities	  for	  utilising	  psychology:	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐individuals	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐group	  ......	  159	  
The	  state-­‐as-­‐person:	  yet,	  which	  psychology?	  ..................................................................	  167	  




Chapter	  5:	  Person,	  self,	  and	  emotions	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  constructionist	  psychology	  ...........	  177	  
A	  world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people	  and	  a	  world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐molecules	  .................................................	  180	  
Person	  and	  self	  in	  Harré’s	  account	  ..................................................................................	  186	  
One	  person,	  three	  selves	  .................................................................................................	  193	  
Constructing	  emotions	  ....................................................................................................	  202	  
Yet,	  the	  body	  matters	  after	  all	  ........................................................................................	  213	  
Conclusion	  ......................................................................................................................	  218	  
	  
Chapter	  6:	  Developing	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  ................................................................	  220	  
Mapping	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  .............................................	  223	  
Creating	  a	  second-­‐order	  person:	  material	  and	  embodied	  implications	  ............................	  229	  
The	  three	  selves	  of	  the	  state	  ...........................................................................................	  234	  
States’	  emotions	  .............................................................................................................	  237	  
States	  as	  friends	  and	  enemies,	  systemic	  cultures	  of	  enmity	  and	  friendship	  .....................	  240	  
Conclusion	  ......................................................................................................................	  245	  
	  
Chapter	  7:	  The	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  –	  implications	  for	  IR	  theory	  .......................................	  247	  
Making	  the	  state	  intelligible:	  overcoming	  a	  disciplinary	  divide	  ........................................	  250	  
Rethinking	  systemic	  interactions	  and	  systemic	  change	  ....................................................	  264	  
Bringing	  emotions	  in	  to	  understand	  “irrational”	  behaviour	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  systemic	  
change	  ............................................................................................................................	  273	  
Processes	  of	  radical	  change:	  re-­‐thinking	  persons,	  re-­‐thinking	  states	  ................................	  277	  
Conclusion	  ......................................................................................................................	  283	  
	  
Conclusion:	  The	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  IR	  theory	  .............................................................	  286	  
	  
Bibliography	  .................................................................................................................................	  297	  
	  




This	   thesis	   is	   driven	   by	   a	   fascination	   with	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   in	   International	  
Relations	  (IR)	  theory.	   Its	  starting	  point	   is	  marked	  by	  the	  observation	  that	   ideas	  of	  persons	  and	  
ideas	   of	   states	   influence	   each	   other	   and	   that	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   thinking	   is	   still	   prevalent	   in	   IR	  
theory.	  More	  specifically,	   it	  critically	  engages	  with	  Alexander	  Wendt’s	  conception	  of	  the	  state-­‐
as-­‐person,	  which	  led	  to	  his	  strong	  statement	  that	  “states	  are	  people	  too”.1	  	  
This	  thesis	  suggests	  an	  alternative	  to	  Wendt’s	  approach.	  This	  alternative	  conception	  is	  driven	  by	  
the	  conviction	  that	  the	   idea	  of	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   indeed	  valuable,	  and	  –	  given	  the	  current	  
self-­‐understanding	   of	   the	  mainstream	   of	   the	   discipline	   as	  well	   as	   prevalent	   lay	   perceptions	   –	  
even	   necessary	   in	  making	   sense	   of	   IR.	   However,	   it	   also	  maintains,	   in	   contrast	   to	  Wendt,	   that	  
agency	  rests	  with	  individual	  human	  beings,	  acting	  alone	  or	  in	  groups,	  and	  that	  we	  have	  to	  seek,	  
first,	  to	  understand	  how	  people	  make	  sense	  of	  themselves	  in	  order	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐
person.	  	  
Following	  a	  critical	  engagement	  with	  Wendt,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  relation	  between	  concepts	  of	  
the	  state	  and	  concepts	  of	  the	  person	  is	  a	  metaphorical	  one.	  States	  are	  people,	  too,	  but	  they	  are	  
so	  only	  metaphorically.	   It	   is	  also	  argued,	  however,	   that	  this	  metaphorical	  connection	  does	  not	  
mark	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  as	  unscientific	  or	  as	  a	  mere	  rhetorical	  device.	  Indeed,	  the	  
argument	  pursued	  here	  is	  that	  such	  metaphorical	  processes	  are	  inescapable	  in	  making	  sense	  of	  
the	   (social)	   world.	   Going	   beyond	   the	   metaphor	   as	   a	   rhetorical	   device,	   we	   can	   understand	  
metaphors	  as	  those	  tools	  that	  connect	  concepts	  and	  structures	  by	  facilitating	  an	  understanding	  
of	  the	  social	  structure	  and	  by	  also	  becoming	  relevant	  for	  social	  action	  that	  ultimately	  plays	  and	  
important	  part	  in	  the	  production	  and	  reproduction	  of	  the	  structure.	  	  	  
With	  regard	  to	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  a	  position	  is	  developed	  in	  this	  thesis	  that	  maintains	  that	  in	  
order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  state,	  understood	  as	  a	  person,	  we	  need	  to	  look	  at	  how	  people	  make	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sense	  of	  themselves.	  Imagining	  the	  state	  as	  a	  person	  is	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  an	  abstract	  
concept	  in	  human	  terms.	  At	  the	  core	  of	  such	  as	  a	  metaphorical	  process	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  make	  
sense	   of	   something	   abstract	   and	   intangible	   in	   terms	   of	   something	   more	   familiar	   and	   more	  
tangible.	   These	   categories	   are,	   of	   course,	   fluid	   and	   depend	   on	   the	   position	   of	   the	   observer.	  
However,	  drawing	  on	  conceptual	  metaphor	  theory,	  metaphorical	  reasoning	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  general	  
principle	  of	  how	  the	  world	  is	  rendered	  intelligible.	  And	  further,	  metaphors	  are	  seen	  as	  being	  at	  
the	  heart	  of	  the	  scientific	  process	  and	  those	  processes	  that	  constitute	  the	  social	  world.	  Yet,	  this	  
is	  not	   to	  argue	  that	   it	   is	  “ideas	  all	   the	  down”.	  Concepts	  are	  enabled	  and	  constrained	  by	  social	  
structures.	  The	  state	  is	  such	  a	  structure	  and	  as	  part	  of	  the	  metaphorical	  process	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  
carefully	  teased	  out	  what	  parts	  of	  the	  structure	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  highlights,	  
what	  parts	  it	  hides,	  and	  what	  structural	  constraints	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  facing.	  	  
Part	  of	  the	  motivation	  behind	  this	  thesis	  is	  the	  conviction	  that	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  state	  
in	  human	   terms	   is	  preferable	   to	  mechanistic	  or	  biological	  understandings.	   It	   is	   suggested	   that	  
understanding	   states	   in	   terms	  of	  persons	   should	   start	  by	   looking	  at	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   selves,	  
identities,	  and	  emotions	  are	  fashioned	  and	  acquire	  meaning	  in	  everyday	  discourses.	  This	  allows	  
us	  to	  find	  answers	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  conceptualise	  the	  state	  and	  the	  question	  of	  what	  is	  
appropriate	  or	  acceptable	  behaviour	  of	  states	  in	  IR.	  
Further,	   it	   is	   argued	   that,	   if	  we	   accept	   the	  person	   as	   a	   starting	  point,	   it	   is	   fruitful	   to	  draw	  on	  
psychology	   in	   order	   to	   develop	   an	   understanding	   of	   what	   it	   means	   to	   be	   a	   being	   with	   a	  
subjective	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  and	  with	  the	  capacity	  for	  emotions.	  To	  a	  certain	  extent,	  
this	  position	   is	  already	  present,	  albeit	   in	  a	  nascent	   form,	   in	  Wendt’s	   change	  of	   focus	   from	  his	  
1999	  book	  Social	  Theory	  to	  his	  2004	  article	  “The	  state	  as	  person	  in	  international	  theory”.	  While	  
Social	  Theory	  is	  ultimately	  aimed	  at	  conceptualising	  systemic	  interaction,	  the	  2004	  article	  begins	  
by	  asking	  “[w]hat	  is	  a	  person”	  and	  then	  moves	  on	  to	  define	  psychological	  personhood	  in	  more	  
detail.2	  I	  take	  this	  as	  an	  invitation	  to	  look	  to	  psychology	  for	  an	  answer.	  	  
However,	   this	   thesis	   also	   cautions	   that	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   critically	   question	   the	   underlying	  
ontological	   and	   epistemological	   assumptions	   of	   the	   specific	   findings	   from	  psychology	   that	  we	  
wish	  to	  render	  useful	  for	   IR	   in	  general	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  particular.	   In	  this	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regard,	  the	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  make	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  recently	  renewed	  interest	  in	  incorporating	  
findings	  from	  psychology	  into	  IR,	  especially	  as	  part	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  emotional	  turn.3	  Ultimately,	  I	  
argue	  that	  it	  is	  most	  useful	  to	  look	  to	  constructionist	  psychology	  for	  an	  answer.	  Constructionist	  
psychology	   maintains	   that	   selves	   and	   emotions	   are	   socially	   constructed	   and	   fundamentally	  
bound	   up	   with	   language	   use.	   It	   avoids	   methodological	   individualism	   and	   the	   postulation	   of	  
entities	  “inside”	  the	  mind.	  	  It	  calls	  for	  a	  look	  not	  inside	  the	  mind	  of	  any	  particular	  person	  but	  for	  
research	  into	  the	  concepts	  about	  self	  and	  emotions	  held	  in	  a	  particular	  society.	  It	   is	  noticeable	  
that	  those	  approaches	  that	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  or	  tacitly	  use	  such	  
an	   understanding	   of	   the	   state,	   often	   adhere	   to	   an	   understanding	   of	   person	   and	   the	   sate-­‐as-­‐
person	   that	   is	   strangely	   devoid	   of	   subjective	   experience	   and	   emotions.	   By	   drawing	   on	  
constructionist	   psychology,	   this	   thesis	   seeks	   to	   remedy	   this	   situation.	   By	   drawing	   on	  
constructionist	  psychology	  to	  theorise	  state	  personhood,	  it	  also	  makes	  an	  important	  addition	  to	  
the	  emerging	  emotional	  turn.	  
The	  aim	  of	  the	  project	  just	  outlined	  can	  be	  restated	  in	  the	  following	  terms.	  There	  is	  a	  prevalent	  
assumption	  in	  IR	  theory	  that	  the	  state	  is	  like	  a	  person.	  Any	  account	  that	  wishes	  to	  address	  the	  
idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   needs	   to	   grapple	   with	   the	   following	   concerns:	   Where	   is	   agency	  
located	   in	  this	  account?	  What	   is	   the	  structural	  context	   in	  which	  actors	  operate	  and	  what	   is	   its	  
impact	   on	   possibilities	   for	   construction?	   What	   is	   the	   specific	   understanding	   of	   the	   person	  
utilised	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   the	   state?	   How	   are	   concepts	   of	   persons	   and	   concepts	   of	   states	  
related?	  
Building	   on	   these	   questions,	   the	   central	   research	   question	   that	   guides	   this	   thesis	   is	   the	  
following:	   Can	   a	   constructivist	   approach	  with	   a	   strong	   input	   from	   constructionist	   psychology,	  
which	   treats	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   as	   a	   metaphor	   while	   acknowledging	   the	   constraints	   of	   the	  
state-­‐as-­‐structure,	   provide	   a	   valuable	   alternative	   understanding	   of	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	  
state	  is	  like	  a	  person?	  In	  answering	  this	  question,	  I	  will	  offer	  what	  I	  call	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	   as	   an	   alternative	   to	   the	   conception	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   that	   prompted	   Wendt’s	  
proclamation	   that	   “states	   are	   people	   too”.	   In	   so	   doing,	   I	   will	   draw	   on	   conceptual	   metaphor	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theory	   and	   constructionist	   psychology.	   Having	   briefly	   outlined	   the	   project,	   I	   now	   turn	   to	  
situating	  the	  project	  further	  in	  terms	  of	  highlighting	  some	  of	  the	  fundamental	  assumptions	  that	  
the	   present	   investigation	   takes	   as	   starting	   points	   and	   that	   locate	   this	   project	  within	  wider	   IR	  
debates.	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Four	  observations	  on	  the	  state	  in	  IR	  
To	  begin	  with,	  four	  observations	  are	  made	  that,	  taken	  together,	  illustrate	  the	  intellectual	  puzzle	  
that	   lies	  at	   the	  heart	  of	   this	   thesis.	   In	  short,	   these	  observations	  are	   the	   following.	  First,	   I	   start	  
from	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   state	   still	   matters,	   normatively	   as	   well	   as	   empirically,	   in	   IR.	  
Second,	  we	   can	  observe	   that	  while	   the	   state	  matters	   for	   IR,	   it	   nevertheless	   remains	   strangely	  
opaque.	  The	  discipline	  does	  not	  agree	  on	  a	  definition	  of	  what	  the	  state	  is;	  nor	  does	  IR	  agree	  on	  
the	   ontological	   status	   of	   the	   state	   or	   on	   how	   to	   go	   about	   making	   and	   validating	   knowledge	  
claims	   regarding	   the	   state.4	  Third,	   building	  on	   this	   assumption,	   it	   seems	   that	   one	  of	   the	  most	  
important	  tasks	  for	  a	  discipline	  whose	  founding	  myth	  is	  so	  profoundly	  tied	  up	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  
the	   state	   is	   to	   question	   its	   most	   important	   concept.	  More	   specifically,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   this	  
thesis,	  one	  way	  of	   imagining	  the	  state,	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	   is	  scrutinised.	   It	   is	  maintained	  that	  
scrutinising	  and	  developing	  ways	  of	  imagining	  the	  state	  offer	  a	  solution	  to	  engage	  with	  both	  the	  
ubiquity	  as	  well	  as	  the	  opacity	  of	  the	  state.	  Fourth,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  strong	  tendency	   in	   IR	  
theory	   to	   personify	   the	   state.	   This	  makes	   the	   connection	   between	   conceptions	   of	   states	   and	  
conceptions	  of	  persons	  an	  important	  candidate	  for	  further	  study.	  Yet,	  imagining	  the	  state	  does	  
happen	   in	   the	   context	   of	   pre-­‐existing	   social	   structure	   which	   needs	   to	   be	   explicitly	  
acknowledged.	  	  
Let	  me	  elaborate	  on	  these	  four	  observations	  briefly	  before	  returning	  to	  them	  in	  more	  detail	   in	  
Chapter	  1.	  	  First,	  we	  can	  observe	  that	  the	  state	  is	  ubiquitous.	  Modern	  social	  and	  political	  theory	  
is	   fundamentally	  shaped	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  same	  can	  be	  said	  about	  much	  of	  
our	  thinking	  about	  world	  politics.	  Put	  simply,	  “over	  the	  last	  five	  centuries	  the	  state	  is	  the	  major	  
political	  reality	  that	  humanity	  has	  constructed.”5	  More	  specifically	  with	  regard	  to	  IR	  theory,	  we	  
can	  observe	  that	  the	  very	  identity	  of	  the	  discipline	  depends	  fundamentally	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  
state.	   The	   discipline,	   understood	   as	   inter-­‐national	   relations,	   rests	   on	   the	   foundational	  
assumption	   that	   the	   state	  matters.	  While	   the	   state	  and	   sovereignty	  are	  highly	   contested,	   and	  
rightly	  so,	  the	  state	  forms	  the	  most	  important	  element	  of	  the	  founding	  myth	  of	  the	  discipline.	  It	  
is	  the	  state	  and	  what	  the	  state	  is	  said	  to	  be	  that	  makes	  IR	  possible.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	   phrase	   “ontological	   status	   of	   the	   state”	   is	   taken	   from	   Erik	   Ringmar,	   'On	   the	  Ontological	   Status	   of	   the	  
State',	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Relations	  2,	  4	  (1996b).	  
5	  Mark	  Neocleous,	   Imagining	  the	  State	   (Maidenhead,	  Berkshire:	  Open	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  2,	  emphasis	   in	  
original.	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Ludwig	  Wittgenstein	  observed	  that	  it	  is	  “the	  first	  step”,	  the	  first	  fundamental	  decision	  about	  the	  
world,	   that	   is	   often	   forgotten	   but	   that	   fundamentally	   shapes	   the	   possibilities	   of	   our	   thinking.	  
Building	  on	  this	  observation,	  Colin	  Wight	  argues	  that	  “the	  first	  step	  for	  IR	  theory,	  and	  one	  upon	  
which	   its	   identity	   might	   be	   said	   to	   depend,	   is	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   ‘state-­‐as-­‐agent’.”6	  And	  
further	  he	  points	  out	   that	   “[w]ithout	  a	  notion	  of	   the	   ‘state-­‐as-­‐agent’,	   the	  distinction	  between	  
political	  theory	  and	  international	  theory	  collapses.”7	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  implication	  here	  
is	  that	  not	  just	  the	  state,	  but	  specifically	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state	  as	  an	  agent,	  is	  a	  fundamental	  first	  
move	  on	  which	  IR	  theorising	  depends.	  It	  follows	  that	  there	  is	  something	  about	  the	  state	  that	  is	  
irreducible	   to	   the	   activities	   of	   individual	   human	  beings.	   Yet,	   everything	  depends	  on	   accepting	  
this	   first	  move.	   Projects	   like	   the	  one	  undertaken	  by	  Wendt	   as	  well	   as	   the	  one	  proposed	  here	  
depend	  fundamentally	  on	  the	  acceptance	  of	  this	  move	  for	  their	  rationale.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  
points	  that	  the	  present	  thesis	  questions.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  this	  process	  stands,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Wendt,	  
the	  rejection	  of	  agency	  of	  the	  state.	  	  
It	   is	  not	  surprising	  then	  that	  IR	  finds	  it	  hard	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  state	  when	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state	  
itself	   is	  part	  of	   its	   founding	  myth.	   In	  addition,	   this	   is	   also	   the	   reason	  why	   it	   seems	   so	  hard	   to	  
question	  some	  of	  the	  underlying	  assumptions	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  states	  in	  IR,	  such	  as	  the	  concept	  
of	  agency	  as	  well	  as	  more	  implicit	  assumptions	  about	  what	  the	  state	  is	  and	  what	  it	  does.	  Lastly,	  
the	  ubiquity	  of	  the	  state	  in	  IR	  not	  only	  leads	  to	  the	  treatment	  of	  the	  state	  as	  an	  agent	  but	  also	  
forms	  the	  corner-­‐stone	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  level	  of	  analysis	  problem.8	  	  
All	  of	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  state	  is	  the	  only	  aspect	  of	  importance	  for	  the	  study	  of	  IR.	  This	  is	  
not	  even	  to	  say	  that	  the	  state	  is,	  empirically,	  still	  the	  most	  important	  driving	  force	  of	  IR.	  I	  agree	  
that	  raising	  questions	  about	  the	  role	  and	  importance	  of	  the	  state	  in	  IR	  is	  crucial.	  For	  the	  purpose	  
of	  this	  thesis,	  however,	  I	  wish	  to	  put	  these	  questions	  “on	  hold”.	  Despite	  the	  clear	  need	  to	  have	  a	  
debate	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  IR,	  it	   is	  still	  uncontroversial	  to	  assume,	  as	  it	   is	  done	  here,	  
that	   the	   state	   matters	   after	   all.	   If	   we	   were	   to	   assume	   something	   else,	   we	   would	   have	   to	  
fundamentally	  question	  the	  discipline	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Colin	   Wight,	   Agents,	   Structures	   and	   International	   Relations:	   Politics	   as	   Ontology	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  2006),	  177.	  
7	  Ibid.	  
8	  J.	  David	  Singer,	  'The	  Level-­‐of-­‐Analysis	  Problem	  in	  International	  Relations',	  World	  Politics	  14,	  1	  (1961).	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Second,	  we	  can	  observe	  that	  even	  when	  we	  accept	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  state	  for	  IR,	  the	  state	  
remains	  opaque	  and	  questions	  of	  how	  to	  conceptualise	  and	  study	  it	  remain	  highly	  contested.	  In	  
a	  first	  step,	  it	  might	  be	  worth	  distinguishing	  between	  reductionist	  and	  non-­‐reductionist	  accounts	  
of	  the	  state.	  We	  can	  find	  numerous	  examples	  in	  IR	  scholarship	  that	  acknowledge	  the	  state	  as	  an	  
important	  element	  in	  making	  sense	  of	  IR	  only	  to	  then	  quickly	  focus	  on	  individual	  human	  beings,	  
state	   leaders,	   or	   diplomats,	   who	   are	   doing	   the	   actual	   thinking,	   acting,	   and,	   for	   a	   small	   but	  
nascent	   part	   of	   the	   discipline,	   feeling.	   Wendt	   is	   especially	   critical	   of	   such	   reductionist	  
approaches.	  When	  analysing	   the	   state	   in	  non-­‐reductionist	   terms,	  however,	  we	  are	   faced	  with	  
the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  conceptualise	  it	  and	  at	  this	  point	  the	  challenge	  of	  opaqueness	  comes	  in.	  
To	   put	   this	   in	   other	   words,	   the	   state	   is	   not	   directly	   observable	   and,	   if	   we	   follow	   a	   non-­‐
reductionist	  approach,	  IR	  scholarship	  needs	  to	  find	  methods	  of	  investigation	  that	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  
a	  positivistic	  tradition.	  Unsurprisingly,	  a	  discipline	  whose	  mainstream	  appears	  to	  be	  tied	  to	  the	  
idea	   that	   to	   be	   scientific	   is	   to	   be	   empiricist	   struggles	   with	   the	   opaqueness	   of	   the	   non-­‐
reductionist	  state.	  	  
Third,	  building	  on	  this,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  state,	  especially	  when	  understood	  as	  one	  entity	  among	  
others,	  needs	   to	  be	   imagined.	  Between	   the	  ubiquity	  and	  opacity	  of	   the	  state,	  ways	  of	  making	  
sense	  of	  the	  state	  need	  to	  be	  found	  and	  the	  assumption	  made	  here	  is	  that	  these	  are	  to	  be	  found	  
in	   ways	   of	   imagining	   it.	   In	   an	   article	   on	   “Symbolism	   in	   Political	   Thought”,	   the	   political	  
philosopher	  Michael	  Walzer	   observes	   that	   the	   “state	   is	   invisible”	   because	   it	   has	   no	   “palpable	  
shape	  or	   substance”.9	  Given	   the	   invisibility	  of	   the	   state	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  and	   the	   tremendous	  
importance	  of	   the	   state	   in	  modern	  politics	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  Walzer	   suggests	   that	   the	   state	  
“must	  be	  personified	  before	  it	  can	  be	  seen,	  symbolized	  before	  it	  can	  be	  loved,	  imagined	  before	  
it	   can	   be	   conceived”.10	  This	   thesis	   makes	   a	   similar	   suggestion.	   However,	   while	   agreeing	   with	  
Walzer,	   it	   also	  maintains	   that	   this	   process	   of	   imagining	   does	   not	   happen	   in	   a	   vacuum	   and	   is	  
enabled	  and	  constrained	  by	  aspects	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐structure.	  	  
Fourth,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  imagining	  the	  state,	  we	  can	  observe	  a	  relatively	  widespread	  tendency	  
for	  personification	  in	  IR.	  Wendt	  with	  his	  statement	  that	  “states	  are	  people,	  too”	  is	  clearly	  one	  of	  
the	   most	   recent	   and	   strongest	   proponents	   of	   this	   tendency.	   But	   a	   general	   trend	   across	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Michael	  Walzer,	  'On	  the	  Role	  of	  Symbolism	  in	  Political	  Thought',	  Political	  Science	  Quarterly	  82,	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10	  Ibid.	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mainstream	  of	  the	  discipline	  can	  be	  identified.	  Observations	  by	  Erik	  Ringmar	  as	  well	  as	  Charles	  
Beitz	  can	  serves	  as	  examples.	  Ringmar	  points	  out	  that	  	  
[a]lthough	   the	   state	   can	   be	   described	   in	   many	   different	   ways,	   when	  
viewed	  from	  the	  outside	  –	  as	  one	  entity	  among	  others	  in	  world	  politics	  
–	   it	   is	   almost	   invariably	   talked	   about	   in	   anthropomorphic	   terms.	   It	   is	  
seen	  as	  an	   ‘actor’	  or	   ‘a	  person’;	   it	   is	   ‘someone’	  or	  a	   ‘subject’	   to	  whom	  
intentions,	  memories,	  rights	  and	  obligations	  are	  attached.11	  
Similarly,	   Beitz	   observes	   that	   “[p]erceptions	   of	   international	   relations	   have	   been	   more	  
thoroughly	  influenced	  by	  the	  analogy	  of	  states	  and	  persons	  than	  by	  any	  other	  device.”12	  While	  
the	  concept	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  clearly	  not	  the	  only	  way	  of	   imagining	  the	  state	   in	   IR,	   it	   is	  
one	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  images.	  This	  prevalence	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  IR	  theory	  
forms	  the	  motivation	  behind	  this	  thesis.	  The	  idea	  then	  calls	  for	  navigating	  between	  agency	  and	  
structure	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   between	   really	   existing	   structures	   and	   language	   and	   social	  
processes	  relating	  to	  these	  structures	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	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  Ringmar,	  'On	  the	  Ontological	  Status	  of	  the	  State',	  443.	  
12	  Charles	   R.	   Beitz,	   Political	   Theory	   and	   International	   Relations	   (Princeton,	   NJ:	   Princeton	   University	   Press,	  
1979),	  69.	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A	  note	  on	  methodology	  and	  terminology	  
This	  thesis	  takes	  Wendt’s	  strong	  statement	  that	  “states	  are	  people,	  too”	  as	  its	  starting	  point.	  A	  
close	  reading	  of	  Wendt	  is	  used	  to	  generate	  key	  questions	  with	  regard	  to	  how	  to	  conceptualise	  
states	  as	  persons.	  The	  two	  key	  questions	  emerging	  from	  this	  critical	  engagement	  with	  Wendt’s	  
writings	  are	  the	  following.	  First,	  what	  role	  do	  metaphors	  play	  in	  generating	  an	  understanding	  of	  
abstract	  entities	  and	  concepts,	  and	  how,	  to	  paraphrase	  Patrick	  T.	  Jackson,	  do	  these	  metaphors	  
function	  in	  relating	  mind	  and	  world	  to	  each	  other?13	  Second,	  what	  can	  psychology	  tell	  us	  about	  
how	  people	  create	  an	  understanding	  of	  themselves,	  and	  how	  can	  we	  make	  these	  findings	  useful	  
for	   IR?	  These	   two	  questions	  are	  answered	  with	   the	  help	  of	   a	   literature-­‐based	   investigation	  of	  
the	   philosophy	   of	   science	   of	  metaphors	   and	  with	   a	   critical	   examination	   of	   potentially	   fruitful	  
contributions	  of	  psychology	  to	  IR	  and	  the	  study	  of	  the	  state.	  The	  first	  line	  of	  investigation	  leads	  
to	   the	   suggestion	   to	   look	   towards	   conceptual	   metaphor	   theory;	   the	   second	   concludes	   that	  
constructionist	  psychology	  is	  the	  most	  useful	  candidate	  for	  the	  aims	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  
With	  regard	  to	  both	  conceptual	  metaphor	  theory	  and	  constructionist	  psychology,	  it	  is	  important	  
to	   note	   that	   this	   thesis	   aims	   at	   making	   a	   contribution	   to	   IR	   theory,	   especially	   constructivist	  
scholarship,	  and	  hence	  is	  written	  with	  an	  IR	  audience	  in	  mind.	  Therefore,	  the	  approach	  towards	  
the	  relevant	  literature	  is	  guided	  by	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  project	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  
Ultimately,	  the	  findings	  generated	  from	  the	   literature	  on	  the	  role	  of	  metaphors	   in	  science	  and	  
constructionist	  psychology,	  and	  here	  especially	  Rom	  Harré’s	  writings,	  are	  brought	  into	  dialogue	  
with	  IR	  conceptualisations	  of	  states	  and	  the	  international	  system.	  	  
This	   cross-­‐disciplinary	   approach	   also	   calls	   for	   a	   note	   on	   terminology.	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	  
thesis,	   it	  will	  be	  important	  to	  use	  the	  terms	  constructionism	  and	  constructivism	  alongside	  each	  
other.	  Although	  there	  are	  great	  similarities	  between	  the	  two,	  it	  will	  be	  important	  to	  uphold	  the	  
distinction.	  	  	  
The	  difference	   in	  terminology	  simply	  reflects	  disciplinary	  differences.	  The	  term	  constructivism,	  
on	  the	  one	  hand,	  is	  firmly	  embedded	  in	  IR	  literature.	  Its	  introduction	  into	  IR	  is	  often	  traced	  back	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Patrick	   Thaddeus	   Jackson,	  The	   Conduct	   of	   Inquiry	   in	   International	   Relations:	   Philosophy	   of	   Science	   and	   Its	  
Implications	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  World	  Politics	  (London	  and	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2011).	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to	  Nicholas	  Onuf’s	  World	  of	  our	  Making.14	  Constructionism,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  the	  term	  more	  
prevalent	   in	  sociology	  and	  the	  sociology	  of	  knowledge	  with	  the	  seminal	  publication	  of	  Peter	  L.	  
Berger	  and	  Thomas	  Luckmann	  ‒	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  Reality	  ‒	  credited	  as	  the	  first	  widely	  
read	  publication	  in	  this	  area.	  	  	  
More	   importantly,	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   kind	   of	   psychological	   literature	   on	  which	   I	   am	  drawing,	  
constructionism	  is	  the	  preferred	  term	  to	  highlight	  a	  new	  turn	  in	  the	  discipline	  that	  is	  critical	  of	  
the	   mainstream	   and	   stresses	   the	   role	   of	   language	   and	   the	   social	   constructedness	   of	   key	  
psychology	  phenomena.15	  Hence,	   in	   the	   first	   instance,	   the	  usage	  of	   the	   two	  terms	  reflects	   the	  
fact	   that	   this	   thesis	  draws	  on	   two	  different	  disciplines	   that	  have	  both	  experienced	  a	   linguistic	  
turn.	  	  	  
Moreover,	  the	  difference	  in	  terminology	  can	  also	  be	  taken	  to	  reflect	  differences	  in	  philosophy	  of	  
science	   positions.	   The	   term	   constructivism	   in	   IR	   is	   a	   catch-­‐all	   phrase	   for	   a	   wide	   range	   of	  
approaches	  whereas	  constructionist	  psychology	  is	  to	  be	  located	  towards	  what	  Wendt	  would	  call	  
a	  thick	  constructivism	  that	  is	  far	  more	  radical	  than	  the	  moderate	  constructivism	  he	  subscribes	  to	  
in	   Social	   Theory.16	  These	   are	   important	   differences	   that	   need	   to	   be	   carefully	   scrutinized	   if	  
borrowing	  between	  disciplines	  is	  to	  be	  useful.	  Hence,	  upholding	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  
on	  the	  level	  of	  terminology	  is	  crucial.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  In	  their	  introductory	  textbook	  Robert	  Jackson	  and	  Georg	  Sørensen	  go	  as	  far	  as	  saying	  that	  Onuf	  coined	  the	  
term.	   This	   is	   a	   controversial	   claim	   given	   its	   much	   longer	   history	   in	   the	   sociology	   of	   knowledge.	   Robert	   H.	  
Jackson	  and	  George	  Sørensen,	  Introduction	  to	  International	  Relations	  Theories	  and	  Approaches,	  3	  ed.	  (Oxford:	  
Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  168.	  Karin	  Fierke	  credits	  Onuf	  for	  introducing	  the	  term	  “constructivism”	  into	  IR.	  
Karin	  M.	   Fierke,	   'Constructivism',	   in	   International	   Relations	   Theories.	   Discipline	   and	  Diversity,	   ed.	   Tim	  Dunn,	  
Milja	  Helena	  Kurki,	  and	  Steve	  Smith	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  172.	  
15	  For	  an	  introduction	  compare	  Vivien	  Burr,	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Social	  Constructionism	  (London	  and	  New	  York:	  
Routledge,	  1995).	  
16 	  For	   Wendt’s	   self	   description	   as	   a	   moderate	   or	   thin	   constructivist	   compare	   Wendt,	   Social	   Theory	   of	  
International	  Politics,	  1-­‐2.	  




The	   seven	   chapters	   of	   this	   thesis	   represent	   three	   steps	   towards	   developing	   the	   constructed	  
state-­‐as-­‐person.	   Ultimately,	   based	   on	   a	   critique	   of	   Wendt,	   the	   alternative	   conception	   of	   the	  
constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   proposed	   which	   treats	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   as	   a	   metaphor	   and	  
makes	   insights	   from	   constructionist	   psychology	   regarding	   the	   construction	   of	   selves	   and	  
emotions	  central	  to	  conceptions	  of	  the	  state	  in	  IR.	  	  	  
Chapters	   1	   and	   2	   situate	   this	   thesis	   and	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   in	   the	   IR	   literature.	  
Whereas	  Chapter	  1	  gives	  a	  general	  overview	  based	  on	   four	  observations	  on	  the	  state	  and	  the	  
historical	   relation	  between	   concepts	   of	   states	   and	   concepts	   of	   persons,	   Chapter	   2	   focuses	   on	  
Wendt’s	  work	  on	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	   in	  particular.	  Both	  chapters	  aim	  at	  generating	  a	  position	  
from	  which	   to	   develop	   an	   alternative	   to	  Wendt’s	   approach	  by	   teasing	   out	   key	   questions	   that	  
need	  to	  be	  addressed	  when	  investigating	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  	  
Chapters	  3	  and	  4	  form	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  thesis	  and	  introduce	  conceptual	  metaphor	  theory	  
and	  constructionist	  psychology,	  respectively.	  Both	  elements	  are	  seen	  as	  necessary	  additions	  to	  
the	  idea	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  given	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  discussion	  in	  the	  first	  part	  
of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  introduction	  of	  conceptual	  metaphor	  theory	  in	  Chapter	  3	  aims	  at	  providing	  an	  
avenue	  that	  takes	  the	  need	  to	  imagine	  the	  state	  seriously	  but	  that	  also	  provides	  a	  position	  from	  
which	   to	   answer	   sceptics,	   such	   as	  Wendt,	  who	  are	   critical	   of	  as-­‐if	  approaches,	   reserve	  only	   a	  
rhetorical	  function	  for	  metaphors,	  and	  mark	  them	  as	  unscientific.	  Constructionist	  psychology	  is	  
introduced	  in	  chapter	  four	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  providing	  an	  alternative	  conception	  of	  persons,	  self,	  
and	  emotions.	  Further,	  Chapter	  4	  contributes	  to	  the	  nascent	  emotional	  turn	  in	  IR	  by	  offering	  a	  
critique	  of	  mainstream	  approaches	  in	  psychology	  that	  are	  rooted	  in	  a	  positivistic	  understanding	  
of	   science	   in	   general	   and	   human	   beings	   in	   particular	   and	   suggesting	   avenues	   for	   fruitful	  
incorporation	  of	  findings	  from	  psychology	  into	  IR’s	  research	  programme.	  	  
The	  third	  and	  last	  part	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  devoted	  to	  fleshing	  out	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐
as-­‐person.	  Chapter	  5	  draws	  on	  constructionist	  psychology	  to	  open	  up	  an	  argument	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  
more	  radically	  constructed	  notion	  of	  persons.	  Self	  and	  emotions	  are	  seen	  as	  socially	  constructed	  
and	  firmly	  based	  in	  language	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  material	  world	  of	  the	  body.	  Here,	  the	  argument	  
is	   put	   forward	   that	   self	   and	   emotions	   form	   part	   of	   a	  meaningful	   story	   that	  makes	   the	  world	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intelligible	  to	  us.	  Emotions,	  constructed	   in	  this	  way,	  also	   imply	   judgements	  of	  appropriateness	  
and	  express	  and	  create	  moral	  guidelines.	  Yet,	  it	  is	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  state	  only	  becomes	  what	  
I	  call	  a	  second-­‐order	  person	  because	  it	  lacks	  embodiment.	  	  
Chapter	   6	   brings	   these	   assumptions	   into	   closer	   contact	   with	   IR	   scholarship	   on	   the	   state	   and	  
articulates	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	   A	   process	   of	   metaphorical	   mapping	  
between	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐structure	  and	  elements	  of	  person-­‐oriented	  discourse	  is	  fleshed	  out.	   	  This	  
allows	   me	   to	   stress	   the	   point	   that	   the	   state	   is	   a	   really	   existing	   structure	   while	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
person	   is	   to	   be	   located	   the	   level	   of	   linguistic	   realism.	   Further,	   Chapter	   6	   relates	   the	   idea	   of	  
scientific	  metaphors,	  and	  the	  commitment	  to	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  selves	  and	  emotions	  put	  
forward	  by	  constructionist	  psychology	  –	  with	  key	  IR	  literature.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  chapter	  stresses	  
the	   departure	   from	  Wendt’s	   approach	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   and	   the	   contribution	   to	   key	   IR	  
literature.	  	  
Chapter	  7	  takes	  the	   idea	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  and	  uses	   it	  to	  debate	  some	  of	  the	  
hard	   questions	   raised	   by	  Wendt’s	   approach	   and	   larger	   disciplinary	   debates.	   It	   addresses	   the	  
disciplinary	  divide	  between	  those	  scholars	  that	  are	  committed	  to	  investigating	  the	  real	  existence	  
of	   the	  state	  and	   those	  scholars	   that	   focus	  on	   language	  and	  social	  practices	  by	  suggesting	   that	  
both	  need	  to	  be	  put	  in	  focus	  when	  dealing	  with	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  Chapter	  7	  also	  articulates	  
and	   illustrates	   a	   clear	   position	  within	   the	   agent-­‐structure	   debate.	   Lastly,	   it	  makes	   suggestion	  
towards	  understanding	   international	   systemic	  change	   from	  the	  perspective	  of	   the	  constructed	  
state-­‐as-­‐person.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  not	  “anarchy	  is	  what	  state	  make	  of	  it”	  but	  “anarchy	  is	  what	  
we	  make	  of	  it.”17	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 	  Alexander	   Wendt,	   'Anarchy	   Is	   What	   States	   Make	   of	   It:	   The	   Social	   Construction	   of	   Power	   Politics',	  
International	  Organization	  46	  (1992).	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Chapter	  1:	  The	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	  in	  IR	  theory	  
Although	   the	   state	   can	   be	   described	   in	   many	   different	   ways,	   when	  
viewed	  from	  the	  outside	  –	  as	  one	  entity	  among	  others	  in	  world	  politics	  
–	   it	   is	   almost	   invariably	   talked	   about	   in	   anthropomorphic	   terms.	   It	   is	  
seen	  as	  an	   ‘actor’	  or	   ‘a	  person’;	   it	   is	   ‘someone’	  or	  a	   ‘subject’	   to	  whom	  
intentions,	  memories,	  rights	  and	  obligations	  are	  attached.1	  
The	  state	  remains	  undoubtedly	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  players	  in	  international	  relations	  and	  
the	  main	  focus	  of	  many	  IR	  theories.	  Yet,	  there	  is	  something	  about	  the	  state	  that	  makes	  it	  hard	  to	  
grasp.	  Quentin	  Skinner	  describes	  this	  problem	  as	  “the	  extraordinary	  elusiveness	  of	  the	  concept,	  
the	  difficulty	  of	  identifying	  the	  state	  with	  anyone	  or	  anything	  in	  particular”.2	  	  	  
Further,	  we	  can	  easily	  detect	  a	  prevalent	  assumption	  within	  IR	  theory	  that	  the	  state	  is	  or	  can	  be	  
treated	   like	   a	   person.	   This	   contention	   finds	   support	   in	   Charles	   Beitz’s	   observation	   that	  
“[p]erceptions	  of	   international	  relations	  have	  been	  more	  thoroughly	  influenced	  by	  the	  analogy	  
of	  states	  and	  persons	  than	  by	  any	  other	  device.”3	  Similarly,	  as	  we	  see	  in	  the	  opening	  quotation,	  
Erik	  Ringmar	   stresses	   that	   IR	   as	   a	  discipline,	  with	   its	   focus	  on	  an	   “outside”	  perspective	  of	   the	  
state,	  has	  a	  tendency	  to	  conceptualise	  it	  in	  anthropomorphic	  terms.	  
Using	   these	   observations	   as	   a	   starting	   point	   for	   this	   thesis,	   it	   will	   be	   important	   to	   carefully	  
analyse	   what	   statements	   such	   as	   these	   entail.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   also	   keep	   in	   mind	   that	   any	  
observation	   on	   the	   state	   and	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   wrapped	   up	   in	   much	   larger	   points	   of	  
contention	  that	  the	  discipline	  continues	  to	  grapple	  with.	  One	  such	  point	  of	  contention	  is	  the	  role	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Ringmar,	  'On	  the	  Ontological	  Status	  of	  the	  State',	  443.	  
2	  Quentin	  Skinner	  and	  Bo	  Stråth,	  'Introduction',	  in	  States	  and	  Citizens.	  History,	  Theory,	  Prospects,	  ed.	  Quentin	  
Skinner	  and	  Bo	  Stråth	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003b),	  3.	  
3	  Beitz,	  Political	  Theory	  and	  International	  Relations,	  69.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  that	  Beitz	  ultimately	  rejects	  the	  
analogy	  between	  people	  and	  states	  on	  the	  descriptive	  and	  the	  prescriptive	  level.	  For	  this	  observation	  compare	  
also	  Chiara	  Bottici,	  Men	  and	  States.	  Rethinking	  the	  Domestic	  Analogy	  in	  a	  Global	  Age	  (Houndmills,	  Basingstoke:	  
Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2009),	  88.	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of	  language	  and	  the	  question	  whether	  language	  is	  merely	  descriptive	  or	  also	  constitutive	  of	  the	  
key	  “entities”	  of	  the	  discipline.	  A	  further	  question	  concerns	  ontology	  and	  the	  quest	  for	  criteria	  
that	   allow	   us	   to	   conclude	   that	   something	   can	   be	   said	   to	   exist.	   Related	   to	   that	   is	   the	  
disagreement	  over	  the	  question	  whether	  it	   is	  only	  individual	  human	  beings	  that	  can	  be	  said	  to	  
really	   exist	   and	   that	   should	  ultimately	   concern	  us.	  A	   final	  preliminary	  point	  worth	  mentioning	  
here	   centres	   on	   the	   question	   of	   moral	   agency	   and	   whether	   it	   is	   to	   be	   located	   solely	   with	  
individual	  human	  beings	  or	  whether	  it	  should	  be	  extended	  to	  groups	  and	  the	  state.	  	  
To	   illustrate	   these	   points	   of	   contention	   briefly,	   it	   can	   be	   pointed	   out	   that	   some	   scholars	  
maintain	  that	  the	  state	  does	  not	  really	  exist;	  for	  them,	  it	  is	  an	  abstract	  construct	  of	  our	  mind,	  an	  
imagined	  entity.4	  Only	  people	  can	  be	  said	  to	  really	  exist	  and	   it	   is	  only	  people	  that	  really	   think,	  
feel	  and	  act.5	  Understanding	  states	  as	  persons	  merely	  results	  from	  a	  sloppy	  use	  of	  language	  and	  
is	  ultimately	  a	  fallacy.6	  This	  group	  of	  scholars	  is	  committed	  to	  ontological	  individualism.7	  Others,	  
such	  as	  Colin	  Wight,	  argue	  that	  states	  exist	  but	  that	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  does	  not	  have	  the	  same	  
ontological	  status.8	  In	  contrast,	  Alexander	  Wendt	  boldly	  states	  that	  “states	  are	  people	  too”.9	  Not	  
only	  does	  the	  state	  exist,	  	  it	  is	  also	  a	  person.	  Emphasising	  cognitive	  aspects	  of	  treating	  states	  as	  
persons,	  thereby	  switching	  the	  focus	  to	  epistemology,	  is	  another	  approach	  to	  the	  debate.	  From	  
this	   perspective,	   the	   argument	   is	   “that	   the	   international	   context	   provides	   an	   apparent	  
environment	   for	   the	   individual	   experiencing	   of	   the	   state	   as	   a	   distinctive	   unitary	   and	   cohesive	  
actor	  with	  its	  own	  intentionality	  and	  personhood”.10	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  state	  depends	  on	  the	  
mental	  constructions	  people	  form	  and	  hold	  of	  the	  state.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	   term	   imagined	   entity	   is	   used	   in	   imitation	   of	   Benedict	   Anderson’s	   imagined	   communities.	   Benedict	  
Anderson,	  Imagined	  Communities.	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Origin	  and	  Spread	  of	  Nationalism	  (London	  and	  New	  York:	  
Verso,	  2006	  [1983]),	  6.	  It	  should	  be	  added	  that	  Anderson	  is	  actually	  concerned	  with	  the	  nation,	  not	  the	  state	  
and	  that	  he	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  the	  ontological	  status	  of	  nations	  or	  individual	  human	  beings.	  	  
5	  See	  for	  example	  Robert	  G.	  Gilpin’s	  response	  to	  Richard	  K.	  Ashley’s	  critique	  of	  (neo-­‐)realism.	  Robert	  G.	  Gilpin,	  
'The	  Richness	  of	  the	  Tradition	  of	  Political	  Realism',	  in	  Neorealism	  and	  Its	  Critics,	  ed.	  Robert	  O.	  Keohane	  (New	  
York	   Columbia	   University	   Press,	   1986	   [1984]),	   esp.	   318.	   For	   Ashley’s	   critique	   see	   Richard	   K.	   Ashley,	   'The	  
Poverty	  of	  Neorealism',	   in	  Neorealism	  and	   Its	  Critics,	  ed.	  Robert	  O.	  Keohane	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  
Press,	  1986	  [1984]).	  
6	  Robert	  G.	  Gilpin,	  'The	  Richness	  of	  the	  Tradition	  of	  Political	  Realism',	  in	  Neorealism	  and	  Its	  Critics,	  ed.	  Robert	  
O.	  Keohane	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1986),	  318.	  
7	  Wight,	  Agents,	  Structures	  and	  International	  Relations:	  Politics	  as	  Ontology,	  62-­‐68.	  
8	  Ibid.,	  	  188.	  
9	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  215.	  	  
10	  Alisher	  Faizullaev,	  'Individual	  Experiencing	  of	  States',	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies	  33,	  3	  (2007),	  531.	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Finally,	   others,	   such	   as	   Toni	   Erskine,	   warn	   that	   while	   IR,	   especially	   in	   the	   political	   realist	  
tradition,	  has	  a	   tendency	   to	  understand	   states	  as	  persons,	   the	   result	   is	   a	   strangely	   “inhuman,	  
amoral	  incarnation”	  of	  a	  person	  devoid	  of	  moral	  agency	  commonly	  and	  crucially	  associated	  with	  
the	   personhood	   of	   individual	   human	   beings.11	  This	   is	   a	   useful	   reminder	   that	   even	   though	  we	  
might	  accept	  that	  the	  state	  is	  an	  agent	  in	  IR	  theory,	  the	  question	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  agent	  the	  state	  
is	  remains	  up	  for	  debate.	  	  
These	   lines	   of	   contention	   and	   their	   respective	   examples	   illustrate	   a	   maze	   of	   different	  
approaches	   to	   the	   state	   and	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   based	   on	   a	   diversity	   of	   aims	   pursued	  when	  
engaging	   the	   idea	   and	   diverse	   and	   sometimes	   seemingly	   incommensurable	   ontological	   and	  
epistemological	  positions.12	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  this,	  this	  chapter	  sets	  the	  scene	  for	  the	  engagement	  
with	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	   Before	   looking	   more	   closely	   into	   Wendt’s	   approach	   in	  
Chapter	  2,	  this	  chapter	  aims	  at	  illustrating	  what	  it	  is	  that	  makes	  the	  state	  so	  fundamental	  to	  the	  
study	   of	   international	   relations	   and	   what	   is	   at	   stake	   in	   the	   debate	   on	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	  
Further,	  based	  on	  an	  engagement	  with	   IR’s	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate,	  Chapter	  1	   concludes	  with	  
preliminary	  suggestions	  towards	  an	  alternative	  conception	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  IR	  that	  is	  to	  
be	  developed	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
First,	   Chapter	   1	   further	   elaborates	   the	   four	   observations	   on	   the	   state	   touched	   upon	   in	   the	  
introduction.	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   state	   in	   IR	   theory	   is	  ubiquitous,	   yet	   strangely	  opaque.	  From	   the	  
perspective	   taken	   in	   this	   thesis	   this	   leads	   to	   a	   need	   to	   imagine	   the	   state.	   The	   lack	   of	   direct	  
observability	  suggests	  the	  need	  to	  conceptualise	  the	  state	  in	  terms	  of	  something	  else.	  In	  IR,	  we	  
find	   a	   prevalence	   to	   think	   of	   states	   in	   terms	   of	   persons.	   Following	   this	   line	   of	   argument,	   a	  
particular	   angle	   is	   developed	  which	   gives	   a	   first	   indication	  of	  where	   to	   locate	   the	   idea	  of	   the	  
constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  developed	   in	   this	   thesis.	   In	  a	   second	  step,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  point	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Toni	  Erskine,	  'Assigning	  Responsibilities	  to	  Institutional	  Moral	  Agents:	  The	  Case	  of	  States	  and	  Quasi-­‐States',	  
Ethics	   &	   International	   Affairs	   15,	   2	   (2001),	   67,	   emphasis	   in	   original.	   Compare	   also	   Toni	   Erskine,	   'Locating	  
Responsibility:	   The	   Problem	   of	   Moral	   Agency	   in	   International	   Relations',	   in	   The	   Oxford	   Handbook	   of	  
International	  Relations,	   ed.	  Chris	  Reus-­‐Smit	  and	  Duncan	  Snidal	   (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  702-­‐
703.	  
12	  I	   use	   the	   term	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   very	   loosely	   here.	   However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   keep	   in	   mind	   that	   key	  
theoretical	  distinctions	  such	  as	  the	  one	  between	  agency	  and	  personhood	  should	  not	  be	  glossed	  over.	  	  Wendt	  
seems	  to	  do	  just	  this	  in	  Social	  Theory,	  in	  which	  one	  cannot	  find	  any	  explicit	  distinction	  between	  what	  it	  means	  
to	  be	  a	  person	  and	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  an	  agent.	  For	  an	  explicit	  treatment	  of	  this,	  see	  Wendt,	   'The	  State	  as	  
Person	   in	   International	   Theory',	   289,	   fn	   1.	   For	   a	   critique	   see	   Wight,	   Agents,	   Structures	   and	   International	  
Relations:	  Politics	  as	  Ontology,	  chapter	  five,	  esp.	  180	  and	  188.	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out	  that	  modern	  concepts	  of	  states	  and	  modern	  concepts	  of	  persons	  have	  developed	  together;	  
following	  Ringmar’s	  observations,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  both	  grew	  up	  together.13	  Further,	  building	  on	  
scholars	  such	  as	  Skinner,	  we	  can	  observe	  a	  process	  of	  increasing	  abstraction	  from	  identifying	  the	  
state	   with	   the	   person	   of	   the	   king	   to	   a	   position,	   emerging	   in	   the	   late	   sixteenth	   and	   early	  
seventeenth	   centuries,	   that	   interprets	   the	   state	   as	   a	   person	   that	   is	   neither	   identical	  with	   the	  
ruler	   nor	   the	   subjects	   of	   the	   state.	   This	   step	   is	   not	   intended	   to	   make	   a	   judgement	   on	   the	  
question	  whether	  the	  state	  indeed	  is	  a	  person.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  used	  to	  illustrate	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	  draws	  on	  a	   long	  history	  of	  an	   intimate	  connection	  between	  the	  two	  concepts.	  
From	  this	  perspective,	  IR’s	  tendency	  to	  personify	  the	  state	  is	  not	  necessarily	  justified	  but	  seems	  
more	  understandable	  and	   indeed	   in	   line	  with	  a	   tradition	  beginning	  with	  Thomas	  Hobbes.	  Yet,	  
while	   these	  observations	  can	  help	   to	  highlight	   the	  underpinnings	  of	   IR’s	   tendency	   to	   resort	   to	  
some	   form	   of	   personification	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   state,	   they	   are	   not	   suitable	   to	   make	   a	  
judgement	  on	  the	  ontological	  status	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.14	  In	  a	  third	  step,	  this	  
chapter	  introduces	  the	  main	  trajectories	  of	  the	  recent	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate	  in	  IR.	  The	  above-­‐
mentioned	   ontological	   status	   of	   the	   state	   is	   one	   key	   point	   in	   the	   debate.	   And	   while	   Wendt	  
skilfully	   re-­‐ignited	   the	   debate	   with	   his	   strong	   statement	   that	   “states	   are	   people	   too”,	   the	  
responses	  to	  his	  claim	  are	  extremely	  varied	  and	  the	  different	  positions	  need	  to	  be	  highlighted.	  	  
The	  three	   final	  parts	  of	   the	  chapter	  aim	  to	   further	   illustrate	   the	   line	  of	   inquiry	   that	   this	   thesis	  
follows	  with	   regard	   to	  working	   towards	  what	   I	   call	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	   First,	   the	  
position	   taken	   in	   this	   thesis	   towards	   the	   role	   of	   language,	   specifically	   metaphors,	   in	   making	  
sense	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  briefly	  outlined.	  Second,	  in	  line	  with	  suggestions	  by	  
Patrick	   T.	   Jackson,	   I	   draw	   on	   Hobbes’s	   concept	   of	   personation	   to	   illustrate	   how	   the	   relation	  
between	  concepts	  of	  persons	  and	  concepts	  of	  states	  can	  be	  usefully	  re-­‐interpreted	  for	  the	  idea	  
of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  In	  a	  final	  move,	  I	  highlight	  that	  IR’s	  personified	  state,	  in	  its	  current	  form,	  
is	   a	   strange	   kind	   of	   person	   in	   so	   far	   as	   it	   lacks	  what	   can	   be	   called	   psychological	   personhood,	  
understood	  as	  a	  subjective,	  emotional	  experience	  of	   the	  world.	  This	   is	   identified	  as	  a	  gap	  that	  
this	  thesis	  aims	  to	  close.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Ringmar,	   'On	   the	  Ontological	   Status	   of	   the	   State',	   444.	   And	   Erik	   Ringmar,	   Identity,	   Interest	   and	   Action.	   A	  
Cultural	  Explanation	  of	  Sweden's	  Intervention	  in	  the	  Thirty	  Years	  War	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  
1996a),	  44-­‐65.	  	  
14	  I	  take	  the	  term	  “ontological	  status	  of	  the	  state”	  from	  Ringmar.	  Compare	  Ringmar,	  'On	  the	  Ontological	  Status	  
of	  the	  State'.	  For	  Wendt’s	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  compare	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  215ff.	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Four	  observations	  on	  the	  state	  in	  IR	  
Jens	   Bartelson	   points	   out	   that	   “questioning	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   state	   is	   tantamount	   to	  
questioning	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   international	   domain	   itself	   as	   well	   as	   that	   of	   International	  
Relations.”15	  It	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  for	  the	  mainstream	  of	  the	  discipline	  the	  state	  is	  simply	  a	  given;	  
the	   state	   exists	   before	   and	   is	   constitutive	   of	   the	   discipline.16	  If	   we	   accept	   the	   view	   that	   the	  
international	  domain,	  and	  hence	  the	  discipline	  of	  IR,	  has	  been	  defined	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  state,	  it	  
follows	  that	  to	  contest	  the	  state	  is	  to	  contest	  the	  discipline.17	  
Similarly,	   taking	   the	  step	   from	  asserting	   the	  centrality	  of	   the	  state	   to	  arguing	   the	  centrality	  of	  
the	   state	   as	   an	   actor,	   Colin	   Wight	   points	   out	   that	   ascribing	   agency	   to	   the	   state	   is	   the	   first	  
fundamental	  move	  made	   by	   the	   discipline.	   Invoking	   Ludwig	  Wittgenstein,	   he	   argues	   that	   this	  
move	  is	  so	  fundamental	  that	  it	  escapes	  our	  attention	  for	  the	  most	  part.18	  Exemplary	  of	  this	  view	  
and	   the	   apparent	   givenness	   that	   is	   ascribed	   to	   the	   state,	  we	  might	   quote	   J.	   D.	   B.	  Miller	  who	  
argues	   that	   “[s]tates	   are	   the	   principal	   actors	   in	   world	   politics.	   It	   is	   of	   them	   and	   of	   other	  
corporate	  bodies,	  rather	  than	  of	  individual	  persons,	  that	  the	  world	  is	  made.”19	  
Taking	   a	   broader	   view,	  we	   can	   observe	   that	  modern	   thinking	   in	   general	   is	   dominated	   by	   the	  
state	   as	   a	   concept	   and	   that	   the	   state	   serves	   as	   a	   key	   point	   in	   relation	   to	   which	   others	   are	  
defined.	   Skinner	  points	  out	   that	   “by	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	   seventeenth	  century	   the	  concept	  of	  
the	   State	   had	   come	   to	   be	   regarded	   as	   the	   most	   important	   object	   of	   analysis	   in	   European	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 	  Jens	   Bartelson,	   'Second	   Natures:	   Is	   the	   State	   Identical	   with	   Itself',	   European	   Journal	   of	   International	  
Relations	  4,	  3	  (1998),	  295-­‐296.	  
16	  Compare	  also	  ibid.,	  	  298-­‐299.	  Obviously,	  this	  move	  might	  also	  be	  made	  for	  entirely	  practical	  reasons.	  This	  is	  
the	  point	  of	  view	  taken	  by	  Wendt.	  In	  Social	  Theory	  he	  maintains	  that	  the	  state	  is	  taken	  as	  a	  given	  but	  that	  this	  
is	  a	  pragmatic	  decision	  guided	  by	  the	  demands	  of	  his	  specific	  research	  question.	  On	  the	  need	  to	  take	  certain	  
elements	  of	  a	  research	  project	  as	  a	  given	  see	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  36.	  And	  on	  taking	  
the	  state	  as	  a	  given,	  see	  ibid.,	  	  198.	  
17	  However,	  critical	  scholars	  such	  as	   Immanuel	  Wallerstein	  remind	  us	   that	  “analysing	  the	  nation	  state	  as	   if	   it	  
were	  the	  locus	  and	  level	  at	  which	  problems	  are	  both	  generated	  and	  solved	  is	  to	  accept	  an	  ideological	  account	  
of	  it,	  to	  analyse	  appearance,	  not	  reality.”	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  state	  for	  the	  discipline	  can,	  from	  
Wallerstein’s	  perspective,	  be	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  an	  ideology	  of	  IR.	  It	  is	  a	  useful	  reminder	  that	  neither	  the	  state	  nor	  
its	  centrality	  are	  natural.	  Roger	  Dale,	  'Nation	  State	  and	  International	  System:	  The	  World-­‐System	  Perspective',	  
in	   The	   Idea	   of	   the	  Modern	   State,	   ed.	   Gregor	  McLennan,	   David	   Held,	   and	   Stuart	   Hall	   (Milton	   Keynes:	   Open	  
University	  Press,	  1984),	  183.	  	  	  
18	  Wight,	  Agents,	  Structures	  and	  International	  Relations:	  Politics	  as	  Ontology,	  177.	  
19	  J.D.B.	  Miller,	  The	  World	  of	  States.	  Connected	  Essays	  (London:	  Croom	  Helm,	  1981),	  16.	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political	  thought.”20	  Indeed,	  one	  does	  not	  need	  to	  look	  far	  to	  find	  the	  observation	  that	  the	  state	  
is	  the	  most	  dominant	  feature	  in	  social	  and	  political	  theory.21	  Mark	  Neocleus,	  for	  example,	  argues	  
that	  	  
[t]he	   axiom,	  which	   constitutes	   the	   core	   feature	   of	   the	   statist	   political	  
imaginary,	  has	  become	  so	  predominant	  a	  part	  of	  modernity	  that	  much	  
of	  how	  we	  think	  is	  shaped	  by	  it.	  Every	  historian	  and	  theorist	  of	  the	  state	  
has	  for	  some	  time	  now	  emphasized	  that	  over	  the	  last	  five	  centuries	  the	  
state	  is	  the	  major	  political	  reality	  that	  humanity	  has	  constructed.22	  
Mirroring	  this,	  David	  Held	  observes	  that	  “[t]here	  is	  nothing	  more	  central	  to	  political	  and	  social	  
theory	  than	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  state,	  and	  nothing	  more	  contested.”23	  To	  give	  another	  example,	  in	  
his	   famous	  “Why	   there	   is	  no	   international	   theory?,”	  Martin	  Wight	  argues	   that	  political	   theory	  
and	  international	  theory	  are	  both	  chiefly	  concerned	  with	  the	  state	  and	  their	  realm	  of	  interest	  is	  
defined	   in	   relation	   to	   it.24	  Political	   theory,	   according	   to	  him,	   can	  be	  described	   as	   “speculation	  
about	  the	  state”;	  international	  theory	  is	  engaged	  in	  “speculation	  about	  the	  society	  of	  states,	  or	  
the	  family	  of	  nations,	  or	  the	  international	  community”.25	  	  
Unsurprisingly,	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  state	  is	  critically	  debated.	  It	  is	  often	  pointed	  out	  that	  while,	  
as	   Neocleus	   rightly	   observes,	   the	   state	   has	   been	   a	   constant	   and	   central	   element	   of	  
understanding	   the	   social	   and	   political	   realm	   in	   modernity,	   this	   is	   neither	   a	   given	   nor	   an	  
unchanging	  fact.	  The	  move	  to	  post-­‐modernity,	  for	  example,	  includes	  a	  fierce	  questioning	  of	  the	  
relevance	  of	  the	  concept	  for	  theoretical	  endeavours	  and	  attempts	  to	  overcome	  its	  dominance	  in	  
shaping	  politics.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Quentin	  Skinner,	  The	  Foundations	  of	  Modern	  Political	  Thought.	  Vol	  2.	  The	  Age	  of	  Reformation	   (Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1978),	  349.	  
21	  Mark	  Neocleus	  argues	  that	  the	  image	  of	  the	  state	  is	  dominant	  in	  both	  social	  and	  political	  theory.	  	  Neocleous,	  
Imagining	   the	   State,	   2.	  We	  might	   also	   add	   that	   the	   state	   becomes	   the	   element	   in	   relation	   to	   which	   other	  
concepts,	  such	  as	  citizenship,	  are	  defined.	  Gianfranco	  Poggi	  for	  example	  asks	  “[w]hat	  do	  citizens	  (as	   it	  were)	  
look	  like	  when	  viewed	  from	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  the	  state?	  In	  other	  words,	  how	  people	  construct	  themselves	  
or	  are	  constructed	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  state.”	  Gianfranco	  Poggi,	  'Citizens	  and	  the	  State:	  Retrospect	  and	  Prospect',	  
in	  States	  and	  Citizens.	  History,	  Theory,	  Prospects,	  ed.	  Quentin	  Skinner	  and	  Bo	  Stråth	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  2003),	  39.	  
22	  Neocleous,	  Imagining	  the	  State,	  2,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
23	  David	   Held,	   'Central	   Perspectives	   on	   the	   Modern	   State',	   in	   The	   Idea	   of	   the	   Modern	   State,	   ed.	   Gregor	  
McLennan,	  David	  Held,	  and	  Stuart	  Hall	  (Milton	  Keynes:	  Open	  University	  Press,	  1984),	  29.	  
24	  Martin	  Wight,	  'Why	  Is	  There	  No	  International	  Theory?',	  in	  Diplomatic	  Investigations.	  Essays	  in	  the	  Theory	  of	  
International	  Politics,	  ed.	  Martin	  Wight	  and	  Herbert	  Butterfield	  (London:	  Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  1966),	  17.	  	  
25	  Ibid.,	  	  18.	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It	  is	  not	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  to	  contribute	  to	  or	  even	  settle	  this	  debate.	  Rather,	  I	  start	  from	  the	  
assumption	   that	   the	   state	   still	   matters	   empirically	   as	   well	   as	   normatively	   for	   the	   study	   of	  
international	  relations.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  state	  is	  necessarily	  the	  most	  important	  actor	  in	  
IR	   and	   it	   is	   also	   not	   a	   judgement	   on	   the	   relevance	   of	   non-­‐state	   actors.	   However,	   what	   is	  
important	   to	  observe	  and	   to	  keep	   in	  mind	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   IR	  as	  a	  discipline	   is,	  at	   its	  core,	   still	  
wedded	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  state.	  Often,	  we	  encounter	  an	  essential	  conception	  of	  the	  state;	  
the	  state	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  concept	  with	  transhistorical	  features,	  which	  allows	  us	  to	  identify	  it	  
across	  time	  and	  space.26	  	  
There	   is	   another	   shift	   in	   focus	   that	   we	   need	   to	   take	   into	   account	   at	   this	   point.	   Despite	  
acknowledging	   the	  centrality	  of	   the	  state,	  Martin	  Wight’s	  concern	   in	  Diplomatic	   Investigations	  
lies	   with	   understanding	   international	   relations	   chiefly	   through	   history	   and	   the	   actions	   of	  
individuals.	   He	   argues	   that	   “the	   quality	   of	   international	   politics,	   the	   preoccupations	   of	  
diplomacy,	   are	   embodied	   and	   communicated	   less	   in	  works	   of	   political	   or	   international	   theory	  
than	   in	   historical	   writings.”	   And	   further	   that	   “[w]orks	   of	   international	   history	   […]	   convey	   the	  
nature	   of	   foreign	   policy	   and	   the	   working	   of	   the	   states-­‐systems	   better	   than	   much	   recent	  
theoretical	  writing	  based	  on	  the	  methodologies.”27	  
However,	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  IR	  systemic	  theorising	  we	  see	  a	  fundamental	  shift	  in	  focus.	  In	  this	  
context,	  Richard	  Ashley	  identifies	  a	  move	  away	  from	  the	  concern	  with	  diplomatic	  practice	  to	  a	  
concern	  with	  the	  state	  in	  a	  more	  abstract	  sense.	  According	  to	  Ashley,	  this	  is	  a	  move	  to	  “objectify	  
political	   life	  and	   improperly	   seek	   to	  make	   international	   relations	   into	  a	   social	   science”.28	  From	  
this	  perspective,	  the	  state	  becomes	  central	  to	  systemic	  theorising	  because	  supposing	  the	  state	  
as	  an	  entity	  and	  as	  an	  agent	  becomes	  an	  import	  an	  step	  in	  being	  able	  to	  do	  “scientific”	  systemic	  
theorising.	  	  
These	  points	   taken	   together	   are	  what	   I	  would	  describe	   as	   the	  ubiquity	   of	   the	   state	   in	   IR.	  We	  
encounter	   the	   state	  as	   the	  dominant	   idea	  of	  political	   life	  and	   social	  organisation.	   Further,	   the	  
state	  becomes	  the	  central	  element	   for	   third	   image	  theorising.	  Yet,	  precisely	  because	  the	  state	  
appears	  to	  be	  so	  foundational	  to	  the	  discipline,	  debating	  its	  status	  and	  its	  very	  conceptualisation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Bartelson,	  'Second	  Natures:	  Is	  the	  State	  Identical	  with	  Itself',	  299.	  
27	  Wight,	  'Why	  Is	  There	  No	  International	  Theory?',	  32.	  
28	  Gilpin,	  'The	  Richness	  of	  the	  Tradition	  of	  Political	  Realism',	  307.	  
	  	   	   	  
	  
20	  
is	   important.	  Such	  a	  debate	  is	  then	  also	  an	  exercise	  in	  questioning	  the	  very	  foundations	  of	  the	  
discipline.	  Further,	  with	  systemic	  theorising	  new	  problems	  and	  questions	  arise.	  	  
For	  this	  reason,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  above-­‐described	  ubiquity	  of	  the	  state	  goes	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  its	  
opaqueness.	  What	  the	  state	  is	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  IR	  is	  far	  from	  settled.	  David	  Held	  argues	  that	  
it	  is	  precisely	  the	  persuasiveness	  of	  the	  state	  which	  makes	  it	  hard	  to	  grasp.29	  One	  way	  to	  explain	  
the	  absence	  of	  a	  common	  ground	  regarding	  what	  we	  talk	  about	  when	  we	  talk	  about	  the	  state	  is,	  
as	  Held	  does,	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  term	  is	  polysemic.	  When	  speaking	  about	  the	  state,	  we	  are	  often	  
referring	  to	  quite	  disparate	  political	  phenomena.30	  
Yale	  H.	  Fergusen	  and	  Richard	  W.	  Mansbach,	  in	  their	  The	  Elusive	  Quest,	  bemoan	  the	  absence	  of	  
an	  agreed-­‐upon	  definition	  of	  what	  the	  state	   in	   IR	   is.	  Despite	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  state	  for	  the	  
discipline,	   its	   opacity	   is	   seen	   as	   an	   impediment	   to	   further	   study	   since,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	  
consensus,	  each	  new	  project	  needs	  to	  start	  by	  defining	  the	  state	  anew.31	  They	  argue	  that	  “[a]n	  
autonomous	   discipline	   requires	   a	   stable	   of	   concepts	   unique	   to	   it	   and	   over	   which	   there	   is	  
substantial	   agreement.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   such	   concepts,	   international	   relations	  will	   remain	   a	  
derivative	  field	  of	  study.”32	  	  
However,	  in	  defining	  a	  concept,	  we	  also	  lose	  important	  insights.	  Drawing	  on	  Bartelson,	  we	  can	  
point	   out	   that	   defining	   a	   concept	   freezes	   its	   meaning	   in	   the	   present	   which,	   sometimes	  
conveniently,	   allows	   us	   to	   forget	   the	   history	   of	   the	   concept.33	  This	   search	   for	   a	   generally	  
accepted	   definition	   and	   clear	   reference	   fixing	   is	   especially	   important	   when	   operating	   from	  
within	  a	  neopositivistic	  framework	  of	  science	  and	  subscribing	  to	  the	  search	  for	  regularities	  and	  
law-­‐like	  principles	  as	  the	  main	  purpose	  of	  science	  in	  general	  and	  IR	  in	  particular.34	  In	  this	  sense,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Held,	  'Central	  Perspectives	  on	  the	  Modern	  State',	  29.	  
30	  Ibid.,	  	  70.	  
31	  Compare	  Yale	  H.	   Ferguson	  and	  Richard	  W.	  Mansbach,	  The	  Elusive	  Quest.	  Theory	  and	   International	  Politics	  
(Columbia,	  SC:	  University	  of	  South	  Carolina	  Press,	  1988),	  7	  and	  221.	  
32	  Ibid.,	  	  112.	  
33	  Jens	  Bartelson,	  A	  Genealogy	  of	   Sovereignty	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  13.	   I	   take	   this	  
argument	   from	  Thomas	   J.	   Bierstecker	   and	  Cynthia	  Weber,	   'The	   Social	   Construction	   of	   State	   Sovereignty',	   in	  
State	   Sovereignty	  as	   Social	   Construct,	   ed.	   Thomas	   J.	   Bierstecker	   and	  Cynthia	  Weber	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  1996),	  3.	  	  
34	  Fergusen	   and	   Mansbach,	   for	   example,	   conclude	   that	   the	   state	   is	   a	   highly	   subjective	   concept	   which	   is	  
“inseparable	  from	  the	  norms,	  ideologies,	  and	  political	  aspirations	  that	  animate	  the	  practitioners	  and	  scholars”.	  
Hence,	  they	  conclude	  that	  “concepts	  like	  ‘state’	  can	  never	  assume	  the	  objective	  and	  operational	  qualities	  that	  
are	  prerequisites	   to	   scientific	  observation	  and	  analysis.”	   Ferguson	  and	  Mansbach,	  The	  Elusive	  Quest.	   Theory	  
and	  International	  Politics,	  424.	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IR	   is	   trapped	   between	   two	   opposing	   demands	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   state.	   Recognising	   its	  
historic	   contingency	   and	   constructedness	   matters	   greatly	   for	   projects	   that	   are	   in	   some	   form	  
critical	  of	  the	  status	  quo.35	  Yet,	  having	  a	  stable	  concept	  to	  use	  in	  a	  neopositivistic	  framework	  of	  
science	   is	   important	   if	   the	   focus	   rests	   on	  discovering	   regularities	  of	   social	   (state)	   behaviour.36	  
Which	   argument	   one	   subscribes	   to	   often	   depends	   on	   a	   pre-­‐established	  philosophy	   of	   science	  
position.	  However,	  with	  Jackson,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  argue	  that	  neither	  position	  should	  be	  privileged	  
from	  the	  outset	  and	  that	  the	  position	  one	  takes	  should	  depend	  on	  the	  kind	  of	  question	  one	  is	  
asking.37	  This	   kind	   of	   argument	   is	   exemplified	   in	  Wendt’s	   approach;	   he	   chooses	   to	   treat	   the	  
state	   as	   a	   given	   and	   relies	   on	   a	   definition	   of	   the	   state	   drawing	   on	   a	   number	   of	   supposed	  
essential	   features.	  He	  argues	   that	  he	  does	  so	  because	  of	   the	  demands	  of	  his	   specific	   research	  
project	   and	   points	   out	   that	   “by	   virtue	   of	   the	   simple	   fact	   that	   it	   is	   humanly	   impossible	   to	  
problematize	  everything	  at	  once”	  some	  aspects	  need	  to	  be	   taken	  as	  a	  given.38	  In	  his	  case,	   the	  
state,	  understood	  as	  a	  unitary	  actor,	  is	  taken	  as	  such	  a	  given.	  
Systemic	  IR,	  including	  Wendt’s	  states	  systemic	  project,	  tends	  to	  privilege	  the	  outside	  view	  of	  the	  
state.	  We	  are	  confronted	  with	  a	  tradition	  that,	  building	  on	  state	  sovereignty,	  tends	  to	  define	  the	  
state	  as	  an	  indivisible	  unit.39	  Sovereignty	  then	  is	  an	  attribute	  of	  the	  state	  and	  is	  also	  the	  element	  
that	  brings	  about	  the	  indivisible	  state	  that	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  unity	  from	  the	  outside.40	  This	  view	  of	  the	  
state	  as	  a	  unity	  has	  of	  course	  been	  widely	  criticised.	  Systemic	  IR,	  however,	  is	  wedded	  to	  the	  idea	  
of	  an	  indivisible	  state.41	  	  
This	  is	  also	  a	  prime	  example	  why	  IR	  needs	  philosophy	  of	  science	  debates	  and	  why	  the	  discipline	  
might	  be	   riddled	  with	  and	  divided	  by	   such	  debate	  more	   than	  other	  disciplines.	   In	  a	   sense	   the	  
problem	   comes	   in	   at	   the	   moment	   that	   IR	   as	   a	   discipline	   moves	   away	   from	   conceptualising	  
international	   relations	   as	   the	   interactions	   between	   state	   officials	   to	   conceptualising	   it	   as	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  For	  such	  a	  description	  of	  social	  constructionists	  (using	  the	  term	  in	  this	  case	  in	  line	  with	  the	  author)	  compare	  
Ian	  Hacking,	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  What?	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  6-­‐7.	  
36	  Jackson,	  The	  Conduct	  of	  Inquiry	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  and	  Its	  Implications	  for	  the	  
Study	  of	  World	  Politics,	  41ff.	  
37	  Ibid.	  
38	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  36.	  
39	  Bartelson,	  'Second	  Natures:	  Is	  the	  State	  Identical	  with	  Itself',	  299.	  Here	  Bartelson	  relies	  on	  Andrew	  Vincent,	  
'Can	  Groups	  Be	  Persons?',	  Review	  of	  Metaphysics	  42,	  4	  (1989),	  694-­‐695.	  
40	  Bartelson,	  'Second	  Natures:	  Is	  the	  State	  Identical	  with	  Itself',	  300.	  
41	  Ibid.,	  	  303.	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interaction	   between	   states.	   With	   the	   kind	   of	   abstraction	   the	   problem	   of	   what	   the	   state	   is	  
becomes	  more	  pressing	  than	  ever.	  	  
One	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  opaqueness	  is	  to	  answer	  it	  by	  saying	  that	  any	  reference	  to	  the	  
state	   existing	   or	   acting	   is	   only	   a	   matter	   of	   rhetorical	   convenience.	   In	   a	   response	   to	   Ashley’s	  
critique	  of	  neorealism,	  Robert	  G.	  Gilpin	  stresses	  that	  neorealists,	  as	  far	  as	  one	  is	  able	  to	  speak	  of	  
them	  as	  a	  unified	  camp	  (a	  point	  doubted	  by	  Gilpin)	  are	  very	  much	  aware	  that	  “the	  state	  does	  
not	   really	   exist.” 42 	  However,	   this	   uneasiness	   with	   slipping	   into	   a	   reductionist	   account	   as	  
exemplified	  by	  Gilpin	   is	  precisely	  the	  motivation	  behind	  Wendt’s	  systemic	  project.43	  Relegating	  
the	   central	   aspect	   of	   the	   discipline	   to	   rhetoric	   is	   what	  Wendt	   wants	   to	   argue	   against.	   If	   the	  
discipline	  has	  been	  successful	  in	  the	  past	  in	  making	  sense	  of	  international	  relations,	  the	  concept	  
of	  the	  state	  must	  be	  located	  somewhere	  beyond	  language,	  Wendt	  and	  others	  argue.44	  Further,	  
the	   reductionist	  account	  misses	   important	  aspects	  of	   social	  behaviour.	  We	  can	  argue	   that	   the	  
representatives	  of	   states	  do	  not	  act	  as	   individuals;	   they	  are	  agents	  of	   the	   states	  acting	  within	  
“the	   structural	   context	  of	   the	   state”.45	  Once	  a	  non-­‐reductionist	  approach	   is	   followed,	  which	   is	  
necessitated	  given	  the	  disciplinary	  founding	  myth	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐agent,	  an	  array	  of	  ontological	  
and	  epistemological	  struggles	  appears.	  More	  than	  ever,	  the	  state	  of	  systemic	  IR	  remains	  elusive.	  
Having	  rejected	  a	  reductionist	  account	  of	  the	  state,	  the	  problem	  of	  defining	  the	  state	  re-­‐appears	  
with	   some	   force.	  However,	  we	  need	   to	  wonder,	  how	  we	  can	  possibly	   answer	   the	  question	  of	  
“what	   the	   state	   is”.	   One	   suggestion	   is	   that	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   imagined,	   and	   here	   I	   understand	  
imagining	   simply	   as	   doing	   conceptual	   work	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   setting	   the	   boundaries	   of	   how	   to	  
study	  the	  state	  by	  associating	  it	  with	  tangible	  elements	  or	  certain	  abstract	  principles.	  	  
What	  is	  suggested	  here	  can	  be	  illustrated	  by	  drawing	  on	  what	  Bartelson	  calls	  the	  “intelligibility	  
of	   the	   state”.46	  What	   he	  means	   by	   this	   is	   described	   in	   the	   following	   question.	   “[U]nder	  what	  
conditions	  is	  [the	  state]	  accessible	  to	  human	  knowledge	  and	  human	  action?”47	  He	  outlines	  two	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Gilpin,	  'The	  Richness	  of	  the	  Tradition	  of	  Political	  Realism',	  318.	  
43	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  290.	  
44	  Ibid.,	  	  289-­‐290.	  
45	  Colin	   Wight,	   'State	   Agency:	   Social	   Action	   without	   Human	   Activity',	   Review	   of	   International	   Studies	   30,	   2	  
(2004),	  276.	  Compare	  also	  Jorg	  Kustermans,	  'The	  State	  as	  Citizen:	  State	  Personhood	  and	  Ideology',	  Journal	  of	  
International	  Relations	  and	  Development	  14,	  1	  (2011),	  3.	  
46	  Bartelson,	  'Second	  Natures:	  Is	  the	  State	  Identical	  with	  Itself',	  297.	  
47	  Ibid.	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potential,	  diametrically	  opposed	  answers	  to	  this	  question.	  Either	  the	  state	  is	  accessible	  because	  
it	  “really”	  exists	  or	  it	  exists	  “only”	  by	  virtue	  of	  intersubjective	  beliefs	  and	  social	  practices	  and	  is	  
instantiated	   through	   them.	   Further,	   he	   argues	   that	   on	   which	   side	   of	   the	   debate	   one	   is	  
positioned	  depends	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  language	  and	  the	  world	  that	  one	  subscribes	  to.	  
Michael	   Walzer’s	   statement	   already	   mentioned	   in	   the	   introduction	   to	   this	   thesis	   is	   worth	  
repeating	  here.	  He	  argues	   that	  “[t]he	  state	   is	   invisible;	   it	  must	  be	  personified	  before	   it	  can	  be	  
seen,	  symbolized	  before	  it	  can	  be	  loved,	  imagined	  before	  it	  can	  be	  conceived.”48	  	  
However,	   imagining	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  to	   imply	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  state	  or	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	   does	   not	   really	   exist.	   If	   we	   subscribe	   to	   the	   first	   approach	   outlined	   by	   Bartelson,	   the	  
state	   exists	   but,	   having	   rejected	   a	   reductionist	   account,	   it	   is	   not	   directly	   observable.	   In	   this	  
context,	  to	   imagine	  the	  state	  means	  to	  find	  ways	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  that	  which	  is	  not	  directly	  
observable.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  second	  approach	  outlined	  by	  Bartelson,	  the	  state	  is	  to	  be	  located	  
at	  the	  level	  of	  intersubjective	  beliefs	  and	  these	  beliefs	  create	  the	  image	  of	  the	  state.	  I	  argue	  that	  
in	  either	  case,	  making	  the	  state	  accessible	  to	  human	  knowledge,	  making	  it	  intelligible,	  requires	  
us	   to	   imagine	   it.	   This	   does	   either	   imply	   the	   need	   to	   explore	   the	   intransitive	   realm	   of	   an	  
unobservable	  or	  ask	  us	  to	  locate	  it	  in	  the	  usage	  of	  language.	  	  
As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  this	  chapter,	  and	  as	  will	  become	  clearer	  in	  the	  following	  
sections,	   one	   prevalent	   way	   of	   the	   discipline	   imagining	   the	   state	   is	   to	   ascribe	   agency	   or	  
personhood	   to	   it.	   Following	   Beitz	   for	   example,	   we	   can	   argue	   that	   central	   principles	   of	   the	  
relations	  between	  states	  such	  as	  state	  autonomy	  and	  the	  resulting	  principle	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  
are	  based	  on	  an	  analogy	  between	  persons	  and	  states.	  Beitz	   links	  this	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  
new	   conception	  of	   international	   order	   in	   the	   seventeenth	   century	   that	   rejected	   the	   idea	   that	  
states	  are	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  moral	  order	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  respublica	  Christiana	  and	  proceeded	  to	  
define	  states	  autonomously.49	  Further,	  he	  identifies	  the	  analogy	  between	  states	  and	  persons	  in	  
the	  works	  of	  jus	  gentium	  scholars	  such	  as	  Christian	  Wolff	  and	  Emerich	  de	  Vattel	  and	  argues	  that	  
the	   basic	   principles	   they	   outlined	   are	   still	   relevant	   today. 50 	  Wolff	   expressed	   the	   analogy	  
between	   persons	   and	   states	   most	   clearly	   when	   he	   argued	   that	   “nations	   are	   regarded	   as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Walzer,	  'On	  the	  Role	  of	  Symbolism	  in	  Political	  Thought',	  194.	  
49	  Beitz,	  Political	  Theory	  and	  International	  Relations,	  71.	  
50	  Ibid.,	  	  75.	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individual	  free	  persons	  living	  in	  a	  state	  of	  nature.”51	  Following	  this	  line	  of	  thought,	  Wolff	  defined	  
states,	   in	  analogy	  with	  persons,	  as	  moral	  equals	  with	  equal	  rights	  and	  obligations.	  We	  can	  see	  
this	   exemplified	   in	   the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐intervention	   and	   hence	   can	   argue	   that	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
person	   idea	   is	   fundamentally	   entrenched	   with	   key	   principles	   of	   international	   relations.52	  This	  
example	   of	   a	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   idea	   in	   IR	   falls	   under	   Bartelson’s	   criteria	   of	   intelligibility	  
understood	  as	  shared	  intersubjective	  meanings	  and	  practices.	  On	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  
of	   intelligibility,	   the	   investigation	   of	   the	   real	   existence	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   we	   find,	   most	  
prominently,	  Wendt’s	  approach.53	  	  
To	  summarise	  this	  section,	  there	  are	  four	  points	  that	  can	  be	  highlighted.	  First,	  this	  thesis	  does	  
not	   seek	   to	   question	   the	   prevalence	   or	   importance	   of	   the	   state	   in	   the	   discipline.	   This	  
foundational	  move	  of	  the	  discipline	  is	  accepted	  as	  a	  given.	  Second,	  an	  opaqueness	  of	  the	  state	  
has	  been	  highlighted.	  Systemic	  theorising	  in	  particular,	  with	  its	  focus	  on	  the	  interaction	  between	  
states,	   having	   rejected	   a	   reductionist	   account	   that	   would	   reduce	   the	   state	   to	   the	   actions	   of	  
individuals,	  has	  to	  face	  this	  opaqueness.	  It	  was	  argued	  that	  this	  leads	  to	  the	  need	  to	  imagine	  the	  
state	  whereby	  the	  term	  “to	   imagine”	  does	  not	  necessarily	   imply	  that	  the	  state	  does	  not	  really	  
exist.	  	  
However,	  even	  if	  we	  accept	  that	  the	  state	  really	  exists,	  what	  the	  state	  is	  remains	  unclear.	  If	  the	  
state	   is	   opaque	   and	   needs	   to	   be	   imagined,	   those	   stable	   platforms	   that	   enable	   us	   to	   use	   the	  
concept	  can	  only	  ever	  be	  temporary	  and	  deserve	  further	  scrutiny.	  Depending	  on	  philosophy	  of	  
science	  commitments,	  this	  questioning	  has	  different	  aims.	  Regardless	  of	  what	  side	  is	  taken,	  the	  
image	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  builds	  on	  a	  long	  tradition	  of	  imagining	  political	  entities	  in	  terms	  of	  
person.	  Further	  elaborating	  upon	  this	  tradition	  is	  the	  task	  of	  the	  following	  section.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  As	  quoted	  in	  ibid.	  
52	  Beitz	   draws	   a	   parallel	   between	   current	   moral	   understandings	   of	   states	   in	   international	   relations	   and	  
nineteenth-­‐century	  liberalism’s	  view	  on	  the	  individual	  person.	  We	  also	  need	  to	  note	  that	  after	  having	  outlined	  
this	  view	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  criticise	  it	  and	  to	  make	  suggestions	  towards	  its	  revision.	  Ibid.,	  	  66.	  	  
53	  These	   different	   stances	   on	   what	   it	   means	   to	   make	   the	   state	   intelligible	   stem,	   unsurprisingly,	   from	   the	  
fundamentally	   different	   orientations	   of	   these	   projects.	   Beitz	   describes	   his	   project	   as	   international	   political	  
theory	  whereas	  Wendt	  emphasizes	  that	  his	  approach	  is	  a	  social	  scientific	  one.	  For	  Beitz	  compare	  ibid.,	  	  9	  and	  
65.	  For	  Wendt	  compare	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  47.	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“From	  the	  state	  of	  princes	  to	  the	  person	  of	  the	  state”54	  
In	  light	  of	  the	  tendency	  to	  treat	  the	  state	  as	  a	  given	  in	  mainstream	  IR,	  it	  is	  worth	  stressing	  that	  
the	  state	  is	  a	  contingent	  concept.55	  Questioning	  concepts	  of	  states	  and	  concepts	  of	  persons,	  as	  it	  
is	  done	  as	  part	  of	  this	  thesis,	  best	  begins	  by	  pointing	  to	  historical	  contingency.56	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  
in	   the	   introduction	   to	   this	   chapter,	   we	   can	   easily	   find	   a	   number	   of	   IR	   scholars	   attesting	   to	   a	  
tendency	   of	   the	   discipline	   to	   think	   of	   the	   state	   as	   a	   person.	   Here,	   I	   would	   like	   to	   highlight	  
aspects	  of	  a	  historical	  trajectory	  of	  thinking	  of	  states	  in	  terms	  of	  persons.	  	  
Stuart	   Hall	   reminds	   us	   that	   “[t]he	   state	   is	   a	   historical	   phenomenon.” 57 	  Linking	   political	  
communities	   with	   notions	   of	   human	   bodies	   or	   individual	   persons	   is	   also	   a	   historical	  
phenomenon	   whose	   beginnings	   can	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   Greek	   antiquity. 58 	  Highlighting	   the	  
historical	  contingency	  of	  both	  terms	  and	  their	  relation	  is	  an	  important	  addition	  to	  the	  recent	  IR	  
debate	   surrounding	  Wendt’s	   “states	   are	   people	   too”	  which	   is	   characterised	   by	   a	   problematic	  
tendency	   to	   treat	   both	   states	   and	   persons	   as	   timeless	   concepts. 59 	  It	   is	   worth	   reminding	  
ourselves	  that	  when	  IR	  speaks	  about	  the	  state	  as	  acting,	  thinking,	  and	  feeling,	  it	  does	  so	  before	  
the	   background	   of	   a	  much	   larger	   history	   of	   thinking	   about	   states	   in	   terms	   of	   persons.	   This	   is	  
especially	  valuable	  given	  the	  prominence	  of	  transhistorical	  positions,	  especially	  in	  the	  realist	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  This	   sub-­‐heading	   is	   taken	   from	  Skinner’s	  Visions	  of	  Politics.	  Quentin	  Skinner,	  Visions	  of	  Politics.	  Volume	  2.	  
Renaissance	  Virtues	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2002a),	  368.	  
55	  For	  this	  tendency	  compare	  for	  example	  Bartelson,	  'Second	  Natures:	  Is	  the	  State	  Identical	  with	  Itself',	  298.	  
56	  Indeed,	  it	  can	  be	  argued,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  that	  certain	  research	  programmes	  need	  to	  
treat	   the	   state	   as	   a	   given,	   transhistorical	   concept	   –	   as	   it	   is	   done	   by	   Alexander	  Wendt	   in	   Social	   Theory	   for	  
example.	  However,	  the	  project	  pursued	  here	  and	  the	  angle	  of	  critique	  levelled	  against	  Wendt	  starts	  from	  the	  
assumption	   that	   acknowledging	  historical	   contingency	   is	   important	  when	  engaging	   the	   idea	  of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
person.	  Compare	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  36.	  
57	  Stuart	  Hall,	  'The	  State	  in	  Question',	  in	  The	  Idea	  of	  the	  Modern	  State,	  ed.	  Gregor	  McLennan,	  David	  Held,	  and	  
Stuart	  Hall	  (Milton	  Keynes:	  Open	  University	  Press,	  1984),	  1,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
58	  Compare	   for	  example	  Arnold	  D.	  Harvey,	  Body	  Politic.	  Political	  Metaphor	  and	  Political	  Violence	   (Newcastle:	  
Cambridge	   Scholars	   Publishing,	   2007).	   In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   recent	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   debate	   compare	   Mika	  
Luoma-­‐Aho,	   'Political	   Theology,	   Anthropomorphism,	   and	   the	   Person-­‐Hood	   of	   the	   State:	   The	   Religion	   of	   IR',	  
International	  Political	  Sociology	  3,	  3	  (2009),	  296.	  
59	  This	  is	  of	  course	  most	  prevalent	  in	  Wendt’s	  work	  while	  others	  such	  as	  Erik	  Ringmar,	  Friedrich	  Kratochwil,	  and	  
Patrick	  T.	  Jackson	  criticise	  the	  a-­‐historic	  treatment	  of	  persons	  and	  states.	  Ringmar,	  'On	  the	  Ontological	  Status	  
of	   the	   State'.	   Friedrich	   Kratochwil,	   'Constructing	   a	   New	   Orthodoxy?	  Wendt's	   Social	   Theory	   of	   International	  
Politics	  and	  the	  Constructivist	  Challenge',	  in	  Constructivism	  and	  International	  Relations.	  Alexander	  Wendt	  and	  
His	  Critics,	  ed.	  Stefano	  Guzzini	  and	  Anna	  Leander	  (London	  and	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2006).	  Patrick	  Thaddeus	  
Jackson,	  'Hegel's	  House,	  or	  'People	  Are	  States	  Too'',	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies	  30,	  2	  (2004b).	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liberalist	   tradition	   of	   mainstream	   IR,	   that	   treat	   the	   state	   as	   a	   given,	   as	   “a	   brute	   fact	   of	  
international	  reality”.60	  	  
The	   historical	   perspective	   introduced	   below	   reminds	   us	   that	   the	   suggestion	   that	   Wendt’s	  
proclamation	  that	  “states	  are	  people	  too”	  is,	  first,	  not	  without	  historical	  precedent	  and	  second,	  
in	   its	  current	   form,	  as	  exemplified	  by	  Wendt’s	  work,	  needs	  be	  understood	  as	  grounded	   in	   the	  
idea	  of	  the	  state	  that	  emerged	   in	  the	  seventeenth	  century.	   In	  this	  vein,	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  of	  
Wendt	   and	  others	   should	  be	  understood	  as	  part	  of	   a	  process	  of	   increasing	  abstraction	  of	   the	  
concept	  of	   the	  state	  during	  which	   the	  state	  came	  to	  be	   thought	  of	  as	  separate	   from	  both	   the	  
ruler	   and	   the	   ruled	   –	   separate	   from	   government	   and	   representatives	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	  
citizens	  on	   the	  other	  hand.	  This	   is	  what	  Skinner	  calls	   this	   the	  “doubly	  abstract	  notion	  of	   state	  
authority”.61	  	  
In	   his	   Visions	   of	   Politics,	   Skinner	   gives	   a	   concise	   account	   of	   the	   conceptual	   changes	   in	  
understanding	  states	  in	  terms	  of	  persons	  that	  took	  place	  from	  the	  fourteenth	  to	  the	  eighteenth	  
century.	  What	  he	  is	  identifying	  in	  this	  time	  period	  is,	  in	  his	  own	  words,	  a	  “process	  by	  which	  the	  
state	   eventually	   came	   to	   be	   viewed	   as	   an	   independent	   agent”.62	  Generally	   speaking,	   this	   is	   a	  
process	  of	  increasing	  abstraction,	  moving	  from	  complete	  identification	  of	  the	  state	  with	  the	  king	  
to	  conceiving	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  separate	  entity	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  artificial	  or	  fictitious	  person.63	  As	  
we	  have	  seen,	   it	   can	  be	  assumed	   that	   in	  many	  cases	   IR	  as	  a	  discipline	  builds	  precisely	  on	   this	  
notion	  of	  the	  state	  as	  an	  independent	  agent.	  	  
Skinner	  begins	  his	  chapter	  “From	  the	  state	  of	  princes	  to	  the	  person	  of	  the	  state”	  by	  pointing	  out	  
that	  in	  the	  fourteenth	  century,	  terms	  like	  estat,	  stato,	  or	  state	  could	  be	  found	  in	  common	  usage.	  	  
However,	   up	   until	   then,	   they	   were	   referring	   to	   the	   standing	   and	   grandeur	   of	   the	   rulers	  
themselves	   and	  not	   to	   the	  political	   entity	   as	   a	  whole.64	  The	  kingdom	  was	   viewed	   through	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Bartelson,	  'Second	  Natures:	  Is	  the	  State	  Identical	  with	  Itself',	  298-­‐305,	  for	  the	  quotation	  see	  298,	  emphasis	  in	  
original.	  
61	  Skinner,	  Visions	  of	  Politics.	  Volume	  2.	  Renaissance	  Virtues,	  394.	  
62	  Ibid.,	  	  379.	  
63	  It	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   there	   is	   a	   debate	   between	   Quentin	   Skinner	   and	   David	   Runciman	   concerning	   the	  
question	  whether	  or	  not	  Hobbes’s	  state	   is	  an	  artificial	  or	  fictitious	  person.	  Quentin	  Skinner,	   'Hobbes	  and	  the	  
Purely	  Artificial	   Person	  of	   the	  State',	   Journal	  of	  Political	  Philosophy	   7,	   1	   (1999).	  And	  David	  Runciman,	   'What	  
Kind	   of	   Person	   Is	   Hobbes's	   State?	   A	   Reply	   to	   Skinner',	   Journal	   of	   Political	   Philosophy	   8,	   2	   (2000b).	   A	  more	  
detailed	  analysis	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  penultimate	  section	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  
64	  Skinner,	  Visions	  of	  Politics.	  Volume	  2.	  Renaissance	  Virtues,	  369-­‐370.	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person	  of	  the	  king;	  referring	  to	  the	  status	  and	  wellbeing	  of	  the	  king	  was	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  status	  
and	  wellbeing	  of	  the	  state.65	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  king	  was	  the	  kingdom.	  However,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  
the	   fourteenth	   century,	   the	   manifestation	   of	   a	   second,	   parallel	   usage	   of	   the	   term	   state	   and	  
related	   ones	   can	   be	   detected.	   Now	   the	   term	   state	   could	   also	   refer	   to	   the	   condition	   of	   the	  
commonwealth.	  And	   it	   is	   here	   that	  we	   can	   find	   the	  beginning	  of	   establishing	   it	   as	   a	   separate	  
entity.66	  Similarly,	   the	   “mirror-­‐for-­‐princes”	   literature	   of	   this	   time,	   a	   form	   of	   advice	   books	   for	  
governing,	   now	   used	   terms	   like	   state	   in	   an	   extended	   meaning.	   Statecraft,	   apart	   from	   being	  
about	  the	  attainment	  of	  power	  and	  the	  benefit	  for	  the	  rulers,	  was	  now	  also	  about	  “managing	  to	  
promote	   the	   happiness	   and	   welfare	   of	   their	   subjects”.67	  Further,	   Skinner	   argues	   that	   by	   the	  
fifteenth	   century,	   the	   subjects	   of	   the	   kingdom	  were	   incorporated	   into	   this	   reasoning	   through	  
the	  emergence	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  common	  good.68	  It	  was	  now	  no	  longer	  the	  king	  alone	  that	  was	  
referred	   to	  when	   speaking	   of	   the	   state	   and	   the	   obligations	   of	   those	  who	   governed	   now	   also	  
included	  the	  so-­‐called	  public	  benefit.69	  Finally,	  in	  Nicolo	  Machiavelli’s	  Il	  Principe	  we	  begin	  to	  find	  
a	  distinction	  between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  state	  (lo	  stato)	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  those	  who	  
govern	  it.70	  Hence,	  with	  Machiavelli	  we	  complete	  the	  move	  to	  a	  period	  in	  which	  the	  state	  is	  no	  
longer	  identical	  with	  those	  who	  govern	  it.	  In	  addition,	  the	  term	  state	  can	  now	  also	  refer	  to	  forms	  
of	  government	  and	  prevailing	  regimes.71	  Machiavelli	  uses	  it	  to	  also	  include	  the	  territories	  of	  the	  
prince.72	  	  A	  final	  innovation,	  also	  taking	  place	  in	  Renaissance	  Italy,	  concerns	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  
term	   state	   to	   include	   “the	   institutions	  of	   government	   and	   the	  means	  of	   coercive	   control	   that	  
serve	  to	  preserve	  order	  within	  political	  communities”.73	  
Skinner	  describes	  the	  process	  of	  teasing	  out	  these	  changes	  as	  tracing	  “linguistic	  innovation[s]”.74	  
He	  starts	  by	  analysing	  the	  common	  usage	  of	  a	  term	  and	  then	  follows	  the	  changes	  in	  its	  usage.	  In	  
the	  case	  of	  the	  state,	  we	  can	  observe	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  referents	  of	  the	  term	  and	  a	  process	  of	  
abstraction.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Ibid.,	  	  371.	  
66	  Skinner	   argues	   that	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Italian	   city-­‐republics	   this	   development	   can	   already	   be	   seen	   in	   the	  
thirteenth	  century.	  Ibid.,	  	  370-­‐371.	  
67	  Ibid.,	  	  374.	  
68	  Ibid.,	  	  372-­‐373.	  
69	  Ibid.,	  	  372.	  
70	  Ibid.,	  	  378.	  
71	  Ibid.,	  	  376.	  
72	  Ibid.	  
73	  Ibid.,	  	  377.	  
74	  Ibid.	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It	  is	  then	  Hobbes	  who	  marks	  the	  definite	  end	  of	  the	  era	  of	  understanding	  public	  power	  in	  more	  
personalised	  and	  charismatic	  terms.75	  Hobbes	  achieves	  a	  clear	  separation	  of	  ruler	  and	  state	  and	  
establishes	   the	   state	   not	   only	   as	   a	   separate	   entity	   but	   as	   an	   agent	   and	   as	   a	   person.76	  In	   his	  
Leviathan,	   Hobbes	   “was	   concerned	   first	   and	   foremost	   with	   defining	   the	   essence	   of	   a	  
commonwealth	  or	  state”.77	  Using	  Hobbes’s	   terms,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  a	  multitude	  (of	  people)	  are	  
united	  through	  the	  fact	  they	  are	  represented	  by	  a	  single	  entity	  or	  person.	  The	  emerging	  position	  
is	  that	  it	  is	  the	  subjugation	  of	  the	  individual	  to	  a	  sovereign	  power	  that	  now	  allows	  us	  to	  speak	  of	  
the	  state	  as	  a	  unity	  and	  even	  as	  a	  person.78	  Following	  Hobbes,	  the	  process	  of,	  first,	  subjugation	  
and,	  second,	  representation	  “as	  one”	  leads	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  commonwealth,	  the	  state,	  as	  
an	  artificial	  or	   fictitious	  person.79	  Leviathan	   also	  makes	   it	   clear	   that	   the	   state	   is	   separate	   from	  
both	   the	  multitude	   as	   well	   as	   those	   that	   represent	   it.	   Further,	   Skinner	   argues	   that,	   with	   the	  
emergence	  of	  republics,	  the	  state	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  conceived	  solely	  through	  its	  ruler.	  From	  this	  
moment	   on,	   the	   citizens	   of	   the	   state	   have	   to	   be	   considered	   in	   a	   way	   that	   goes	   beyond	   the	  
notion	  of	   the	  earlier	   common	  good.	  Hence,	  with	  Hobbes,	   state	  authority	   takes	  on	   its	   “doubly	  
abstract	  notion”	  that	  is	  key	  for	  IR’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  state	  as	  an	  agent.80	  “[I]t	  is	  Hobbes	  who	  
first	   speaks	   systematically	   and	  unapologetically	   in	   the	  abstract	   and	  unmodulated	   tones	  of	   the	  
modern	   theorist	   of	   the	   sovereign	   state.”81	  He	   introduces	   an	   “abstract	   vision	  of	   sovereignty	   as	  
the	  property	  of	  an	  impersonal	  agency”.82	  
While	  we	  can	  trace	  a	  process	  of	  increasing	  abstraction	  eventually	  leading	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state	  
as	   an	   artificial	   or	   fictitious	   person	  with	   the	   help	   of	   Skinner,	   drawing	   on	   the	  medievalist	   Ernst	  
Kantorowicz	   is	   helpful	   in	   understanding	   part	   of	   the	   conceptual	   influences	   stemming	   from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Ibid.,	  	  368.	  
76	  Ibid.	  
77	  Murray	  Forsyth,	   'Thomas	  Hobbes	  and	   the	  Constituent	  Power	  of	   the	  People',	  Political	  Studies	  29,	  2	   (1981),	  
192.	  
78	  Skinner,	  Visions	  of	  Politics.	  Volume	  2.	  Renaissance	  Virtues,	  398-­‐400.	  	  
79	  See	  Runciman,	  'What	  Kind	  of	  Person	  Is	  Hobbes's	  State?	  A	  Reply	  to	  Skinner'.For	  a	  different	  interpretation	  of	  
Hobbes’s	   state	   as	   an	   artificial	   person	   see	   Skinner,	   'Hobbes	   and	   the	   Purely	   Artificial	   Person	   of	   the	   State'.	  
Regaring	   the	   terms	   commonwealth	  and	   state,	   Skinner	  observes	   that	  Hobbes	  uses	  both	   interchangeably	  and	  
that	   by	   the	   second	   half	   of	   Leviathan,	   the	   term	   state	   becomes	  more	   prominent.	   Skinner,	  Visions	   of	   Politics.	  
Volume	  2.	  Renaissance	  Virtues,	  402.	  
80	  Skinner,	  Visions	  of	  Politics.	  Volume	  2.	  Renaissance	  Virtues,	  394.	  
81	  Ibid.,	  	  413.	  
82	  Ibid.,	  	  368-­‐369.	  In	  his	  ‘On	  the	  Role	  of	  Symbolism	  in	  Political	  Thought’,	  Walzer	  also	  points	  to	  the	  connection	  
between	   church	   and	   state	   in	   the	   form	  of	   the	   “body	   politic”	   and	   highlights	   how	   the	   Reformation	   and	   social	  
contract	  thinking	  weakened	  this	  connection	  but	  did	  not	   lead	  to	   its	  complete	  rejection.	  Compare	  Walzer,	   'On	  
the	  Role	  of	  Symbolism	  in	  Political	  Thought',	  193.	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Roman	   Law	   and	   Christian	   theology	   regarding	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   and	   the	  
corresponding	   changes	   in	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   state	   that	   were	   taking	   place	   from	   the	  
twelfth	  to	  the	  sixteenth	  century.	  	  
Kantorowicz	   reminds	   us	   of	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   ecclesiastical	   model	   on	   the	   conceptual	  
understanding	  of	  the	  late	  medieval	  and	  early	  modern	  commonwealths.83	  The	  key	  concept	  is	  the	  
so-­‐called	  corpus	  mysticum.	  Corpus	  mysticum	  is	  the	   idea	  that	  the	  church	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  
one	  body,	  with	  Christ	  as	  its	  head.84	  In	  twelfth-­‐century	  theologian	  circles,	  a	  distinction	  was	  made	  
between	  the	  two	  bodies	  of	  Christ.	  One	  is	  understood	  as	  being	  the	  collective	  body	  of	  the	  church;	  
the	  other	  one	  is	  understood	  as	  being	  the	  individual	  body	  of	  Christ.85	  Kantorowicz	  explains	  that	  
the	   individual,	   “natural”	   body	   of	   Christ	   was	   understood	   as	   an	   organism	   acquiring	   social	   and	  
corporational	  functions;	  it	  served	  with	  head	  and	  limbs,	  as	  the	  prototype	  and	  individuation	  of	  a	  
super-­‐individual	  collective,	  the	  church	  as	  corpus	  mysticum.86	  
Before	   this	   background	   of	   religious	   imagery,	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   King’s	   Two	  Bodies	   emerged	   as	   a	  
model	   for	   thinking	  about	   secular	   communities.87	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   there	   is	   the	   individual	   and	  
mortal	  body	  of	  the	  king;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  is	  the	  image	  of	  a	  body	  that	  is	  referring	  to	  the	  
institution	  of	  the	  king	  or,	  by	  extension,	  the	  body	  of	  the	  political	  entity	  over	  which	  he	  governs.	  	  
The	  more	   secularised	   version	   of	   Christ’s	   two	   bodies	   can	   be	   credited	   to	   Thomas	  Aquinas	  who	  
replaced	  the	  “liturgical	   idiom	  by	  a	   juristic	   idiom”,	  by	  adding	  sociological	  and	  organicist	  notions	  
to	   what	   was	   hitherto	   a	   more	   literal	   understanding.88	  This	   secularised	   version	   of	   Christian	  
mythology	  later	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  elaborations	  of	  sixteenth-­‐century	  English	  legal	  scholars	  who	  
sought	   to	   develop	   a	   distinction	   between	   the	   king	   as	   a	   mortal	   man	   and	   the	   king	   as	   the	  
embodiment	   of	   the	   commonwealth.89 	  Building	   on	   this,	   Elizabethan	   lawyers	   were	   able	   to	  
address	  questions	  of	  succession	  and	  property	  by	  utilising	  the	  legal	  fiction	  of	  two	  different	  bodies	  
in	   one	   person:	   one	   body	   was	   natural	   and	   mortal	   and	   the	   other	   one	   was	   political	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Ernst	  H.	  Kantorowicz,	  The	  King's	  Two	  Bodies.	  A	  Study	   in	  Mediaeval	  Political	  Theology	   (Princeton:	  Princeton	  
University	  Press,	  1957),	  194.	  
84	  Ibid.	  
85	  Ibid.,	  198.	  
86	  Kantorowicz,	  The	  King's	  Two	  Bodies.	  A	  Study	  in	  Mediaeval	  Political	  Theology,	  201.	  
87	  Ibid.,	  	  16.	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  Ibid.,	  	  201.	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  Ibid.,	  	  17.	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transcended	  time.90	  We	  have	   to	  note	   though,	   that	   the	  notion	  of	   the	  king’s	  corporate	  body,	  as	  
utilised	  by	  English	   lawyers	  of	  the	  time,	   integrates	  the	  king	  and	  the	  subjects.	  We	  observed	  that	  
"the	  king	  in	  his	  body	  politic	  is	  incorporated	  with	  his	  subjects,	  and	  they	  with	  him."91	  It	  is	  only	  with	  
Hobbes	  that	  the	  two	  become	  separate.	  	  
One	  of	  Kantorowicz	  main	  achievements	  in	  The	  King’s	  Two	  Bodies	  is	  the	  description	  of	  a	  process	  
of	   secularisation	   in	  which	   the	   state	   becomes	   an	   “autonomous	   institutional	   subject”,	   separate	  
from	   the	  church.92	  In	   the	  context	  of	   the	   idea	  of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	  Kantorowicz	   is	   important	  
because	  we	   can	   trace	   a	   process	   of	   abstraction	   that	   includes	   the	   separation	   of	   the	   king	   as	   an	  
individual	  person	  from	  the	  kingdom.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  this	  development,	  the	  king	  is	  still	  seen	  as	  an	  
embodiment	   of	   the	   kingdom	   but	   in	   an	   abstract,	   less	   literal	   sense.	   Kantorowicz	   highlights	   the	  
establishment	  of	  the	  fiction	  of	  a	  political	  body	  in	  sixteenth	  century	  English	  law.	  The	  separation	  
of	  ruler	  and	  ruled	  by	  establishing	  the	  artificial	  or	  fictitious	  person	  of	  the	  state	  as	  introduced	  by	  
Hobbes	  is	  yet	  a	  further	  abstraction.	  We	  need	  to	  keep	  this	  historical	  background	  in	  mind	  as	  the	  
more	  recent	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate	  is	  brought	  into	  clearer	  focus	  in	  the	  following.	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However,	  we	  also	  need	  to	  keep	   in	  mind	  that	  the	  two	  spheres	  remain	   in	  close	  exchange.	  Kantorowicz	  argues	  
that	   the	  exchange	  between	  church	  and	  state	  did	  not	  come	  to	  an	  end	  after	   the	  Middle	  Ages.	  He	  argues	   that	  
“[o]nly	  the	  objectives	  changed,	  as	  the	  center	  of	  gravity	  shifted,	  so	  to	  speak,	  from	  the	  ruling	  personages	  of	  the	  
Middle	   Ages	   to	   the	   ruled	   collectives	   of	   early	  modern	   times,	   to	   the	   new	   national	   states	   and	   other	   political	  
communities.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  field	  of	  exchanges	  between	  Church	  and	  State,	  and	  of	  mutual	  influences,	  was	  
expanded	  from	  individual	  dignitaries	  to	  compact	  communities.”	  Kantorowicz,	  'Mysteries	  of	  State:	  An	  Absolutist	  
Concept	  and	  Its	  Late	  Mediaeval	  Origins',	  66.	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The	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  IR	  theory	  
Recent	  engagements	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  often	  begin	  with	  the	  observation	  that	  
IR	  has	  failed	  to	  deal	  with	  this	  aspect	  of	   its	  most	   important	  concept	  adequately.	   It	   is	  often	  said	  
that	   the	   debate	   has	   been	   lying	   dormant	   since	   Arnold	  Wolfers’	   1959	   essay	   on	   “The	   actors	   in	  
world	  politics.”93	  Wendt,	   for	  example,	  describes	  Wolfers’	  work	  as	   the	   “only	   sustained	  modern	  
treatment”	  of	  state	  personhood	  and	  “virtually	  the	  last	  word	  on	  the	  subject”.94	  	  
Despite	   IR’s	   prevalence	   for	   taking	   state	   agency	   for	   granted	   and	   of	   personifying	   the	   state,	   it	  
seems	  –	  if	  we	  follow	  the	  argument	  made	  by	  Wendt	  and	  others	  –	  that	  the	  question,	  through	  not	  
new	  at	  all,	  has	  not	  been	  discussed	  since	  the	  1950s.	  This	   is	  all	   the	  more	  surprising	  since,	  as	  we	  
have	   seen	   in	   the	   first	   part	   of	   this	   chapter,	   the	   state	   and	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   form	   the	  
foundations	  of	  the	  discipline.	  However,	  any	  debate	  on	  these	  central	  elements	  inevitably	  touches	  
upon	   larger	   epistemological	   and	   ontological	   questions.	   In	   the	   broadest	   terms,	   we	   need	   to	  
engage	  the	  question	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  do	  social	  science	  when	  faced	  with	  intangible	  “entities”	  
and	  social	  facts.	  	  
From	  this	  perspective,	  we	  can	  see	  how	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  
grouped	  around	  philosophy	  of	  social	  science	  rifts.	   It	   is	  fair	  to	  suggest	  that	  positions	  within	  this	  
debate	  are	  often	  determined	  by	  a	   specific,	  a	  priori	  philosophy	  of	   science	  commitment.	  This	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  Wolfers’	  essay	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  1962	  collection	  Discord	  and	  Collaboration.	  Arnold	  Wolfers,	  Discord	  and	  
Collaboration	   (Baltimore:	   Johns	   Hopkins	   Press,	   1962),	   3-­‐24,	   ibid.	   	   For	   this	   observation	   on	   Wolfers’	   status	  
compare	  Patrick	  Thaddeus	  Jackson,	  'Forum	  Introduction:	  Is	  the	  State	  a	  Person?	  Why	  Should	  We	  Care?',	  Review	  
of	  International	  Studies	  30,	  2	  (2004a),	  255.	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  290.	  See	  also	  
Kustermans,	  'The	  State	  as	  Citizen:	  State	  Personhood	  and	  Ideology',	  4.	  Compare	  also	  Wight,	  Agents,	  Structures	  
and	  International	  Relations:	  Politics	  as	  Ontology,	  178.	  	  
Two	   additional	   points	   are	   worth	   noting.	   First,	   Wolfers	   is	   to	   be	   located	   in	   the	   political	   realist	   camp	   of	   the	  
discipline.	  Further,	   the	  room	  for	  action	  that	  his	  states-­‐as-­‐agents	  have	   is	  quite	   limited.	  He	  uses	  –	  and	   is	  most	  
likely	   the	   originator	   –	   of	   the	   famous	   house	   on	   fire	   metaphor	   which	   aims	   to	   illustrate	   that	   international	  
relations	  leave	  little	  room	  for	  alternative	  courses	  of	  action.	  According	  to	  the	  metaphor,	  the	  state	  is	  an	  agent	  
with	  a	   very	   limited	  ability	   to	   choose	  alternative	  paths	  of	  action.	   Its	   activities	  are,	   for	   the	  most	  part,	   already	  
determined	  by	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  situation.	  Moreover,	  Wolfers	  limits	  the	  usefulness	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  
state-­‐as-­‐actor	  theory	  to	  situations	  as	  extreme	  as	  the	  “house	  on	  fire.”	  Hence,	  state	  agency	  is	  limited	  in	  at	  least	  
two	  senses	  for	  Wolfers.	  See	  Wolfers,	  Discord	  and	  Collaboration,	  13-­‐15.	  For	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  house	  on	  fire	  
and	   its	   relevance	   for	   IR	   compare	   also	   Ted	   Hopf,	   'The	   Promise	   of	   Constructivism	   in	   International	   Relations	  
Theory',	   International	   Security	   23,	   1	   (1998),	   173.	   For	   the	   role	   of	  Wolfers’	   “house	   on	   fire”	  metaphor	   for	   the	  
relation	  and	  interplay	  of	  domestic	  and	  international	  politics	  compare	  Elisabetta	  Brighi,	  Foreign	  Policy,	  Domestic	  
Politics	  and	  International	  Relations:	  The	  Case	  of	  Italy	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2013),	  31.	  
94	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  291.	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  195.	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perhaps	   unsurprising	   and	   true	   for	   almost	   any	   question	   in	   the	   social	   sciences.	   However,	   with	  
regard	  to	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	   these	  rifts	  become	  fundamental	   to	   the	  extent	   that	   they	   lead	  to	  
full	  endorsements	  such	  as	  Wendt’s	  suggestion	  that	  “states	  are	  people	  too”	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  or	  
complete	  rejections	  such	  as	  Gilpin’s	  remark	  that	  “the	  state	  does	  not	  really	  exist”	  on	  the	  other.95	  
In	  the	   introduction	  to	  this	  chapter,	   I	  tentatively	  pointed	  to	  two	  such	  areas	  of	  contention	  –	  the	  
role	  of	  language	  in	  constituting	  social	  reality	  and	  the	  criteria	  for	  establishing	  ontological	  status.	  
Dividing	  lines	  identified	  earlier,	  such	  as	  the	  question	  of	  the	  “intelligibility	  of	  the	  state”	  raised	  by	  
Bartelson,	  apply	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  just	  as	  well.96	  	  In	  addition,	  already	  hinted	  
at	   in	  the	  introduction	  to	  this	  chapter,	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate	  also	   includes	  the	  question	  of	  
what	  kind	  of	  person	  the	  state	  is.	  	  
Following	  the	  recent	  debate	  on	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  the	  discipline,	  the	  story,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  
usually	   starts	   with	   the	   observation	   that	   the	   discipline,	   despite	   almost	   three	   decades	   of	  
discussing	   the	   agent-­‐structure	   problem,	   has	   failed	   to	   engage	   this	   question.97	  It	   is	   argued	   that	  
Wendt	   re-­‐introduced	   the	   question	   of	   state	   personhood	   more	   prominently	   in	   1999	   when	   he	  
pointed	   out	   that	   “states	   are	   people	   too”.	  Wendt’s	  Social	   Theory	   and	   a	   2004	   special	   forum	   in	  
Review	  of	   International	  Studies	  which	  centred	  on	  an	  article	  by	  Wendt	  are	  then	  presented	  as	  a	  
first	  move	  to	  remedy	  this	  situation	  after	  a	  long	  silence.98	  Here,	  the	  main	  protagonists,	  along-­‐side	  
Wendt,	   are	   Iver	   B.	  Neumann,	   Colin	  Wight,	   and	   Patrick	   T.	   Jackson.99	  After	   the	   forum	  debate	   a	  
number	  of	  articles	  followed-­‐up	  on	  what	  had	  now	  been	  established	  as	  a	  legitimate	  discourse	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  Wendt,	   Social	   Theory	   of	   International	   Politics,	   215.	   And	   Gilpin,	   'The	   Richness	   of	   the	   Tradition	   of	   Political	  
Realism',	  318.	  
96	  Bartelson,	  'Second	  Natures:	  Is	  the	  State	  Identical	  with	  Itself',	  297.	  
97	  Here,	  Wendt’s	   1987	   article	   is	   taken	   as	   the	   starting	   point	   for	   explicitly	   debating	   questions	   of	   agency	   and	  
structure	   in	   IR.	   Alexander	   Wendt,	   'The	   Agent-­‐Structure	   Problem	   in	   International	   Relations	   Theory',	  
International	   Organization	   41,	   3	   (1987).	   For	   the	   observation	   that	   Wendt	   significantly	   contributed	   to	   the	  
agency-­‐structure	   debate	   see	   Emmanuel	   Adler,	   'Constructivism	   in	   International	   Relations',	   in	   Handbook	   of	  
International	   Relations,	   ed.	   Walter	   Carlsnaes,	   Thomas	   Risse-­‐Kappen,	   and	   Beth	   A.	   Simmons	   (London:	   Sage,	  
2002).	  
98	  Compare	  Jackson’s	   introduction	  to	  the	  forum	  debate.	   Jackson,	   'Forum	  Introduction:	   Is	   the	  State	  a	  Person?	  
Why	  Should	  We	  Care?'.	  
99	  The	  special	   forum	   in	  Review	  of	   International	  Studies	  was	  preceded	  by	  a	   roundtable	  discussion	  at	   the	  43rd	  
Annual	   Convention	   of	   the	   International	   Studies	   Association.	   Under	   the	   title	   “Are	   States	   People	   Too?	  
Roundtable	  on	  the	  Constitution	  of	  State	  Agency	  in	  World	  Politics”	  Alexander	  Wendt,	  Patrick	  T.	  Jackson	  (chair),	  
Iver	  B.	  Neumann,	  Heikki	  Patomäki,	  Cynthia	  Weber,	  and	  Colin	  Wight	  discussed	  ideas	  of	  state	  agency	  and	  state	  
personhood.	  See	  also	  the	  forum	  publications:	   Iver	  B.	  Neumann,	   'Beware	  of	  Organicism:	  The	  Narrative	  Self	  of	  
the	   State',	  Review	  of	   International	   Studies	   30,	   2	   (2004).	  Wight,	   'State	  Agency:	   Social	   Action	  without	  Human	  
Activity'.	   Jackson,	   'Hegel's	   House,	   or	   'People	   Are	   States	   Too''.	  Wendt,	   'The	   State	   as	   Person	   in	   International	  
Theory'.	  
	  	   	   	  
	  
33	  
the	   discipline.100	  In	   the	   following,	   I	   will	   refer	   to	   this	   as	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   debate.	   Running	  
parallel	   to	   this,	   we	   find	   a	   discussion	   on	   moral	   agency	   of	   the	   state.101	  However,	   it	   remains	  
separate	   from	   the	   forum	   debate	   and	   its	   offshoots.	   While	   acknowledging	   the	   importance	   of	  
moral	   questions,	   those	   partaking	   in	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   debate	   are	   more	   concerned	   with	  
making	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  agent-­‐structure	  debate	  and	  settling	  the	  question	  of	  the	  ontological	  
status	  of	  the	  state.102	  	  
In	   Social	   Theory,	   the	   state,	   understood	   as	   a	   person,	   becomes	   central	   to	   Wendt’s	   systemic	  
approach	   that	   puts	   a	   symbolic	   interactionist	   exchange	   between	   states	   at	   the	   centre	   of	  
establishing	   an	   international	   culture	   of	   anarchy.103	  In	  Wendt’s	  work,	   anarchy	   is	   not	   seen	   as	   a	  
self-­‐fulfilling	   prophecy	   that	   inevitably	   leads	   to	   a	   Hobbesian	  world	   of	   enmity.104	  Rather,	   it	   is	   a	  
systemic	   structure	   that	   can	   be	   changed	   by	   the	   interaction	   of	   states.	   Hence,	   a	   Hobbesian	  
international	  culture	  of	  enmity	  is	  not	  the	  only	  possible	  world	  in	  which	  states	  can	  live.	  In	  Wendt’s	  
words	   “anarchy	   is	   what	   states	  make	   of	   it.”105	  It	   is	   this	   general	   thrust	   of	   the	   argument	   that,	   I	  
believe,	  necessitates	  Wendt’s	  claim	  that	  “states	  are	  people	  too”	  and	  ignites	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
in	  the	  discipline.	  In	  Jackson’s	  words,	  Wendt	  delivers	  the	  “first	  systematic	  account	  [of	  the	  idea	  of	  
the	  state-­‐as-­‐person]	  that	  the	  field	  has	  seen	  in	  many	  years”.106	  
Building	  on	  this,	  Wendt’s	  2004	  article	  links	  the	  question	  of	  state	  personhood	  with	  the	  standing	  
of	  the	  discipline	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  argument	  is	  that	  if	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  only	  a	  fiction,	  we	  need	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  Here	  we	  can	  note	  Peter	  Lomas‘	  critique	  of	  Wendt.	  Peter	  Lomas,	   'Anthropomorphism,	  Personification	  and	  
Ethics:	   A	   Reply	   to	   Alexander	  Wendt',	   Review	   of	   International	   Studies	   31,	   2	   (2005).	   A	   number	   of	   additional	  
articles	   also	   use	   the	   2004	   debate	   as	   a	   starting	   point.	   Among	   these	   are	   Luoma-­‐Aho,	   'Political	   Theology,	  
Anthropomorphism,	   and	   the	   Person-­‐Hood	   of	   the	   State:	   The	   Religion	   of	   IR'.	   Ulrich	   Franke	   and	   Ulrich	   Roos,	  
'Actor,	  Structure,	  Process:	  Transcending	   the	  State	  Personhood	  Debate	  by	  Means	  of	  a	  Pragmatist	  Ontological	  
Model	  for	  International	  Relations	  Theory',	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies	  36,	  4	  (2010).	  Kustermans,	  'The	  State	  
as	   Citizen:	   State	   Personhood	   and	   Ideology'.	   Faizullaev,	   'Individual	   Experiencing	   of	   States'.	   And	   Jacob	   Schiff,	  
''Real'?	  As	  If!	  Critical	  Reflections	  on	  State	  Personhood',	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies	  34,	  2	  (2008).	  	  
101	  For	   instance,	   Chris	   J.	   Brown,	   Toni	   A.	   Erskine,	  Mervyn	   L.	   Frost,	   Jenna	   L.	   Sindle,	   and	   	  Molly	  M.	   Cochrane	  
discussed	   the	   moral	   responsibility	   of	   collective	   actors	   under	   the	   title	   “Institutions	   and	   Moral	   Agency:	   In	  
Concept”	  at	  the	  41st	  Annual	  Convention	  of	  the	  International	  Studies	  Association.	  
102	  For	  example,	  Jackson	  cites	  ethical	  questions	  as	  one	  reason	  why	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  highly	  relevant.	  In	  his	  
2004	  article,	  Wendt	  mentions	  moral	  personhood	  as	  important	  but	  also	  moves	  on	  to	  say	  that	  this	  will	  not	  be	  his	  
main	   focus.	   Jackson,	   'Forum	   Introduction:	   Is	   the	   State	   a	   Person?	  Why	   Should	  We	   Care?',	   258.	  Wendt,	   'The	  
State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  295.	  
103	  Compare	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  chapter	  seven.	  
104	  Ibid.,	  	  309.	  
105	  Wendt,	  'Anarchy	  Is	  What	  States	  Make	  of	  It:	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  Power	  Politics'.	  
106	  Jackson,	  'Forum	  Introduction:	  Is	  the	  State	  a	  Person?	  Why	  Should	  We	  Care?',	  256.	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to	  wonder	  why	   this	   fiction	  has	  worked	   so	  well	   in	  making	   sense	  of	   international	   relations	   and	  
why	   a	   “more	   realistic”	   picture	   has	   not	   emerged	  over	   time.107	  In	  Wendt’s	   view,	   understanding	  
states	  as	  persons	  is	  central	  to	  IR;	  yet,	  it	  is	  also	  a	  fundamentally	  neglected	  aspect.	  This	  rhetorical	  
move	  is	  similar	  to	  what	  has	  been	  described	  in	  the	  first	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  as	  the	  ubiquity	  and	  
opacity	  of	  the	  state	   in	  the	  discipline.	   In	  Wendt’s	  case,	  arguing	  from	  within	  the	  agent-­‐structure	  
debate,	  the	  personhood	  of	  the	  state	  and	  its	  ontological	  status	  become	  central	  to	  the	  discipline’s	  
self-­‐understanding.108	  Wendt	  argues	   that	  we	  need	   to	  go	  beyond	   treating	   the	  personified	  state	  
as-­‐	  if	  it	  existed	  and	  debate	  its	  ontological	  status.	  Colin	  Wight	  agrees	  and	  adds	  that	  “[t]o	  continue	  
with	  a	  metaphorical	  and/or	  fictitious	  account	  of	  the	  state	   is	  to	  conduct	   ‘business	  as	  usual’.”109	  
Both	   take	   a	   scientific	   realist	   stance,	   putting	   ontological	   questions	   first	   and	   arguing,	   against	  
positivism	  on	  one	  side	  and	  narrativism	  on	  the	  other	  side,	  that	  unobservable	  entities	  such	  as	  the	  
state	  are	  real.	  Related	  to	  this,	  they	  share	  a	  strong	  commitment	  to	  argue	  against	  a	  reductionist	  
view	  of	  the	  state.110	  Looking	  at	  the	  question	  of	  the	  ontology	  of	  the	  state,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  
Wendt	   and	  Wight	   represent	   one	   side	   in	   the	   2004	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   debate,	   while	   Jackson	   and	  
Neumann	   can	   be	   located	   on	   the	   other.	   Jackson	   suggests	   focusing	   on	   the	   “process	   of	  
personation”	  and	  argues	  that	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  we	  need	  to	  look	  at	  
the	  processes	  by	  which	  social	  actors	  are	  constructed	  and	  reproduced.111	  These	  should	  be	  similar	  
for	  persons	  and	  states	  alike	  and	  hence	  the	  statement	  “states	  are	  people	   too”	  can	  be	   inverted	  
and	  it	  is	  equally	  plausible	  to	  say	  that	  “people	  are	  states	  too”.112	  Neumann	  suggests	  a	  narrativist	  
account	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	   He	   argues	   that	   thinking	   depends	   on	   language	   and	   language	  
operates	   largely	   through	  metaphors.	  Hence,	   the	  attempt	   to	  escape	  the	  as-­‐if	  world	  and	  search	  
for	   the	   really	   existing	   state	   is	   futile	   in	   his	   opinion.	   As	   each	   metaphor	   has	   potential	   to	   be	  
constraining	  and	  enabling,	  the	  question	  we	  need	  to	  be	  asking,	  according	  to	  Neumann,	   is	  what	  
metaphors	   constitute	   a	   particular	   phenomenon.113	  From	   this	   perspective,	   Neumann	   criticises	  
the	  organic	  metaphors	  he	  detects	  in	  Wendt’s	  work	  on	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  and	  argues	  that	  these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  290.	  
108	  It	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   agency	   and	   personhood	   are	   conflated	   in	  Wendt’s	   approach.	   This	   is	   criticised	   by	  
others	  who	  engage	  in	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  discussion.	  For	  treating	  “state”	  and	  “actor”	  synonymously	  compare	  
ibid.,	  	  289,	  fn	  1.	  For	  a	  discussion	  compare	  Kustermans,	  'The	  State	  as	  Citizen:	  State	  Personhood	  and	  Ideology',	  4.	  	  
109	  Wight,	  'State	  Agency:	  Social	  Action	  without	  Human	  Activity',	  271.	  
110	  For	  Wight	  compare	  ibid.,	  	  276.	  
111	  Jackson,	  'Hegel's	  House,	  or	  'People	  Are	  States	  Too'',	  281-­‐282.	  
112	  Ibid.,	  	  281.	  
113	  For	  these	  observations	  compare	  Neumann,	  'Beware	  of	  Organicism:	  The	  Narrative	  Self	  of	  the	  State',	  265.	  
	  	   	   	  
	  
35	  
need	   to	   be	   overcome.	   This	   debate	   on	   where	   to	   locate	   the	   state	   and	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  
between	  Wight	   and	  Wendt	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   Neumann	   and	   Jackson	   on	   the	   other	   hand	  
marks	  the	  first	  dividing	  line	  in	  the	  debate.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  it	   is	  reminiscent	  of	  Bartelson’s	  
criteria	  of	  the	  “intelligibility	  of	  the	  state”.114	  
A	  second	  division	  in	  the	  debate	  rests	  on	  the	  question	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  person	  the	  state	  is.	  Wendt,	  
drawing	  on	  an	  article	  by	  Andrew	  Vincent,	  re-­‐introduces	  the	  helpful	  distinction	  between	  moral,	  
legal,	   and	   psychological	   personhood. 115 	  Wendt	   argues	   that	   this	   distinction	   has	   important	  
consequences	  for	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  can	  locate	  the	  state	  in	  the	  world	  of	  really	  existing	  entities	  
or	  whether	  the	  state	  is	  to	  be	  located	  in	  social	  practices.	  For	  him,	  legal	  and	  moral	  personhoods	  
are	  constituted	  “entirely	  by	  social	  recognition”.116	  In	  contrast,	  psychological	  personhood,	  Wendt	  
argues,	  requires	  a	  suitable	  inside	  and	  is	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  pre-­‐social	  and	  “cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  
social	   context”.117	  Hence,	  psychological	  personhood	   is	   the	  hard	  case	   for	  a	  philosophical	   realist	  
treatment	  of	  the	  state	  that	  Wendt	  regards	  as	  important	  for	  the	  discipline.	  Ultimately,	  this	  is	  the	  
reason	   for	   Wendt’s	   engagement	   with	   psychological	   state	   personhood	   in	   his	   2004	   article.	  
Although	   Wendt’s	   points	   regarding	   these	   types	   of	   personhood	   and	   the	   degree	   of	   their	  
intersubjective	  constitution	  need	  to	  be	  further	  questioned,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  to	  what	  kind	  of	  
state	   personhood	   we	   subscribe	   has	   important	   consequences	   for	   the	   possibilities	   we	   see	   for	  
making	  the	  state	  intelligible.118	  	  	  
In	   addition,	   three	   offshoots	   of	   the	   2004	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   debate	   are	   worth	   mentioning.	   Jorg	  
Kustermans	  makes	  a	  direct	  contribution	  to	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate	  by	  drawing	  on	  Jackson’s	  
notion	   of	   personation	   to	   argue	   in	   favour	   of	   personhood-­‐as-­‐status	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   state.119	  
With	   this	   focus	   on	   personhood-­‐as-­‐status,	   understood	   primarily	   as	   	   legal	   personhood,	  
Kustermans	  circumvents	   the	  ontological	  questions	  at	   the	  heart	  of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  Bartelson,	  'Second	  Natures:	  Is	  the	  State	  Identical	  with	  Itself',	  297.	  
115	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  294.	  Vincent,	  'Can	  Groups	  Be	  Persons?'.	  
116	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  294.	  
117	  Ibid.,	  	  295.	  
118	  For	   a	   different	   take	   on	  moral	   personhood	  which	   disagrees	  with	   the	   argument	   that	  moral	   personhood	   is	  
solely	   based	   on	   social	   recognition	   compare	   for	   example	   Erskine,	   'Assigning	   Responsibilities	   to	   Institutional	  
Moral	   Agents:	   The	   Case	   of	   States	   and	   Quasi-­‐States'.	   Toni	   Erskine,	   'Kicking	   Bodies	   and	   Damning	   Souls:	   The	  
Danger	  of	  Harming	  "Innocent"	  Individuals	  While	  Punishing	  "Delinquent"	  States',	  in	  Accountability	  for	  Collective	  
Wrongdoing,	  ed.	  Tracy	  Isaacs	  and	  Richard	  Vernon	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2011	  [2010]).	  
119	  For	  his	  self-­‐declared	  aim	  to	  make	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  debate	  compare	  Kustermans,	  'The	  State	  as	  Citizen:	  
State	  Personhood	  and	  Ideology',	  22.	  For	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  personhood-­‐as-­‐status	  argument	  compare	  ibid.,	  	  1-­‐2.	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Further,	  he	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  an	  ideological	  dimension	  to	  personhood	  and	  argues	  that	  it	   is	  
always	   also	   a	   political	   question.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   state	   it	   is	   about	   membership	   in	   the	  
community	   of	   states	   and	   the	   process	   of	   being	   accepted	   as	   such	   a	   member. 120 	  In	   both	  
Kustermans	  and	  Jackson’s	  account	  social	  practices	  are	  in	  the	  foreground	  and	  the	  material	  reality	  
of	  the	  state	  is	  less	  important	  if	  not	  neglected	  all	  together.	  Hence,	  Kustermans	  can	  argue	  that	  the	  
state	   is	  a	  person	  but	  given	  his	  approach	  he	  can	  also	  argue	  that	  “states	  do	  not	  necessarily	  have	  
desires,	  or	   interests,	   identities	  or	  emotions.”121	  One	  can,	  he	  argues,	   remain	  agnostic	   regarding	  
these	  aspects	  and	  still	  maintain	  that	  states	  are	  persons.122	  While	  Kustermans	  makes	  a	  valuable	  
contribution,	  I	  think	  the	  ontological	  question	  of	  psychological	  state	  personhood,	  Wendt’s	  “hard	  
case”,	  needs	  to	  be	  engaged	  to	  further	  the	  debate,	  even	  if	  the	  result	  is	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  idea.123	  	  
A	   second	   response	  and	  contribution	   to	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate	   is	  Ulrich	  Franke	  and	  Ulrich	  
Roos’	  “Actor,	  structure,	  process”.	  They	  seek	  to	  speak	  directly	  to	  the	  agency-­‐structure	  debate	  in	  
IR	  and	  focus	  specifically	  on	  ontological	  questions	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  Drawing	  on	  
both	  Wendt	   and	  Wight,	   they	   find	   a	   position	   that	   transcends	   some	   of	   the	   dichotomies	   of	   the	  
earlier	  debate	  by	  drawing	  on	  pragmatist	  scholarship.	  With	  Wight	  and	  against	  Wendt,	  they	  argue	  
that	   the	   state	   is	   not	   an	   agent	   but	   a	   structure	   and	   reserve	   the	   status	   of	   actorhood	   only	   for	  
individual	   human	   beings.124	  They	   are	   able	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   state	   is	   a	   structure	   of	   corporate	  
practice	  which	  means	  that	  the	  state	  is	  seen	  as	  more	  than	  the	  sum	  of	  its	  parts	  and	  a	  reductionist	  
account	   is	  clearly	  rejected.	  However,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  state	  depends	  on	  individual	  human	  
beings	   to	   produce	   and	   reproduce	   this	   structure.125	  Hence,	   they	   suggest	   a	   way	   that	   avoids	  
reductionism	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  does	  not	  confer	  agency	  to	  the	  state,	  thereby	  transcending	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120	  This	   is	   based	   on	   the	   distinction	   between	   a	   liberal	   and	   a	   republican	   notion	   of	   citizenship	   which	   each	  
demands	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  community	  and	  brings	  forth	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  citizen.	  Compare	  ibid.,	  	  12-­‐17.	  
121	  Ibid.,	  	  1.	  
122	  Ibid.,	  	  2.	  
123	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  295.	  
124	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  in	  his	  2006	  book,	  Wight	  developed	  a	  more	  subtle	  understanding	  of	  agency.	  Compare	  
Wight,	  Agents,	   Structures	   and	   International	   Relations:	   Politics	   as	   Ontology,	   224.	   Similarly,	   we	   also	   need	   to	  
acknowledge	   the	   difference	   between	   structure	   and	   structuratum.	   Ibid.,	   	   220.	   Also	  Milja	   Kurki,	  Causation	   in	  
International	  Relations:	  Reclaiming	  Causal	  Analysis	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  254.	  
125 	  For	   this	   argument	   compare	   	   Franke	   and	   Roos,	   'Actor,	   Structure,	   Process:	   Transcending	   the	   State	  
Personhood	  Debate	   by	  Means	   of	   a	   Pragmatist	   Ontological	  Model	   for	   International	   Relations	   Theory',	   1058,	  
also	  1064.	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the	  dichotomy	  that	  Wendt	  takes	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  his	  2004	  article.126	  First,	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  
the	  state	  as	  a	  structure	  of	  corporate	  practice	  and	  secondly,	  to	  the	  individual	  human	  being	  as	  the	  
sole	  holder	  of	  agency,	  they	  add	  the	  idea	  of	  process	  “understood	  as	  the	  dialectical	  interrelation	  
between	   those	   structures	   and	   actors”.127	  Their	  main	   aim	   is	   not	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
person	  debate	  by	  suggesting	  an	  alternative	  view	  of	  the	  personhood	  of	  the	  state.	   Instead,	  they	  
reject	  all	  ideas	  of	  the	  state	  as	  an	  actor	  or	  person	  and	  bring	  the	  individual	  human	  being	  back	  into	  
the	   agency-­‐structure	   debate	   by	   introducing	   the	   role	   of	   processes	   more	   explicitly.	   This,	   they	  
argue,	  “is	   for	  the	  most	  part	   implicitly	  taken	  for	  granted,	  yet	   largely	  marginalized	   in	  theoretical	  
models”.128	  While	  this	  thesis,	   in	  contrast	  to	  Franke	  and	  Roos’	  approach,	  seeks	  to	  make	  a	  direct	  
contribution	   to	   the	   debate	   by	   accepting	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   as	   useful,	   their	   point	  
about	   a	   false	   dichotomy	   between	   reductionism	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   full	   acceptance	   of	   the	  
reality	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  on	  the	  other	  is	  taken	  on	  board	  as	  a	  helpful	  critique.	  Similarly	  their	  
emphasis	  on	  process	  is	  valuable.	  	  
Last	   but	   not	   least,	  Mika	   Luoma-­‐Aho	   utilises	   the	   renewed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   debate	   to	   illustrate	  
how	  IR	  is,	  in	  his	  view,	  a	  form	  of	  religion.	  He,	  too,	  sees	  the	  personified	  state	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  
discipline.	  Arguing	  that	  anthropomorphism	  is	  a	  defining	  criterion	  for	  religion,	  he	  observes	  that	  IR	  
is	  a	  “system	  of	   thought	   that	   takes	   the	  metaphorical	   image	  of	   the	  personified,	  embodied	  state	  
more	  seriously	  than	  other	  more	   idiosyncratic	   forms	  of	  anthropomorphism”.129	  Hence,	   in	   IR	  we	  
encounter	   the	   personified	   state	   as	   a	   religious	   image	   put	   into	   disciplinary	   form.130	  Luoma-­‐Aho	  
begins	   by	   illustrating	   a	   historical	   connection	   between	   religious	   imagery	   and	   ideas	   about	   the	  
state,	  similar	  to	  what	  has	  been	  pointed	  out	  above	  by	  drawing	  on	  Skinner	  and	  Kantorowicz.131	  In	  
line	  with	  the	  other	  scholars	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate,	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  state	  is	  central	  to	  
IR,	  but,	  disagreeing	  with	  Wendt	  and	  Wight,	  he	  also	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  collective	  belief	  
only.	  Drawing	   an	   analogy	  between	   the	   state	   in	   IR	   and	  God	   in	  Christian	  belief,	   he	  provides	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  They	  argue	  that	  “[d]ifferent	   from	  Wendt	  who	  […]	  has	   framed	  the	  state	  personhood	  debate	  as	  a	  dilemma	  
from	  which	  it	  is	  only	  possible	  to	  escape	  by	  either	  confessing	  reductionism	  or	  recognising	  the	  real	  personhood	  
of	  states,	  we	  hold	  that	  our	  model	  offers	  a	  third	  possibility	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  problem	  at	  hand.”	  Ibid.,	  	  1058.	  
127	  Ibid.,	  	  1077.	  
128	  Ibid.	  
129	  Luoma-­‐Aho,	  'Political	  Theology,	  Anthropomorphism,	  and	  the	  Person-­‐Hood	  of	  the	  State:	  The	  Religion	  of	  IR',	  
293.	  
130	  Ibid.	  
131	  He	  further	  draws	  on	  Carl	  Schmitt	  and	  Eric	  Voegelin	  to	  advance	  his	  argument	  in	  political	  theology.	  Compare	  
ibid.,	  	  298-­‐299.	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interesting	  answer	   to	  what	  has	  been	  described	  as	   the	  ubiquity	  and	  opacity	  of	   the	  state	   in	   the	  
first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter.	  Luoma-­‐Aho	  certainly	  provides	  ample	  material	  for	  re-­‐thinking	  the	  status	  
of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  discipline	  with	  regard	  to	  its	  sacrosanct	  position	  in	  the	  mainstream.	  However,	  
arguing	  that	  the	  anthropomorphised	  state	  in	  IR	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  faith	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  making	  any	  
headway	  in	  the	  debate.	  Rather	  it	  is	  an	  argument	  to	  end	  all	  debate	  and	  hence	  it	  is	  not	  helpful	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis	  and	  the	  main	  disciplinary	  dichotomies	  outlined	  earlier.132	  	  
Going	  back	  to	  one	  of	  the	  starting	  points	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  draw	  on	  the	  
closing	  remarks	  of	  Wendt’s	  2004	  article.	  Here,	  Wendt	  concludes	  with	  a	  normative	  suggestion	  as	  
to	  why	  we	  might	  want	  to	  support	  the	   idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  He	  argues	  that	  “states	  help	  
bring	  order,	  and	  yes,	  even	   justice	  to	  the	  world,	  and	   if	  we	  want	  to	  have	  states	  then	   it	   is	  better	  
they	   take	   the	   form	  of	  persons	   rather	   than	  something	  more	  amorphous,	  because	   this	  will	  help	  
make	   their	   effects	   more	   politically	   accountable.”133	  I	   entirely	   agree	   with	   Wendt	   that	   states,	  
given	  their	  omnipresence	  in	  political	  life	  in	  general	  and	  in	  IR	  specifically,	  better	  take	  the	  form	  of	  
persons	   rather	   than	   of	   something	   more	   mechanistic.	   This	   conviction	   forms	   one	   of	   the	  
motivations	  behind	  this	  thesis.	  
Building	  on,	  but	  also	  fundamentally	  distinguishing	  the	  approach	  taken	  here	  from	  Wendt’s,	  this	  
thesis	  will	  make	  a	  suggestion	  towards	  what	  I	  call	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  Based	  on	  this	  
overview	  on	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate	   in	   IR,	   there	   are	   three	   areas	   in	  which	   the	  constructed	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	  seeks	  to	  make	  a	  contribution.	  The	  three	  elements	  which	  will	  be	  outlined	  in	  the	  
following	   and	   further	   developed	   throughout	   subsequent	   chapters	   are:	   the	   role	   of	  metaphors,	  
the	  process	  of	  personation,	  and	  the	  question	  of	  psychological	  state	  personhood.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132	  It	  is	  especially	  in	  the	  conclusion	  that	  Luoma-­‐Aho	  seems	  to	  argue	  that,	  despite	  some	  unhelpful	  implications,	  
the	  anthropomorphised	  state	   is	  simply	  an	   inescapable	  matter	  of	  belief.	  And	  he	  adds	  that	  he	  certainly	  shares	  
this	  belief.	  Ibid.,	  	  esp.	  307-­‐308,	  ibid.	  
133	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  316.	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Towards	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person:	  metaphors	  that	  
matter	  
Given	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   debate	   just	   described,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   role	   of	   metaphors	   in	   the	  
discipline	   in	  general	  and	  specifically	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  deserves	  to	  
be	  given	  more	  room.	  As	  outlined,	  we	  can	  see	  how	  the	  recent	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate	  operates	  
along	   one	   key	   dichotomy.	   Wendt	   argues	   that	   either	   the	   state	   is	   real	   or	   it	   is	   merely	   a	  
metaphor.134	  Depending	  on	   the	  position	   regarding	   the	   role	  of	   language,	  a	   scholar	  might	   come	  
down	  on	  one	  side	  of	  this	  divide	  or	  the	  other.	  However,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  role	  of	  metaphors	  I	  
argue	  that	  this	  is	  a	  false	  dichotomy.	  
The	   point	  worth	   stressing	   is	   that	   unless	  we	   assume,	   perhaps	   in	   a	   naïve	   empiricist	   fashion,	   to	  
have	  direct,	  unmediated	  access	  to	  the	  world,	  we	  need	  to	  have	  a	  form	  of	  mediation	  between	  the	  
phenomenon	  “out	  there”	  in	  the	  world	  and	  our	  concepts	  of	  them.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  role	  is	  taken	  
on	  by	  metaphors.	  As	  we	  have	   seen	  above,	   it	   is	  uncontroversial	   to	  argue	   that	  we	  do	  not	  have	  
direct	  access	  to	  the	  state	  as	  there	  is	  nothing	  that	  can	  easily	  and	  unmistakably	  be	  taken	  to	  be	  the	  
state.	  	  
In	  other	  words,	  the	  argument	  put	  forth	  here	  is	  that	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  state	  is	  mediated	  by	  
metaphors	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  subscribe	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  state	  really	  exists	  or	  
locate	   it	   “only”	   in	   intersubjective	   beliefs	   and	   shared	   practices.	   In	   this	   sense,	   I	   agree	   with	  
Neumann	  whose	  key	  contribution	  to	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate	   is	  a	  reminder	  to	  question	  our	  
metaphors.	  Yet,	  at	   the	  same	  time	  and	  against	  Neumann,	   I	  argue	  that	  this	  does	  not	  commit	  us	  
necessarily	  to	  a	  narrativist	  account	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  	  	  
This	  suggestion	  will	  be	  developed	  further	  over	  the	  course	  of	  this	  thesis	  and	  especially	  in	  Chapter	  
3.	  For	  now,	  it	  is	  enough	  to	  first	  register	  a	  scepticism	  regarding	  the	  problematic	  attitude	  towards	  
the	  role	  of	  metaphors	  in	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate	  and	  second,	  the	  false	  dichotomy	  opened	  up	  
in	  the	  debate	  that	  gives	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  possible	  utilisation	  of	  metaphors	  should	  solely	  
be	  confined	  to	  one	  side	  in	  the	  debate.	  Second,	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  section,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  
highlight	  how	  a	  metaphorical	  approach	  can	  be	  a	  useful	  analytical	   tool	  even	  before	   the	  harder	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  Ibid.,	  	  289-­‐291.	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questions	  of	  epistemology	  and	  ontology	  are	  addressed.	  By	  highlighting	  the	  difference	  between	  
body-­‐politic	   and	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   arguments	   as	   well	   as	   the	   difference	   between	  
anthropomorphisation	  and	  personification,	  I	  aim	  to	  show	  how	  a	  metaphor-­‐perspective	  is	  helpful	  
in	  making	  important	  analytical	  distinctions	  that	  tend	  to	  get	  glossed	  over	  in	  the	  debate.	  	  
At	   a	   very	  basic	   level,	   to	  use	  a	  metaphor	   is	   to	   “talk	   and,	  potentially,	   think	  about	   something	   in	  
terms	  of	   something	   else”.135	  Often,	   this	   is	   seen	   as	   a	   process	  whereby	   something	   that	   is	  more	  
familiar	   and	   more	   tangible	   is	   used	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   something	   else	   that	   is	   regarded	   as	  
unfamiliar	  and	  less	  tangible.	  Based	  on	  this	  assumption,	  conceptual	  metaphor	  theory	  introduces	  
a	  distinction	  between	  the	  source	  and	  the	   target	  domain	  of	  a	  metaphor.	  The	  source	  domain	   is	  
taken	  to	  be	  the	  more	  familiar	  element	  that	  is	  drawn	  upon	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  target	  
domain.	   For	  example,	   in	   the	   case	  of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   the	   source	  domain	   is	   constituted	  by	  
ideas	   about	   persons	   which	   are	   applied	   to	   the	   target	   domain,	   the	   state.136	  Further,	   we	   can	  
distinguish	   between	   theory-­‐constitutive	  metaphors,	   those	  metaphors	   that	   form	   the	   core	   of	   a	  
system	   of	   thought,	   and	   pedagogical	  metaphors,	   those	  metaphors	   that	   are	   utilised	   to	   explain	  
that	  system	  of	  thought.137	  The	  assumption,	  to	  be	  elaborated	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  is	  that	  
the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   in	   IR	   is	   a	   theory-­‐constitutive	  metaphor.	  As	  a	   first	   step	   towards	   re-­‐framing	  
metaphors	  in	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate	  we	  can	  say	  that	  	  	  
[s]uccessful	   metaphors	   may	   contribute	   to	   the	   development	   of	   whole	  
research	   programmes,	   and	   influence	   research	   paradigms	   for	  
considerable	  periods	  of	  time.	  In	  this	  sense	  scientific	  metaphors	  can	  play	  
an	  important	  ideological	  role	  since	  they	  can	  be	  central	  to	  the	  dominant	  
ways	   in	   which	   particular	   phenomena	   are	   understood	   by	   influential	  
groups	  of	  experts	  in	  particular	  cultural	  and	  historical	  contexts.138	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  Elena	  Semino,	  Metaphor	  in	  Discourse	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  1.	  
136	  A	  number	  of	  points	  of	  caution	  need	  to	  be	  added	  here	  that	  will	  be	  further	  elaborated	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  First,	  we	  
need	   to	   be	   careful	   not	   to	   interpret	   this	   relationship	   between	   source	   and	   target	   domain	   as	   a	   form	   of	  
comparison.	   Second,	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	   two	  domains	   is	  more	  appropriately	   conceptualised	  as	  an	  
interanimation	   of	   thoughts	   than	   as	   a	   one-­‐directional	   application	   of	   concepts	   from	   one	   area	   to	   another.	  
Compare	   Max	   Black,	   Models	   and	   Metaphors.	   Studies	   in	   Language	   and	   Philosophy	   (Ithaca,	   NY:	   Cornell	  
University	   Press,	   1962).	  Max	   Black,	   'More	   About	  Metaphor',	   in	  Metaphor	   and	   Thought,	   ed.	   Andrew	  Ortony	  
(Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  University	   Press,	   1993	   [1979]).	   Ivor	   Armstrong	   Richards,	  The	   Philosophy	   of	   Rhetoric	  
(London:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1936).	  
137	  For	  this	  distinction	  compare	  Richard	  Boyd,	  'Metaphor	  and	  Theory	  Change:	  What	  Is	  "Metaphor"	  a	  Metaphor	  
For?',	  in	  Metaphor	  and	  Thought,	  ed.	  Andrew	  Ortony	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1993	  [1979]).	  
138	  Semino,	  Metaphor	  in	  Discourse,	  135.	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Based	  on	  this,	   I	  argue	  that	  this	  way	  of	   interpreting	  ideas	  of	  states-­‐as-­‐persons	  as	  an	  interaction	  
between	  two	  different	  concepts	  is	  helpful	  in	  making	  a	  number	  of	  analytical	  distinctions.	  First,	  I	  
argue	  that	  we	  need	  to	  distinguish	  the	  body	  politic	  from	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  The	  body	  politic	  ‒	  
the	   older	   form	   of	  making	   sense	   of	   political	   communities	   ‒	   carries	   connotations	   of	   unity	   and	  
potentially	  a	  functional	  division	  of	   labour	  but	   it	  certainly	  does	  not	   imply	  a	  mind,	  and	  based	  on	  
that	  does	  not	  imply	  reasoning,	  feeling,	  or	  actions.139	  	  In	  this	  sense	  we	  need	  to	  draw	  a	  distinction	  
between	  the	  Roman	  law	  conception	  of	  certain	  groups	  as	  “corpus”,	  and	  the	  late	  medieval	  idea	  of	  
the	   king’s	   two	   bodies	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   later	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   ideas	   on	   the	   other.140	  In	  
addition,	   the	   body	   politic	   understood	   as	   a	   metaphor	   can	   further	   be	   distinguished	   into	   a	  
mechanistic	  and	  an	  organic	  understanding	  of	  the	  body	  politic.141	  For	  example,	  looking	  at	  French	  
organicist	  thought	  of	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  we	  find	  that	  the	  organism	  metaphor	  was	  used	  
to	  imagine	  a	  society	  as	  consisting	  of	  functional	  parts	  that	  form	  an	  emergent	  single	  entity.142	  	  
This	   distinction	   between	  metaphors	   that	   draw	   on	   the	   body	   and	  metaphors	   that	   draw	   on	   the	  
person	  also	  helps	  in	  highlighting	  a	  key	  move	  that	  Hobbes	  introduced.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Hobbes	  
can	  be	  credited	  for	  giving	  agency	  to	  the	  state.	  With	  Harry	  D.	  Gould	  we	  can	  argue	  that	  this	  move	  
is	  a	  transformation	  of	  the	  Roman	  law	  idea	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  corpus	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  
person.143	  Gould	   argues	   that	   “[b]y	   eliding	   person	   and	   body,	   artificial	   person	   and	   body	   politic,	  
Hobbes	  changed	  the	  metaphor,	  and	  created	  the	  corporate	  person,	  opening	  the	  door	  to	  a	  new	  
set	   of	   associations	   –	   especially	   cognitive	   –that	   body	  does	   not	   entail.”144	  Hence,	   in	  Hobbes	  we	  
encounter	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  political	  community	  as	  a	  body	  to	  the	  political	  community	  as	  
a	  person.	  This	  opens	  up	  potential	  for	  attaching	  actions,	  intentions,	  and	  even	  feelings	  to	  the	  new	  
image	  of	  the	  state.	  
Keeping	   this	   in	   mind,	   we	   should	   also	   draw	   an	   analytical	   distinction	   between	  
anthropomorphisation	  and	  personification	  which	  will	   form	  the	  basis	   for	  how	  the	  terms	  will	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  Harry	  D.	  Gould,	  'International	  Criminal	  Bodies',	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies	  35,	  3	  (2009),	  706.	  
140	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  corporation	  in	  Roman	  law,	  compare	  ibid.	  
141	  Compare	  Harvey,	  Body	  Politic.	  Political	  Metaphor	  and	  Political	  Violence,	  37.	  
142	  One	  has	   to	   keep	   in	  mind	   that	   this	   approach	  of	   an	   early	   sociology	  was	  part	   of	   the	   attempt	   to	  model	   the	  
social	   sciences	   onto	   the	   “scientific	   model”	   of	   the	   natural	   sciences	   and	   establishing	   society	   as	   an	   object	   of	  
“scientific	  study”.	  Daniela	  S.	  Barberis,	  'In	  Search	  of	  an	  Object:	  Organicist	  Sociology	  and	  the	  Reality	  of	  Society	  in	  
Fin-­‐De-­‐Siecle	  France',	  History	  of	  the	  Human	  Sciences	  16,	  3	  (2003),	  57-­‐59.	  
143	  Gould,	  'International	  Criminal	  Bodies',	  708.	  
144	  Ibid.,	  	  709.	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used	   in	   the	   subsequent	   chapters	   I	   take	   the	  below	  distinction	   from	   James	   J.	   Paxson’s	   study	  of	  
different	   tropes	   related	   to	   personification	   in	   literature	   theory.145	  Embodiment	   describes	   the	  
giving	  of	  a	  physical	   form	  to	  an	  abstract	  entity,	   in	  other	  words	   the	   transformation	   from	  a	  non-­‐
corporeal	  entity	  into	  a	  corporeal	  one.	  Anthropomorphisation	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  next	  step	  
towards	  understanding	  an	  abstract	  entity	  in	  human	  terms.	  It	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  embodiment	  where	  the	  
form	  given	  to	  an	  abstract	  entity	  is	  explicitly	  human.	  Personification,	  last	  but	  not	  least,	  describes	  
the	  transformation	  of	  an	  abstract	  entity	  into	  a	  sentient	  human	  form	  possessing	  a	  face,	  a	  voice,	  
thought	  and	  language.	  This	  last	  aspect	  has	  been	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  recent	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate	  
and	  will	  also	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  
To	   re-­‐iterate,	   the	   position	   taken	   here	   is	   that	   metaphors	   play	   a	   role	   in	   making	   the	   state	  
intelligible	  regardless	  of	  whether	  one	  subscribes	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  state	  really	  exits	  or	  that	  it	  is	  
only	   to	   be	   located	   in	   intersubjective	  meanings	   and	   social	   processes.	   Further,	   drawing	   on	   the	  
distinction	  between	   target	   and	   source	  domain	  of	   a	  metaphor	   is	  useful	   for	   introducing	   further	  
analytical	  distinctions	  between	  different	  kinds	  of	  metaphors	  regarding	  the	  state.	  	  
In	  the	  following,	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  target	  domain,	  the	  state,	  is	  necessary.	  Given	  the	  discussion	  
in	  the	  previous	  sections,	  this	  warrants	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  Hobbes	  conception	  of	  the	  person	  and	  the	  
process	   of	   personation	   that	   Jackson	   and	   Kustermans	   re-­‐introduced	   in	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  
debate.	  	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145	  For	   this	   and	   the	   following	   see	   James	   J.	   Paxson,	   The	   Poetics	   of	   Personification	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  1994),	  42.	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Towards	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person:	  personification	  as	  
representation	  
As	  we	  have	  seen	  by	  drawing	  on	  Skinner’s	  work,	  the	  modern	  concept	  of	  the	  state	  that	  separates	  
it	   from	   both	   the	   ruler	   and	   the	   ruled	   fully	   emerged	   with	   the	   writings	   of	   Hobbes.	   It	   has	   been	  
argued	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  state	  is	  not	  easily	  identifiable	  with	  the	  citizens	  or	  the	  
representatives	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  IR’s	  struggle	  with	  the	  concept.	  	  
As	  a	  first	  step	  towards	  developing	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  a	  turn	  to	  Hobbes’s	  theory	  of	  
representation	   is	   useful.	   It	   is	   worth	   bearing	   in	   mind	   that	   it	   is	   Hobbes	   “who	   first	   speaks	  
systematically	   and	   unapologetically	   in	   the	   abstract	   and	   unmodulated	   tones	   of	   the	   modern	  
theorist	  of	  the	  sovereign	  state”.146	  And	  despite	  the	  presence	  of	  rival	   ideologies	  put	  forward	  by	  
the	  monarchomachs	  at	  the	  time	  and	  found	  in	  classical	  republican	  visions,	  Hobbes’s	  notion	  of	  the	  
state	  quickly	  became	  a	   central	  part	  of	   the	  political	  discourse	  of	   seventeenth-­‐century	  Western	  
Europe.147	  We	   should	   also	   not	   forget	   that	   Hobbes’s	   main	   aim	   is	   “to	   work	   out	   a	   new	   the	  
meanings	  of	  authority	  and	  subjection”.148	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Hobbes	   is	  a	  thinker	  of	  absolute	  
power	   and	   a	   defender	   of	   monarchy,	   the	   impact	   his	   writings	   had	   on	   the	   modern	  
conceptualisation	  of	  the	  state	  is	  enough	  reason	  to	  begin	  thinking	  about	  states-­‐as-­‐persons	  with	  a	  
close	  look	  at	  the	  theoretical	  moves	  he	  performs	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  person	  of	  the	  state.149	  	  
Further,	   as	  we	  have	   seen,	   in	   the	  more	   recent	   literature	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   a	  
similar	  suggestion	  is	  made	  by	  Jackson.150	  The	  main	  thrust	  of	  Jackson’s	  critique	  of	  Wendt’s	  state-­‐
as-­‐person	  has	  already	  been	  outlined.	  Jackson	  inverts	  Wendt’s	  famous	  statement	  and	  finds	  it	  at	  
least	   equally	   plausible	   to	   claim	   that	   “people	   are	   states	   too”	   because	   both	   are	   similar	   social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  Skinner,	  Visions	  of	  Politics.	  Volume	  2.	  Renaissance	  Virtues,	  413.	  
147	  Ibid.,	  	  406.	  
148	  Walzer,	  'On	  the	  Role	  of	  Symbolism	  in	  Political	  Thought',	  191.	  
149	  This	   is	  done	  keeping	   the	  critique	  of	   the	  so-­‐called	  Cambridge	  school	   in	  mind	   that	  “the	  central	   texts	   in	   the	  
canon	  of	  the	  history	  of	  political	  thought	  should	  not	  be	  read	  as	  through	  written	  to	  instruct	  us.”	  David	  Runciman,	  
'History	  of	  Political	  Thought:	  The	  State	  of	  the	  Discipline',	  British	  Journal	  of	  Politics	  and	  International	  Relations	  
3,	  1	  (2001).	  
150	  Jackson,	  'Hegel's	  House,	  or	  'People	  Are	  States	  Too'',	  286-­‐287.	  Karin	  Fierke	  makes	  a	  similar	  suggestion,	  albeit	  
in	  passing,	  by	  building	  on	  Jackson.	  Compare	  Karin	  Fierke,	  Political	  Self-­‐Sacrifice.	  Agency,	  Body	  and	  Emotion	  in	  
International	  Relations	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  82.	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actors. 151 	  In	   the	   context	   of	   this	   critique,	   Jackson	   makes	   recourse	   to	   Hobbes’s	   theory	   of	  
representation	  and	  what	  Hobbes	  calls	  personation	   in	  order	  to	  outline	  an	  alternative	  view	  that	  
allows	  Jackson	  to	  shift	  the	  focus	  from	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  understood	  as	  an	  entity	  to	  the	  state-­‐
as-­‐person	  understood	  as	  a	  social	  process.152	  	  
Taking	  this	  as	  a	  starting	  point,	   in	  the	  following,	   I	  would	   like	  to	  go	  back	  to	  the	   ideas	  of	  Hobbes	  
regarding	   the	   state	   and	   his	   theory	   of	   attributed	   action	   in	   particular.153	  With	   Skinner	   we	   can	  
argue	  that	  it	  is	  Hobbes	  who	  “eventually	  worked	  out	  a	  distinctive	  and	  highly	  influential	  approach	  
to	   the	  question	  of	  how	   it	   is	  possible	   for	  a	   state	  –	  or	  any	  other	  abstraction	  or	   collectivity	  –	   to	  
perform	  actions	  and	  take	  responsibility	  for	  the	  consequences”.154	  	  
Hobbes	   lays	   out	   his	   theory	   of	   attributed	   action	   in	   a	   number	   of	   his	   writings,	   but	   the	   most	  
prominent	   source	   is	   Chapter	   XVI	   of	   Leviathan,	   “Of	   Persons,	   Authors	   and	   things	   Personated”.	  
Here,	   Hobbes	   distinguishes	   between	   three	   kinds	   of	   persons:	   natural,	   artificial	   and	   fictitious	  
persons.155	  This	  distinction	  is	  meant	  to	  answer	  questions	  of	  representation	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  
questions	  of	  ownership	  of	  actions	  on	  the	  other.	  The	  three	  types	  of	  persons	  are	  “set	  apart	  from	  
each	  other	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  different	  number	  of	  subjects	  or	  vehicles	  of	  personality	  that	  
they	   require.”156	  Natural	   persons	   represent	   themselves	   through	   their	   own	   actions	   and	   take	  
responsibility	  for	  them.	  In	  contrast,	  an	  artificial	  person	  acts	  on	  behalf	  of	  another	  natural	  person.	  
The	   artificial	   person	   represents	   a	   natural	   person	  while	   the	  natural	   person	   that	   is	   represented	  
still	  bears	  the	  responsibility	  for	  things	  done	  in	  their	  name.	  The	  fictitious	  person	  is	  a	  construct	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151	  Here,	  the	  term	  social	  actor	  refers	  to	  Jackson’s	  point	  that	  “both	  are	  entities	  in	  the	  name	  of	  which	  actions	  are	  
performed.”	  This	  assumption	  is	  based	  on	  the	  Hobbesian	  concept	  of	  personation.	  	  Jackson,	  'Hegel's	  House,	  or	  
'People	  Are	  States	  Too'',	  281,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
152	  It	   is	  worth	   pointing	   out	   that	   the	   term	   “entity”	   is	   used	   as	   a	   shorthand	   expression	   here.	   Rhetorically,	   it	   is	  
convenient	   to	   juxtapose	  entities	   and	  processes.	  However,	   entity	   is	   not	   to	  be	  understood	   in	   strictly	  material	  
terms.	  Rather,	  Jackson’s	  insistence	  on	  process	  is	  a	  reply	  to	  and	  critique	  of	  the	  scientific	  realist	  account	  of	  the	  
state	   and	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   and	   particularly	   the	   search	   for	   “constitutive	   essences”,	   understood	   as	   those	  
elements	  that	  are	  fundamental	  to	  a	  definition	  of	  an	  entity.	  Compare	  ibid.,	  	  281	  and	  for	  the	  critique	  of	  scientific	  
realist	  accounts	  283.	  
153	  For	  the	  term	  compare	  Skinner,	  'Hobbes	  and	  the	  Purely	  Artificial	  Person	  of	  the	  State',	  26.	  
154	  Ibid.,	  	  3.	  
155	  David	  Runciman,	  Pluralism	  and	  the	  Personality	  of	  the	  State	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  
9.	  While	   Runciman	   identifies	   about	   three	   kinds	   of	   persons	   in	   Hobbes’s	   thinking,	   Skinner	   only	   distinguishes	  
between	  natural	  and	  artificial	  persons	  and	  views	  fictitious	  persons	  as	  a	  special	  case	  of	  artificial	  ones.	  Compare	  
Skinner,	   'Hobbes	  and	  the	  Purely	  Artificial	  Person	  of	  the	  State'.	   In	  his	  reply	  to	  Skinner,	  Runicman	  defends	  this	  
distinction.	  Runciman,	  'What	  Kind	  of	  Person	  Is	  Hobbes's	  State?	  A	  Reply	  to	  Skinner'.	  
156	  Runciman,	  Pluralism	  and	  the	  Personality	  of	  the	  State,	  9.	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three	   different	   elements:	   owner,	   actor,	   and	   fictitious	   author.157	  In	   “Of	   Persons,	   Authors	   and	  
things	   Personated”,	   Hobbes	   gives	   the	   example	   of	   a	   bridge	   acquiring	   the	   status	   of	   a	   fictitious	  
person.	  He	  argues	  that	  a	  bridge	  has	  a	  physical	  presence	  in	  the	  world	  but	  cannot	  act	  itself	  or	  bear	  
responsibilities.	  However,	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  bridge	  can	  authorise	  someone	  else	  to	  represent	  the	  
bridge.	   And	   through	   this	   act	   of	   representation	   the	   appearance	   of	   the	   bridge	   acting	   can	   be	  
created.	  	  
In	  a	  next	  step,	  we	  need	  to	  ask	  how	  Hobbes’s	  concept	  of	  a	  person	  by	  fiction	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  
state.158	  In	  order	  to	  escape	  the	  state	  of	  nature,	  people,	  each	  with	  everyone	  else,	  agree	  to	  come	  
together	  and	  transfer	  their	  power	  onto	  a	  single	  entity,	  the	  sovereign.	  This	  act	  of	  transformation	  
creates	  the	  sovereign	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  what	  Hobbes	  calls	  “the	  multitude”.	  The	  multitude	  
becomes	   transformed	   into	   a	   single	   person	   through	   the	   unity	   of	   their	   representative. 159	  
However,	   the	   people	   themselves	   do	   not	   need	   to	   be	   unified,	   it	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   are	  
represented	   as	   one,	   by	   the	   sovereign,	   that	   transforms	   them	   into	   one	   person.160	  For	   Hobbes	  
there	   is	   no	   “double	   contract”.	   He	   rejects	   the	   idea	   of	   having	   one	   contract	   with	  which	   people	  
agree	  to	  form	  a	  society	  and	  another	  one	  to	  authorise	  a	  representative	  for	  themselves.161	  Rather,	  
the	  society	  and	  the	  sovereign	  to	  represent	  that	  society	  are	  created	  in	  a	  single	  move.	  The	  state-­‐
as-­‐person,	  distinct	   from	  both	   the	   sovereign	  and	   the	  multitude,	   is	   created	  when	   the	  multitude	  
decides	  to	  transfer	  their	  power	  onto	  a	  representative,	  the	  sovereign.162	  	  
In	   this	   context	   we	   also	   need	   to	   note	   the	   crucial	   distinction	   between	   artificial	   and	   fictitious	  
personhood.	   What	   I	   have	   described	   so	   far	   is	   in	   line	   with	   Hobbes’s	   concept	   of	   artificial	  
personhood.	  A	  group	  of	  natural	  persons	  ‒	  the	  multitude	  	  is	  represented	  by	  an	  artificial	  person	  ‒	  
the	  sovereign.	  It	  is	  this	  mechanism	  of	  representation	  that	  allows	  for	  people	  to	  escape	  the	  state	  
of	   nature.	   However,	   what	   is	   created	   in	   this	   process	   is	   the	   fictitious	   person	   of	   the	   state.	   The	  
natural	  persons	  that	  are	  represented	  by	  the	  sovereign	  are	  represented	  as	  one,	  but	  only	  because	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157	  Ibid.	  
158	  It	   is	   important	  to	  note	  that	  Hobbes	  himself	  argues	  that	  the	  state	   is	  a	  person	  but	  that	  he	  does	  not	  specify	  
what	   kind	   of	   person	   –	   natural,	   artificial,	   or	   fictitious	   –	   it	   is.	   Compare	   Runciman,	   'What	   Kind	   of	   Person	   Is	  
Hobbes's	  State?	  A	  Reply	  to	  Skinner',	  274.	  
159	  Skinner,	  Visions	  of	  Politics.	  Volume	  2.	  Renaissance	  Virtues,	  400.	  
160	  Runciman,	  Pluralism	  and	  the	  Personality	  of	  the	  State,	  11.	  
161	  Ibid.,	  	  12.	  
162	  Ibid.,	  	  13.	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they	  are	  represented	  by	  one,	  the	  sovereign.163	  This	  unity	  is	  a	  fiction.	  To	  put	  it	  in	  Runciman’s	  own	  
words:	  “For	  though	  the	  sovereign	  is	  authorised	  by	  the	  multitude,	  he	  does	  not	  bear	  a	  multitude	  
of	  persons	  but	  only	  one,	  a	  person	  distinct	  from	  his	  own	  and	  also	  from	  those	  of	  his	  many	  natural	  
authors.”164	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  sovereign	  does	  not	  represent	  the	  people,	  as	  would	  be	  the	  case	  
with	   artificial	   personhood.	   The	   sovereign	   represents	   the	   state	   that	   has	   been	   formed	   in	   the	  
moment	  of	  the	  contract.	  And	  the	  state	  thus	  created	  is	  a	  fictitious	  person.	  	  
Following	  Runciman’s	  account,	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  remains	  a	  fiction	  because	  it	  appears	  to	  bear	  
responsibility	  but	  cannot	  actually	  do	  so;	  it	  appears	  to	  act	  but	  cannot	  act.165	  Herein	  lays	  the	  key	  
difference	   between	   artificial	   and	   fictitious	   personhood.	   The	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   thus	   created	   is	  
much	   like	   the	  bridge	   in	   the	  example	  mentioned	  earlier.166	  Actions	  are	  performed	  by	   individual	  
human	  beings	  but	  no	  responsibility	  is	  taken.167	  Yet,	  Runciman	  cautions	  that	  this	  should	  not	  lead	  
to	   a	   dismissal	   of	   the	   fictitious	   personhood	   of	   the	   state	   as	   inconsequential.	   The	   state’s	  
appearance	  “as	  a	  real	  person	  has	  real	  consequences,	  because	  the	  multitude	  and	  sovereign	  both	  
condition	   their	   actions	   to	   take	   account	   of	   its	   presence”. 168 	  He	   argues	   that	   through	  
representation,	  the	  state	  is	  given	  “an	  enduring	  presence	  in	  the	  world	  […]	  of	  real	  people”.169	  This	  
is	  not	  a	  presence	  in	  the	  world	  of	  fiction,	  a	  play	  on	  the	  stage	  for	  example,	  but	  a	  presence	  in	  the	  
real	   world	   with	   real	   consequences	   which	   is	   made	   possible	   by	   the	   “combined	   efforts	   of	   real	  
persons”.170	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163	  Ibid.,	  	  11.	  
164	  Ibid.,	  	  13.	  
165	  Runciman,	  'What	  Kind	  of	  Person	  Is	  Hobbes's	  State?	  A	  Reply	  to	  Skinner',	  272-­‐273.	  
166	  A	  point	  of	  caution	  needs	  to	  be	  added	  here	  because	  the	  example	  of	  the	  bridge	  and	  the	  example	  of	  the	  state,	  
though	  both	  fictitious	  persons	  by	  authorisation	  and	  representation,	  differ	  from	  each	  other.	  First,	  in	  contrast	  to	  
the	  bridge	  the	  state	  does	  not	  exist	  prior	  to	  the	  social	  contract.	  Its	  presence	  is	  a	  more	  fragile	  one	  and	  unlike	  the	  
bridge,	   there	   is	  nothing	   in	   the	   real	  world	   that	   can	   readily	  be	   identified	  as	   the	   fictitious	  person	  of	   the	   state.	  
Second,	   in	   the	  example	  of	   the	  bridge	   it	   is	   the	  owner	  who	  authorises	   the	  actor	   to	   represent	   the	  bridge	  as	  a	  
fictitious	  person.	  However,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  bridge,	  the	  state	  is	  not	  owned	  previously.	  The	  multitude	  differs	  
from	  the	  owner	  of	  a	  bridge	  who	  authorises	  action	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  bridge	  based	  on	  having	  “dominion”	  over	  
the	   bridge.	   Compare	   ibid.,	   	   273-­‐274.Despite	   their	   disagreement,	   Skinner	   also	   classes	   the	   state	   in	   the	   same	  
group	  as,	  for	  example,	  hospital	  and	  bridges.	  Compare	  Skinner,	  'Hobbes	  and	  the	  Purely	  Artificial	  Person	  of	  the	  
State',	  22.	  
167	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  question	  of	  responsibility	  is	  key	  for	  Runciman.	  Whether	  or	  not	  there	  is	  the	  
possibility	  of	  taking	  responsibility	  for	  actions	  performed	  on	  behalf	  of	  another	  person	  or	  entity	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  
of	   the	   distinction	   between	   artificial	   and	   fictitious	   persons.	   Compare	   Runciman,	   'What	   Kind	   of	   Person	   Is	  
Hobbes's	  State?	  A	  Reply	  to	  Skinner',	  272.	  
168	  Ibid.	  
169	  Ibid.	  
170	  Ibid.,	  	  276.	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Conceptualising	   the	   state	   as	   a	   fictitious	   person	   leaves	   us	   then	   with	   three	   components:	   the	  
people,	  the	  sovereign,	  and	  the	  state.	  Both	  people	  and	  sovereign	  act	   in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  make	  
the	   fiction	   of	   the	   state	   a	   reality.	   This	   way	   of	   conceptualising	   the	   state	   broadly	   falls	   within	   a	  
constructivist	   framework.	   It	   can	   be	   taken	   beyond	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   social	   contract	   to	   establish	  
sovereign	  and	  state.	  The	  sovereign	  represents	  the	  multitude	  as	  one	  person,	  not	  as	  a	  collection	  
or	  aggregation	  of	   individual	  members.	  This	  means	   that	  Hobbes’s	   state	   is	  not	  a	  belief	   in	  group	  
identity	  or	  the	  personality	  of	  groups.171	  	  
To	   summarise	   then,	   in	   Hobbes’s	   framework	   there	   are	   two	   elements	   to	   the	   process	   of	  
personation	   of	   the	   state.	   First,	   there	   is	   the	   social	   contract	   that	   establishes	   the	   unity	   of	   the	  
multitude.	   Second,	   there	   is	   an	   element	   of	   process	   to	   the	   fictitious	   person	   of	   the	   state	   as	   it	  
depends	  on	  representation	  and,	  as	  Runciman	  argues,	  the	  continuous	  effort	  of	  real	  people.172	  	  
I	  conclude	  this	  section	  with	  one	  further	  question.	  If,	  as	  Runciman	  and	  Skinner’s	  interpretations	  
of	  Hobbes	  suggest	  the	  sovereign	   is	  to	  represent	  the	  state	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  collectivity	  of	  the	  
people,	  what	   is	   it	  that	  the	  sovereign	  actually	  represents?	  Referring	  to	  the	  fictitious	  personality	  
of	   a	   bridge,	   Runciman	   remarks	   that	   “because	   the	   act	   of	   personation	   is	   predicated	   on	   the	  
personality	   of	   whatever	   is	   to	   be	   personated,	   this	   is	   not	   possible	   unless	   the	   bridge	   itself	   is	  
conceived	  as	  a	  person.”173	  Based	  on	  this	  observation,	  we	  can	  ask,	  what	  is	  the	  personality	  of	  the	  
state	  that	  is	  to	  be	  represented?	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  it	  can	  neither	  be	  reduced	  to	  the	  personality	  
of	  the	  sovereign	  nor	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  citizens,	  either	  understood	  as	  an	  aggregation	  of	  
individuals	  or	  as	  a	  group.	  In	  Runciman’s	  account,	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  as	  an	  
idea	   that	   is	   given	   life	   through	   the	   concerted	   actions	   of	   individuals.	   However,	   this	   leaves	   the	  
question	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  person	  the	  state	  is	  still	  unanswered.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  Skinner,	  'Hobbes	  and	  the	  Purely	  Artificial	  Person	  of	  the	  State',	  21.	  
172	  Whether	   or	   not	   this	   second	   part	   depends	   on	   the	   continuous	   active	   participation	   and	   acceptance	   of	   the	  
citizens	  is	  debated.	  In	  his	  interpretation,	  Runciman	  seems	  to	  imply	  just	  that	  when	  he	  speaks	  of	  the	  “combined	  
efforts	  of	  real	  persons.“	  Runciman,	  'What	  Kind	  of	  Person	  Is	  Hobbes's	  State?	  A	  Reply	  to	  Skinner',	  276.	  However,	  
Hobbes’s	   social	   contract	   is	  often	   interpreted	  as	   leaving	  only	   the	  most	  minimal	   right	  of	   resistance.	  From	  this	  
perspective,	  much	   like	  the	  social	  contract,	   the	   fictitious	  person	  of	   the	  state	  would	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  active	  
participation	   of	   the	   state’s	   citizens.	   Compare	   for	   example	   Philip	   Pettit	  who	   gives	   only	   a	   passive	   role	   to	   the	  
represented	   people.	   Philip	   Pettit,	   Made	   with	   Words.	   Hobbes	   on	   Language,	   Mind	   and	   Politics	   (Princeton:	  
Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  162,	  note	  1.	  Further,	  Kustermans	  adds	  yet	  another	  source	  of	  personation	  we	  
can	  take	  note	  of	  in	  this	  context.	  He	  suggests	  that	  the	  international	  realm	  can	  now	  also	  be	  considered	  a	  source	  
of	  personation.	  Kustermans,	  'The	  State	  as	  Citizen:	  State	  Personhood	  and	  Ideology',	  4.	  
173	  Runciman,	  Pluralism	  and	  the	  Personality	  of	  the	  State,	  8.	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Towards	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person:	  bringing	  emotions	  
in	  	  
Having	  observed	  a	  prevalence	  in	  IR	  to	  treat	  the	  state	  as	  a	  person,	  there	  is	  a	  second	  tendency	  to	  
be	   observed.	   Erskine	   for	   example	   points	   out	   that	   “there	   is	   a	   fascinating	   proclivity	   in	  
International	   Relations	   for	   accepting	   states	   as	   purposive,	   yet	   amoral,	   actors.”174	  State	   agency,	  
based	   on	   the	   assumption	   of	   the	   state	   as	   a	   rational,	   unitary	   actor,	   is	   often	   seen	   as	   an	  
unproblematic	  assumption.175	  In	  many	  cases,	  the	  state	  as	  a	  rational,	  unitary	  actor	  is	  based	  on	  a	  
conception	   of	   individual	   human	   beings	   drawn	   from	   microeconomics,	   leading	   to	   the	   curious	  
amorality	  of	  the	  state.176	  	  Even	  after	  a	  cursory	  look	  at	  the	  recent	  debate	  regarding	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐
person,	  it	  becomes	  evident	  that	  the	  concept	  we	  encounter	  is	  missing	  two	  key	  aspect	  of	  what	  it	  
means	  to	  be	  human:	  the	  capacity	  for	  moral	  judgements	  and	  the	  capacity	  for	  emotions.	  It	  is	  this	  
second	  aspect	  that	  this	  thesis	  takes	  issue	  with.	  	  	  
In	  his	   article	  on	   the	   “The	   state	  as	  person	   in	   international	   theory”,	  Wendt	   focuses	  on	  what	  he	  
calls	  psychological	  personhood,	  as	  distinguished	   from	   legal	  and	  moral	  personhood.	  This	   thesis	  
follows	  him	  in	  this	  focus.	  However,	  while	  the	  capacity	  for	  subjective	  experience,	  which	  includes	  
the	   capacity	   for	   emotions,	   forms	   part	   of	   his	   definition	   of	   psychological	   personhood,	   it	   is	   a	  
strangely	  neglected	  aspect.	   It	   is	  added	  almost	  as	  an	  after-­‐thought	  and	  with	  the	  caveat	  that	  by	  
dealing	  with	  this	  facet	  of	  psychological	  personhood	  and	  by	  relating	  it	  to	  the	  person	  of	  the	  state,	  
we	  enter	  highly	  controversial	  theoretical	  territory.	  	  
I	  believe	   that	   if	  we	  want	   to	   further	  engage	  with	   this	   facet	  of	  psychological	  personhood,	   there	  
are	  two	  general	  tendencies	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  that	  need	  to	  be	  questioned.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  
we	  can	  identify	  a	  general	  absence	  of	  interest	  in	  emotions	  in	  IR’s	  mainstream	  and	  a	  prevalence	  of	  
rational	   actor	   assumptions.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   even	   when	   the	   importance	   of	   emotions	   is	  
acknowledged,	   we	   are	   still	   faced	   with	   a	   tendency	   to	   adhere	   to	   a	   clear	   dichotomy	   between	  
rationality	  and	  emotions.	  Wendt	  needs	  to	  be	  credited	  with	  introducing	  important	  qualifications	  
to	  the	  rational	  actor	  assumption	  in	  IR.	  Social	  Theory	  especially	  needs	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  move	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174	  Erskine,	  'Locating	  Responsibility:	  The	  Problem	  of	  Moral	  Agency	  in	  International	  Relations',	  702.	  
175	  Toni	  Erskine,	   'Introduction:	  Making	  Sense	  of	   'Responsibility'	   in	  International	  Relations	  -­‐	  Key	  Questions	  and	  
Concepts',	   in	  Can	   Institutions	  Have	  Responsibilities?	  Collective	  Moral	  Agency	  and	   International	  Relations,	  ed.	  
Toni	  Erskine	  (Houndmills,	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2003),	  3.	  
176	  The	  role	  of	  microeconomic	  analogies	  in	  Waltz’s	  systemic	  theory	  can	  serve	  as	  an	  example	  here.	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include	   rational	   actor	   assumptions	   in	   a	   constructivist	   framework	   that	   emphasises	   the	  
importance	  of	  identities	  and	  interests.177	  	  
However,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  tendency	  to	  separate	  rationality	  and	  emotions	  is	  reflected	  in	  Wendt’s	  
work.	  In	  his	  2004	  article,	  he	  separates	  being	  an	  intentional	  actor	  from	  the	  ability	  for	  a	  subjective	  
experience	   of	   the	   world.	   Hence,	   his	   first	   element	   of	   psychological	   personhood,	   being	   an	  
intentional	  actor,	   is	  described	  as	  being	  “purposive	  or	  goal-­‐directed”.178	  However,	  being	  critical	  
of	   the	   rational	   actor	   assumption,	   it	   seems	   curious	   to	   separate	   intentions	   from	   “having	   a	  
subjective	  experience	  of	  the	  world”	  and	  emotions.	  	  
Hence,	  parallel	  to	  what	  has	  been	  observed	  regarding	  the	  strange	  amorality	  of	  the	  person	  of	  the	  
state,	  we	  can	  ask	  why	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	  also	  a	  strangely	  unemotional	  person.	  This	   relates	  
this	  thesis	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	  emotional	  turn	  in	  IR.179	  One	  of	  the	  main	  drivers	  behind	  the	  emotional	  
turn	  is	  the	  argument	  that	  we	  cannot	  assume	  a	  pure	  rationality.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  emotional	  turn	  
is	  a	  move	  against	  one	  of	  IR’s	  core	  assumptions,	  namely	  that	  the	  agents	  of	  international	  relations	  
can	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  rational	  actors.	  	  	  
Part	   of	   the	   emotional	   turn	   are,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   those	   scholars	   who	   see	   this	   renewed	  
commitment	  to	  questioning	  the	  divide	  between	  rationality	  and	  emotionality	  as	  an	  invitation	  to	  
bring	  psychology	   to	   the	  discipline.180	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   there	  are	   those	  who	  aim	  to	  question	  
scientific	  methods	  and	  draw	  on	   the	  humanities	  and	  especially	  aesthetic	  considerations.181	  This	  
thesis	   is	   aligned	   with	   the	   first	   group.	   However,	   this	   brings	   the	   question	   of	   what	   kind	   of	  
psychology	  we	  are	  drawing	  on	  into	  sharper	  focus.	  It	  will	  also	  require	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  specific	  
philosophy	   of	   science	   commitments	   of	   the	   discipline	   of	   psychology.	   In	   Chapter	   4,	   it	   will	   be	  
argued	   that	   for	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   we	   best	   draw	   on	   so-­‐called	   constructionist	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  115.	  
178	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  295.	  
179	  As	  an	  early	  proponent	  we	  can	  point	  to	  Jonathan	  Mercer	  who	  is	  also	  a	  direct	  critic	  of	  Wendt’s	  Social	  Theory.	  
However,	  the	  recent	  emotional	  turn	  in	  the	  discipline	  is	  best	  described	  as	  originating	  with	  Neta	  C.	  Crawford’s	  
seminal	  article	  as	  well	  as	  Ronald	  Bleiker	  and	  Emma	  Hutchison’s	  contribution.	  Jonathan	  Mercer,	   'Anarchy	  and	  
Identity',	  International	  Organization	  49,	  2	  (1995).	  Mercer,	  'Rationality	  and	  Psychology	  in	  International	  Politics'.	  
Crawford,	   'The	  Passion	  of	  World	  Politics:	  Propositions	  on	  Emotion	  and	  Emotional	  Relationships'.	  Bleiker	  and	  
Hutchison,	  'Fear	  No	  More:	  Emotions	  and	  World	  Politics'.	  
180 	  Jonathan	   Mercer	   can	   be	   mentioned	   as	   a	   proponent	   here.	   Mercer,	   'Rationality	   and	   Psychology	   in	  
International	  Politics'.	  
181	  Bleiker	  and	  Hutchison	  belong	   to	   this	  group	   for	  example.	  Bleiker	  and	  Hutchison,	   'Fear	  No	  More:	  Emotions	  
and	  World	  Politics'.	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psychology	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  people	  make	  sense	  of	  themselves	  and	  how	  
emotions	  come	  about.	  Constructionist	  psychology	  locates	  the	  self	  and	  emotions	  at	  the	  level	  of	  
discourse	  and	  shared	  practices.	  This	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  how	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐a-­‐
person	  is	  developed.	  	  	  




The	  chapter	  outlines	  examples	  which	  illustrate	  that	  it	  is	  common	  practice	  to	  anthropomorphise	  
or	   personify	   the	   state	   in	   IR.	   This	   is	   taken	   as	   a	   reason	   to	   engage	   further	   with	   this	   prevalent	  
tendency	  of	   the	  discipline	   and	  especially	   the	   arguments	   put	   forward	   in	  what	   I	   call	   the	   recent	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate.182	  Wendt’s	  strong	  statement	  that	  “states	  are	  people	  too”	  is	  taken	  as	  a	  
starting	  point.183	  
As	   an	   introduction	   to	   this	   discussion,	   I	   have	   outlined	   how	   the	   discipline	   faces	   a	   particular	  
conundrum	  with	  the	  state	  when	  the	  need	  for	  a	  non-­‐reductionist	  understanding	  is	  accepted.	  The	  
state	  appears	  to	  be	  everywhere	  and	  nowhere.184	  It	  is	  ubiquitous	  and	  opaque	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  
This	  was	  taken	  to	  argue	  that	   IR	   is	   in	  part	  constituted	  by	  arguments	  on	  how	  to	  make	  the	  state	  
intelligible	   which	   ultimately	   results	   in	   a	   sharp	   disciplinary	   division	   between	   those	   who	   argue	  
that	   the	   state	   is	   real	   and	   those	   who	   aim	   to	   locate	   it	   in	   intersubjective	   meaning	   and	   social	  
processes.185	  I	   argue	   that	   regardless	   of	   what	   side	   one	   is	   positioned	   on,	   making	   the	   state	  
intelligible	  includes	  the	  need	  to	  imagine	  it.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  images	  of	  the	  discipline	  is	  
the	  image	  of	  the	  person.	  	  
This	  prevalence	  in	  the	  discipline	  was	  taken	  as	  a	  motivation	  to	  point	  out,	  mainly	  with	  the	  help	  of	  
Skinner	   and	   Kantorowicz,	   that	   thinking	   of	   states	   in	   terms	   of	   human	   bodies	   or	   persons	   has	  
significant	   historical	   precedent	   and	   that	   neither	   the	   state	   nor	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   should	   be	  
treated	  as	  transhistorical	  concepts	  or	  simply	  as	  given.	  It	  is	  Hobbes	  who	  emerges	  as	  a	  prominent	  
figure	  in	  the	  debate	  and	  the	  theorist	  most	  central	  to	  the	  conception	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  IR.	  
With	  Skinner	  it	  was	  argued	  that	  he	  is	  the	  first	  modern	  thinker	  of	  the	  state.	  Hobbes	  introduces	  a	  
clear	  separation	  of	  the	  state	  from	  both	  the	  ruler	  and	  the	  ruled	  in	  the	  form	  of	  what	  Skinner	  calls	  
the	   “doubly	   abstract	   notion	   of	   state	   authority”	   which	   eventually	   allows	   for	   the	   state	   to	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182	  For	  this	  argument	  I	  take	   inspiration	  from	  Jackson	  who	  points	  out	  “that	  analysts	  can	  and	  should	  take	  their	  
bearings	  from	  extant	  classificatory	  practices,	  seeking	  only	  to	  bring	  some	  abstract	  order	  to	  the	  sorts	  of	  things	  
that	  are	  already	  and	  empirically	  going	  on	   in	  the	  social	  domain	  under	   investigation”.	   Jackson,	  The	  Conduct	  of	  
Inquiry	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  and	  Its	  Implications	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  World	  Politics,	  34.	  
183	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  215.	  
184	  Compare	  Ringmar,	  'On	  the	  Ontological	  Status	  of	  the	  State'.	  
185	  Compare	  Bartelson,	  'Second	  Natures:	  Is	  the	  State	  Identical	  with	  Itself',	  297.	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viewed	   as	   an	   independent	   agent.186	  This	   is	   also	   taken	   as	   the	   reason	   why	   Hobbes’s	   state	   is	   a	  
prominent	  basis	  for	  IR’s	  understanding	  of	  its	  most	  important	  concept.	  
Looking	   specifically	   at	   the	   recent	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   debate	   the	   key	   point	   of	   contention	   of	   the	  
debate	  is	  the	  question	  of	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  state.	  Here,	  two	  fundamentally	  opposing	  views	  can	  
be	  identified.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  there	  are	  those	  scholars,	  represented	  by	  Wendt	  and	  Wight,	  who	  
stress	   the	   need	   to	   accept	   the	   state	   as	   really	   existing.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   there	   are	   those,	  
exemplary	   we	   can	   name	   Jackson	   and	   Neumann,	   who	   argue	   that	   the	   state	   and	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
person	   are	   best	   located	   in	   intersubjective	   practices	   and	   social	   processes.	   A	   second	   point	   of	  
differentiation	   in	   the	  debate	  centres	  on	   the	  question	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  person	   the	   state	   is.	   The	  
debate	   distinguishes	   between	   legal,	  moral,	   and	   psychological	   personhood.	  Wendt	   focuses	   on	  
psychological	  personhood	  as	  he	  regards	  this	  as	  the	  hard	  case	  for	  a	  philosophical	  realist	  view	  of	  
the	  state.	  This	  thesis	  follows	  him	  in	  this	  interest	  in	  the	  state	  as	  a	  psychological	  person,	  albeit	  for	  
different	  reasons.	  	  	  
Three	  observations	  in	  particular	  have	  been	  extracted	  from	  the	  debate.	  These	  will	  form	  the	  basis	  
of	  the	  alternative	  vision	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  IR	  that	  this	  thesis	  aims	  to	  develop.	  
First,	   it	  was	  argued	   that	   the	   role	  of	  metaphors	   in	   the	  scientific	  process	   is	  underappreciated	   in	  
the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate.	  In	  his	  2004	  article,	  Wendt	  argues	  that	  either	  we	  treat	  the	  state	  and	  
the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   as	  merely	  metaphorical	   or	   we	   engage	   the	  much	   harder	   question	   of	   their	  
ontological	  status.	  He	  points	  out	  that	  disciplinary	  progress	  only	  results	  from	  engaging	  the	  latter	  
question.	   I	   agree	   with	   him	   but	   also	   argue	   that	   his	   view	   represents	   a	   false	   dichotomy.	   The	  
contention	   is	   that	   regardless	   of	   how	   we	   answer	   the	   question	   of	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   state,	  
metaphors	  matter	  and	  are	  potentially	  theory-­‐constitutive.	  A	  closer	  engagement	  with	  their	  role	  
in	  the	  scientific	  process	  and	  their	  specific	  role	  with	  regard	  to	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  ideas	  is	  warranted	  
and	  will	  take	  place	  in	  Chapter	  3	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Second,	  building	  on	  Jackson’s	  intervention	  in	  the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate,	  Hobbes’s	   process	   of	   personation	  was	  put	   into	   sharper	   focus.	   The	   key	  
insight	  is	  that	  the	  state	  is	  established	  as	  a	  fictitious	  person	  through	  a	  process	  of	  representation.	  
It	  is	  not	  the	  unity	  of	  what	  Hobbes	  calls	  the	  multitude	  that	  establishes	  the	  state	  as	  a	  person	  but	  
their	  representation	  as	  a	  unit.	  Further,	  the	  state	  is	  not	  to	  be	  identified	  with	  either	  the	  ruler	  or	  
the	  ruled,	  its	  person	  is	  separate	  from	  both.	  Lastly,	  building	  on	  Runciman’s	  account,	  it	  is	  vital	  to	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  Skinner,	  Visions	  of	  Politics.	  Volume	  2.	  Renaissance	  Virtues,	  394.	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stress	  that	  arguing	  that	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  a	  fictitious	  person	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  it	  is	  without	  
real	  consequences	  in	  the	  world	  of	  real	  people,	  as	  “the	  multitude	  and	  sovereign	  both	  condition	  
their	  actions	  to	  take	  account	  of	   its	  presence.”187	  It	   is	  this	  conception	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  fictitious	  
person	  which	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  fruitful	  response	  to	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
note	  that	  this	  puts	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  something	  becomes	  a	  person	  which	  
stands	   in	   contrast	   to	  Wendt	   and	  Wight’s	   approaches	   to	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate.	   To	   argue	  
that	   a	   greater	   emphasis	   on	   process,	   as	   opposed	   to	   essential	   qualities	   of	   persons,	   is	   indeed	  
preferable	  will	  be	  the	  task	  of	  Chapters	  2	  and	  5.	  
Last	  but	  not	   least,	  despite	  the	  prevalence	  of	  the	   idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	   in	   IR,	   it	  remains	  a	  
strangely	  unemotional	  person.	   It	   is	  argued	  that	  the	  recent	  emotional	  turn	   in	  the	  discipline	  can	  
make	  a	  key	  contribution	  here.	  Two	  insights	  are	  taken	  on	  board.	  First,	  the	  dichotomous	  view	  of	  
rationality	   and	  emotionality	   is	   unhelpful.	   Second,	   insights	   from	  psychology	   can	  and	   should	  be	  
integrated	   into	  IR	  theorising.	   It	   is	  hypothesised	  that	  psychology	  can	  provide	   important	   insights	  
into	  how	  people	  make	  sense	  of	  themselves	  that	  can	  be	  made	  useful	  for	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person.	  The	  suggestion,	  to	  be	  further	  developed	  in	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5	  and	  applied	  to	  the	  
state	   in	   Chapter	   6,	   is	   that	   it	   is	   constructionist	   psychology	   with	   its	   emphasis	   on	   the	   socially	  
constructed	   nature	   of	   the	   self	   and	   of	   emotions	   that	   can	  make	   the	  most	   fruitful	   contribution	  
here.	  This	  constitutes	  an	  emphasis	  on	  process	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  essences	  that	  will	  need	  to	  be	  
carefully	  weighed	   against	   the	   key	   contribution	   to	   the	   debate	  made	   by	  Wendt.	   Chapter	   7	  will	  
highlight	   the	   departure	   from	   Wendt	   more	   specifically	   and	   outline	   contributions	   to	   larger	  
disciplinary	  debates.	  	  
Keeping	  these	  three	  points	  regarding	  the	  role	  of	  metaphors,	  the	  process	  of	  personation,	  and	  the	  
importance	  of	  emotions	  in	  mind,	  the	  research	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis	  can	  be	  formulated	  as	  follows.	  
There	   is	   a	  prevalent	   assumption	   in	   IR	   theory	   that	   the	   state	   is	   like	   a	  person.	  Any	  account	   that	  
wishes	  to	  address	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  needs	  to	  grapple	  with	  the	  following	  concerns:	  
Where	  is	  agency	  located	  in	  this	  account?	  What	  is	  the	  structural	  context	  in	  which	  actors	  operate	  
and	  what	  is	  its	  impact	  on	  possibilities	  for	  construction?	  What	  is	  the	  specific	  understanding	  of	  the	  
person	  utilised	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  state?	  How	  are	  concepts	  of	  persons	  and	  concepts	  of	  states	  
related?	  Building	  on	  these	  questions,	  the	  central	  research	  question	  that	  guides	  this	  thesis	  is	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187	  Runciman,	  'What	  Kind	  of	  Person	  Is	  Hobbes's	  State?	  A	  Reply	  to	  Skinner',	  272.	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following:	   Can	   a	   constructivist	   approach	  with	   a	   strong	   input	   from	   constructionist	   psychology,	  
which	   treats	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   as	   a	   metaphor	   while	   acknowledging	   the	   constraints	   of	   the	  
state-­‐as-­‐structure,	   provide	   a	   valuable	   alternative	   understanding	   of	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	  
state	   is	   like	  a	  person?	  As	  a	   result,	   I	  will	  offer	  what	   I	  call	   the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  as	  an	  
alternative	   to	  Wendt’s	  conception	  of	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  and	  address	  key	  disciplinary	  debates	  
regarding	  the	  role	  of	  language,	  possibilities	  for	  construction	  of	  the	  social	  world,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  
emotions	  in	  a	  discipline	  wedded	  to	  the	  rational	  actor	  assumption.	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Chapter	  2:	  The	  Wendtian	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	  
Alexander	  Wendt	   is	  the	  most	   important	  point	  of	  reference	  for	  many	  recent	  engagements	  with	  
the	   idea	   of	   state	   personhood.	   He	   can	   plausibly	   be	   credited	   for	   putting	   forward	   the	   “first	  
systematic	  account	  of	  states	  as	  actors	  that	  the	  field	  has	  seen	  in	  many	  years”.1	  This	  chapter	  aims	  
at	  clarifying	  Wendt’s	  position	  with	  a	  view	  to	  finding	  an	  avenue	  to	  develop	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐
as-­‐person	   further.	   A	   close	   look	   at	   Wendt’s	   conception	   of	   the	   person	   and	   the	   state,	   the	  
philosophy	   of	   science	   position	   he	   is	   taking,	   and	   the	   resulting	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	  
therefore	  paramount.	  
Wendt	  directly	  addresses	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  two	  publications.	  These	  are	  his	  1999	  
book	   Social	   Theory	   of	   International	   Politics	   and	   his	   2004	   article	   “The	   state	   as	   person	   in	  
international	  theory”.2	  The	  ultimate	  aim	  of	  Social	  Theory	  is	  to	  stress	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  states’	  
interests	  and	  identities	  for	  the	  “states	  systemic	  project”.3	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	   is	   necessary	   for	   Wendt	   in	   order	   for	   his	   systemic	   project,	   based	   on	   a	   symbolic	  
interactionist	  account	  of	   identity	  and	  interest	  formation	  among	  states,	  to	  function.	  As	  the	  title	  
suggests,	  we	  also	  find	  a	  strong	  engagement	  with	  social	  theory,	  especially	  in	  the	  form	  of	  bringing	  
scientific	  realism	  to	  bear	  on	  IR	  theorising.	  Indeed,	  critics	  praise	  Wendt	  for	  bringing	  social	  theory	  
closer	  to	   IR	  debates.	  For	  example,	   Iver	  B.	  Neumann	  observes	  that	  “[o]ne	  of	  the	  many	  services	  
that	   Wendt	   has	   done	   IR	   is	   to	   link	   the	   discipline	   more	   firmly	   to	   social	   theory	   overall.”4	  And	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Jackson,	  'Forum	  Introduction:	  Is	  the	  State	  a	  Person?	  Why	  Should	  We	  Care?',	  256,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
2	  Early	  writings	  draw	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  implicitly.	  But	  it	  is	  only	  in	  Social	  Theory	  that	  we	  find	  a	  
strong	  articulation	  of	  the	  idea	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  For	  example,	  in	  “Constructing	  International	  Politics,”	  the	  state	  
is	  described	  as	  an	  agent	  that	  produces	  and	  reproduces	  the	  (international)	  social	  structure.	  In	  “Anarchy	  is	  what	  
states	  make	  of	  it”	  Wendt	  argues	  that	  “a	  theoretically	  productive	  analogy	  can	  be	  made	  between	  individuals	  and	  
states.”	   Alexander	   Wendt,	   'Constructing	   International	   Politics',	   International	   Security	   20,	   1	   (1995),	   76-­‐77.	  
Wendt,	  'Anarchy	  Is	  What	  States	  Make	  of	  It:	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  Power	  Politics',	  397	  fn	  21.	  
3	  For	  the	  term	  “states	  systemic	  project”	  see	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  7.	  
4	  Neumann,	  'Beware	  of	  Organicism:	  The	  Narrative	  Self	  of	  the	  State',	  264.	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Hayward	  Alker	  credits	  Wendt	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  “systematically	   ‘sociologizes’	   IR’s	  disciplinary	  
self-­‐understanding”	  in	  his	  Social	  Theory.5	  
In	  “The	  state	  as	  person”,	  Wendt	  aims	  at	  something	  else;	  his	  2004	  article	  is	  to	  be	  understood,	  in	  
his	  own	  words,	  as	  “part	  road	  map	  and	  part	  bibliographic	  essay”	  that	  aims	  at	  charting	  the	  debate	  
about	  state	  personhood	  and	  its	  related	  questions.6	  The	  article	  draws	  on	  social	  theory	  as	  well	  as	  
philosophical,	  biological,	  and	  psychological	  literature	  –	  going	  substantially	  beyond	  the	  argument	  
in	  favour	  of	  treating	  states	  as	  persons	  presented	  in	  Social	  Theory.	  The	  endeavour	  of	  “The	  state	  
as	  person”	  can	  aptly	  be	  described	  as	  an	  "exercise	  in	  philosophical	  anthropology”.7	  
Looking	  at	  Wendt’s	  earlier	  articles,	  especially	  “Anarchy	  is	  what	  states	  make	  of	  it”	  and	  “Levels	  of	  
Analysis	  vs.	  Agents	  and	  Structures”,	  two	  trajectories	  that	  are	  relevant	  for	  the	  investigation	  into	  
Wendt’s	  position	  on	  state	  personhood	  can	  be	  teased	  out.8	  First,	  we	  can	  identify	  a	  concern	  with	  
the	  relation	  between	  agents	  and	  structures	  and	  how	  structures	  constitute	  agents	  and	  vice	  versa.	  
Indeed,	  Wendt	  is	  credited	  for	  making	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  the	  agent-­‐structure	  debate	  in	  
IR.9	  Second,	   his	   work,	   prior	   to	   2006,	   is	   concerned	   with	   the	   balance	   between	   ideational	   and	  
material	   factors	  within	   a	  via	  media	   constructivist	   framework.	  With	   regard	   to	   the	   first,	  Wendt	  
takes	  a	  systemic	  perspective;	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  latter,	  Wendt	  uses	  scientific	  realism	  as	  a	  basis	  
and	  posits	  a	  “rump	  materialism”	  of	  the	  social	  world.	  
Last	  but	  not	   least,	   two	  more	   recent	   articles	  by	  Wendt	  warrant	   attention.	   In	   “Social	   Theory	   as	  
Cartesian	  Science”,	  Wendt	  tries	  to	  draw	  some	  of	  his	  main	  themes,	  especially	  the	  question	  of	  the	  
relation	  between	  the	  ideational	  and	  material	  together	  by	  using	  quantum	  theory	  assumptions.	  In	  
responding	   to	   critiques,	   some	   of	   the	   core	   questions	   related	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
person	  re-­‐emerge	  here	  and	  are	  addressed	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  “quantum	  social	  science”.10	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Hayward	  R.	  Alker,	  'On	  Learning	  from	  Wendt',	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies	  26,	  1	  (2000),	  141.	  
6	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  291.	  	  
7	  I	  take	  this	  term	  from	  Kustermans,	  'The	  State	  as	  Citizen:	  State	  Personhood	  and	  Ideology',	  5.	  
8	  See	  for	  example	  Alexander	  Wendt,	  'Levels	  of	  Analysis	  Vs.	  Agents	  and	  Structures:	  Part	  Iii',	  Review	  of	  
International	  Studies	  18,	  2	  (1992).	  And	  Wendt,	  'Anarchy	  Is	  What	  States	  Make	  of	  It:	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  
Power	  Politics'.	  	  
9	  Compare	  for	  example	  Adler,	  'Constructivism	  in	  International	  Relations',	  104-­‐106.	  
10	  Most	   notably	   for	   the	   context	   of	   this	   investigation	   are:	   state	   agency,	   collective	   unconsciousness,	   and	  
superorganisms.	   For	   the	   term	   “quantum	   social	   science”	   see	   Alexander	   Wendt,	   'Social	   Theory	   as	   Cartesian	  
Science:	   An	   Auto-­‐Critique	   from	   a	   Quantum	   Perspective',	   in	   Constructivism	   and	   International	   Relations:	  
Alexander	  Wendt	   and	  His	   Critics,	   ed.	   Stefano	  Guzzini	   and	  Anna	   Leander	   (London	   and	  New	  York:	   Routledge,	  
2006),	  196.	  For	  a	  similar	  argument	  see	  also	  Alexander	  Wendt,	  'Flatland:	  Quantum	  Mind	  and	  the	  International	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In	  “Why	  a	  world	  state	  is	  inevitable”,	  Wendt	  engages	  in	  a	  teleological	  argument	  that	  sees	  a	  world	  
state	  as	  the	  final	  stage	  of	  a	  development	  driven	  by	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  logic	  of	  anarchy.	  Two	  things	  
are	  interesting	  to	  note.	  First,	  in	  this	  process	  the	  state	  is	  not	  to	  be	  overcome	  but	  will	  remain	  as	  
one	   subject	   among	   others.11	  Secondly,	  Wendt	   also	   describes	   the	  world	   state	   as	   a	   subject;	   he	  
also	  personifies	   it	  and	  attributes	  a	  corporate	  personhood	  and	  even	  a	  “self”	  to	   it.	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  
personified	  world	  state	  and	  a	  personified	  state	  exist	  side	  by	  side.12	  Both	  articles	  “Why	  a	  World	  
State	   is	   inevitable”	   and	   “Social	   Theory	   as	   Cartesian	   Science”	   go	   back	   to	   some	   of	   the	   key	  
questions	  underlying	  Wendt’s	  work	  that	  are	  teased	  out	  in	  this	  chapter.	  
In	  the	  following,	  I	  give	  an	  overview	  and	  critique	  of	  Wendt’s	  conception	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  I	  
will	  start	  by	  giving	  a	  description	  of	  Wendt’s	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  and	  then	  will	  move	  on	  to	  pay	  closer	  
attention	  to	  his	  philosophical,	  social	  science	  and	  IR	  theory	  commitments.	  The	  focus	  will	  rest	  on	  
Social	  Theory,	  “The	  state	  as	  person”,	  and	  the	  critical	  engagement	  with	  both	  offered	  by,	  among	  
others,	   Colin	   Wight,	   Patrick	   T.	   Jackson,	   Iver	   B.	   Neumann,	   Hidemi	   Suganami,	   and	   Friedrich	  
Kratochwil.	   Following	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   debate	   in	   IR	   in	  
Chapter	  1,	  special	  attention	  will	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
are	  real	  and	  do	  not	  merely	  exist	   in	  an	  as-­‐if	  fashion.	  Further,	  we	  need	  to	  question	  what	  kind	  of	  
person	  Wendt’s	  state	  is.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  Wendt’s	  constructivist	  position	  and	  his	  commitment	  
to	  scientific	  realism	  and	  their	  implications	  need	  to	  be	  carefully	  analysed.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Hologram',	  in	  New	  Systems	  Theories	  of	  World	  Politics,	  ed.	  Mathias	  Albert,	  Lars-­‐Erik	  Cederman,	  and	  Alexander	  
Wendt	  (Houndmills,	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2010).	  
11	  At	   the	   final	   stage	  of	   the	  “logic	  of	  anarchy”,	   the	   stage	  of	   the	  world	   state,	   state	   sovereignty	  will	  have	  been	  
transferred	  to	  the	  world	  state	  and	   the	  recognition	  of	   individuals	  will	  no	   longer	  be	  mediated	  by	  states.	  Both,	  
individuals	   and	   states	   are	   subjects	   that	   behave	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   world	   state.	   They	   recognise	   and	   are	  
recognised	   by	   the	   world	   state.	   Alexander	   Wendt,	   'Why	   a	   World	   State	   Is	   Inevitable',	   European	   Journal	   of	  
International	  Relations	  9,	  4	  (2003),	  525	  and	  527.	  
12	  The	  most	  explicit	  statement	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  probably	  the	  following.	  “[L]ike	  today’s	  states	  I	  am	  arguing	  that	  a	  
world	  state	  would	  be	  a	  subject	  –	  a	  corporate	  person	  or	  Self”	  ibid.,	  	  527.	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Wendtian	  constructivism:	  the	  via	  media	  and	  ideas	  not	  all	  the	  
way	  down	  
When	   talking	  about	  Wendt’s	   specific	   version	  of	   constructivism,	   it	   is	  worth	   stressing	   that	  most	  
constructivists,	   including	   Wendt,	   do	   not	   regard	   constructivism	   as	   a	   theory	   operating	   on	   the	  
same	   level	  as	   realism	  or	   liberalism.13	  Constructivism	   is	  best	  described	  as	  a	  set	  of	  assumptions.	  
Wendt’s	  Social	  Theory	   is	   the	  attempt	   to	  construct	   the	  next	  big	   theory	  of	   IR	   taking	  Kenneth	  N.	  
Waltz’s	   work	   as	   a	   starting	   point	   and	   re-­‐working	   Theory	   of	   International	   Politics	   from	   a	  
constructivist	  and	  social	  theory	  perspective.14	  	  
Wendt	   himself	   labels	   his	   constructivism	   as	   “thin”	   and	   “moderate”.15	  In	   Social	   Theory,	   Wendt	  
sets	   himself	   the	   goal	   of	   operating	   on	   a	  middle	   ground,	   a	   via	  media,	   between	   rationalist	   and	  
reflectivist	   theories. 16 	  He	   points	   out	   that	   this	   perspective	   “concedes	   important	   points	   to	  
materialist	  and	  individualist	  perspectives	  and	  endorses	  a	  scientific	  approach	  to	  social	  inquiry”.17	  
It	  is	  important	  for	  him	  to	  stress	  that	  his	  constructivist	  approach	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  “ideas	  
all	  the	  way	  down”.18	  	  
Closely	   connected	   to	   this	   is	  Wendt’s	   proposal	   of	   rump	  materialism.19	  By	   starting	   from	  Waltz’s	  
neorealism	  to	  construct	  his	  social	   theory	  of	   IR,	  Wendt	  engages	  with	  the	  materialism	  that	  goes	  
hand	   in	   hand	  with	  Waltz,	   especially	   the	  distribution	  of	   capabilities	   as	   a	  material	   factor	   of	   the	  
state	  system.	  However,	  Wendt	  also	  argues	  that	  neorealism	  “fetishizes”	  material	  capabilities	  by	  
attributing	  meaning	  and	  power	  to	  them	  that	  can	  only	  be	  attributed	  to	  human	  beings.20	  He	  aims	  
at	   opening	   up	   Waltz’s	   conception	   of	   interests	   by	   arguing	   that	   state	   interests	   and	   systemic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  7.	  
14	  Ibid.,	  	  8.	  
15	  Ibid.,	  	  xiv.	  
16	  Ibid.,	  	  40.	  Interestingly,	  Wendt	  points	  out	  that	  the	  term	  via	  media	  was	  suggested	  to	  him	  by	  Steve	  Smith.	  See	  
ibid.,	  	  40,	  fn	  98.	  	  
Yet,	   in	   a	   critique	   of	   Social	   Theory,	   Smith	   argues	   that	   “Wendt	   does	   not	   succeed	   in	   constructing	   his	  
philosophically	   principled	  middle	  way.”	   Steve	   Smith,	   'Wendt's	  World',	  Review	   of	   International	   Studies	   26,	   1	  
(2000),	  152.	  
17	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  1.	  
18	  See	   for	   example	   ibid.,	   	   132,	   emphasis	   in	   original.	   In	   this	   passage,	  Wendt	   argues,	   based	   on	   observations	  
regarding	   individual	   human	   beings,	   that	   interests	   are	   based	   within	   a	   biological	   realism	   which	   does	   not	  
preclude	  social	  construction	  but	  limits	  the	  possibilities	  of	  construction.	  	  
19	  Ibid.,	  	  109.	  
20	  Ibid.	  Here	  Wendt	  is	  quoting	  Tim	  Dant,	  'Fetishism	  and	  the	  Social	  Value	  of	  Objects',	  The	  Sociological	  Review	  44,	  
3	  (1996),	  496.	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culture	  have	  been	  implicit	  in	  Waltz	  all	  along.21	  Yet,	  it	  is	  not	  ideas	  all	  the	  way	  down.	  With	  regard	  
to	  the	  interactions	  of	  states,	  Wendt	  calls	  for	  the	  acknowledgement	  of	  material	  forces	  that	  have	  
independent	  effects	  on	  international	  life.	  	  
Similarly,	  with	  regard	  to	   individual	  human	  beings,	   fundamental	  material	  needs	  are,	   in	  Wendt’s	  
framework,	   given	   and	   determined	   by	   human	   nature. 22	  This	   point	   is	   important	   because	   it	  
distinguishes	  Wendt	  from	  what	  he	  calls	  radical	  constructivists	  who,	  according	  to	  his	  description,	  
deny	  the	  social	  significance	  of	  biological	  needs.23	  	  
While	   acknowledging	   that	   this	   rump	   materialism	   is	   a	   concession	   to	   political	   realists,	   Wendt,	  
nevertheless	   defends	   it	   by	   arguing	   that	   “material	   capabilities	   do	   have	   some	   intrinsic	   causal	  
powers”	   and	   can	   therefore	  not	  be	   ignored.24	  Material	   capabilities	  matter	   in	  Wendt’s	  world	   to	  
the	  extent	  that	  they	  make	  certain	  outcomes	  more	  likely	  and	  constrain	  others.	  For	  Wendt,	  there	  
is	  a	  material	  basis	  to	  what	  is	  possible	  in	  a	  constructed	  world.	  However,	  we	  should	  also	  note	  that	  
Wendt’s	  treatment	  of	  social	  structures,	  when	  he,	  for	  example,	  describes	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  as	  
a	   social	   structure	  based	  on	   shared	   knowledge,	   is	   fundamentally	   idealist	   at	   times.25	  Depending	  
on	  where	  the	  focus	  is	  put,	  Wendt	  can	  indeed	  be	  read,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  in	  more	  idealist	  terms	  
and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  more	  realist	  terms.	  This	  might	  be	  a	  consequence	  of	  seeking	  a	  middle	  
ground	  position.26	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  109.	  
22 	  The	   “rump	   materialism”	   of	   the	   state	   is	   given	   by	   material	   capabilities,	   the	   composition	   of	   material	  
capabilities,	   and	  geography	  as	  well	   as	  natural	   resources.	   The	   rump	  materialism	  of	   the	   individual	   is	   given	  by	  
fundamental	   human	   needs	   which	   are	   physical	   security,	   ontological	   security,	   sociation,	   self-­‐esteem,	   and	  
transcendence.	  Ibid.,	  	  for	  the	  former	  see	  110-­‐111	  and	  for	  the	  latter	  see	  131-­‐132.	  
23	  Ibid.,	  	  131.	  
24	  Ibid.,	  	  98,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  See	  also	  the	  following	  for	  a	  more	  general	  comments	  on	  this	  issue	  ibid.,	  	  96.	  
25	  Compare	   ibid.,	   	   215.	   For	   a	   critique,	   see	  Wight,	  Agents,	   Structures	   and	   International	   Relations:	   Politics	   as	  
Ontology,	  183.	  Friedrich	  Kratochwil	  identifies	  several	  different	  definitions	  of	  the	  state	  system	  in	  Wendt’s	  Social	  
Theory	   ranging	   from	  a	  Waltzian	  notion	  that	   is	  close	   to	  a	  natural	   system	  to	  a	  system	  that	   is	  best	  understood	  
exclusively	   in	   cultural	   terms.	   Kratochwil,	   'Constructing	   a	   New	   Orthodoxy?	   Wendt's	   Social	   Theory	   of	  
International	  Politics	  and	  the	  Constructivist	  Challenge',	  43.	  
26	  It	   might	   also	   be	   part	   of	   a	   process	   in	   Wendt’s	   work	   that	   resembles	   a	   move	   towards	   a	   more	   radical	  
constructivism.	  Eric	  Ringmar,	  a	  former	  Wendt	  student,	  for	  example	  observes	  that	  there	  are	  “two	  Wendts”.	  The	  
later	   Wendt	   is	   much	   more	   “ideas	   all	   the	   way	   down”.	   Similarly,	   Wendt’s	   work	   on	   quantum	   social	   science,	  
despite	   the	   insistence	  on	  a	  scientific	   realist	   framework,	  brings	  him	  even	  closer	   to	  a	  radical	  constructivism	  of	  
the	   social.	   Erik	   Ringmar,	   'Alexander	   Wendt:	   A	   Social	   Scientist	   Struggling	   with	   History',	   in	   The	   Future	   of	  
International	  Relations.	  Masters	  in	  the	  Making,	  ed.	  Iver	  B.	  Neumann	  and	  Ole	  Weaver	  (London	  and	  New	  York:	  
Routledge,	  1997).	  Wendt,	  'Social	  Theory	  as	  Cartesian	  Science:	  An	  Auto-­‐Critique	  from	  a	  Quantum	  Perspective'.	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Wendt’s	   aim	   to	   find	   a	   middle	   ground	   becomes	   more	   concrete	   when	   looking	   at	   his	  
epistemological	  and	  ontological	  commitments.	  He	  is	  explicit	  about	  his	  choices.	  In	  his	  own	  words,	  
he	   follows	   an	   idealist	   ontology	   but	   chooses	   a	   positivist	   epistemology. 27 	  He	   adds	   that	  
“[c]onstructivism	   should	   be	   construed	   narrowly	   as	   an	   ontology,	   not	   broadly	   as	   an	  
epistemology.”28	  Constructivism,	   is,	   according	   to	   Wendt,	   not	   incompatible	   with	   a	   positivist	  
epistemology,	  or	  as	  he	  puts	  it	  “with	  a	  scientific	  approach	  to	  social	  inquiry”.29	  He	  bridges	  this	  gap	  
by	  building	  a	  via	  media	  constructivism	  based	  on	  scientific	  realism.30	  	  
It	   is	   important	   to	  stress	   that	  Wendt’s	  approach	  represents	  only	  one	  version	  of	  constructivism.	  
On	   the	   one	   hand,	   we	   have	   Wendt’s	   self-­‐description	   as	   a	   constructivist	   and	   his	   view	   of	  
constructivism	  as	  an	  approach	  to	  IR.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  can	  find	  various	  categorisations	  of	  
Wendt’s	  constructivism	  introduced	  by	  other	  scholars.	  Depending	  on	  where	  they	  stand	  within	  a	  
constructivist	   spectrum	   and	   depending	   on	   their	   (implicit)	   definitions	   of	   what	   constructivism	  
means	  or	  what	  such	  an	  approach	  should	  or	  should	  not	  entail,	  we	  find	  very	  different	  descriptions	  
of	  Wendt.	  In	  the	  following,	  a	  look	  at	  two	  key	  figures	  and	  their	  perspective	  on	  Wendt	  serves	  to	  
illustrate	  this	  point	  and	  helps	  to	  gain	  a	  more	  nuanced	  grasp	  of	  the	  version	  of	  constructivism	  that	  
we	  encounter	  in	  Wendt	  and	  that	  underpins	  his	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  	  
Emanuel	  Adler	  points	  out	   that	   the	  1992	  article	   “Anarchy	   is	  what	   states	  make	  of	   it”	  as	  well	   as	  
Social	  Theory	  established	  Wendt	  as	  one	  of	  the	  leading	  constructivist	  scholars.	  He	  outlines	  three	  
specific	  debates	   that	  were	  shaped	  by	  Wendt.	  First,	   there	   is	   the	  agent-­‐structure	  debate.	  Based	  
on	   Anthony	   Gidden’s	   structuration	   theory,	   Wendt	   seeks	   to	   show	   how	   agents	   and	   structure	  
mutually	   constitute	   each	   other.31	  The	   second	   debate	   develops	   out	   of	   the	   distinction	   between	  
understanding,	  Verstehen,	  und	  explaining,	  Erklären.	  Crystallising	  in	  a	  debate	  between	  Wendt	  on	  
one	  side	  and	  Martin	  Hollis	  and	  Steve	  Smith	  on	  the	  other,	  a	  key	  question	  is	  whether	  one	  should	  
start	  from	  ontology	  or	  epistemology	  when	  attempting	  to	  theorise	  about	  international	  relations.	  
Wendt,	   in	   scientific	   realist	   fashion,	   starts	   from	  ontological	   premises	  whereas	  Hollis	   and	   Smith	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  38-­‐40.	  
28	  Ibid.,	  	  41.	  
29	  Ibid.	  
30	  These	  moves	  and	  Wendt’s	  via	  media	  position	  are	  of	  course	  not	  without	  criticism.	  Steve	  Smith	  for	  example	  
argues	  that	  “Wendt	  …	  sides	  with	  positivists	  in	  terms	  of	  epistemology,	  but	  with	  post-­‐positivists	  in	  terms	  of	  
ontology.”	  However,	  Smith	  sees	  Wendt’s	  approach	  as	  a	  failed	  attempt	  at	  constructing	  this	  middle	  ground.	  
Smith,	  'Wendt's	  World',	  152.	  
31	  Adler,	  'Constructivism	  in	  International	  Relations',	  105.	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argue	  that	  ontology	  can	  only	  be	  addressed	  after	  one	  has	  made	  a	  decision	  about	  epistemology.	  
In	  other	  words,	  they	  argue	  that	  we	  first	  need	  to	  decide	  how	  we	  can	  know	  the	  world	  before	  we	  
can	   study	   the	   objects	   in	   the	   world.	   Wendt,	   in	   contrast,	   argues	   that	   we	   need	   to	   start	   from	  
ontology	  and	  take	  the	  objects	  in	  the	  world	  as	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  making	  knowledge	  claims.32	  
A	  third	  constructivist	  debate,	  outlined	  by	  Adler	   in	  which	  Wendt	   is	  a	  key	  figure	  –	   in	  fact	   it	  took	  
mainly	  place	  between	  him	  and	  his	  critics	  –	  is	  the	  debate	  about	  causal	  and	  constitutive	  relations	  
in	  the	  social	  world.33	  	  
Worth	  mentioning	   is	   also	   Chris	   Reus-­‐Smit’s	   characterisation	   of	  Wendt’s	   constructivism.	   Reus-­‐
Smit	  distinguishes	  between	   three	  kinds	  of	   constructivism	   that	  evolved	   in	   the	  1990s:	   systemic,	  
unit-­‐level,	  and	  holistic	  constructivism.34	  Wendt	  is	  presented	  as	  not	  only	  the	  dominant	  exponent	  
of	   systemic	   constructivism,	   but	   as	   “the	   only	   true	   example	   of	   this	   rarefied	   form	   of	  
constructivism”. 35 	  According	   to	   Reus-­‐Smit,	   systemic	   constructivism	   adopts	   “third-­‐image”	  
theorising,	   thereby	   following	   neorealists.	   Systemic	   constructivism	   focuses	   on	   the	   interactions	  
between	  states	  understood	  as	  unitary	  actors;	  staying	  true	  to	  the	  name	  systemic	  constructivism,	  
everything	  that	  belongs	  to	  the	  domestic	  realm	  is	  bracketed.	  	  
It	  is	  worth	  stressing	  that	  this	  position	  is	  not	  surprising	  given	  that	  Wendt	  takes	  his	  starting	  point	  
from	  Waltz.	  He	  defends	  his	  perspective	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  questions	  he	  asks	  shape	  his	  enquiry	  
and	   that	   for	   his	   type	   of	   enquiry	   –	   an	   interest	   in	   the	   states	   systemic	   project	   –	   a	   systemic	  
perspective	  that	  brackets	  off	  elements	  of	  state	  identity	  that	  have	  a	  domestic	  source	  is	  needed.	  
While	  theoretically	  elegant,	  Reus-­‐Smit	  criticises	  that	  this	  move	  “confines	  the	  process	  that	  shape	  
international	  societies	  within	  an	  unnecessarily	  and	  unproductively	  narrow	  realm”.36	  And	  further,	  
he	  emphasises	  that	  this	  is	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  Wendt’s	  systemic	  constructivism	  seems	  at	  a	  
loss	  when	  trying	  to	  explain	  change,	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  international	  society	  as	  well	  as	  at	  the	  level	  
of	  the	  state.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Ibid.	  
33	  Ibid.,	  	  106.	  
34	  For	  this	  and	  the	  following	  see	  Christian	  Reus-­‐Smit,	  'Constructivism',	  in	  Theories	  of	  International	  Relations,	  ed.	  
Scott	  Burchill,	  et	  al.	  (Houndmills,	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2009),	  213	  and	  223f.	  
35	  Ibid.,	  	  223.	  
36	  Ibid.,	  	  223-­‐224.	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More	   importantly	   for	   the	   characterisation	  of	  Wendt	   as	   a	   constructivist	   is,	   however,	   the	  point	  
that	   Wendt’s	   systemic	   constructivism	   is	   at	   odds	   with	   the	   positions	   taken	   by	   other	  
constructivists.	  Reus-­‐Smit	  argues	  that	  Wendt’s	  focus	  on	  the	  systemic	  level,	  his	  treatment	  of	  the	  
state	   as	   a	   unitary	   actor,	   and	   his	   adoption	   of	   a	   scientific	   realist	   position	   separates	   him	   clearly	  
from	  other	  constructivists	  such	  as	  Friedrich	  Kratochwil,	  Nicholas	  Onuf,	  and	  Karin	  Fierke.37	  Fierke	  
for	  example,	  by	  pointing	  to	  the	  indebtedness	  of	  constructivism	  to	  the	  linguistic	  turn,	  argues	  that	  
Wendt’s	  positivistic	  epistemology	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  core	  constructivist	  assumptions.38	  	  
Nevertheless,	   Reus-­‐Smit	   argues	   that	   Wendt’s	   importance	   for	   the	   discipline	   should	   not	   be	  
underestimated	  and	  that	  it	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  Social	  Theory	  “is	  the	  most	  sustained	  elaboration	  
of	   constructivist	   theory”. 39 	  However,	   given	   disagreements	   about	   what	   it	   means	   to	   be	   a	  
constructivist,	   the	   arguments	   put	   forward	   in	  Social	   Theory	   are	   highly	   contested	  which	   in	   turn	  
makes	   it	  “one	  of	   the	  principal	  axes	  of	   tension	  within	  constructivism”.40	  Wendt	  serves	  a	  similar	  
function	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  thesis.	  The	  engagement	  with	  Wendt’s	  work	  on	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
serves	  to	  outline	  the	  broad	  lines	  of	  the	  debate.	  What	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  constructivist	  and	  where	  
to	  locate	  this	  thesis	  within	  a	  spectrum	  of	  various	  constructivist	  approaches	  are	  two	  of	  the	  points	  
that	  need	  to	  be	  addressed.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  For	   a	   similar	   critique	   of	   the	   incompatibility	   of	   Wendt’s	   adoption	   of	   scientific	   realism	   with	   constructivist	  
assumptions	  see	  	  Kratochwil,	   'Constructing	  a	  New	  Orthodoxy?	  Wendt's	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics	  
and	  the	  Constructivist	  Challenge',	  38.	  	  
38	  Fierke,	   'Constructivism',	   173-­‐174.	   Compare	   also	  Karin	  M.	   Fierke,	   'Wittgenstein	   and	   International	   Relations	  
Theory',	   in	   International	   Relations	   Theory	   and	   Philosophy:	   Interpretive	   Dialogues,	   ed.	   Cerwyn	   Moore	   and	  
Farrands	  Chris	  (London	  and	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2010).	  And	  Friedrich	  Kratochwil,	  'Constructivism:	  What	  It	  Is	  
(Not)	  and	  How	  It	  Matters',	  in	  Approaches	  and	  Methodologies	  in	  the	  Social	  Sciences.	  A	  Pluralist	  Perspective,	  ed.	  
Donatella	   Della	   Porta	   and	  Michael	   Keating	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	   University	   Press,	   2008).	   It	   is	   also	   worth	  
pointing	   out	   that	   the	   label	   positivism	   does	   not	   actually	   go	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   Wendt’s	   scientific	   realist	  
approach.	   Compare	  Wight,	  Agents,	   Structures	   and	   International	   Relations:	   Politics	   as	   Ontology,	   17.	   See	   the	  
following	  section	  for	  further	  elaboration	  on	  this	  point.	  
39	  Reus-­‐Smit,	  'Constructivism',	  226.	  It	  is	  worth	  stressing	  that	  in	  the	  same	  passage	  Reus-­‐Smit	  argues	  that	  
“constructivists	  repeatedly	  insist	  that	  constructivism	  is	  not	  a	  theory,	  but	  rather	  an	  analytical	  framework.”	  	  
40	  Ibid.,	  	  227.	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Scientific	  realist	  commitments	  
In	   order	   to	   better	   understand	   Wendt’s	   stance	   on	   state	   personhood,	   a	   careful	   look	   at	   his	  
philosophy	  of	  science	  commitments	  is	  necessary.	  In	  “The	  state	  as	  person”	  Wendt	  stresses	  very	  
strongly	  that	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  are	  real.	  In	  fact,	  this	  is	  the	  main	  point	  that	  Wendt	  
uses	   to	   delineate	   himself	   from	   mainstream	   approaches	   in	   IR	   theory.	   He	   claims	   that	   most	  
theories	  look	  at	  state	  personhood	  only	  in	  an	  as-­‐if	  fashion,	  treating	  it	  as	  “a	  useful	  fiction,	  analogy,	  
metaphor,	  or	  shorthand	  for	  something	  else”.41	  In	  these	  cases,	  the	  state	  is	  in	  some	  way	  described	  
as-­‐if	   it	  were	   a	  person,	   but	  ultimately,	   the	   state	   is	   something	  else.	  Wendt	   argues	   that	   an	  as-­‐if	  
treatment	   of	   the	   state	   is	   indeed	   very	   compelling	   “to	   the	  modern	   scientific	   mind”	   given	   that	  
“most	  of	  us	  at	  least	  tacitly	  accept	  an	  ontology	  of	  physicalism,	  or	  materialism,	  which	  is	  the	  view	  
that,	  ultimately,	  reality	  is	  made	  up	  of	  purely	  physical	  stuff	  (matter).”42	  	  
This	  lack	  of	  commitment	  to	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  state	  and	  state	  personhood	  is	  Wendt’s	  starting	  
point.	  Wendt	  then	  faces	  a	  problem:	  how	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  state	  is	  real	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  
not	   purely	   matter	   and	   not	   directly	   observable?43	  He	   finds	   an	   answer	   by	   turning	   to	   scientific	  
realist	  principles.	  	  
It	   has	   to	   be	   stressed	   that	   scientific	   realism	   is	   not	   a	   theory	   of	   IR	   itself.	   Rather,	   it	   is	   best	  
understood	   in	   terms	   of	   making	   “second-­‐order,	   conceptual	   or	   meta-­‐theoretical	   claims”.44	  In	  
Social	  Theory,	  Wendt	  outlines	  three	  main	  principles	  of	  scientific	  realism:	  
1	   the	   world	   is	   independent	   of	   the	   mind	   and	   language	   of	   individual	  
observers;	   2	   mature	   scientific	   theories	   typically	   refer	   to	   this	   world,	   3	  
even	  when	  it	  is	  not	  directly	  observable.45	  
We	  can	  note	  that	  scientific	  realism	  is	  first	  and	  foremost	  concerned	  with	  the	  ontological	  status	  of	  
things:	   objects,	   ideas,	   relations,	   structures	   are	   all	   considered	   to	   be	   real. 46 	  The	   strong	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  289.	  
42	  Ibid.,	  	  290.	  
43	  Two	  things	  should	  be	  pointed	  out	  explicitly	   in	  this	  context.	  First,	  although	  physicalism	  and	  materialism	  are	  
sometimes	   used	   interchangeably,	   the	   two	   terms	   should	   not	   be	   conflated.	   Second,	   it	   is	  worth	   stressing	   that	  
some	  “things”	  of	  a	  psychological,	  moral	  or	  social	  nature	  are	  said	  to	  exist	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  they	  supervene	  on	  
the	  physical.	  This	  is	  different	  from	  saying	  that	  “reality	  is	  made	  up	  of	  purely	  physical	  stuff.”	  Ibid.	  	  
44	  Jonathan	   Joseph,	   'Philosophy	   in	   International	   Relations.	   A	   Scientific	   Realist	   Approach',	  Millennium	   35,	   2	  
(2007),	  346.	  
45	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  51.	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differentiation	  between	  the	  ideational	  and	  the	  material	  breaks	  down	  in	  scientific	  realism.	  “Thus	  
ideational	  things	  as	  much	  as	  material	  things	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  a	  real	  existence	  independent	  of	  
particular	   conceptions	   and	   understandings	   we	   may	   have	   of	   them.”47	  This	   is	   how	   the	   state,	  
though	  not	   directly	   observable,	   can	  be	   said	   to	  be	   real;	   it	   exists	   independent	  of	   our	   particular	  
conception	  of	  it.	  	  
There	  are	  several	  further	  assumptions.	  First,	  a	  scientific	  realist	  perspective	  stresses	  that	  various	  
interpretations	  of	  the	  world	  are	  possible,	  yet	  not	  every	  interpretation	  is	  permissible;	  the	  world	  
“resists”	   certain	   interpretations.48	  Especially	   in	   the	   social	   sciences,	   all	   observation	   is	   theory-­‐
laden;	   yet,	   observation	   is	   not	   theory-­‐determined	   as	   in	   post-­‐modern	   or	   radical	   constructivist	  
approaches.49	  This	   is	  what	  Wendt	  calls	  “rump	  materialism”.	  This	  “rump	  materialism”	  limits	  the	  
interpretations	   that	   can	  be	  made	  and	   restricts	  an	   idealist	  world-­‐view.50	  From	  this	  perspective,	  
post-­‐modern	   scholars	   and	   radical	   constructivists	   who	   focus	   on	   the	   level	   of	   discourse	   do	   not	  
bring	   their	   theories	   into	   a	   dialogue	   with	   the	   world.	   Hence,	   they	   ignore	   what	   is	   and	   ignore	  
deeper	  levels	  of	  reality.	  	  	  
Second,	   scientific	   realism	  posits	   that	   there	   is	   a	  world	   “out	   there”,	   that,	   though	   it	   is	   often	  not	  
directly	   observable,	   has	   causal	   effects.	   “What	   scientific	   realists	   claim	   is	   that	   the	   behavior	   of	  
things	  is	  influenced	  by	  self-­‐organizing,	  mind-­‐independent	  structures	  that	  constitute	  those	  things	  
with	  certain	  intrinsic	  powers	  and	  dispositions.”51	  For	  Wendt,	  the	  state	  is	  such	  an	  entity.52	  	  
There	   are	   several	   important	   aims	   that	   Wendt	   follows	   by	   resorting	   to	   scientific	   realism	   for	  
theorising	  the	  state	  and	  states’	  systemic	  interactions.	  First,	  Wendt	  argues	  that	  scientific	  realism	  
offers	   a	  way	   to	   reconcile	  his	  ontological	   idealism	  with	  his	   epistemological	   positivism.53	  In	   that	  
sense,	   scientific	   realism	   allows	  Wendt	   to	   build	   what	   he	   calls	   a	   via	   media	   constructivism.54	  It	  
allows	   him	   to	   keep	   a	   distinction	   between	   subject	   and	   object	   and	   to	   retain	   what	   he	   calls	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
46	  Joseph,	  'Philosophy	  in	  International	  Relations.	  A	  Scientific	  Realist	  Approach',	  354.	  
47	  Ibid.	  
48	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  57.	  
49	  Ibid.,	  	  63.	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  See	  for	  example	  ibid.,	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51	  Ibid.,	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52	  Wendt	  argues	  that	  “[a]	  state’s	  ability	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  organize	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  as	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  example,	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   illegal	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  Ibid.,	  	  73.	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  Ibid.,	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“commitment	  to	  science”	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  giving	  ideational	  factors	  their	  due.55	  However,	  
Wendt’s	  description	  of	  his	  epistemology	  as	  positivistic	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  concession	  to	  an	  
IR	   mainstream	   wedded	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   positivism	   is	   synonymous	   with	   science.56 	  In	   fact,	  
Wendt’s	  turn	  to	  scientific	  realism	  with	  the	  emphasis	  on	  unobservables	  and	  a	  stratified	  view	  of	  
reality	  needs	   to	  be	  understood	  as	  a	   critique	  of	  positivism.	  And	   it	   is	  precisely	   this	   critique	   that	  
allows	  him	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  state	  really	  exists.	  In	  that	  sense,	  Wendt’s	  via	  media	  constructivism	  
does	   not	   represent	   a	   middle-­‐ground	   between	   idealism	   and	   positivism.	   Rather,	   it	   is	   a	  
constructivism	   that,	   in	   contrast	   to	   more	   radical	   constructivists	   who	   operate	   on	   the	   level	   of	  
discourse	  alone,	  stresses	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  deeper	  reality	  “behind”	  discourse.57	  	  
Second,	  Wendt	  utilises	  the	  scientific	  realist	  position	  to	  assert	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  state.	  The	  state	  is	  
not	  directly	  observable	  and	  for	  Wendt	  it	  is	  scientific	  realism	  which	  helps	  him	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  
state	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   direct	   empirical	   access	   to	   it.	   Wendt	   argues	   that	   empiricists	   and	  
postmodernists,	   albeit	   from	   fundamentally	   different	   perspectives,	   doubt	   the	   existence	   of	  
unobservables	   and	   “reject	   the	   realist	   claim	   that	   IR	   theory	   can	   know	   the	   deep	   structure	   of	  
international	   reality”.58	  For	  both	  empiricists	  and	  postmodernists	   the	  state	  does	  not	  really	  exist	  
and	  therefore,	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  engage	  the	  state	  as	  a	  real	  causal	  structure	  that	  makes	  certain	  
actions	   possible	   while	   constraining	   others.	   This	   is	   a	   problem	   for	   a	   discipline	   whose	   self-­‐
understanding	  is	  so	  fundamentally	  dependent	  on	  the	  state.	  	  Yet,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  pointed	  out	  that	  
for	  those	   interested	   in	  aspects	  of	  the	  social	  world,	  the	  view	  that	  unobservables	  do	  not	  exist	   is	  
virtually	   impossible	   to	   hold.59	  Existence	   in	   the	   first	   place	   is	   not	   confined	   to	   things	   that	   are	  
observable	  or	  directly	  measurable.	  Suganami	  convincingly	  argues	  that	  “reducing	  the	  criterion	  of	  
existence	  solely	  to	  direct	  observability	  is	  silly.”60	  Such	  a	  view	  would	  unduly	  narrow	  the	  range	  of	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  39	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  47.	  
56	  Wight,	  Agents,	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  Relations:	  Politics	  as	  Ontology.	  
57	  For	  an	  overview	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  scientific	  realist	  principles	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  position	  visa	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  vis	  positivism	  and	  radical	  constructivist	  
approaches	  see	  also	  Heikki	  Patomäki	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  Colin	  Wight,	  'After	  Postpositivism?	  The	  Promises	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  Wight,	  'State	  Agency:	  Social	  Action	  without	  Human	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  271.	  
60	  Hidemi	   Suganami,	   'Wendt,	   IR,	   and	   Philosophy',	   in	   Constructivism	   and	   International	   Relations.	   Alexander	  
Wendt	  and	  His	  Critics,	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  (London	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  York:	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things	  than	  can	  legitimately	  be	  said	  to	  exist.61	  Hence,	  an	  acceptance	  of	  unobservables,	  Suganami	  
argues,	  is	  also	  possible	  without	  necessarily	  subscribing	  to	  scientific	  realism.	  
The	  third	  reason	  for	  Wendt’s	  commitment	  to	  scientific	  realism	  is	  tied	  up	  with	  what	  he	  refers	  to	  
as	  the	  ultimate	  argument	  or	  miracle	  argument.62	  Wendt	  argues	  that	  the	  state	  (and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐
person)	  must	  be	  real	  because	  the	  theories	  that	  invoke	  the	  state	  and	  the	  personhood	  of	  the	  state	  
work	  well	  in	  explaining	  the	  world.	  If	  they	  would	  not	  refer	  to	  something	  real,	  their	  success	  would	  
be	   a	   miracle.	   This	   has	   to	   be	   understood	   before	   the	   background	   of	   a	   specific	   conception	   of	  
science	  and	  scientific	  progress.	  Wendt	  asks:	   “If	   [the	  state	  and	  state	  personhood]	  were	  merely	  
fiction,	  then	  one	  might	  expect	  a	  more	  precise,	  realistic	  concept	  of	  state	  to	  have	  emerged	  over	  
time.”63	  In	  other	  words,	  Wendt	  asks	  if	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  only	  a	  useful	  fiction,	  why	  does	  this	  
fiction	   work	   so	   well	   in	   explaining	   the	   world	   of	   states	   and	   why	   has	   not	   a	   more	   “realistic”	  
explanations	  of	  the	  state	  emerged	  over	  time?64	  The	  task	  of	  science	  is	  to	  get	  closer	  to	  the	  “deep	  
structure	  of	  the	  world	  out	  there”.65	  From	  a	  scientific	  realist	  perspective,	  the	  purpose	  of	  science	  
is	  to	  bring	  our	  theories	  of	  the	  world	  in	  ever	  closer	  alignment	  with	  the	  actual	  world	  “out	  there”	  
and	  its	  structures.	  Wendt	  argues	  that	  only	  scientific	  realism	  does	  not	  turn	  the	  success	  of	  science	  
into	   a	   miracle.66	  According	   to	  Wendt,	   from	   this,	   and	   only	   from	   this,	   perspective	   do	   we	   have	  
good	  grounds	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  state	  (and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person)	  is	  indeed	  real.	  	  
Fourth,	   as	  we	   have	   already	   seen,	   scientific	   realism	   allows	  Wendt	   to	   defend	   a	   certain	   view	   of	  
science	  and	  scientific	  progress.	  It	  allows	  Wendt	  to	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  a	  “world	  out	  there”	  which	  
theories	  of	   IR	   try	   to	  approximate.	   Scientific	  progress	   is	   seen	  as	   the	  ever	   closer	   approximation	  
between	  the	  theories	  and	  the	  world.	  Progress	  is	  the	  increase	  in	  explanatory	  or	  predictive	  power	  
of	   our	   theories.67	  Thus,	   he	   argues	   that	   “[w]hat	  makes	   a	   theory	   true	   is	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   it	  
reflects	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  the	  world.”68	  What	  lies	  behind	  this	  is	  a	  correspondence	  theory	  of	  
truth.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  terms	  used	  do	  need	  to	  correspond	  to	  an	  extra-­‐discursive	  reality.	  This	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  Wendt,	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  Wendt,	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is	   different	   from	   a	   relational	   theory	   of	   reference	   held	   by	   post-­‐modernists	   and	   more	   radical	  
constructivist.	  Wendt	  criticises	  them	  for	  not	  being	  able	  to	  explain	  the	  “resistance	  of	  the	  world	  to	  
certain	   representations,	   and	   thus	   for	   representational	   failures	   or	   misrepresentations”. 69	  
However,	  Wendt	   cautions	   that	   this	   is	   not	   to	   be	  mistaken	   for	   a	   foundationalist	   epistemology	  
because	  from	  within	  his	  philosophy	  of	  science	  “[t]heories	  are	  always	  tested	  against	  theories”70	  
and	  not	  directly	  against	  the	  real	  world.	  Even	  with	  so-­‐called	  mature	  theories,	  theories	  that	  have	  
been	   quite	   successful	   over	   time,	   there	   is	   only	   ever	   approximation	   and	   not	   truth,	   Wendt	  
argues.71	  	  
Kratochwil,	   unsurprisingly	   given	   his	   strong	   constructivist	   stance,	   critically	   questions	   Wendt’s	  
position	  and	  argues	  that	  Wendt	  does	  not	  succeed	  in	  being	  a	  constructivist	  and	  a	  scientific	  realist	  
at	  the	  same	  time.	  For	  Kratochwil,	  scientific	  realism	  and	  constructivism	  are	  a	  “failed	  marriage”	  in	  
Wendt’s	   case.72	  Wendt	   starts	   his	   theorising	   about	   the	   state	   from	   the	   basis	   of	   some	   essential	  
features	   of	   the	   world.	   In	   other	   words,	   he	   starts	   from	   ontology.	   This	   is	   in	   line	   with	   a	   key	  
assumption	   of	   scientific	   realism	   that	   the	   “world	   is	   independent	   of	   the	  mind	   and	   language	   of	  
individual	   observers.” 73 	  However,	   from	   a	   more	   radical	   constructivist	   perspective,	   essential	  
features	  of	  any	  entity	  are	  highly	  dependent	  on	  one’s	  point	  of	   view	  and	   therefore	  a	  matter	  of	  
social	   construction,	   convention,	   and	   rules	   rather	   than	   part	   of	   the	   intrinsic	   properties	   of	   the	  
“thing”	   under	   scrutiny.74	  While	   essentialism	   must	   hold	   that	   there	   is	   one	   true	   essence	   of	   a	  
“thing”,	   a	   more	   radical	   constructivism	   holds	   that	   this	   essence	   is	   socially	   constructed	   and	  
therefore	  not	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  “thing”.75	  From	  a	  more	  radical	  constructivist	  perspective,	  “things”	  
are	  not	   independent	   from	  our	   frame	  of	   reference.	  What	   constructivism	  debates,	   according	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Ibid.,	  	  56.	  
70	  Ibid.,	  	  59.	  	  
71	  Ibid.,	  	  68-­‐69.	  It	  needs	  to	  be	  added	  though,	  that	  Wendt	  does	  not	  regard	  theories	  of	  international	  relations	  to	  
be	  mature	  theories.	  Further,	  Kratochwil	  disputes	  this	  point	  and	  argues	  that	  Wendt	   is	   indeed	  foundationalist.	  
Wendt,	  'Social	  Theory	  as	  Cartesian	  Science:	  An	  Auto-­‐Critique	  from	  a	  Quantum	  Perspective',	  23.	  
72 	  Kratochwil,	   'Constructing	   a	   New	   Orthodoxy?	   Wendt's	   Social	   Theory	   of	   International	   Politics	   and	   the	  
Constructivist	  Challenge',	  41.	  
73	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  51.	  	  
74	  For	  a	  similar	  argument	  that	  focuses	  on	  a	  critique	  of	  Wendt’s	  essentialism	  and	  also	  concludes	  that	  this	  is	  at	  
odds	  with	  constructivist	  commitments,	  see	  Jackson,	  'Hegel's	  House,	  or	  'People	  Are	  States	  Too'',	  283.	  	  
75 	  Kratochwil,	   'Constructing	   a	   New	   Orthodoxy?	   Wendt's	   Social	   Theory	   of	   International	   Politics	   and	   the	  
Constructivist	  Challenge',	  41.	  I	  use	  the	  word	  “thing”	  here	  in	  line	  with	  Kratochwil’s	  usage	  of	  the	  word	  when	  he	  
argues	  against	  Wendt’s	  essentialism.	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Kratochwil,	   “is	  not	   the	   [question]	  of	  existence	   but	  of	   recognising	  what	   the	  existing	   thing	   is”.76	  
Kratochwil	  argues	  that	  Wendt’s	  scientific	  realist	  account	  tends	  to	  overly	  emphasise	  the	  question	  
of	  existence	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  “what”	  question.	  	  	  
Keeping	  these	  basic	  scientific	  realist	  premises	  in	  mind,	  a	  careful	  look	  at	  Wendt’s	  states	  systemic	  
project	  and	  his	  conception	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  needs	  to	  be	  taken.	  In	  a	  further	  step,	  the	  claim	  
that	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  are	  real	  and	  that	  we	  can	  ascribe	  “rump	  materialism”	  to	  
them	  will	  be	  addressed.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Ibid.,	  	  42,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	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The	  state	  as	  an	  agent,	  the	  state	  as	  a	  person	  
In	  Social	  Theory,	  Wendt	  proclaims	  “states	  are	  people	  too”.77	  In	  a	  first	  step,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  be	  
clear	   about	   what	   kind	   of	   person	   it	   is	   that	   we	   encounter	   in	  Wendt’s	   work.	   As	   pointed	   out	   in	  
Chapter	  1,	  in	  Wendt’s	  framework	  the	  state	  is	  a	  given.	  The	  state	  is	  ontologically	  prior	  to	  the	  state	  
system	  and	  pre-­‐social.78	  Moreover,	  the	  state	  is	  a	  unitary	  actor;	  it	  is	  purposive	  and	  has	  a	  sense	  of	  
self.79	  	  
Wendt	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  we	  can	  legitimately	  attribute	  human	  qualities	  like	  desires,	  beliefs,	  
and	   intentionality	   to	   the	   state.80	  He	   rests	   his	   model	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   on	   five	   essential	  
properties	  of	  the	  state	  that	  he	  derives	  from	  Weberian,	  Marxist,	  and	  Pluralist	  conceptions.81	  The	  
five	   properties	   of	   the	   essential	   state	   are	   “(1)	   an	   institutional-­‐legal	   order,	   (2)	   an	   organization	  
claiming	   a	   monopoly	   on	   the	   legitimate	   use	   of	   organized	   violence,	   (3)	   an	   organization	   with	  
sovereignty,	   (4)	   a	   society,	   and	   (5)	   territory”.82	  These	   essential	   properties	   form	   the	   basis	   of	  
Wendt’s	   idea	  of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	   It	   is	   crucial	   to	  note	   these	   five	  properties	  as	   they	  already	  
define	   the	   possibilities	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   in	   important	  ways.	  Wendt	   points	   out	   that	   “the	  
details	   of	   our	   understanding	   of	   state	   persons	  may	   be	   sensitive	   to	   different	   definitions	   of	   the	  
state	  (Liberal,	  Weberian,	  Marxist,	  and	  so	  on).”83	  	  
Building	   on	   these	   five	   essential	   properties,	   Wendt	   argues	   that	   identities	   and	   interests	   can	  
legitimately	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   state	   and,	   therefore,	   the	   state	   can	  be	   said	   to	   be	   a	   person.84	  
Here,	  Wendt	  makes	  two	  moves.	  First,	  he	  attempts	  “to	  give	  [his]	  model	  of	  the	  state	  a	  ‘body’	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  215.	  
78	  Ibid.	  
79	  Wendt	   stresses	   that	   being	   an	   actor	   already	   implies	   being	   unitary	   and	   that	   therefore	   the	   phrase	   “unitary	  
actor”	  is	  actually	  an	  unnecessary	  doubling	  in	  efforts.	  See	  	  ibid.,	  	  195.	  
80	  Ibid.,	  	  197.	  	  
81	  Ibid.,	  	  198-­‐214.	  
82	  Ibid.,	  	  202.	  	  
83	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  291,	  fn11.	  
84	  Wendt	  distinguishes	  between	  four	  different	  types	  of	  identity	  that	  open	  up	  a	  spectrum	  between	  an	  identity	  
that	  is	  defined	  solely	  by	  the	  individual	  and	  an	  identity	  that	  is	  dominated	  by	  the	  social	  context	  in	  which	  the	  
individual	  operates.	  He	  distinguishes	  between:	  “(1)	  personal	  or	  corporate,	  (2)	  type,	  (3)	  role,	  and	  (4)	  collective”	  
identity.	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  224.	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showing	  that	  it	  is	  an	  actor	  which	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  its	  parts”.85	  Secondly,	  he	  aims	  to	  give	  the	  
state	  “life”	  by	  identifying	  “its	  intrinsic	  motivational	  dispositions	  or	  ‘national	  interest’”.86	  	  
Thus,	   the	   state	   is	   a	   corporate	   agent	   which	   is	   described	   by	  Wendt	   as	   “a	   structure	   of	   shared	  
knowledge	   or	   discourse	   that	   enables	   individuals	   to	   engage	   in	   institutionalized	   collective	  
action”.87	  True	  to	  his	  constructivist	  roots,	  Wendt	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  individuals’	  shared	  knowledge	  
that	  produces	  and	  reproduces	  the	  state	  as	  a	  corporate	  person.88	  These	  points	  are	  important	  to	  
note.	  While	  essential	  qualities	  of	  the	  state	  can	  be	   identified,	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	  a	  structure	  
based	  on	   shared	   knowledge.	  Hence,	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   not	  material,	   apart	   from	   the	   rump	  
material	   basis	   outlined	   by	   Wendt.	   Yet,	   as	   a	   structure	   it	   is	   real	   and	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	  
individuals	  while	  nevertheless	  depending	  on	  them	  for	  its	  continuation.89	  
As	  mentioned	  before,	  the	  second	  important	  point	  of	  reference	  for	  Wendt’s	  work	  regarding	  the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   the	   2004	   article	   “The	   state	   as	   person	   in	   international	   theory”.	  While	  Social	  
Theory	   ultimately	   aims	   at	   constructing	   a	   systemic	   view	  of	   international	   politics	   in	  which	   state	  
identity	  is	  shaped	  by	  systemic	  interaction,	  “The	  state	  as	  person”	  is	  concerned	  with	  what	  Wendt	  
calls	  the	  “inside	  constitution”	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  	  
As	   we	   have	   seen	   in	   Chapter	   1,	   Wendt,	   by	   drawing	   on	   Andrew	   Vincent’s	   “Can	   groups	   be	  
persons”,	  distinguishes	  three	  kinds	  of	  persons.90	  A	  distinction	  needs	  to	  be	  made	  between	  moral,	  
legal,	   and	   psychological	   personhood.	   Wendt	   argues	   that	   moral	   personhood	   and	   legal	  
personhood	  are	  based	  on	  social	  conventions.91	  In	  other	  words,	  to	  be	  a	  moral	  or	  legal	  person	  is	  
to	  be	  recognised	  as	  such	  by	  others.92	  It	  is	  social	  recognition	  not	  capabilities	  or	  internal	  structures	  
that	   are	   crucial	   for	  moral	   or	   legal	   personhood.	   For	   him,	   it	   is	   only	   psychological	   persons	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Ibid.,	  	  197.	  
86	  Ibid.	  
87	  Ibid.,	  	  215.	  
88	  Ibid.,	  	  218.	  
89	  Ibid.,	  	  215.	  
90	  Vincent,	  'Can	  Groups	  Be	  Persons?'.	  
91	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  294.	  
92	  With	  regard	  to	  legal	  personhood	  of	  the	  state,	  Kustermans’	  approach	  follows	  this	  argument.	  See	  Kustermans,	  
'The	  State	  as	  Citizen:	  State	  Personhood	  and	  Ideology'.With	  regard	  to	  moral	  personhood,	  many	  would	  disagree	  
with	  reducing	  it	  to	  a	  question	  of	  social	  recognition.	  Compare	  for	  example	  Erskine,	  'Assigning	  Responsibilities	  to	  
Institutional	  Moral	   Agents:	   The	   Case	   of	   States	   and	  Quasi-­‐States'.	   And	   Erskine,	   'Kicking	   Bodies	   and	  Damning	  
Souls:	  The	  Danger	  of	  Harming	  "Innocent"	  Individuals	  While	  Punishing	  "Delinquent"	  States'.	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“cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   their	   social	   context”.93	  Hence,	   it	   is	   only	   psychological	   persons	   that	   are	  
constituted	   from	   the	   inside.	   This	   makes	   psychological	   personhood	   the	   ideal	   test	   case	   for	  
Wendt’s	   realist	   stance	   on	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	   Inside	   constitution,	   in	   scientific	   realist	   fashion,	  
refers	  to	  a	  self-­‐organising	  quality	  that	  is	  independent	  from	  interaction	  and	  context.94	  	  
Similar	  to	  Social	  Theory,	  in	  his	  2004	  article	  Wendt	  offers	  an	  essential	  definition	  of	  psychological	  
persons	   as	   a	   starting	   point.	   It	   is	   a	   definition	   based	   on	   a	   rationalist	   model	   which	   forms	   his	  
“baseline	   for	   thinking	   about	   the	   psychological	   personhood	   of	   states”.95	  Wendt	   defends	   this	  
choice	  by	  pointing	  out	   that	   this	   is	   the	  most	   familiar	  point	  of	   view	   in	   IR	   scholarship.96	  Rational	  
actors,	   according	   to	   the	   definition	  Wendt	   utilises,	   are	   characterised	   by	   four	  main	   properties.	  
They	  have	  “(1)	  a	  unitary	  identity	  that	  persists	  over	  time;	  (2)	  beliefs	  about	  their	  environment;	  (3)	  
transitive	  desires	  that	  motivate	  them	  to	  move;	  and	  (4)	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  choices	  on	  a	  rational	  
basis,	  usually	  defined	  as	  expected-­‐utility	  maximization”.97	  
Building	   on	   these	   choices	   Wendt	   outlines	   “three	   inside	   tests	   for	   full-­‐fledged	   psychological	  
personhood”.98 	  These	   are	   being	   an	   intentional	   action,	   being	   an	   organism,	   and	   possessing	  
consciousness. 99 	  Wendt	   goes	   on	   to	   define	   these	   three	   areas	   by	   resorting	   mainly	   to	   the	  
philosophical,	  biological,	  and	  psychological	  literatures.	  All	  three	  aspects	  are	  then	  explored	  with	  
regard	  to	  the	  state.	  Intentionality	  is	  the	  least	  problematic	  of	  the	  three	  for	  Wendt	  as,	  he	  argues,	  
it	  is	  already	  widely	  accepted	  in	  IR	  scholarship.	  To	  make	  his	  model	  work	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  other	  
two	  aspects,	  Wendt	  uses	  the	  concepts	  of	  superorganisms	  and	  collective	  consciousness.100	  	  
There	   is	  common	  ground	  between	  Wendt’s	  conception	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	   in	  Social	  Theory	  
and	  in	  “The	  state	  as	  person”.	  In	  both	  cases,	  he	  argues	  against	  what	  he	  calls	  a	  metaphorical	  or	  as-­‐
if	   treatment	  of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	   In	  both	   cases,	  he	   searches	   for	  essential	   features	  of	   states	  
and	  state-­‐persons	  that	  are	  valid	  across	  time	  and	  cultural	  context.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





98	  Ibid.,	  	  296.	  
99	  Ibid.	  
100	  Ibid.,	  	  309-­‐314.	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As	  mentioned	   in	   the	  previous	  chapter,	   the	   forum	  discussion	   in	  Review	  of	   International	  Studies	  
that	   focused	   on	  Wendt’s	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   illustrates	   several	   avenues	   of	   critique	   of	  
Wendt’s	   idea	  of	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.101	  One	  of	   the	  major	   lines	  of	  discontent	   is	   the	  question	  of	  
whether	  or	  not	  the	  state	  is	  real.	  This	  aspect	  and	  other	  aspects	  of	  Wendt’s	  theoretical	  positioning	  
warrant	  a	  closer	  attention.	  
	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  Jackson,	  'Forum	  Introduction:	  Is	  the	  State	  a	  Person?	  Why	  Should	  We	  Care?',	  255-­‐258.	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Real	  states	  and	  real	  states-­‐as-­‐persons	  
Having	   examined	   Wendt’s	   scientific	   realism,	   in	   the	   following	   the	   focus	   shifts	   towards	   the	  
understanding	   of	   the	   state	   from	   a	   scientific	   realist	   perspective.	  What	   does	   a	   scientific	   realist	  
approach	  mean	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person?	  	  
One	  of	   the	  most	   important	  points	  of	  discussion	   is	   the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	   the	  state	   is	  
real.	  As	  pointed	  out	  earlier,	  a	  commitment	  to	  scientific	  realism	  allows	  Wendt	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  
state,	   despite	   not	   being	   directly	   observable,	   is	   nevertheless	   real.	   Looking	   at	   the	   debates	   that	  
ensued	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Social	  Theory	  as	  well	  as	  “The	  state	  as	  a	  person”,	   it	   is	  this	  aspect	  that	   is	  
most	  widely	  discussed.102	  In	  Social	  Theory,	  Wendt	  argues	  that	  the	  state	  has	  ideational	  as	  well	  as	  
material	  features.	  He	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  a	  rump	  materialism	  that	  constrains	  the	  possibilities	  for	  
social	  construction.	  Nevertheless,	  for	  him	  the	  important	  basis	  for	  the	  state	   is	  the	  fact	  that	   it	   is	  
ideational.	  Neumann,	  in	  his	  response	  to	  Wendt’s	  Social	  Theory	  understands	  Wendt’s	  state	  as	  a	  
narrative	   structure.	   He	   describes	   Wendt’s	   argument	   as	   “the	   philosophical	   realist	   claim	   that	  
narratives	   of	   state	   Selves,	   and	   therefore	   states	   themselves,	   are	   real.”103	  This	   is	   an	   interesting	  
perspective	  held	  by	  others,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  Wendt’s	  take.104	  While	  rump	  materialism	  does	  not	  deny	  
the	  existence	  of	  narratives	  of	  the	  state,	  Wendt’s	  view	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  partly	  material	  structure	  
and	   his	   essentialising	   view	   of	   the	   state,	   meaning	   the	   belief	   that	   there	   are	   certain	   intrinsic	  
characteristics	   of	   the	   state,	   lead	   him	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   state	  must	   be	  more	   than	   a	   narrative	  
structure.	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  state	  is,	  in	  Wendt’s	  words,	  one	  of	  the	  deep	  structures	  underlying	  
social	   life.	   The	   state	   is	   both	  material	   and	   ideational;	   it	   is	   both	   physical	   and	   a	   distribution	   of	  
knowledge.105	  	  
However,	  once	  Wendt’s	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  state	  in	  “The	  state	  as	  person”	  is	  brought	  into	  
view,	  the	  picture	  gets	  more	  complex.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  in	  “The	  state	  as	  person”	  he	  is	  focused	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  See	  for	  example	  Schiff,	  ''Real'?	  As	  If!	  Critical	  Reflections	  on	  State	  Personhood'.	  	  
103	  Neumann,	  'Beware	  of	  Organicism:	  The	  Narrative	  Self	  of	  the	  State',	  259.	  
104	  On	  the	  state	  as	  a	  narrative	  structure	  see	  for	  example	  Ringmar,	  'On	  the	  Ontological	  Status	  of	  the	  State'.	  and	  
Neumann,	  'Beware	  of	  Organicism:	  The	  Narrative	  Self	  of	  the	  State'.	  	  
105	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  189-­‐190.	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the	   inside	  constitution	  of	   the	  state	  as	  a	  person.	  This	   leads	  him	  to	  define	   three	   inside	   tests	   for	  
state-­‐personhood:	  being	  an	  intentional	  actor,	  being	  a	  superorganism,	  and	  being	  conscious.106	  	  
First,	  and	  this	  point	  is	  based	  on	  Suganami’s	  critique,	  the	  ultimate	  or	  miracle	  argument	  does	  not	  
seem	   to	   be	   a	   good	   basis	   for	   arguing	   that	   the	   state	   is	   real.	   Simply	   because	   the	   best	   current	  
scientific	  explanation	  invokes	  an	  entity,	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  this	  entity	  is	  indeed	  real.	  He	  argues	  
that	   while	   science	   is	   about	   an	   improved	   understanding	   of	   the	   world,	   the	   entities	   invoked	   in	  
these	   explanations	   do	   not	   need	   to	   be	   real.	   This	   is	   because	  we	  have	   to	   bear	   in	  mind	   that	   the	  
entities	   invoked	  in	  the	  currently	  best	  explanation	  might	  be	  rejected	  at	  some	  later	  stage	  of	  the	  
scientific	  process.107	  Even	  a	  “hard	  science”	  such	  as	  physics	  offers	  ample	  examples	  of	  this	  process	  
of	  invoking	  and	  later	  rejecting	  the	  existence	  of	  certain	  entities.	  So,	  if	  scientific	  realism	  is	  used	  to	  
argue	   that	   because	   a	   theory	   invokes	   an	   entity	   such	   as	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   and	   because	   that	  
theory	  works	  well	  in	  reflecting	  the	  world	  and	  is	  the	  best	  current	  explanation,	  this	  entity	  must	  be	  
real,	  it	  is	  of	  questionable	  usefulness.	  	  
Secondly,	  there	  is	  a	  problematic	  conflation	  of	  two	  different	  arguments	  to	  be	  found	  in	  Wendt’s	  
state-­‐person.	  One	  argument	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  state	  is	  real.	  The	  other	  one	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  state	  
as	   an	   intentional	   agent,	   or	   even	  as	   a	  person,	   is	   real.	   These	   are	   two	   very	  different	  points	   that	  
seem	  to	  be	  merged	   in	  Wendt.108	  A	  distinction	  made	  by	  Wight	   identifies	  this	  as	  a	  problem	  that	  
cannot	  be	  neglected	   in	  Wendt’s	  work	  on	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  Wendt	  seems	  to	  brush	  over	   the	  
distinction	  between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  state	  being	  real	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
being	  real.109	  The	  argument	  here	  is	  that	  we	  need	  to	  distinguish	  between	  philosophical	  ontology	  
on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   scientific	   ontology	   on	   the	   other	   hand.	   In	   a	   response	   to	  Wendt,	  Wight	  
points	   to	   the	   importance	  of	  distinguishing	  between	   the	   two.	  Philosophical	  ontology	  addresses	  
the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  state	  really	  exists.	  The	  question	  of	  what	  it	  is,	  is	  then	  a	  matter	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  296.	  
107	  Wendt	  also	  points	  out	  that	  theories	  can	  be	  successful	  (e.g.	  helpful	  in	  understanding	  the	  world,	  especially	  in	  
predicting	  things)	  even	  though	  they	  are	  “wrong”.	  In	  this	  case,	  “wrong”	  means	  “not	  referring	  to	  anything	  real	  or	  
true”.	  Therefore,	  “[s]uccessful	  reference	  is	  …	  not	  necessary	  for	  empirical	  success.”	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  
International	  Politics,	  65.	  However,	  Wendt	  still	  maintains	  that	  progress	  in	  science	  is	  the	  ever	  closer	  
approximation	  to	  reality	  which	  builds	  on	  early	  theories	  “having	  gotten	  something	  right”	  ibid.,	  	  66.	  
108	  For	   this	   critique	   see	   for	   example	   Suganami,	   'Wendt,	   IR,	   and	   Philosophy',	   63.	   Also	  Wight,	   'State	   Agency:	  
Social	  Action	  without	  Human	  Activity'.	  
109	  Wight,	   'State	  Agency:	   Social	   Action	  without	  Human	  Activity',	   269.	   Suganami	   identifies	   the	   same	  problem	  
and	  speaks	  a	  conflation	  of	  two	  separate	  questions.	  Suganami,	  'Wendt,	  IR,	  and	  Philosophy',	  63.	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scientific	  ontology.110	  With	  Wendt,	  Wight	  argues	   that	   the	  metaphorical	  or	  “as	   if”	   treatment	  of	  
the	   state	   is	   to	   be	   questioned	   for	   to	   continue	  with	   this	   treatment	   of	   the	   state	   “is	   to	   conduct	  
business	  as	  usual”.111	  However,	  building	  on	  the	  above	  distinction	  the	  suggestion	  is	  that	  while	  we	  
can	   assert	   the	   reality	   of	   the	   state,	   we	   can,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   remain	   critical	   regarding	   the	  
question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  state	  is	  a	  person.	  	  
In	  addition,	   there	   is	  a	   second	  problematic	  blurring	  of	   concepts	   that	  Wight	   identifies:	  equating	  
agency	   with	   personhood.	   Nowhere	   in	   Social	   Theory	   or	   in	   “The	   state	   as	   person”	   does	  Wendt	  
make	  an	  explicit	  distinction	  between	  agency	  and	  personhood.	  He	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  “agency	  
is	  a	  category	  that	  applies	  only	  to	  persons.”112	  This	  is	  problematic.	  It	  can	  be	  conceded	  that	  some	  
of	  the	  properties	  we	  attribute	  to	  people	  are	  an	  important	  part	  of	  any	  understanding	  of	  agency.	  
However,	   we	   might	   also	   be	   able	   argue	   that	   the	   state	   has	   agency	   without	   also	   making	   it	   a	  
person.113	  Making	  sense	  of	  agency	  through	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  person,	  understood	  in	  a	  broad	  sense,	  
is	  only	  one	  option.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  how	  we	  encounter	  ourselves	  and	  others	  as	  agents,	  it	  seems	  a	  
self-­‐evident	   and	   familiar	   option	   but	   by	   far	   not	   the	   only	   one.	   Wendt’s	   argument	   is	   that	   he	  
“take[s]	   ‘actor’	   and	   ‘person’	   to	  be	   synonymous,	   since	   the	   attributes	   routinely	   applied	   in	   IR	   to	  
state	   actors	   are	   those	   of	   persons”	   and	   further	   he	   argues	   that	   “person”	   is	   the	   term	   more	  
commonly	  used	  in	  philosophical	  discourses.114	  However,	  this	  reference	  to	  the	  common	  practices	  
does	   not	   address	   Wight’s	   criticism	   sufficiently.	   We	   are	   still	   left	   with	   the	   gap	   between	  
philosophical	  and	  scientific	  ontology.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  former,	  the	  state	  can	  be	  said	  
to	  exist.	  However,	   the	  question	  what	  the	  state	   is	  belongs	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  scientific	  ontology.	   I	  
argue	  that	  it	  is	  here	  that	  the	  role	  of	  devises	  such	  as	  metaphors	  comes	  in.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  
treating	  the	  state	  as	  a	  person	   is	  a	  useful	  metaphor	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  “what	   is	   it”	  question	  
which	  cannot	  simply	  answered	  by	  “looking”	  at	  aspects	  of	  the	  world,	  especially	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  
the	  unobservables	  of	  the	  social	  world	  such	  as	  the	  state.115	  This	  point	  will	  be	  developed	  further	  in	  
Chapter	  3.	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The	  essential	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  Wendt	  searches	  for	  essential	  
features	  that	  serve	  to	  describe	  the	  entity	  or	  phenomenon	  as	  such.	  This	  search	  for	  an	  ontological	  
starting	  point	  builds	  on	  the	  scientific	  realist	  assumption	  that	  the	  entities	  we	  study	  (even	  in	  the	  
social	   sciences)	   exist	   independently	   of	   our	   knowledge	   of	   or	   discourses	   about	   them.	   “In	   the	  
realist	  view,	  the	  theorist	  baptizes	  an	  unobservable	  phenomenon	  by	  proposing	  a	  description	  of	  
its	  properties	  and	  some	  hypotheses	  about	  how	  these	  relate	  to	  observable	  effects.”116	  	  
Additionally,	  Wendt	  believes	  that	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  that	  drives	  him	  in	  
Social	   Theory,	   the	   states	   systemic	   project,	   an	   essentialised	   state	   and	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   are	  
necessary.	  He	  argues	  that	  “we	  can	  theorize	  about	  processes	  of	  social	  construction	  at	  the	  level	  of	  
the	  state	  system	  only	   if	  such	  processes	  have	  exogenously	  given,	  relatively	  stable	  platforms.”117	  
This	  means	   that	   the	   state	   has	   to	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   given	   for	   his	   research	   purposes	   and	   its	  
features	  need	  to	  be	  defined	  beyond	  discourse.	  Further,	  he	  points	  out	  that	  the	  theorist	  is	  in	  need	  
of	   finding	   a	   common	   ground	   in	   order	   to	  make	   sense	   of	   the	   state;	   defining	   essential	   features	  
offers	  such	  a	  common	  ground.118	  	  
Wendt	   accepts	   the	   label	   “essentialist”	   for	   himself.	   But	   he	   cautions	   that	   he	   only	   accepts	   “this	  
label	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  properly	  understood”	  and	  is	  not	  taken	  to	  mean	  “appealing	  to	  an	  unanalyzed	  
or	  occult	  essence”.119	  Rather,	  he	  argues	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  weak	  essentialism	  which	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  
claim	  “that	  the	  behavior	  of	  things	  is	  influenced	  by	  self-­‐organizing,	  mind-­‐independent	  structures	  
that	   constitute	   those	   things	   with	   certain	   intrinsic	   powers	   and	   dispositions”.120	  The	   scientific	  
process	  works	  towards	  discovering	  these	  structures.	  	  
As	  pointed	  out	  earlier,	  the	  five	  essential	  features	  of	  the	  state	  that	  Wendt	  proposes	  are	  having	  an	  
institutional-­‐legal	  order,	  a	  legitimate	  monopoly	  on	  the	  use	  of	  violence,	  sovereignty,	  society,	  and	  
territory.121	  These	   criteria	   are	  meant	   to	   describe	  what	   all	   states	   have	   in	   common,	   in	   all	   times	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and	  all	  places.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  criteria,	  Wendt	  argues,	  we	  encounter	  the	  “state	  as	  such”.122	  
With	  his	  thin	  essentialism,	  Wendt	  tries	  to	  find	  a	  middle	  ground,	  similar	  to	  his	  commitment	  to	  a	  
thin	   constructivism.	   He	   delineates	   himself	   from	   anti-­‐essentialists,	   such	   as	   postmodernists.	  
However,	   he	   also	   delineates	   himself	   from	  what	   he	   calls	   “thicker	   essentialists”	   like	   neorealists	  
and	  neoliberals.	  Wendt	  wishes	  to	  maintain	  a	  “minimalist	  version”	  of	  an	  essential	  platform	  of	  the	  
state,	   arguing	   that	   such	   a	  minimal	   essentialism	   is	   necessary	   for	   structural	   theorising	   but	   also	  
arguing	  that	  many	  of	  the	  characteristics	  that	  “thicker	  essentialists”	  would	  describe	  as	   inherent	  
to	  the	  state,	  such	  as	  egoism	  and	  power-­‐seeking	  behaviour,	  are	  in	  fact	  “contingent,	  constructed	  
by	   the	   international	   system”.123	  This	  middle	   ground	   allows	   him	   to	   treat	   some	   features	   of	   the	  
state	  as	  intrinsic	  and	  given	  while	  others	  are	  treated	  as	  socially	  constructed	  at	  the	  system	  level.	  	  
In	  Social	  Theory,	  Wendt	  is	  very	  explicit	  about	  his	  essential	  state.	  While	  less	  explicit	  in	  “The	  state	  
as	   person”,	   there	   are	   good	   reasons	   to	   ascribe	   the	   same	   idea	   of	   a	   thin	   or	   middle	   ground	  
essentialism	  to	  his	  later	  work	  as	  well.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  in	  “The	  state	  as	  person”	  he	  uses	  a	  four-­‐
point	  description	  of	  persons	  as	  rational	  actors	  as	  a	  starting	  point124	  and	  based	  on	  that	  he	  defines	  
his	  three	  inside-­‐test-­‐criteria	  for	  psychological	  state-­‐personhood.125	  In	  the	  following,	  I	  would	  like	  
to	  offer	  three	  points	  of	  critique	  of	  Wendt’s	  thin	  essentialism	  and	  its	  consequences.	  	  
Wendt	  starts	  from	  a	  thin	  essentialist	  definition	  of	  the	  state	  to	  have	  a	  stable	  and	  among	  theorists	  
inter-­‐subjectively	  agreed	  upon	  platform	  for	   further	   theorising	  about	  processes	  at	   the	  systemic	  
level.	   Implicit	   in	   this	   is	   the	  assumption	   that	   there	   is	   a	   thin	  essence	  of	   the	   state	   that	  does	  not	  
change.	  This	  part	  of	   the	  concept	  of	   the	  state	   is	  assumed	  to	  be	  timeless	  and,	   in	  the	  basic	   form	  
presented	  by	  Wendt,	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  applicable	  across	  cultures.	  Wendt’s	  essential	  state	  aims	  at	  
“transhistorical	   generalizations	   about	   the	   essential	   state”.126	  And	   while	   Wendt	   acknowledges	  
some	  of	   the	  dangers	  of	   such	  a	  project,	  he	  argues	   that	  “such	  generalizations	  are	  not	   ruled	  out	  
altogether”127	  by	  these	  points	  of	  caution.	  A	  thin	  essential	  state	  is	  necessary	  for	  his	  theorising.	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However,	   for	  others	  constructivists	   the	  state	  cannot	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  given.	  They	  argue	  that	   its	  
conception	  changes	  over	  time	  and	  across	  cultures.	  Talking	  about	  the	  state	  today	  is	  not	  the	  same	  
as	   talking	  about	   the	  state	  as	   it	  existed	  400	  years	  ago,	  at	   the	   time	  of	   the	  Peace	  of	  Westphalia.	  
States,	  too,	  are	  the	  product	  of	  constant	  cultural	  production	  and	  reproduction	  and	  thus	  subject	  
to	  change.	  Wendt	  allows	  for	  some	  construction	  and	  change	  at	  the	  systems	  level	  but	  starts	  from	  
a	   basic	   essentialist	   notion	   of	   the	   state.	   As	   with	   a	   critique	   of	   Wendt’s	   scientific	   realist	  
commitment,	  one	  of	  the	  questions	  raised	  again	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  this	  notion	  can	  be	  reconciled	  
with	  constructivist	  commitments.	  	  
For	  a	  critical	  perspective,	  we	  can	  once	  again	  turn	  to	  Kratochwil	  who	  argues	  that	  “there	  are	  no	  
simple	   givens	   for	   constructivist,	   such	   as	   ‘structures’	   or	   ‘forces’	   that	   are	   not	   again	   results	   of	  
particular	  action	  and	  ‘constructions’	  that	  require	  further	  explanations.”128	  Against	  this	  we	  have	  
Wendt’s	  point	  that	  for	  his	  state	  systemic	  project,	  the	  state	  has	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  given	  in	  order	  
for	   him	   to	   explore	   the	   interaction	   at	   the	   systems	   level.	   	   It	   is	   true	   that	   not	   everything	   can	   be	  
problematised	  at	  once.	  And	  while	  constructions	  are	  going	  on	  at	  various	  “levels”,	  not	  all	   levels	  
can	   be	   taken	   into	   view	   at	   once.	   Yet,	   Wendt’s	   essential	   state	   should	   come	   with	   a	   strong	  
disclaimer	  pointing	  out	   that	  even	  his	  essential	   state	   is	  already	  a	  particular	  construction	  of	   the	  
state,	  rooted	  in	  a	  particular	  time	  and	  theoretical	  context.	  For	  example,	  be	  referring	  to	  Weberian	  
notions	  of	  the	  state	  he	  defines	  an	  essential	  state	  based	  on	  the	  monopoly	  of	  violence	  that	  is	  not	  
uncontested	  and	  not	  applicable	  across	  time.129	  Similar	  points	  can	  be	  made	  with	  his	  Marxist	  and	  
Pluralist	   analysis	   of	   the	   state	   that	   feed	   into	   his	   conceptualisation.	   Yet,	   he	   argues	   he	   is	  
“interested	  only	  in	  what	  all	  states	  in	  all	  times	  and	  places	  have	  in	  common,	  in	  the	  ‘essential	  state’	  
or	   ‘state-­‐as-­‐such’”.130	  Especially	  before	   the	  background	  of	  his	   constructivist	   commitments,	   the	  
idea	  of	  a	  “state-­‐as-­‐such”	  has	  to	  be	  viewed	  critically.	  	  
Changing	  perspective	  slightly	  from	  the	  essential	  features	  of	  the	  state	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  
state	  as	  an	  agent,	  Smith	  offers	  a	  similar	  critique.	  Smith	  reads	  Wendt	  as	  “unconcerned	  with	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128	  Kratochwil,	   'Constructing	   a	   New	   Orthodoxy?	   Wendt's	   Social	   Theory	   of	   International	   Politics	   and	   the	  
Constructivist	  Challenge',	  30.	  
129	  Wendt	  takes	  these	  two	  points	  explicitly	  from	  Weber.	  The	  state	  is	  “an	  organization	  claiming	  a	  monopoly	  on	  
the	   legitimate	   use	   of	   organized	   violence”	   and	   “an	   organization	   with	   sovereignty”.	   Wendt,	   Social	   Theory	   of	  
International	  Politics,	  202.	  
130	  Ibid.,	  	  201.	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construction	  of	  agents,	  subjectivity	  and	  identity”.131	  Wendt	  argues	  that,	  here	  too,	  we	  encounter	  
stable	   platforms	   that	   form	   the	   basic	   blocs	   for	   further	   systemic	   theorising.	   Identities	   are	   to	   a	  
large	   extent	   viewed	   as	   given	   before	   interaction	   and	   the	   formation	   of	   self	   and	   other	   remains	  
unproblematised.	  However,	  other	  constructivists	  would	  argue	  that	  subjectivity	  and	  identity	  are	  
only	   the	   outcomes	   of	   discourse	   and	   can	   therefore	   not	   exist	   before	   exchange	   and	   without	   a	  
notion	  of	  other.	  Further	  the	  boundaries	  of	  self	  and	  other	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  state	  should	  be	  seen	  
as	   more	   fluid	   than	   Wendt’s	   account	   would	   allow	   for,	   as	   he	   needs	   to	   start	   from	   an	   already	  
established	  self	  and	  an	  already	  established	  other.	  In	  this	  instance,	  Wendt	  is	  clearly	  at	  odds	  with	  
constructivists	   such	   as	   Onuf	   or	   Kratochwil	   and	   adds	   a	   givenness	   that	   seems	   necessary	   but	  
constrains	   and	   pre-­‐determines	   his	   account	   of	   the	   establishment	   of	   systemic	   cultures	  
fundamentally	  and	  unhelpfully.	  	  
To	  draw	  these	  critiques	  together	  and	  focus	  again	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  a	  reminder	  
of	   Jackson’s	   answer	   to	  Wendt’s	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	  useful.	   Jackson	  provides	  a	   strong	  argument	  
against	  Wendt’s	  essentialism	  that	  combines	  some	  of	  the	  above	  points.	  Instead	  of	  searching	  for	  
intrinsic	   features	  of	   states	  or	   states-­‐as-­‐person,	   he	   argues,	  we	  need	   to	   focus	  on	   the	  processes	  
that	  make	   these	   entities	   what	   they	   are.	   Criticising	  Wendt’s	   scientific	   realist	   commitment,	   he	  
argues	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  it	  is	  the	  process	  of	  personation	  that	  scholars	  need	  
to	  be	  concerned	  with.	  Searching	  for	  what	  the	  state	  is	  in	  itself	  is	  useless;	  it	  is	  the	  processes	  that	  
shape	  the	  state	  and	  constantly	  re-­‐shape	  it	  that	  matter.	  For	  Jackson,	  actors	  in	  the	  social	  sphere	  
“should	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  product	  of	  ongoing	  constitutive	  practices”.132	  The	  state,	   its	   identity	  
and	   its	   boundaries,	   are,	   in	   Jackson’s	   view,	   the	   product	   of	   everyday	   practices	   and	   political	  
struggles.	   Constructing	   states	   and	   persons	   is	   about	   producing	   and	   reproducing	   social	  
conventions.133	  Social	   actors,	   whether	   individuals	   or	   collectives,	   instead	   of	   being	   ascribed	   an	  
essence,	   “should	   be	   regarded	   as	   the	   product	   of	   ongoing	   constitutive	   practices”. 134 	  This	  
orientation	   towards	   process	   allows	   for	   understanding	   change	   and	   acknowledges	   that	   there	   is	  
very	  little	  about	  social	  facts	  that	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  given.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  state	  we	  might	  ask:	  
what	  constitutes	  the	  state	  in	  its	  current	  forms?	  And	  further,	  what	  in	  our	  everyday	  practices	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131	  Smith,	  'Wendt's	  World',	  160.	  
132	  Jackson,	  'Hegel's	  House,	  or	  'People	  Are	  States	  Too'',	  285.	  
133	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  286-­‐287.	  
134	  Ibid.,	  	  285,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	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political	  struggles	  constitutes	  the	  state	  as	  a	  person.135	  Why	  is	  it	  that	  talking	  about	  states	  in	  terms	  
of	   person	   is	   possible,	   although	   of	   course	   not	   uncontested,	   at	   this	   current	   point	   in	   time?	   An	  
answer	   to	   this	   last	   question	  will	   entail	   looking	   at	   the	  practices	   that	   constitute	   the	   state	   in	   its	  
current	  form	  such	  as	  sovereignty	  and	  territorial	  integrity.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  chapter	  one,	  Jackson	  gives	  a	  slightly	  different	  twist	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  as	  
understood	  by	  Wendt.	  He	  derives	  the	  idea	  of	  personation	  from	  Hobbes	  and	  his	  ideas	  of	  representation	  and	  the	  
process	   by	  which	   an	   individual	   or	   group	   is	   authorized	   to	   speak	   on	   behalf	   of	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object.	  Jackson,	  'Hegel's	  House,	  or	  'People	  Are	  States	  Too'',	  286.	  




Four	   main	   points	   of	   critique	   emerge	   out	   of	   the	   discussion	   of	   Chapter	   2.	   First,	   we	   need	   to	  
question	  what	  it	  means	  to	  say	  that	  the	  state	  is	  a	  person.	  	  
A	  first	  helpful	  distinction,	  based	  on	  Wight’s	  critique	  of	  Wendt,	  between	  philosophical	  ontology	  
and	   scientific	   ontology	   is	   introduced.	   Philosophical	   ontology	   asks	   whether	   the	   state	   is	   real,	  
whereas	  scientific	  ontology	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  question	  of	  what	  the	  state	  is,	  in	  other	  words	  
whether	  it	  really	  is	  a	  person.	  With	  Wight	  we	  can	  observe	  that	  Wendt’s	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  shows	  a	  
tendency	  to	  conflate	  the	  two.136	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Wendt’s	  miracle	  argument	  regarding	  the	  state-­‐
as-­‐person	   is	  addressed	  and	  critiqued.	  Put	  simply,	  Wendt	  argues	   that	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  must	  
be	   real	   because	   the	   theories	   that	   invoke	   the	   state	   work	   well	   in	   making	   sense	   of	   the	   world.	  
Following	  philosophical	   realist	  premises,	  he	   stresses	   the	   idea	   that	   scientific	  progress	  occurs	   in	  
the	  form	  of	  an	  ever	  closer	  approximation	  between	  our	  theories	  and	  the	  real	  causal	  structure	  of	  
the	  world.	  	  Hence,	  if	  IR	  theories	  that	  build	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  have	  not	  been	  
rejected	   in	   the	   course	   of	   testing	   theories	   against	   other	   theories,	   it	   must	   be	   a	   very	   likely	  
candidate	  for	  reflecting	  the	  real,	  causal	  structures	  of	  the	  world.	  Here,	  the	  critique	  of	  Suganami	  is	  
helpful;	  he	  points	  out	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  theory	  that	  works	  well	  posits	  an	  entity	  cannot	  be	  taken	  
to	  mean	  that	  this	  entity	  indeed	  really	  exists.	  “Hard	  sciences”	  such	  as	  physics	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  great	  
example	  of	   this,	  he	  argues.137	  In	   contrast,	   the	  point	  of	   view	  developed	  as	  part	  of	  a	   critique	  of	  
Wendt	  in	  the	  thesis	  is	  that	  the	  state	  is	  best	  seen	  as	  a	  real	  structure	  and	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	  a	  prevalent	  way	   in	  which	  the	  discipline	  of	   IR	  renders	   it	   intelligible.	  But	  most	  
importantly,	  it	  is	  this	  process	  of	  sense-­‐making	  that	  we	  need	  to	  pay	  attention	  to.	  	  
Second,	  drawing	  on	   critics	   such	  as	  Kratochwil,	   a	  nascent	  essentialism	  with	   regard	   to	  both	   the	  
state	   and	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   can	   be	   identified	   in	   Wendt’s	   work.	   This	   tendency	   is	   most	  
pronounced	   in	  Social	  Theory.	  Here,	  Wendt	  defines	  “rump	  materialism”	   for	   the	  person	  and	   for	  
the	   state.138	  While	   Wendt’s	   rump	   materialist	   theory	   of	   human	   nature	   is	   commonsensical,	   it	  
cannot	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  base	  for	  thinking	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  Kratochwil	  argues	  that	  the	  rump	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136	  Wight,	  'State	  Agency:	  Social	  Action	  without	  Human	  Activity'.	  
137	  Suganami,	  'Wendt,	  IR,	  and	  Philosophy'.	  
138	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  131.	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materialism	   we	   encounter	   in	   Wendt	   runs	   against	   core	   constructivist	   principles.139	  In	   a	   first	  
instance,	   this	   critique	   needs	   to	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   result	   of	   fundamentally	   different	  
constructivist	   positions.	   However,	   Kratochwil’s	   critique	   also	   opens	   up	   a	   fruitful	   avenue	   for	  
developing	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   by	   precisely	   taking	   the	   construction	   of	   states	   and	  
persons	  even	  further	  than	  Wendt	  does.	  	  
Third,	  Wendt,	   in	   Social	   Theory	   but	  more	   pronounced	   in	   “The	   state	   as	   person	   in	   international	  
theory”,	  rejects	  what	  he	  calls	  an	  as-­‐if	  or	  metaphorical	  conception	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐
person.	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  first	  principle	  of	  scientific	  realism	  which	  states	  that	  “the	  world	  is	  
independent	  of	  the	  mind	  and	  language	  of	  individual	  observers”,	  and	  forms	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  
Wendt’s	  argument	  that	  IR	  needs	  to	  take	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  real	  seriously	  
instead	  of	  evading	   it	  through	  skilful	   language-­‐use.140	  However,	  we	  need	  to	  wonder	  whether	  or	  
not	  this	  rejection	  is	  helpful	  for	  understanding	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  Wendt	  relegates	  metaphors	  
to	  a	  role	  as	  figures	  of	  speech;	  the	  contention	  in	  this	  thesis	   is	  that	  they	  play	  a	  much	  wider	  role	  
through	  their	  ability	  to	  be	  constitutive	  of	  the	  social	  world	  and	  their	  role	  in	  the	  scientific	  process.	  	  
Fourth,	   in	   a	   response	   to	   Wendt,	   Jackson	   suggests	   that	   the	   focus	   might	   be	   shifted	   from	   the	  
question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  state	  is	  a	  person	  to	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  process	  of	  becoming	  a	  person,	  
what	   Jackson	   calls	   the	   process	   of	   personation.141	  Hence,	   the	   thesis	   takes	   the	   suggestion	   on	  
board	  that	  understanding	  how	  this	  process	  works	  with	  regard	  to	  individual	  human	  beings	  yields	  
important	   insights	   for	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	   Instead	   of	   suggesting	   essential	   features	   of	   the	  
person,	  we	   need	   to	   look	   at	   the	   processes	   through	  which	   individuals	   constitute	   their	   sense	   of	  
self.	  The	  preliminary	  assumption	  here	  is	  that	  this	  process	  of	  establishing	  a	  self	  should	  be	  located	  
more	  towards	  the	  “ideas	  all	  the	  way	  down	  end”	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  than	  Wendt	  allows	  for	  with	  
his	  conceptualisation	  of	  systemic	  interaction.	  	  
The	   second	   part	   of	   the	   thesis,	   consisting	   of	   Chapters	   3	   and	   4,	   aims	   at	   addressing	   these	   four	  
points	   of	   critique	   by	   drawing	   on	   conceptual	  metaphor	   theory	   and	   constructionist	   psychology	  
respectively.	  Chapter	  3,	  on	  metaphors,	  sets	  out	   to	  address	   the	   first	  and	  third	  point	  of	  critique	  
outlined.	  Chapter	  4,	  which	   looks	  at	   the	  so-­‐called	  emotional	   turn	   in	   the	  discipline	  and	  makes	  a	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  Kratochwil,	   'Constructing	   a	   New	   Orthodoxy?	   Wendt's	   Social	   Theory	   of	   International	   Politics	   and	   the	  
Constructivist	  Challenge'.	  
140	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  51.	  
141	  Jackson,	  'Hegel's	  House,	  or	  'People	  Are	  States	  Too''.	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case	  for	  the	  usefulness	  of	  constructionist	  psychology,	  addresses	  the	  second	  and	  the	  fourth	  point	  
of	  critique	  of	  Wendt’s	  concept	  of	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  Taken	  together	   they	  will	   form	  the	  basis	  
for	  making	  the	  case	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  developed	  in	  the	  thesis.	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Chapter	  3:	  The	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  as	  a	  
metaphor	  
Wanting	   to	  engage	  with	   the	  concept	  of	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  and	  taking	  my	  starting	  point	   from	  
Alexander	  Wendt,	  there	  are	  several	  points	  that	  need	  to	  be	  questioned	  and	  elaborated.	  One	  of	  
the	  questions	  raised	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  is	  whether	  the	  state	  really	   is	  a	  person	  or	  whether	  
the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  a	  mere	  metaphor.	  Further,	  we	  need	  to	  ask	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  
have	  to	  accept	  this	  dichotomous	  view.	  These	  two	  questions	  motivate	  the	  chapter.	  	  
Wendt,	   positioning	   himself	   as	   a	   scientific	   realist,	   argues	   that	   the	   state	   is	   real.	   Moreover,	   he	  
argues	  that	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  real.	  This	  point,	  which	  forms	  a	  key	  part	  of	  his	  argument,	  needs	  
to	  be	  put	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Wendt’s	  philosophy	  of	  science	  commitments.1	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  he	  
takes	   a	   scientific	   realist	   stance,	   a	   position	   most	   prominently	   elaborated	   on	   in	   Social	   Theory.	  
Following	   in	  that	  direction	  but	   focusing	  on	  the	  state	   itself	   rather	  than	  systemic	   interactions	  of	  
states,	  he	  aims	  at	  establishing	  the	  state	  as	  a	  psychological	  person	  in	  his	  2004	  article	  “The	  state	  
as	  person	  in	  international	  relations	  theory”.	  Here,	  the	  key	  point	  for	  Wendt	  is	  to	  find	  possibilities	  
that	  enable	  us	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  state	  is	  real	  and	  that	  it	  really	  is	  a	  person.	  By	  doing	  so,	  he	  aims	  to	  
distinguish	   himself	   from	   mainstream	   approaches	   to	   the	   state	   that	   are,	   in	   his	   view,	   guilty	   of	  
treating	  the	  state	  as-­‐if	  it	  were	  a	  person	  but	  that,	  and	  this	  is	  Wendt’s	  criticism,	  never	  engage	  the	  
hard	  ontological	  question	  of	  what	  the	  state	  really	  is.	  Hence,	  Wendt	  is	  critical	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  as-­‐
if	  stories	  and	  metaphorical	  treatments	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  	  
As	   pointed	   out	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   in	   order	   to	   start	   addressing	   Wendt’s	   criticism,	   it	   is	  
important	   to	   keep	   the	  distinction	  between	   scientific	   and	  philosophical	   ontology	   in	  mind.2	  The	  
present	  engagement	  with	  metaphors	   aims	  at	   contributing	   to	   an	  elaboration	  on	  how	   scientific	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  For	  the	  term	  “on	  the	  ontological	  status	  of	  the	  state”	  see	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  215.	  It	  
is	  borrowed	  from	  Ringmar,	  'On	  the	  Ontological	  Status	  of	  the	  State'.	  	  
2	  Compare	   also	   Jackson,	   The	   Conduct	   of	   Inquiry	   in	   International	   Relations:	   Philosophy	   of	   Science	   and	   Its	  
Implications	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  World	  Politics,	  28.	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ontology	  can	  be	  engaged	  with	  from	  a	  strong	  constructivist	  perspective.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  I	  ask	  
the	  question	  what	  the	  state	  is,	  not	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  can	  say	  that	  it	  is.	  As	  I	  have	  pointed	  out	  in	  
Chapter	  1,	  there	  is	  a	  prevalence	  in	  IR	  	  to	  think	  about	  states	  in	  terms	  of	  persons.	  However,	  this	  
should	  not	  be	   taken	  as	  an	   indication	   that	   the	  state	   is	  a	  person.	  Rather,	   I	  argue	   that	   there	   is	  a	  
need	   to	   imagine	   the	  state	  and	   its	   scientific	  ontology	   is	  determined	  by	   the	  kinds	  of	   images	  we	  
use	  to	  make	  it	  more	  tangible.3	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  image	  of	  the	  person	  provides	  one	  possibility	  
to	  conceptualise	  the	  state.	  	  
This	  chapter	  illustrates	  that	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  lies	  a	  metaphorical	  
process.	   The	   assumption	   is	   that	   most	   concepts	   that	   social	   scientists	   operate	   with	   are	  
“unalterably	  metaphoric”.4	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  this	  has	  consequences	  beyond	  the	  level	  of	  language.	  
By	   drawing	   on	   insights	   regarding	   the	   role	   of	  metaphors	   in	   the	   scientific	   process,	   this	   chapter	  
argues	   that	  metaphors	   cannot	   be	   dismissed	   as	  mere	   figures	   of	   speech.	  More	   specifically,	   the	  
point	   pursued	   here	   is	   that	   we	   cannot	   make	   sense	   of	   the	   state	   in	   IR	   without	   recourse	   to	  
metaphors.	   Following	   from	   this,	   the	   larger	   question	   about	   the	   role	   of	   metaphors	   in	   IR	  
scholarship	  can	  be	  engaged.	  	  
In	  very	  general	  terms,	  a	  suspicion	  towards	  metaphors	  as	  being	  unscientific	  can	  be	  identified	  in	  
mainstream	   IR	   scholarship.	   In	   the	   seminal	  Diplomatic	   Investigations,	   Hedley	   Bull	   for	   example	  
makes	   the	   strong	   statement	   that	   metaphors	   are	   to	   be	   regarded	   “as	   a	   sign	   of	   infancy	   in	   a	  
subject”.5	  	  
A	  general	  suspicion	  towards	  metaphors	  in	  science	  is	  linked	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  metaphors	  
are	  only	   rhetorical	  devices.	   From	   this	  perspective,	  metaphors	  are	   said	   to	   lack	   the	  precision	  of	  
formal	   definitions	   and	   hence	   are	   unsuitable	   to	   establish	   clear	   references	   between	   objects.	  
Critiques	   of	   this	   kind	   usually	   view	   metaphors	   as	   a	   figure	   of	   speech	   that	   is	   replaceable,	   and	  
indeed	   should	   be	   replaced,	   by	   a	   literal	   expression	   or	   explication.	   An	   underlying	   aim	   of	   this	  
chapter	  is	  to	  show	  how	  this	  view	  of	  metaphors	  is	  unhelpful	  and	  indeed	  neglects	  the	  point	  that	  
new	  knowledge	  is	  constructed	  and	  the	  crucial	  role	  played	  by	  language	  in	  this	  process.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  For	  the	  term	  scientific	  ontology	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate	  compare	  Wight,	  2004.	  
4	  Robert	  A.	  Nisbet,	  'Genealogy,	  Growth,	  and	  Other	  Metaphors',	  New	  Literary	  History	  1,	  3	  (1970).	  
5	  Hedley	   Bull,	   'Society	   and	   Anarchy	   in	   International	   Relations',	   in	   Diplomatic	   Investigations,	   ed.	   Herbert	  
Butterfield	  and	  Martin	  Wight	  (London:	  Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  1966),	  45.	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Responding	   to	   the	   suspicion	   towards	   metaphors,	   this	   chapter,	   first,	   aims	   to	   develop	   a	  
perspective	   on	   metaphors	   that	   allows	   me	   to	   treat	   them	   as	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   IR	   theory.	  
Secondly,	  it	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  metaphors	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  weakness	  of	  the	  subject,	  but	  
rather	   as	   an	   element	  of	   studying	   international	   relations	   that	   cannot	  be	   escaped.	  Ultimately,	   I	  
argue	  that	  the	  dichotomy	  that	  Wendt	  opens	  up	  between	  either	  interpreting	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
as	   a	  mere	   metaphor	   or	   treating	   it	   as	   real	   is	   a	   false	   one.	   This	   position	   is	   developed	   through	  
recourse	   to	   conceptual	  metaphor	   theory.	  Wendt	   is	   adamant	   in	   trying	   to	  overcome	  notions	  of	  
metaphorical	   thinking	   in	   IR	   scholarship.	   However,	   it	   will	   be	  maintained	   that	   it	   is	   precisely	   an	  
acceptance	   of	   metaphorical	   thinking	   that	   is	   needed	   to	   understand	   what	   the	   state	   in	   IR	   is.	  
Conceptual	   metaphor	   theory	   focuses	   on	   how	   one	   subject,	   system	   of	   ideas,	   or	   concept	   can	  
usefully	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  another	  subject,	  system	  of	  ideas,	  or	  concept.	  	  
This	  chapter	  aims	  to	  show	  how	  an	  argument	  about	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  needs	  to	  be	  developed	  
through	  acknowledging	  that	  when	  we	  speak	  about	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  we	  utilise	  a	  conceptual	  
metaphor.	  The	  argument	  is	  that	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  state	  is	  a	  really	  existing	  structure.6	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  however,	  ways	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  this	  structure	  in	  IR,	  ways	  of	  imagining	  the	  state,	  
cannot	   avoid	   an	   engagement	  with	  metaphorical	   thinking.	  Moreover,	   rather	   than	   viewing	   this	  
metaphorical	   perspective	   as	   a	  weakness	   of	   the	   subject,	   it	   is	   seen	   as	   the	   only	  way	   of	  making	  
sense	  of	  the	  state	  among	  other	  states.	  Maybe	  it	  is	  indeed	  the	  case	  that	  there	  is	  “no	  real	  knowing	  
apart	  from	  metaphor”.7	  
Keeping	  these	  points	  in	  mind	  this	  chapter	  proceeds	  in	  four	  main	  steps.	  In	  a	  first	  instance	  I	  enter	  
a	  philosophy	  of	   science	  discussion	  on	  metaphors.	  Here,	   I	   aim	   to	   show	  how	   the	   conception	  of	  
what	  a	  metaphor	   is	  and	  what	   it	  does	  has	   fundamentally	   shifted	  away	   from	  a	  perspective	   that	  
confines	  metaphors	  to	  a	  role	  as	  figures	  of	  speech.	  Related	  to	  this,	  I	  outline	  a	  three-­‐part	  typology	  
of	  what	  I	  call	  ‒	  borrowing	  from	  I.	  A.	  Richards	  ‒	  modes	  of	  metaphors,	  which	  aims	  to	  clarify	  that	  
while	  metaphors	  can	  act	  as	  figures	  of	  speech,	  they	  can	  also	  shape	  the	  ways	   in	  which	  we	  think	  
about	  the	  world	  in	  more	  fundamental	  ways.	  While	  IR	  scholarship	  can	  study	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Compare	  for	  example	  Wight,	  'State	  Agency:	  Social	  Action	  without	  Human	  Activity'.	  Wight,	  Agents,	  Structures	  
and	   International	   Relations:	   Politics	   as	   Ontology.	   As	   well	   as	   Kurki,	   Causation	   in	   International	   Relations:	  
Reclaiming	  Causal	  Analysis.	  	  
7	  Paul	  Cantor,	  'Friedrich	  Nietzsche:	  The	  Use	  and	  Abuse	  of	  Metaphor',	  in	  Metaphor:	  Problems	  and	  Perspectives,	  
ed.	  David	  S.	  Miall	  (Brighton:	  The	  Harvester	  Press,	  1982),	  71-­‐72.	  As	  cited	  in	  Richard	  Little,	  The	  Balance	  of	  Power	  
in	  International	  Relations:	  Metaphors,	  Myths,	  and	  Models	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  30.	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as	  a	  figure	  of	  speech,	  it	  also	  needs	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  serves	  as	  
a	  so-­‐called	  theory	  constitutive	  metaphor.	  Second,	  I	  aim	  to	  highlight	  the	  few	  instances	  in	  which	  
IR	   scholarship	  explicitly	  acknowledges	   the	  constitutive	   role	  of	  metaphors	   in	   the	   subject.	   I	   also	  
show	  how,	  despite	  Wendt’s	  commitment	  to	  argue	  against	  what	  he	  calls	  as-­‐if	  thinking,	  his	  ideas	  
on	  states-­‐as-­‐persons	  as	  well	  as	  later	  ideas	  on	  the	  so-­‐called	  quantum	  social	  science	  do	  not	  escape	  
metaphorical	   thinking	   entirely.	   Indeed,	   both	   concepts	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   based	   on	  
metaphors.	   Third,	   a	   further	   aim	  of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   illustrate	   how	  a	  metaphor	   is	   established	  
through	   a	   process	   of	   so-­‐called	   structural	   mapping.	   This	   process	   will	   serve	   as	   the	   basis	   for	  
developing	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   further	   in	   Chapter	   6.	   The	   last	   part	   of	   this	   chapter	  
elaborates	  on	   the	  different	   roles	   that	  metaphors	  play	  depending	  on	   the	   relationship	  between	  
mind	   and	   world	   that	   the	   researcher	   subscribes	   to.	   I	   will	   highlight	   how	   this	   has	   important	  
implications	   for	   how	   we	   can	   make	   sense	   of	   the	   state	   in	   IR	   scholarship	   and	   especially	   the	  
possibilities	  of	  developing	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  further.	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Understanding	  metaphors	  –	  interaction	  view	  and	  theory	  
constitutive	  metaphors	  
A	   useful	   starting	   point	   is	   to	   give	   a	   basic	   definition	   of	   what	   I	   mean	   when	   I	   speak	   about	  
metaphors,	   in	  other	  words	  to	  give	  a	  definition	  that	  represents	  a	   lowest	  common	  denominator	  
regarding	   various	   understandings	   of	   metaphors.	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	   a	   lowest	   common	  
denominator,	  to	  use	  a	  metaphor	  is	  to	  “talk	  and,	  potentially,	  think	  about	  something	  in	  terms	  of	  
something	   else”.8	  Or,	   to	   put	   it	   another	   way,	   the	   “essence	   of	  metaphor	   is	   understanding	   and	  
experiencing	   one	   kind	   of	   thing	   in	   terms	   of	   another”.9	  This	   definition	   is	   useful	   for	   it	   does	   not	  
foreclose	   various	   interpretations	   of	  metaphors.	   Based	  on	   this	   definition,	   an	   engagement	  with	  
metaphors	  that	  is	  located	  in	  fields	  as	  varied	  as	  literature	  studies,	  cognitive	  psychology,	  political	  
philosophy,	   or	   quantum	   physics	   is	   conceivable.10	  This	   lowest-­‐common	   denominator	   definition	  
also	  allows	  us	  to	  remain	  agnostic,	  for	  the	  moment,	  regarding	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  relate	  our	  
concepts	  and	  the	  world	  to	  each	  other.11	  	  
It	   is	   important	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   there	   is	   not	   one	   single	   perspective	   to	   understand	  
metaphors,	   nor	   is	   it	   the	   case	   that	   any	   one	   perspective	   is	   superior.	   However,	   for	   analytical	  
purposes,	   a	   first	   useful	   distinction	   is	   to	   be	  made	   based	  on	   the	   functions	   of	  metaphors	   in	   the	  
scientific	   process.	   The	   following	   categories,	   what	   I	   call,	   borrowing	   from	   Richards,	  modes	   of	  
metaphors,	  seem	  most	  useful	  as	  a	  first	  point	  of	  departure:	  metaphors	  as	  figures	  of	  speech	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Semino,	  Metaphor	  in	  Discourse,	  1.	  	  
9	  George	  Lakoff	  and	  Mark	  Johnson,	  Metaphors	  We	  Live	  By	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2003	  [1980]),	  
5.	  
10	  Some	  of	  the	  standard	  definitions	  found	  in	  lexica	  and	  encyclopaedia	  are	  less	  useful	  in	  this	  regard.	  The	  great	  
majority	   of	   them	   start	   by	   defining	   metaphors	   as	   a	   figure	   of	   speech.	   This	   immediately	   forecloses	   other	  
approaches	   to	   metaphors.	   This	   “standard	   definition”	   also	   emphasises	   that	   metaphors	   are	   a	   form	   of	  
comparison.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  in	  the	  following,	  this	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  an	  understanding	  of	  metaphors	  now	  accepted	  
as	   the	  mainstream	  position	   in	   the	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  For	  definitions	  of	  “metaphor”	   that	  are	  problematic	  
from	   the	  perspective	   developed	   in	   the	   course	   of	   this	   chapter	   see	   for	   example	  Catherine	   Soanes	   and	  Angus	  
Stenson,	  eds.,	  Oxford	  Dictionary	  of	  English,	  2	  ed.	   (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  1103.	  And	  Michael	  
Agnes	  and	  Andrew	  N.	  Sparks,	  eds.,	  Webster's	  New	  World	  Large	  Print	  Dictionary,	  4	  ed.	  (Indianapolis,	  IN:	  Wiley	  
Publishing,	  2001),	  661.	  
11	  What	   I	   am	   referring	   to	   here	   is	   the	   difference	   between	  what	   Jackson	   termed	   a	  mind-­‐world	   dualist	   and	   a	  
mind-­‐world	   monist	   perspective.	   Compare	   Jackson,	   The	   Conduct	   of	   Inquiry	   in	   International	   Relations:	  
Philosophy	  of	  Science	  and	  Its	  Implications	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  World	  Politics,	  37.	  It	  is	  also	  useful	  to	  compare	  Rom	  
Harré,	  'When	  the	  Knower	  Is	  Also	  the	  Known',	  in	  Knowing	  the	  Social	  World,	  ed.	  Tim	  May	  and	  Malcolm	  Williams	  
(Buckingham:	  Open	  University	  Press,	  1998c).	  	  
	  	   	   	  
	  
89	  
tools	   for	   persuasion,	  metaphors	   as	   tools	   for	   orienting	   ourselves	   in	   the	  world	   and	   providing	   a	  
framework	  for	  action,	  and	  metaphors	  as	  tools	  for	  constructing	  knowledge.12	  	  
A	   first	   intuition	   is	  often	   to	  define	  metaphors	  as	   figures	  of	   speech	  and	   to	   confine	   them	  to	   this	  
role.	   From	   this	   perspective,	  metaphors	   are	   seen	   as	   an	  ornament	  of	   language	   that	   is	   different	  
from	   and	   added	   to	   the	   standard	   mode	   of	   expressing	   ourselves. 13 	  They	   are	   seen	   as	   an	  
embellishment	   of	   the	   way	   we	   speak	   that	   could	   be	   dispensed	   with,	   and	   indeed	   should	   be	  
dispensed	   with	   if	   we	   aim	   for	   clarity	   of	   expression.	   Metaphors	   are	   regarded	   with	   suspicion	  
because	   they	   potentially	   challenge	   the	   idea	   that	   there	   should	   be	   a	   clear	   correspondence	  
between	  our	  concepts	  and	  the	  world.14	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view	  metaphors	  belong	  to	  the	  realm	  
of	  literature	  and	  rhetoric;	  they	  are	  used	  instead	  of	  a	  literal	  expression	  for	  their	  aesthetic	  appeal	  
or	  persuasive	  power;	   they	  are	  meant	  to	  engage	  the	  senses	  and	  trigger	  emotions.	  Hence,	   their	  
role	  in	  scientific	  pursuits	  is	  viewed	  with	  suspicion.	  Those	  critical	  of	  the	  usefulness	  of	  metaphors	  
as	   part	   of	   “science”	   argue	   that	   metaphors	   lack	   economy	   of	   expression,	   invite	   multiple	  
interpretations,	  conceal	  meaning	  and	  can	  become	  tools	  of	  subtle	  influence	  and	  power.15	  	  	  
However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  declare	  from	  the	  start	  that,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐
as-­‐person,	  I	  am	  predominantly	  interested	  in	  the	  third	  mode	  of	  metaphor	  outlined:	  metaphors	  as	  
tools	   for	   constructing	   knowledge.	   I	   refer	   to	   metaphors	   in	   this	   context	   as	   theory-­‐constitutive	  
metaphors.16	  This	   poses	   a	   challenge	   for	   the	   traditional	   view	   of	   the	   role	   of	   metaphors	   in	   the	  
social	  sciences	  outlined	  above	  as	  well	  as	  for	  Wendt’s	  conception	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  A	   similar	   distinction	   is	   introduced	   by	   Sabine	   Maasen	   and	   Peter	   Weingart	   who	   differentiate	   between	  
metaphors	   as	   a	   figure	   of	   speech,	   a	   heuristic,	   or	   as	   a	   scientific	  model.	   Sabine	  Maasen	   and	   Peter	  Weingart,	  
Metaphors	   and	   the	  Dynamics	   of	   Knowledge	   (London:	   Routledge,	   2000),	   3.	   The	   term	   is	   taken	   from	  Richards	  
account.	  Richards,	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  Rhetoric,	  94.	  
13	  It	   is	   interesting	   to	  note	   that	   this	   relationship	  could	  also	  be	   turned	  around	  and	   that	   there	   is	  no	   immediate	  
reason	  why	  metaphors	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  exception	  to	  the	  “rule”	  of	  literal	  expression.	  Peter	  Mühlhäusler	  
helpfully	   suggests	   that	   “[m]ost	   investigators	   of	  metaphor	   have	   asked	   how	  metaphorical	  meaning	   is	   derived	  
from	  literal	  meaning,	  ignoring	  …	  the	  problem	  of	  delimiting	  literal	  meaning	  and	  the	  fact.”	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  suggest	  
that	  a	  more	  helpful	  question	  might	  be	  the	  following.	  “How	  is	  literal	  meaning	  derived	  from	  metaphor?	  or	  How	  
does	   literal	   meaning	   emerge	   from	   metaphor?”	   Peter	   Mühlhäusler,	   'Toward	   and	   Explanatory	   Theory	   of	  
Metaphor',	   in	  The	  Ubiquity	   of	  Metaphor:	  Metaphor	   in	   Language	   and	   Thought,	   ed.	  Wolf	   Paprotté	   and	   René	  
Dirven	  (Amsterdam:	  John	  Benjamins,	  1985),	  57.	  
14	  Compare	  Little,	  The	  Balance	  of	  Power	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Metaphors,	  Myths,	  and	  Models,	  26.	  	  
15	  Compare	  for	  example	  Maasen	  and	  Weingart,	  Metaphors	  and	  the	  Dynamics	  of	  Knowledge,	  24-­‐28.	  
16	  The	   term	   theory-­‐constitutive	  metaphor	   is	   borrowed	   from	  Richard	   Boyd	  whose	   perspective	   on	  metaphors	  
will	  be	  elaborated	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  Boyd,	  'Metaphor	  and	  Theory	  Change:	  What	  Is	  "Metaphor"	  a	  Metaphor	  
For?'.	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In	   each	  of	   the	   three	  modes	  of	  metaphors	   outlined,	  metaphors	  play	   a	   cognitive	   role;	   although	  
this	   role	   is	   associated	  with	  different	   aims.	   In	  each	   case,	  metaphors	   influence	  how	  we	   see	   the	  
world.	  In	  some	  cases	  they	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  appeal	  to	  affects	  and	  emotions.	  In	  other	  cases,	  they	  
are	  the	  tools	  that	  make	  a	  certain	  world	  view	  possible	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  In	  the	  seminal	  Metaphors	  
We	   Live	   By,	   George	   Lakoff	   and	  Mark	   Johnson	   show	   how	  metaphors	   are	   not	   simply	   a	  way	   of	  
talking	  about	  things	  but	  how	  they	  also	  profoundly	  influence	  how	  we	  think.17	  Yet,	  especially	  for	  a	  
project	   situated	   in	   the	   area	   of	   IR,	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   also	   keep	   the	   intentions	   behind	   the	   use	   of	  
metaphors	   in	  mind.	  Metaphors	  can	  be	  (scientific)	  thinking	  tools	  as	  well	  as	  tools	  for	  persuasion	  
and	   propaganda.	   The	   dividing	   line	   between	   the	   two	   is	   not	   always	   clear.	   While	   this	   is	   an	  
important	  point	  of	  caution,	   in	  the	  following	   I	  will	  engage	   in	  a	  philosophy	  of	  science	  discussion	  
regarding	  the	  role	  of	  metaphors	  in	  science	  that	  brackets	  this	  problem	  for	  the	  moment.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson,	  Metaphors	  We	  Live	  By.	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An	  interaction	  view	  of	  metaphor	  
I	  am	  first	  and	  foremost	  interested	  in	  metaphors	  as	  thinking	  tools,	  as	  a	  way	  of	  making	  the	  world	  
more	   intelligible	   and	   highlighting	   aspects	   of	   the	   world	   hitherto	   unseen.	   As	   outlined	   in	   the	  
previous	   chapter,	   this	   interest	   in	   the	   role	   of	   metaphors	   in	   science	   is	   the	   outcome	   of	   my	  
engagement	   with	  Wendt’s	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   and	   a	   question	   that	   was	   raised	   when	  
reading	   Wendt’s	   particular	   view	   on	   the	   role	   of	   metaphors.	   Wendt	   opens	   up	   a	   dichotomy	  
between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  being	  real	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	   being	   a	  mere	   metaphor,	   a	   useful	   fiction.18	  In	   his	   2004	   article	   “The	   state	   as	   person”,	  
Wendt	  describes	  a	  common	  position	  in	  IR	  that	  treats	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  metaphorical	  terms.	  
This	  is	  ultimately	  a	  position	  that,	  in	  Wendt’s	  view,	  needs	  to	  be	  overcome.	  	  
Despite	  our	   state-­‐centric	  world,	   however,	   if	   pressed	  on	  whether	   state	  
persons	   are	   ‘real’,	   in	   my	   experience	  most	   IR	   scholars	   will	   back	   away.	  
States	   are	   not	   really	   persons,	   only	   ‘as	   if’	   ones.	   State	   personhood	   is	   a	  
useful	  fiction,	  analogy,	  metaphor,	  or	  shorthand	  for	  something	  else.19	  	  
In	  Social	  Theory,	  Wendt	  briefly	  runs	  through	  a	  list	  of	  disparate	  scholarly	  perspectives	  that	  share	  
as	   their	   common	   ground	   a	   suspicion	   towards	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state	   as	   an	   actor.20	  Wendt	  
identifies	  their	  common	  ground,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  common	  problem,	  as	  their	  refusal	  to	  accept	  the	  
reality	  of	  the	  state	  as	  an	  actor	  and	  their	  insistence	  on	  an	  as-­‐if	  treatment.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  	  
What	   unites	   these	   otherwise	   disparate	   views	   is	   the	   proposition	   that	  
state	  actorhood	  is	  just	  a	  ‘useful	  fiction’	  or	  ‘metaphor’	  for	  what	  is	  ‘really’	  
something	   else.	   The	   state	   is	   not	   really	   an	   actor	   at	   all,	   but	   merely	   a	  
‘theoretical	  construct’.21	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Compare	  for	  example	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  10.	  
19	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  289,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
20	  I	  am	  using	  the	  term	  actor	  here	  as	  this	  is	  the	  term	  that	  Wendt	  uses	  in	  the	  particular	  passage	  of	  Social	  Theory.	  
But	   moreover,	   for	   Wendt,	   the	   terms	   person	   and	   actor	   are	   closely	   related.	   In	   a	   subsequent	   passage	   he	  
introduces	  the	  move	  from	  “actor”	  to	  “person”.	  In	  his	  conceptualisation,	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐actor	  becomes	  a	  person	  
by	   showing	  “that	   such	   talk	   [of	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐actor]	   refers	   to	  a	   real	   corporate	  being	   to	  which	  we	  can	  properly	  
attribute	  human	  qualities	   like	   identities,	   interests,	   and	   intentionality”.	  Wendt,	  Social	   Theory	  of	   International	  
Politics,	  215.	  Further,	  the	  perspectives	  he	  outlines	  are	  liberalism,	  the	  study	  of	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making,	  
individualism	  and	  post-­‐structuralism.	  This	  is	  quite	  problematic	  as	  the	  categories	  are	  not	  free	  from	  overlap.	  	  
21	  Ibid.,	  	  196.	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With	  regard	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  he	  summarises	  these	  approaches	  as	  nominalist,	  
instrumentalist,	   or	   sceptical	   and	   locates	   them	   and	   his	   own	   approach	   at	   opposite	   ends	   of	   a	  
spectrum.	  Thus,	  opening	  up	  a	  dichotomy	  between	  his	  approach	  and	  so-­‐called	  as-­‐if	  approaches.	  
He	  argues	  that	  	  
[n]ominalists,	  who	  seem	  lately	  to	  hold	  the	  upper	  hand	  in	  IR	  scholarship,	  
believe	   that	   corporate	   agency	   is	   just	   a	   useful	   fiction	   or	   metaphor	   to	  
describe	   what	   is	   ‘really’	   the	   actions	   of	   individuals.	   Scientific	   realists	  
believe	   it	   refers	   to	   a	   real,	   emergent	   phenomenon	   which	   cannot	   be	  
reduced	  to	  individuals.22	  	  
Leaving	   the	   question	   of	   different	   philosophy	   of	   science	   commitments	   of	   what	   Wendt	   calls	  
nominalists	   and	   scientific	   realists	   aside	   for	   now,	   we	   can	   observe	   here	   how	   a	   dichotomy	   is	  
opened	  up	  here	  between	  as-­‐if	   and	  metaphorical	   thinking	  on	   the	  one	  hand	   and	   accepting	   the	  
reality	   of	   the	   state	   on	   the	   other	   hand.	   This	   is	   problematic.	   Arguing	   that	   something	   is	   only	   a	  
metaphor	   fails	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   various	   roles	   that	   metaphors	   can	   play.	  While	   they	  might	  
serve	  as	  figures	  of	  speech	  in	  a	  particular	  instance,	  they	  might	  also	  shape	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  
make	  sense	  of	   the	  world	   in	  more	   fundamental	  ways	  and	  contribute	   to	  creating	  what	   really	   is.	  	  
This	  is	  the	  point	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  get	  at	  with	  what	  I	  call	  modes	  of	  metaphors.	  	  
Hence,	  the	  key	  question	  that	  follows	  from	  this	  starting	  point	  is:	  What	  role	  can	  metaphors	  play	  in	  
science?	  Keeping	  this	   in	  mind,	   in	  the	  following	  engagement	  with	  the	  role	  of	  metaphors	  I	  focus	  
on	  scholars	  that	  explicitly	  engage	  with	  the	  above	  question	  and	  who	  argue,	  contra	  Wendt,	  that	  
metaphors	  can	  be	  more	  than	  figures	  of	  speech.	  
Among	   those	  who	   study	   the	   role	   of	  metaphors	   in	   science,	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   fundamental	  
agreement	  that	  they	  play	  a	  crucial	  role.	  Although,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  what	  kind	  of	  role	  a	  metaphor	  
is	  said	  to	  play	  differs	  depending	  on	  the	  specific	  philosophy	  of	  science	  commitments	  made.	  
The	   starting	   point	   taken	   here	   is	   to	   assume	   that	   metaphors	   matter	   and	   that	   they	   can	   play	   a	  
crucial	  role	  in	  constructing	  knowledge.	  The	  basic	  premise	  is	  that	  “[m]etaphor	  is	  needed	  because	  
we	  can	  conceive	  more	  than	  we	  say.	  Metaphor	  is	  needed	  to	  communicate	  about	  new	  concepts	  
or	  experiences.	  Metaphor	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  conceive	  and	  recognize	  similarities,	  and	  for	  that	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  Ibid.,	  	  215.	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reason	  may	  be	  the	  only	  way	  we	  can	  talk	  about	  new	  conceptions.”23	  Or	  as	  Andrew	  Ortony	  puts	  it,	  
“metaphors	  are	  necessary	  and	  not	  just	  nice.”24	  
I	   am	   going	   to	   start	   by	   introducing	   two	   key	   distinctions	   regarding	   how	   metaphors	   can	   be	  
approached.	  The	   first	  one	   is	   the	  distinction	  between	  a	   comparison	  and	  an	   interaction	  view	  of	  
metaphors.	   The	   second	   distinction	   is	   made	   between	   pedagogical	   metaphors	   and	   theory-­‐
constitutive	   ones.	   The	   key	   figures	   for	   the	   following	   insights	   regarding	   the	   philosophy	   of	  
metaphor	  are	  I.	  A.	  Richards,	  Max	  Black	  and	  Richard	  Boyd.25	  	  
Black	   is	  usually	   the	   first	   to	  be	  cited	  as	  an	  early	  proponent	  of	  a	   fundamental	   re-­‐thinking	  of	   the	  
role	  of	  metaphors	  in	  science.	  His	  ideas	  have	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  paradigm	  shift	  
that	  included	  the	  linguistic	  turn	  and	  a	  shift	  towards	  anti-­‐positivism	  in	  the	  social	  sciences,	  starting	  
in	   the	   1960s.26	  Black	   argues	   against	   viewing	   metaphors	   as	   forms	   of	   comparison	   and	   instead	  
develops	  what	   he	   calls	   interaction	   view	  of	  metaphor.27	  This	  move	   is	   a	   crucial	   one	   because	   as	  
long	  as	  metaphors	  are	  seen	  as	  a	   form	  of	  comparison,	   they	  can	  easily	  be	   replaced,	  and	  maybe	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Robert	   R.	   Hoffman,	   'Some	   Implications	   of	   Metaphor	   for	   Philosophy	   and	   Psychology	   of	   Science',	   in	   The	  
Ubiquity	  of	  Metaphor:	  Metaphor	  in	  Language	  and	  Thought,	  ed.	  Wolf	  Paprotté	  and	  René	  Dirven	  (Amsterdam:	  
John	  Benjamins,	  1985),	  338.	  	  
However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   while	   this	   quotation	   works	   well	   in	   conveying	   a	   general	   enthusiams	  
regarding	   metaphors,	   some	   of	   the	   assumptions	   expressed	   implicitly	   need	   further	   questioning.	   The	   first	  
sentence	   points	   to	   the	   relation	   between	   thought	   and	   language	   which	   needs	   further,	   explicit	   discussion.	  
Further,	  Hoffman	  argues	  that	  “[m]etaphor	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  conceive	  and	  recognize	  similarities”.	  However,	  
some	   scholars	   who	   engage	   with	   the	   role	   of	   metaphor	   in	   scientific	   processes	   would	   argue	   that	   similarity	  
between	  subjects	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  a	  metaphor	  to	  be	  used	  or	  to	  be	  created.	  For	  the	  view	  that	  
metaphors	  must	  be	  based	  on	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  similarity	  compare	  Eleonora	  Montuschi,	  'Metaphors	  in	  Science',	  in	  
A	   Companion	   to	   the	   Philosophy	   of	   Science,	   ed.	  W.	   H.	   Newton-­‐Smith,	   280.	   For	   the	   contrary	   position,	   which	  
argues	   that	   a	   pre-­‐existing	   similarity	   is	   not	   necessary	   and	   that	   it	   is	   rather	   the	   metaphor	   itself	   that	   creates	  
similarities	   between	   the	   two	   subjects	   compare	   Paul	   Patton’s	   chapter	   “Mobile	   concepts,	  metaphor,	   and	   the	  
problem	  of	  referentiality”.	  Paul	  Patton,	  Deleuzian	  Concepts.	  Philosophy,	  Colonialization,	  Politics	  (Stanford,	  CA:	  
Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  
24	  Andrew	  Ortony,	  'Why	  Metaphors	  Are	  Necessary	  and	  Not	  Just	  Nice',	  Educational	  Theory	  25	  (1975),	  45.	  
25	  Sabine	  Maasen	  and	  Peter	  Weingart	  for	  example	  point	  to	  Max	  Black	  as	  the	  key	  proponent	  of	  an	  anti-­‐positivist	  
shift	   regarding	   metaphors	   in	   the	   1960s	   with	   Richards	   being	   cited	   as	   an	   early	   forerunner.	   Maasen	   and	  
Weingart,	  Metaphors	  and	  the	  Dynamics	  of	  Knowledge,	  25.	  Compare	  also	  Véronique	  Mottier,	  'Metaphors,	  Mini-­‐
Narratives	  and	  Foucauldian	  Discourse	  Theory',	  in	  Political	  Language	  and	  Metaphor:	  Interpreting	  and	  Changing	  
the	   World,	   ed.	   Terrell	   Carver	   and	   Jernej	   Pikalo	   (New	   York:	   Routledge,	   2008),	   184.	   For	   an	   example	   of	  
metaphorical	   approaches	   in	   IR	   that	   start	   from	   Black’s	   insight	   compare	   Little,	   The	   Balance	   of	   Power	   in	  
International	   Relations:	   Metaphors,	   Myths,	   and	  Models,	   29-­‐36.	   As	   well	   as	  Michael	   P.	   Marks,	  Metaphors	   in	  
International	  Relations	  Theory	  (New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2011),	  23-­‐36.	  
26	  Maasen	  and	  Weingart,	  Metaphors	  and	  the	  Dynamics	  of	  Knowledge,	  25.	  
27	  To	   be	   precise	   it	   is	   worth	   pointing	   out	   that	   the	   comparison	   view	   is	   a	   special	   case	   of	   what	   Black	   calls	  
substitution	   view.	   The	   substitution	   view	   of	   metaphors	   holds	   that	   they	   can	   always	   be	   replaced	   by	   a	   literal	  
statement.	  Black,	  Models	  and	  Metaphors.	  Studies	  in	  Language	  and	  Philosophy,	  35.	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should	   even	   be	   replaced,	   by	   a	   literal	   expression	   or	   an	   explication	   of	   that	   comparison.	   They	  
would	   be	   of	   little	   value	   in	   the	   scientific	   process	   apart	   from	   maybe	   serving	   as	   a	   shorthand	  
expression	   or	   a	   placeholder	   phrase.	   Ultimately,	   the	   comparison	   view	   confines	   metaphors	   to	  
their	  role	  as	  a	  figure	  of	  speech.	  Following	  the	  comparison	  view,	  the	  argument	  is	  that	  metaphors	  
need	  to	  be	  replaced	  by	  literal	  expressions	  for	  clarity	  and	  precision	  of	  scientific	  communication.	  
But	   with	   the	   shift	   to	   an	   interaction	   view	   of	   metaphors,	   Black	   counters	   the	   argument	   that	  
metaphors	   are	   nothing	  more	   than	   a	   figure	   of	   speech	   that	  might	   only	   be	   valued	   for	   aesthetic	  
reasons.	  
By	   emphasising	   that	   a	   metaphor	   entails	   an	   interaction	   of	   two	   thoughts	   that	   cannot	   be	  
“translated”	   into	   a	   literal	   expression.	   He	   argues	   that	   a	   “[m]etaphorical	   statement	   is	   not	   a	  
substitute	   for	   a	   formal	   comparison	   or	   any	   other	   kind	   of	   literal	   statement,	   but	   has	   its	   own	  
distinctive	   capacities	   and	  achievements”.28	  The	   interaction	  view	  posits	   that	   a	  metaphor	  brings	  
two	   different	   subjects	   together,	   a	   principle	   and	   a	   subsidiary	   subject.	   The	   principal	   subject	  
acquires	  new	  meaning	  by	  being	  brought	  into	  context	  with	  the	  subsidiary	  one;	  and	  the	  subsidiary	  
subject	   helps	   to	   organise	   or	   structure	   thoughts	   about	   the	   principle	   one. 29 	  Applying	   this	  
terminology	   to	   the	  concept	  of	  states-­‐as-­‐persons,	   the	  subsidiary	  subject	   is	  constituted	  by	   ideas	  
about	   persons	   and	   the	   principle	   subject	   is	   constituted	   by	   ideas	   about	   the	   state.	   By	   bringing	  
these	  two	  concepts	  in	  contact	  with	  each	  other,	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  state	  acquires	  new	  meaning;	  
thoughts	  about	  the	  state	  in	  IR	  can	  then	  be	  structured	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  concepts	  of	  persons.	  	  	  	  
Black	  stresses	  that	  the	  “subjects”	  are	  best	  described	  as	  systems	  of	  things	  –	  in	  this	  case	  systems	  
of	   ideas	  about	   states	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  and	  systems	  of	   ideas	  about	  persons	  on	   the	  other.	   In	  a	  
later	  article,	  Black	  points	  out	   that	  every	  metaphor	   involves	  a	  process	  of	  mapping.	  Metaphors,	  
understood	   in	   this	   way,	   are	   “an	   instrument	   for	   drawing	   implications	   grounded	   in	   perceived	  
analogies	  of	  structure	  between	  two	  subjects	  belonging	  to	  different	  domains”.30	  I	  find	  this	  point	  
especially	  valuable	  as	  the	  reference	  to	  the	  process	  of	  mapping	  highlights	  a	  way	  of	  specifying	  and	  
explicating	  the	  workings	  of	  a	  metaphor.31	  Another	  point	  to	  be	  taken	  from	  Black	  is	  the	  emphasis	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Ibid.,	  	  37.	  
29	  Compare	   for	   example	   Rom	   Harré	   and	   Janet	   Martin,	   'Metaphor	   in	   Science',	   in	  Metaphor:	   Problems	   and	  
Perspectives,	  ed.	  David	  S.	  Miall	  (Brighton:	  The	  Harvester	  Press,	  1982),	  91.	  
30	  Black,	  'More	  About	  Metaphor',	  31.	  
31	  Black	   himself	   does	   not	   use	   the	   term	   structural	   mapping	   which	   will	   be	   introduced	   later	   in	   the	   chapter,	  
although	  he	  comes	  close	  when	  he	  speaks	  about	  “analogies	  of	  structure	  between	  two	  subjects”.	  Ibid.	  We	  can	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that	  “metaphor	  selects,	  emphasizes,	  suppresses,	  and	  organizes	  features	  of	  the	  principle	  subject	  
by	   implying	   statements	   about	   it	   that	   normally	   apply	   to	   the	   subsidiary	   subject”.32	  This	   gives	  
metaphors	   a	   “cognitively	   irreplaceable	   status”.33	  Metaphors	   are	   useful	   in	   changing	   and	   re-­‐
organising	  meaning,	  hence	  in	  constructing	  new	  knowledge.34	  	  
However,	   it	   is	   really	   the	   English	   philosopher	   Richards	   who	   has	   to	   be	   credited	   with	   doing	  
pioneering	  work	  in	  the	  study	  of	  metaphors	  thirty	  years	  prior	  to	  Black.35	  The	  terms	  he	  introduced	  
are	  still	  influential	  today.	  Richards,	  in	  a	  series	  of	  lectures	  given	  in	  1936,	  describes	  metaphors	  as	  
“an	   intercourse	   of	   thoughts”.36	  For	   him	   metaphors	   are	   a	   process	   whereby	   “two	   thoughts	   of	  
different	  things	  [are]	  active	  together	  and	  supported	  by	  a	  single	  word	  or	  phrase”.37	  Ultimately,	  he	  
aims	   to	  argue	   that	  metaphors	  are	  more	   than	  a	   rhetorical	  device	  and	   thus,	  aims	   to	  distinguish	  
himself	  from	  traditional,	  comparison	  theories	  of	  metaphors.	  He	  argues	  that	  
[t]he	   traditional	   theory	  noticed	  only	  a	   few	  of	   the	  modes	  of	  metaphor;	  
and	  limited	  its	  application	  of	  the	  term	  metaphor	  to	  a	  few	  of	  them	  only.	  
And	   thereby	   it	  made	  metaphor	   seem	   to	  be	  a	   verbal	  matter,	   a	   shifting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
find	   the	   term	   structural	   mapping	   for	   example	   in	   Dedre	   Gentner’s	   work.	   Dedre	   Gentner,	   'Are	   Scientific	  
Analogies	  Metaphors?',	   in	  Metaphor:	  Problems	  and	  Perspectives,	  ed.	  David	  S.	  Miall	   (Brighton:	  The	  Harvester	  
Press,	  1982).	   	  Dedre	  Gentner	  and	  Jonathan	  Grudin,	   'The	  Evolution	  of	  Mental	  Metaphors	  in	  Psychology:	  A	  90-­‐
Year	  Retrospective',	  American	  Psychologist	  40,	  2	  (1985).	  	  Dedre	  Gentner,	  'Metaphor	  as	  Structure	  Mapping:	  The	  
Relational	   Shift	   ',	   Child	   Development	   59,	   1	   (1988).	   Dedre	   Gentner,	   'Structure-­‐Mapping:	   A	   Theoretical	  
Framework	   for	   Analogy',	   Cognitive	   Science	   7,	   2	   (1983).	   Dedre	   Gentner	   and	   Arthur	   B.	   Markman,	   'Structure	  
Mapping	   in	  Analogy	  and	  Similarity',	  American	  Psychologist	  52,	  1	  (1997).	  Dedre	  Gentner	  and	  Brian	  F.	  Bowdle,	  
'The	  Career	  of	  Metaphor',	  Psychological	  Review	  112,	  1	  (2005).	  Dedre	  Gentner	  and	  Brian	  F.	  Bowdle,	  'Metaphor	  
as	   Structure-­‐Mapping',	   in	   The	   Cambridge	   Handbook	   of	   Metaphor	   and	   Thought,	   ed.	   Jr.	   Raymond	  W.	   Gibbs	  
(Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008).	  
32	  Black,	  Models	  and	  Metaphors.	  Studies	  in	  Language	  and	  Philosophy,	  44-­‐45.	  
33	  Harré	  and	  Martin,	  'Metaphor	  in	  Science',	  91.	  
34	  For	  this	  point	  compare	  Jernej	  Pikalo,	  'Mechanical	  Metaphors	  in	  Politics',	  in	  Political	  Language	  and	  Metaphor:	  
Interpreting	  and	  Changing	  the	  World,	  ed.	  Terrell	  Carver	  and	  Jernej	  Pikalo	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2008),	  44.	  
35	  David	  Miall,	  and	  Rom	  Harré	  and	  Janet	  Martin	  make	  this	  point	  about	  Richards	  quite	  strongly.	  David	  S.	  Miall,	  
'Introduction',	   in	  Metaphor:	   Problems	   and	   Perspectives,	   ed.	   David	   S.	   Miall	   (Brighton:	   The	   Harvester	   Press,	  
1982).	  Harré	  and	  Martin,	  'Metaphor	  in	  Science',	  92-­‐93.	  Although	  Black	  is	  “the	  main	  philosophical	  exponent	  of	  
Richards’	  ideas,”	  Harré	  and	  Martin	  feel	  that	  Black’s	  description	  of	  the	  interaction	  view	  is	  not	  as	  insightful	  as	  the	  
one	  provided	  by	  Richards	  almost	  three	  decades	  earlier.	  	  
36	  Richards,	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  Rhetoric,	  94	  (emphasis	  in	  original).	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  what	  this	  term	  entails	  see	  
Miall,	  'Introduction',	  xii.	  As	  well	  as	  Richards,	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  Rhetoric,	  47-­‐66.	  
37	  Harré	  and	  Martin,	  'Metaphor	  in	  Science',	  93.	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and	   displacement	   of	   words,	   whereas	   fundamentally	   it	   is	   a	   borrowing	  
between	  and	  intercourse	  of	  thoughts,	  a	  transaction	  between	  contexts.38	  
In	  other	  words,	  Richards	  argues	  that	  two	  thoughts	  are	  active	  together	  in	  a	  metaphor,	  supported	  
by	   a	   single	   word	   or	   expression.39	  In	   Richards’	   view	   the	   two	   thoughts	   are	   co-­‐present.40	  Here,	  
Richards	  provides	  a	  shift	  from	  a	  semantic	  perspective	  on	  metaphors	  to	  an	  interest	   in	  cognitive	  
processes.41	  Metaphors	  are	  now	  no	  longer	  seen	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  mere	  words	  but	  also	  a	  matter	  of	  
thought.	   Richards	   is	   the	   one	   who	   has	   to	   be	   credited	   with	   advancing	   this	   shift	   in	   the	   way	  
metaphors	  are	  viewed	  within	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  	  
There	   are	   differences	   in	   terminology	   that	   are	  worth	   noting.	   Black	   calls	   the	   element	   that	   one	  
aims	  to	  understand	  the	  principal	   subject;	   in	  Richards’	   terminology	   it	   is	   the	   tenor.	  The	  element	  
that	  provides	  structure	  and	  insights	  is	  called	  the	  subsidiary	  subject	  by	  Black	  while	  Richards	  refers	  
to	  it	  as	  the	  vehicle.42	  The	  terms	  generally	  accepted	  now,	  which	  are	  used	  in	  conceptual	  metaphor	  
theory,	   are	   target	   domain	   and	   source	   domain.	   Applying	   this	   terminology	   to	   the	   case	   of	   the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	   states	   are	   seen	   as	   the	   target	   domain	   and	   concepts	   of	   persons	   serve	   as	   the	  
source	  domain.	  
However,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   differences	   in	   terminology	   there	   is	   another	   important	   difference	  
between	  Black	  and	  Richards	  that	  is	  important	  to	  pay	  attention	  to.	  In	  a	  critical	  engagement	  with	  
both,	  Rom	  Harré	  and	  Janet	  Martin	  note	  how	  there	  are	  passages	  in	  Black	  where	  he	  appears	  to	  be	  
closer	  to	  a	  comparison	  view	  than	  to	  an	  interaction	  view.43	  This	  of	  course	  is	  problematic	  if	  one	  is	  
interested	  in	  arguing	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  value	  of	  metaphors	  beyond	  their	  role	  as	  a	  figure	  of	  speech.	  
Harré	  and	  Martin	  point	  out	   that	  Black’s	   insistence	  on	  keeping	  the	  two	  subjects	  of	  a	  metaphor	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Richards,	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  Rhetoric,	  94	  (emphasis	  in	  original).	  Here,	  the	  term	  “traditional	  theory”	  refers	  to	  
an	  Aristotelian	  conception	  of	  metaphor	  as	  well	  as	  eighteenth	  century	  understandings	  of	  metaphor.	  	  Compare	  
also	  the	  following	  for	  an	  explicit	  argument	  against	  the	  comparison	  view	  ibid.,	  	  120ff.	  
39	  Ibid.,	  	  93.	  
40	  Harré	  and	  Martin,	  'Metaphor	  in	  Science',	  94.	  
41	  Miall,	  'Introduction',	  xiii.	  
42	  For	   the	   terms	   tenor	  and	  vehicle	  and	  an	  explanation	  of	   their	   relation	  compare	  Richards,	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  
Rhetoric,	  100-­‐101.	  For	  Black	  compare	  Black,	  Models	  and	  Metaphors.	  Studies	  in	  Language	  and	  Philosophy,	  39.	  
However,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  Black’s	  and	  Richards’	  terms	  are	  not	  directly	  comparable.	  Following	  Harré	  and	  
Martin,	  Richards’	  view	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  subtler	  one	  as	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  rest	  on	  the	  need	  to	  interpret	  
tenor	   and	   vehicle	   as	   two	   distinct	   subjects	   represented	   by	   two	   distinct	   nouns.	   Compare	   Harré	   and	  Martin,	  
'Metaphor	  in	  Science',	  94.	  	  
43	  Harré	  and	  Martin,	  'Metaphor	  in	  Science',	  92.	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completely	  separate	  and	   in	  applying	  his	  theory	  primarily	  to	  metaphors	  that	   involve	  two	  nouns	  
moves	  him	  closer	  to	  a	  comparison	  view.44	  Further,	  when	  Black	  describes	  a	  metaphor	  as	  a	  filter,	  
he	  implies	  a	  one-­‐directional	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  subjects	  of	  a	  metaphor.45	  However,	  a	  
fuller	  interaction	  view	  of	  metaphor	  will	  recognise	  that	  while	  the	  source	  domain	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  
be	   structuring	   the	   perception	   of	   the	   target	   domain,	   the	   elements	   selected	   from	   the	   source	  
domain	  are	   in	  part	  already	  determined	  by	   the	   target	  domain.	   For	  example	   to	  highlight	  how	  a	  
metaphor	  works,	   Black	   uses	   the	   example	   of	   “man	   is	  wolf”.46	  He	   outlines	   how	   the	   concept	   of	  
“wolf”	   is	  used	   to	  structure	  an	  understanding	  of	  “man”.	  However,	  he	  does	  not	  emphasise	   that	  
the	  selection	  of	  elements	  from	  the	  concept	  of	  wolf	  is	  already	  guided	  by	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  
concept	   of	   “man”.	   Hence,	   he	   does	   not	   recognise	   that	   this	   process	   is	   not	   a	   one-­‐directional	  
application	   of	   wolf-­‐associations	   to	   people	   but	   an	   interaction	   between	   the	   two	   concepts	  
designed	   to	  generate	  new	   insights	  of	   “man”.47	  It	  needs	   to	  be	  emphasised	   that	  a	  metaphorical	  
process	   is	   more	   than	   a	   filtering	   process.	   Hence,	   emphasising	   a	   fuller	   interaction	   view	   of	  
metaphor,	   as	   Richards	   does,	   is	   a	   first	   important	   step	   in	   recognising	   their	   potential	   value	   for	  
producing	  new	  knowledge.	  	  
Building	   on	   this	   position	   of	   defining	   a	   metaphor	   as	   an	   interaction	   of	   thoughts,	   a	   second	  
distinction	   can	  be	   introduced.	  More	   specific	   to	   the	   scientific	   process	   is	   the	   second	  distinction	  
mentioned	   earlier	   between	   theory-­‐constitutive	   and	   pedagogical	   metaphors	   which	   will	   be	  
elaborated	  on	  in	  the	  following.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Ibid.,	  	  92-­‐94.	  
45	  Black	  uses	  a	  metaphor	  to	  explain	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  process	  of	  filtering.	  The	  process	  is	  likened	  to	  looking	  “at	  the	  
night	   sky	   through	   a	   piece	  of	   heavily	   smoked	   glass	   on	  which	   certain	   lines	   have	  been	   left	   clear”	  whereby	  we	  
“shall	   see	   only	   the	   stars	   that	   can	   be	  made	   to	   lie	   on	   the	   lines	   previously	   prepared	   upon	   the	   screen”.	   Black,	  
Models	  and	  Metaphors.	  Studies	  in	  Language	  and	  Philosophy,	  41.	  
46	  Ibid.,	  	  39-­‐41.	  
47	  However,	   it	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   the	   terminology	   of	   source	   and	   target	   domain	   that	   is	   prominent	   in	  
conceptual	  metaphor	  theory	  today	  perpetuates	  this	  problematic	  view	  of	  a	  one-­‐directional	  relationship.	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Metaphors	  to	  build	  theories	  and	  metaphors	  to	  explain	  
theories	  
Starting	  from	  Wendt’s	  critical	  stance	  regarding	  the	  role	  of	  metaphors,	  I	  think	  it	   is	   important	  to	  
further	  clarify	  their	  role	  in	  the	  scientific	  process.	  Boyd	  introduces	  the	  useful	  distinction	  between	  
two	  basic	   types	   of	   roles,	   theory-­‐constitutive	   and	   pedagogical,	   that	  metaphors	   can	   play	   in	   the	  
scientific	   process.48	  This	   distinction	   adds	   a	   helpful	   perspective	   to	   the	   debate	   between	  Wendt	  
and	  his	  critiques.	  The	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  understood	  as	  a	  metaphor,	  can	  take	  on	  either	  
role.	   Following	  Wendt’s	   observations	   and	   applying	   Boyd’s	   terminology,	   it	   can	   be	   argued	   that	  
those	   studying	   the	   state	   in	   IR	  are	   likely	   to	  be	  happy	   to	  accept	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  as	  a	  useful	  
pedagogical	  metaphor	  while	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  as	  a	  theory-­‐constitutive	  metaphor	  
represents	  a	  highly	  contested	  case.	  	  	  
According	   to	   Boyd,	   a	   pedagogical	   metaphor	   “play[s]	   a	   role	   in	   the	   teaching	   or	   explication	   of	  
theories” 49 	  whereas	   theory-­‐constitutive	   metaphors	   “constitute	   at	   least	   for	   a	   time,	   an	  
irreplaceable	  part	  of	  the	  linguistic	  machinery	  of	  a	  scientific	  theory”.50	  In	  that	  sense	  the	  latter	  can	  
contribute	   to	   theory-­‐change	   by	   introducing	   new	   concepts	   whereas	   the	   former	   helps	   in	  
explaining	   a	   theory	   and	   making	   it	   more	   tangible	   for	   pedagogical	   purposes.	   The	   pedagogical	  
metaphor	  is	  replaceable	  whereas	  the	  theory-­‐constitutive	  one	  is	  the	  source	  of	  key	  assumptions	  
and	  hypothesis	  about	  its	  subject.	  	  	  
The	  most	  important	  difference	  between	  pedagogical	  metaphors	  and	  theory-­‐constitutive	  ones	  is	  
that	  the	  former	  is,	  according	  to	  Boyd,	  conceptually	  open-­‐ended	  whereas	  the	  latter	  is	  inductively	  
open-­‐ended. 51 	  Conceptual	   open-­‐endedness	   of	   the	   pedagogical	   metaphor	   means	   that	  
associations	   are	   made	   and	   implications	   are	   drawn	   based	   on	   common	   knowledge.	   When	   a	  
pedagogical	  metaphor	  is	  used	  some	  shared	  knowledge	  is	  presupposed	  and	  some	  variability	  for	  
interpretation	   is	   left	   open.	   Hence,	   the	   pedagogical	   metaphor	   is	   aimed	   at	   explaining	   not	   at	  
inviting	   further	   research.	   In	   contrast,	  while	   also	   building	   on	   a	   common	  basis	   of	   knowledge,	   a	  
theory-­‐constitutive	  metaphor	   invites	   the	   recipient	   to	   further	   explore	   aspects	   that	   are	   not	   yet	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  For	   the	   following	   see	  also	  Semino	   for	  an	  overview	  and	  various	  examples.	   Semino,	  Metaphor	   in	  Discourse,	  
130-­‐148.	  
49	  Boyd,	  'Metaphor	  and	  Theory	  Change:	  What	  Is	  "Metaphor"	  a	  Metaphor	  For?',	  485.	  	  
50	  Ibid.,	  	  486.	  
51	  For	  this	  and	  the	  following	  explanation	  of	  the	  difference	  see	  ibid.,	  	  488-­‐490.	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discovered	   or	   not	   yet	   understood.	   Potentially,	   a	   theory-­‐constitutive	  metaphor	   invites	   further	  
research	   and	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   whole	   new	   research	   programme.	   Boyd’s	   theory-­‐constitutive	  
metaphor	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  there	  is	  a	  similarity	  of	  some	  kind	  between	  source	  and	  
target	   domain	   which,	   upon	   further	   exploration,	   might	   lead	   to	   new	   insights.	   A	   scientific	  
metaphor,	  a	  term	  used	  by	  Boyd	  that	  I	  will	  also	  utilise	  as	  part	  of	  this	  chapter,	  invites	  this	  process	  
of	  exploring	  the	  metaphor	  further.	   Indeed,	  Boyd	  argues	  that	  a	  successful	  research	  programme	  
will	   invite	   further	   and	   further	   exploration.	   From	   this	   perspective,	   metaphors	   are	   a	   tool	   for	  
further	  scientific	  exploration	  based	  on	  the	  intuition	  of	  resemblance	  between	  two	  entities.52	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 	  It	   is	   important	   to	   stress	   though	   that	   Boyd’s	   theory-­‐constitutive	   metaphors	   are	   part	   of	   a	   process	   of	  
explication	  that	  eventually	   leads	  to	  the	  metaphor	  being	  replaced	  by	  a	  “literal”	  expression.	   Indeed,	  he	  argues	  
that	   “there	   seems	   to	   be	   no	   reason	   to	   doubt	   that	   such	   explication	   is	   possible	   in	   the	   case	   of	   some	   theory-­‐
constitutive	  metaphors,	   nor	   is	   there	   any	   reason	   to	  doubt	   that	   complete	  explications	   are	  often	   the	  eventual	  
result	  of	  the	  attempts	  at	  explication	  which	  are	  central	  to	  scientific	  inquiry.”	  Ibid.,	  	  488.	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Other	  perspectives	  on	  metaphor	  
In	  the	  following,	  I	  point	  to	  other	  possible	  approaches	  to	  metaphors	  that	  also	  share	  an	  interest	  in	  
how	   a	   metaphor	   constructs	   knowledge.	   A	   distinction	   made	   by	   Sabine	   Maasen	   and	   Peter	  
Weingart	   proves	   most	   useful	   for	   the	   summary	   I	   attempt	   in	   the	   following.	   They	   distinguish	  
between	   three	   levels	  at	  which	   research	  about	  metaphors	  as	   tools	   for	  knowledge	  construction	  
can	  be	  undertaken.	  This	  is	  particularly	  helpful	  in	  pointing	  out	  where	  the	  approach	  regarding	  the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	  developed	   in	   subsequent	  chapters	   is	   to	  be	   located.	  Maasen	  and	  Weingart	  are	  
interested	  in	  analysing	  metaphors	  at	  what	  they	  identify	  as	  the	  level	  of	  discourse	  and	  delineate	  
this	  perspective	  from	  a	  sub-­‐discursive	  and	  supra-­‐discursive	  view.	  It	  is	  the	  latter	  two	  perspectives	  
that	  provide	  an	  interesting	  addition	  but	  also	  contrast	  to	  what	  has	  been	  said	  so	  far.	  	  
The	   sub-­‐discursive	   perspective	   is	   best	   described	   as	   a	   bottom-­‐up	   approach;	   metaphors	   are	  
analysed	  at	  the	  cognitive	  level.53	  The	  most	  prominent	  exponents	  of	  the	  sub-­‐discursive	  view	  and	  
widely	   cited	   in	   general	   are	   George	   Lakoff	   and	   Mark	   Johnson.	   With	   regard	   to	   this	   cognitive	  
perspective	  on	  metaphors,	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  are	   interesting	  because	  they	  take	  a	  very	  strong	  
position	  when	  they	  argue	  that	  “human	  thought	  processes	  are	  largely	  metaphorical.”54	  They	  take	  
this	   claim	   furthest	   when	   they	   aim	   at	   analysing	   the	   metaphorical	   basis	   of	   major	   works	   of	  
philosophy	   in	   their	   Philosophy	   in	   the	   Flesh.	   However,	   it	   is	   crucial	   to	   note	   that	   this	   cognitive	  
perspective	  on	  metaphors	  is	  not	  a	  recent	  phenomenon.	  We	  an	  go	  back	  to	  Richards	  once	  more	  
who,	  as	  early	  as	  1936,	  pointed	  out	  that	  “[t]hought	  is	  metaphoric,	  and	  proceeds	  by	  comparison,	  
and	  the	  metaphors	  of	  language	  derive	  therefrom.”55	  	  
In	   the	   seminal	  Metaphors	   We	   Live	   By,	   Lakoff	   and	   Johnson	   argue	   that	   metaphors	   are	   both	  
cultural	  and	  embodied	  phenomena.	  The	  authors	  point	  to	  an	  “experiential	  basis”	   for	  metaphor	  
but	   take	   that	   to	   mean	   “physical	   and	   cultural	   experience”.56	  As	   the	   title	   already	   suggests,	   in	  
Philosophy	   in	   the	   Flesh,	   published	  20	   years	   later,	   they	   argue	   that	   all	  metaphors	   are	   based	  on	  
embodied	  experience	  and	  that	  “our	  bodily	  experience	  is	  the	  primal	  basis	  for	  everything	  we	  can	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Maasen	  and	  Weingart,	  Metaphors	  and	  the	  Dynamics	  of	  Knowledge,	  27-­‐33.	  
54	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson,	  Metaphors	  We	  Live	  By,	  6	  (emphasis	  in	  original).	  	  
55	  Richards,	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  Rhetoric,	  94,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
56	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson,	  Metaphors	  We	  Live	  By,	  19.	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mean,	  think,	  know,	  and	  communicate.”57	  In	  that	  sense,	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  are	  taking	  Richards	  
perspective	  further	  by	  linking	  thought	  processes	  to	  embodiment.	  	  
However,	  against	  their	  second,	  stronger	  claim	  I	  argue	  that	  while	  ideas	  such	  as	  states-­‐as-­‐persons	  
might	  be	  influenced	  by	  our	  experience	  of	  ourselves	  as	  (embodied)	  beings	  and	  (acting)	  subjects,	  
concepts	   such	   as	   personhood,	   and	   hence	   states-­‐as-­‐persons,	   are	   more	   influenced	   by	   cultural	  
ideas	   of	   what	   it	   means	   to	   be	   a	   person.	   For	   example,	   the	   conception	   of	   humans	   as	   socially	  
atomised,	  selfish,	  and	  above	  all	  gain-­‐seeking	  is	  a	  cultural	  phenomenon	  linked	  to	  the	  emergence	  
of	  modern	   capitalism	   rather	   than	  a	  perspective	   that	   is	   determined	  by	  human	  embodiment	  or	  
“human	   nature”. 58 	  Hence,	   conceptions	   of	   what	   it	   means	   to	   be	   a	   person	   or	   to	   possess	  
personhood	  cannot	  be	  narrowed	  down	  to	  bodily	  experience	  but	  always	  have	  to	  be	  understood	  
before	   the	  background	  of	  culture.	   I	   find	  Lakoff	  and	   Johnson’s	  points	  extremely	   interesting	  but	  
from	  an	  ethico-­‐political	  perspective	  they	  are	  not	  compatible	  with	  a	  project	  that	  is	  interested	  in	  
the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  IR.	  Relating	  key	  concepts	  back	  to	  bodily	  experience	  in	  the	  way	  
they	  do,	  an	  approach	  that	  can	  best	  be	  termed	  “essentialist	  cognitivism”,	  does	  not	  sit	  well	  with	  
the	   idea	   of	   concepts	   being	   discursively	   structured	   and	   contested. 59 	  Lakoff	   and	   Johnson’s	  
assumption	   is	   that	   there	   is	  basically	  no	  reasoning	  without	   recourse	   to	   (embodied)	  metaphors.	  
While	  I	  can	  follow	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson’s	  general	  observations,	  their	  stronger	  claim	  regarding	  the	  
embodied	   nature	   of	  metaphors	   is	   rejected	   for	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	   It	   is	  worth	  
pointing	  out	   that	   this	   is	   not	   a	   general	   rejection	  but	   certainly	   a	   rejection	  of	   their	   emphasis	   on	  
embodiment	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  developed	  subsequently.	  	  
The	   supra-­‐discursive	   approach,	   as	   outlined	   by	  Maasen	   and	  Weingart,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	   a	  
top-­‐down	   approach	   that	   is	   interested	   in	   how	   metaphors	   can	   operate	   above	   the	   level	   of	  
discourse	  as	  “cultural	  cosmologies”	  and	  transmitters	  of	  ideologies	  entering	  various	  discourses	  at	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57George	  Lakoff	  and	  Mark	  Johnson,	  Philosophy	  in	  the	  Flesh.	  The	  Embodied	  Mind	  and	  Its	  Challenge	  to	  Western	  
Thought	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  1999),	  xi.	  
58	  Heikki	   Patomäki,	  After	   International	   Relations.	   Critical	   Realism	   and	   the	   (Re)Construction	   of	  World	   Politics	  
(London:	  Routledge,	  2002),	  24-­‐26.	  
59	  As	  pointed	  out	  in	  Charlotte	  Fridolfsson,	  'Political	  Protest	  and	  Metaphor',	  in	  Politics,	  Language	  and	  Metaphor,	  
ed.	  Terrell	  Carver	  and	  Jernej	  Pikalo	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2007),	  133.	  In	  a	  similar	  way,	  Maasen	  and	  Weingarten	  
also	   disagree	   with	   Lakoff	   and	   Johnson’s	   view	   that	   sees	   bodily	   experience	   as	   the	   only	   source	   domain	   for	  
metaphors.	   They	   argue	   against	   “giving	   ontological,	   epistemological,	   and	   analytical	   priority	   to	   bodily	  
experience”.	  Maasen	  and	  Weingart,	  Metaphors	  and	  the	  Dynamics	  of	  Knowledge,	  33.	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the	   same	   time.60	  This	   approach	   is	   interesting	   because	   of	   its	   emphasis	   on	   how	   metaphorical	  
structurings	   are	   incorporated	   into	   various	   discourses	   at	   the	   same	   time	   and	   can	   thus	   become	  
powerful	   independent	   forces	   that	   operate	   across	   discourses.	  Maasen	   and	  Weingart	  maintain	  
that	   in	   order	   to	   assume	   this	   ideological	   function,	   metaphors	   need	   to	   play	   “various	   roles	  
(heuristic,	  epistemic,	  rhetorical)	  in	  various	  discourses”.61	  	  
Related	   to	   the	   Maasen	   and	  Weingart’s	   supra-­‐discursive	   perspective	   is	   the	   idea	   of	   metaphor	  
themes.	   “[M]etaphor	   themes	   can	   be	   central	   to	   a	   world	   view	   or	   paradigm,	   almost	   a	   part	   of	  
metaphysics.”62	  They	  can	  also	  be	  described,	  using	  Stephen	  C.	  Pepper’s	  famous	  term,	  as	  a	  “world	  
hypotheses”.	  Pepper	  identifies	  four	  world	  hypotheses:	  formism,	  mechanism,	  contextualism,	  and	  
organicism.	   Each	   of	   those	   world	   hypotheses	   is	   based	   on	   a	   root	   metaphor	   and	   represents	   a	  
complete	   conceptual	   system	   from	   within	   which	   to	   interpret	   the	   world.63	  The	   root	   metaphor	  
shapes	   how	   the	  world	   is	   perceived	   and	  what	   counts	   as	   scientific	   evidence.	   Every	   observation	  
and	  every	  inference	  about	  the	  world	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  root	  metaphor.	  “Each	  world	  hypothesis	  is	  
autonomous.	   As	   an	   attempt	   to	   provide	   a	   complete	   view	  of	   the	  world,	   each	  world	   hypothesis	  
creates	  its	  own	  field	  of	  play.	  Within	  that	  field	  of	  play	  ‘competing’	  world	  views	  can	  be	  interpreted	  
but	  cannot	  compete	  directly.”64	  	  
The	  mechanistic	  world-­‐view	  for	  example	   is	  based	  on	  the	  root	  metaphor	  of	   the	  machine.	  From	  
the	   perspective	   of	   a	  mechanistic	  world	   hypothesis,	   the	  world	   consists	   of	   various	   parts	  which	  
exist	   prior	   to	   and	   independent	   of	   the	   structured	   relations	   in	   which	   they	   are	   embedded.	   The	  
whole	  is	  reducible	  to	  its	  parts	  and	  force	  or	  energy	  is	  channelled	  trough	  the	  system.	  Relations	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Maasen	  and	  Weingart,	  Metaphors	  and	  the	  Dynamics	  of	  Knowledge,	  27-­‐30.	  The	  term	  “cultural	  cosmologies”	  
is	   borrowed	   from	   Anne	   Harrington,	   'Metaphoric	   Connections:	   Holistic	   Science	   in	   the	   Shadow	   of	   the	   Third	  
Reich',	  Social	  Research	  62,	  2	  (1995),	  359.	  
61	  Maasen	  and	  Weingart,	  Metaphors	  and	  the	  Dynamics	  of	  Knowledge,	  30.	  
62	  Robert	   R.	   Hoffman,	   'Metaphor	   in	   Science',	   in	   Cognition	   and	   Figurative	   Language,	   ed.	   R.	   P.	   Honeck	   and	  
Robert	  R.	  Hoffman	  (Hillsdale,	  NJ:	  Erlbaum,	  1980),	  405.	  
63	  For	  a	  suggestion	  to	  introduce	  Pepper’s	  idea	  of	  root	  metaphor	  into	  IR	  scholarship	  compare	  Richard	  Little,	  'A	  
'Balance	   of	   Power'',	   in	  Contending	   Images	   of	  World	   Politics,	   ed.	   Greg	   Fry	   and	   Jacinta	  O'Hagan	   (Houndmills,	  
Basingstoke:	   Macmillan,	   2000),	   50.	   As	   well	   as	   Little,	   The	   Balance	   of	   Power	   in	   International	   Relations:	  
Metaphors,	   Myths,	   and	   Models,	   58.	   Little	   notes	   how	   there	   is	   an	   overlap	   between	   Pepper’s	   idea	   of	   root	  
metaphor	  and	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche’s	  master	  metaphors.	  	  
64	  Steven	  C.	  Hayes,	  Linda	  J.	  Hayes,	  and	  Hayne	  W.	  Reese,	  'Finding	  the	  Philosophical	  Core:	  A	  Review	  of	  Stephen	  
C.	   Pepper's	  World	  Hypotheses:	   A	   Study	   in	   Evidence',	   Journal	   of	   the	   Experimental	   Analysis	   of	   Behavior	   50,	   1	  
(1988),	  98.	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stable	   and	   outcomes	   are	   predictable.65	  In	   the	   same	   way,	   an	   organicist	   world-­‐hypothesis	   will	  
fundamentally	  shape	  ways	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  in	  biological	  terms.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  
making	  sense	  of	  the	  state	  in	  international	  relations	  we	  can	  easily	  see	  how	  both,	  the	  mechanistic	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  organicist	  framework	  can	  be	  utilised	  to	  create	  knowledge.	  However,	  the	  concept	  
of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  as	   it	  will	  be	  understood	  here,	   is	  based	  on	  a	  different	  world	  hypothesis.	  
Following	  Wendt’s	   initial	   suggestion	   that	   “states	   are	   people	   too”,	  we	   are	   entering	   a	  world	   of	  
people	   in	   interaction	  with	  other	  people.66	  The	  question	  then	  becomes	  not	  one	  of	   investigating	  
mechanisms	  or	  biological	  processes	  but	  one	  of	   investigating	  how	  we	  as	  people	  make	  sense	  of	  
ourselves.	  In	  this	  context	  we	  also	  need	  to	  note	  Pepper’s	  insistence	  that	  	  
world	  views	  are	  orthogonal	  to	  each	  other	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  conflict.	  
Apparent	  conflicts	  are	  really	  pseudo-­‐conflicts,	  wherein	  criticisms	  of	  one	  
world	   view	  are	  made	   in	   terms	  of	   the	   categorical	   concepts	  of	   another.	  
These	   kinds	   of	   conflicts	   are	   illegitimate	   and	   cannot	   be	   resolved;	   they	  
can	  only	  be	  recognized.67	  
Hence,	  a	  mechanistic	  world	  view,	  an	  organicist	  one	  and	  a	  person-­‐oriented	  one	  do	  not	  compete	  
directly	   with	   each	   other	   but	   are	   seen	   as	   operating	   each	   from	   within	   their	   own	   conceptual	  
system.	  	  
The	   two	   perspectives	   briefly	   outlined	   in	   this	   section,	   the	   sub-­‐discursive	   as	  well	   as	   the	   supra-­‐
discursive	  view,	  represent	  two	  potentially	  valuable	  alternative	  approaches	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person.	  The	  embodied	  approach	  by	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	   leads	  to	  the	  question	  to	  what	  
extend	   some	   form	   of	   anthropomorphisation	   of	   in-­‐animate	   objects	   is	   a	   “human”	   tendency,	   a	  
cognitive	  inevitability	  that	  is	  clearest	  in	  folk	  psychology	  and	  indirectly	  influences	  lay	  persons	  and	  
scholars	  alike.	  The	  supra-­‐discursive	  view	  when	  linked	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  world	  hypotheses	  and	  root	  
metaphors	   entails	   the	   question	  whether	  metaphorical	   conceptualisations	   of	   states	   should	   be	  
regarded	   as	   linked	   to	   a	   variety	   of	   discourses	   and	  wider	   cultural	   phenomena.	   Root	  metaphors	  
can	  be	  made	  useful	   to	   compare	   theories	  and	  understand	   their	  difference,	   for	  example,	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  argument	  presented	  here	  compare	  ibid.	  
66	  The	  key	  points	   in	  this	  regard	  are	  his	  utilisation	  of	  symbolic	   interactionist	  accounts	   in	  Social	  Theory	  and	  his	  
emphasis	  on	  psychological	  personhood	  in	  “The	  state	  as	  person	  in	  international	  theory”.	  
67 	  Hayes,	   Hayes,	   and	   Reese,	   'Finding	   the	   Philosophical	   Core:	   A	   Review	   of	   Stephen	   C.	   Pepper's	   World	  
Hypotheses:	  A	  Study	  in	  Evidence',	  105.	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following	   I	   will	   argue	   how	   Kenneth	   N.	   Waltz	   and	   Wendt	   differ	   with	   regard	   to	   their	   world	  
hypothesis	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  systemic	  interactions.	  	  
Both	  of	   these	  perspectives	  are	  extremely	   interesting	  questions	  but	  neither	   is	   the	  one	  pursued	  
here.	  What	   I	  am	  mainly	   interested	   in	  here	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   located	  at	  the	  
same	  level	  as	  Maasen	  and	  Weingart’s	  discursive	  view.	  While	  a	   link	  between	  ideas	  of	  states-­‐as-­‐
persons	  and	  cognitive	  tendencies	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  as	  well	  as	  culture-­‐specific	  metaphor	  themes	  
on	  the	  other	  are	  interesting	  to	  explore,	  here	  I	  aim	  to	  develop	  the	  metaphor	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
with	  a	  focus	  on	  utilising	  concepts	  of	  states	  and	  concepts	  of	  persons	  to	  select	  elements	  for	  the	  
source	   and	   target	   domain	   of	   the	   metaphor	   and	   exploring	   the	   consequences	   of	   this	  
interanimation	  of	  thoughts.	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A	  definition	  and	  two	  distinctions	  
While	  I	  have	  given	  an	  overview	  of	  how	  metaphors	  can	  be	  approached	  and	  the	  specific	  interest	  
in	  what	  is	  called,	  borrowing	  Boyd’s	  term,	  a	  scientific	  metaphor,	  in	  the	  following	  I	  aim	  at	  bringing	  
the	  aspects	  outlined	  above	  together	  by	  providing	  a	  working-­‐definition	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  
thesis.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  term	  scientific	  metaphor	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  imply	  a	  specific	  
commitment	   to	   a	   particular	   philosophy	   of	   science	   perspective.	   Rather,	   the	   term	   is	   meant	   to	  
emphasise	  an	   interest	   in	   the	   role	  played	  by	  metaphors	  as	  part	  of	   knowledge	  production	   in	   IR	  
and	   specifically	   as	   part	   of	   theory-­‐building.	   Based	   on	   what	   I	   described	   above,	   the	   working-­‐
definition	  employed	  here	  is	  the	  following.	  
A	  scientific	  metaphor	  is	  a	  process	  whereby	  one	  concept	  is	  thought	  of	   in	  terms	  of	  another.	  This	  
process	   is	   to	   be	   understood	   as	   an	   interanimation	   of	   thoughts	   and	   is	   potentially	   open-­‐ended.	  
Based	   on	   this	   interanimation	   of	   thoughts,	   a	   scientific	   metaphor	   invites	   further	   research	   and	  
exploration	   of	   connections	   between	   concepts.	   The	   connections	   established	   between	   the	   two	  
elements	   of	   a	   metaphor	   highlight	   or	   create	   similarities	   while	   hiding	   differences.	   A	   scientific	  
metaphor	  constitutes	  the	  assumptions	  made	  within	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  in	  important	  ways.	  
The	  nature	  of	  this	  process	  allows	  for	  exchanges	  between	  two	  different	  discourses	  or	  disciplines.	  
In	  that	  sense,	  a	  scientific	  metaphor	  can	  serve	  as	  an	  interdisciplinary	  bridge-­‐builder	  and	  a	  tool	  for	  
incorporating	   concepts	   from	   other	   disciplines	   by	   making	   them	   useful	   for	   the	   realm	   under	  
investigation.	  
The	  emphasis	  on	  process	   in	   this	  working	  definition	   is	  worth	  noting.	   It	   aims	  at	  pointing	   to	   the	  
fluidity	  inherent	  in	  a	  metaphor	  and	  its	  role	  in	  the	  scientific	  process.	  There	  are	  three	  points	  worth	  
stressing	   related	   to	  metaphors	   as	   a	   process.	   First,	   a	   scientific	  metaphor	   involves	   a	   process	   of	  
discovery	   whereby	   new	   relations	   between	   source	   and	   target	   domain	   are	   made	   explicit.	  
Secondly,	   under	   a	   general	   metaphor	   theme,	   there	   is	   a	   variety	   of	   different	   metaphors	   to	   be	  
explored	  and	  developed.68	  Thirdly,	  metaphors	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  bring	  two	  different	  subjects	  
or	  disciplines	  together	  or	  of	   informing	  various	  discourses	  at	  the	  same	  time.	   In	  this	  sense,	  they	  
foster	   interdisciplinary	   and	   the	   incorporation	  of	  new	  concepts	   into	   IR.	  All	   three	  processes	   are	  
never	  complete.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  Hoffman,	  'Metaphor	  in	  Science',	  406.	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Having	  suggested	  a	  tentative	  definition,	  it	  is	  equally	  important	  to	  point	  to	  differences	  between	  
metaphors	   as	   they	   are	   understood	   here	   and	   other	   terms	   that	   are	   sometimes	   used	  
interchangeably.	   For	   example,	   a	   number	   of	   different	   conceptualisations	   of	   the	   relationship	  
between	   analogy	   and	   metaphor	   exist	   and	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   tendency	   to	   use	   the	   terms	  
metaphor	  and	  analogy	  interchangeably.	  	  
When	   the	   terms	   analogy	   and	  metaphor	   are	   used	   interchangeably,	   they	   are	   cast	   in	   the	   same	  
category	   because	   they	   both	   establish	   a	   relation	   between	   two	   different	   entities,	   concepts	   or	  
realms.	  Wendt,	  for	  example,	  uses	  these	  terms	  interchangeably;	  when	  describing	  a	  tendency	  of	  
mainstream	   IR	   he	   argues	   “[s]tate	   personhood	   is	   a	   useful	   fiction,	   analogy,	   metaphor,	   or	  
shorthand	  for	  something	  else.”69	  Similarly,	  in	  Dedre	  Gentner’s	  terminology,	  analogy	  is	  used	  as	  a	  
neutral	  term	  for	  “any	  non-­‐literal	  similarity	  comparison”.70	  For	  her,	  metaphors	  are	  a	  special	  case	  
of	  analogy.	  
However,	  we	  can	  contrast	  this	  with	  a	  narrower	  definition	  of	  analogy	  that	  draws	  on	  its	  usage	  in	  
logic.	  In	  this	  narrower	  sense	  analogy	  is	  taken	  to	  describe	  “a	  process	  of	  arguing	  from	  similarity	  in	  
known	  respects	  to	  similarity	  in	  other	  respects”.71	  This	  is	  usually	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  if	  two	  things	  
are	   similar	   in	   some	   respects	   they	  will	   also	   be	   similar	   in	   other	   respects.	   When	   analysing	   the	  
domestic	  analogy,	  Hidemi	  Suganami	  introduces	  and	  stresses	  this	  point.72	  In	  this	  narrower	  sense,	  
an	   analogy	   has	   to	   be	   sharply	   distinguished	   from	   a	   metaphor. 73 	  In	   Boyd’s	   conception	   for	  
example,	   the	   similarities	   established	   between	   the	   two	   domains	   of	   a	   metaphor	   invite	   us	   to	  
search	   for	   further	   commonalities.	   However,	   similarities	   in	   some	   respects	   cannot	   be	   taken	   to	  
infer	   similarities	   in	   other	   respects.	   	   To	   the	   contrary,	   metaphors	   highlight	   commonality	   while	  
hiding	  differences	  and	  can	  operate	   in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  similarities	  that	  are	  
highlighted	  and	  the	  differences	  that	  are	  hidden.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  289.	  
70	  Gentner,	  'Are	  Scientific	  Analogies	  Metaphors?',	  108.	  
71	  Soanes	  and	  Stenson,	  eds.,	  Oxford	  Dictionary	  of	  English,	  55.	  
72	  Hidemi	   Suganami,	   The	   Domestic	   Analogy	   and	   World	   Order	   Proposals	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	   University	  
Press,	  1989),	  24-­‐27.	  
73	  Similarly,	   in	   her	  Men	  and	   States	   Chiara	  Bottici	   points	   to	   the	  usage	  of	   the	   term	   in	  Aristotle	   and	  Plato	   and	  
introduces	  the	  distinction	  between	  mathematical	  and	  geometrical	  analogy.	  Both	   instances	  represent	  a	  much	  
stricter	  understanding	  of	  analogy	  than	  what	  is	  commonly	  in	  use	  today.	  Bottici,	  Men	  and	  States.	  Rethinking	  the	  
Domestic	  Analogy	  in	  a	  Global	  Age,	  19-­‐20.	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But	   even	   when	   we	   use	   the	   wider	   definition	   of	   analogy	   advanced	   by	   Gentner,	   analogy	   and	  
metaphor	   should	   only	   be	   used	   interchangeable	   when	   one	   point	   of	   caution	   is	   acknowledged.	  	  
Gentner’s	  definition	  of	  analogy	  implies	  a	  comparison.	  But	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  there	  is	  more	  going	  
on	   in	   a	  metaphor	   than	   a	   simple	   comparison.	   Indeed,	   it	   was	   argued	   that	   the	   rejection	   of	   the	  
comparison	   view	   of	  metaphors	   is	   a	   key	   element	   for	   taking	   them	  more	   seriously	   as	   a	   theory-­‐
constitutive	   element.	   This	   can	   be	   contrasted	   with	   Elliot	   Zashin	   and	   Phillip	   C.	   Chapman’s	  
description	   of	   the	   difference	   between	   analogies	   and	   metaphors.	   For	   them,	   analogies	   and	  
metaphors	  become	  prevalent	  at	  different	  stages	  of	  the	  thought	  process.	  Whereas	  a	  metaphor	  
brings	   about	   associations	   of	   ideas	   based	  on	   images,	   feelings,	   and	   connotations,	   an	   analogy	   is	  
more	  abstract,	  operates	  through	  explicit	  comparison,	  and	  is	  utilised	  at	  a	  later,	  more	  deliberate	  
stage	   of	   the	   thought	   process.74	  In	   contrast,	   from	   the	   perspective	   taken	   here	   which	   will	   be	  
outlined	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  last	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  the	  goal	  is	  not	  to	  eventually	  replace	  the	  
“vagueness”	  of	   the	  metaphor	  with	  an	  explicit	  comparison.	  Rather,	   it	   is	  precisely	   the	  quality	  of	  
the	  metaphor	  as	  an	  interanimation	  of	  thoughts,	  irreducible	  to	  a	  direct	  comparison,	  that	  creates	  
its	  value	  as	  a	  knowledge	  creating	  tool.	  	  
A	  last	  distinction	  needs	  to	  be	  made	  based	  on	  the	  type	  of	  inference	  that	  is	  implied	  when	  utilising	  
metaphors	   as	   tools	   for	   theory-­‐building.	   Metaphors	   establish	   a	   relation	   between	   two	   distinct	  
realms	  as	  part	  of	  which	  elements	  from	  one	  realm	  (source	  domain)	  are	  carried	  over	  and	  made	  to	  
fit	  the	  other	  realm	  (target	  domain)	  so	  that	  the	  latter	  can	  be	  seen	  and	  investigated	  from	  a	  new	  
perspective.	  This	  needs	  to	  be	  clearly	  distinguished	  from	  processes	  of	  deduction.	  Deduction	  as	  a	  
type	  of	  inference	  is	  the	  application	  of	  a	  general	  principle	  to	  a	  specific	  case;	  it	  can	  be	  described	  as	  
a	   top-­‐down	   approach	   that	   moves	   from	   the	   general	   principle	   to	   the	   specific	   case.	   Further,	   a	  
deductive	  conclusion	  necessarily	  follows	  and	  must	  be	  true	  when	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  argument	  
are	  true.	  	  
The	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   could	   be	   approached	   from	   a	   deductive	   as	   well	   as	   from	   a	  
metaphorical	  perspective.	  From	  the	  deductive	  perspective,	  we	  would	  argue	  that	  elements	  of	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  Compare	  Elliot	   Zashin	  and	  Phillip	  C.	  Chapman,	   'The	  Uses	  of	  Metaphor	  and	  Analogy:	   Toward	  a	  Renewal	  of	  
Political	  Language	  ',	  The	  Journal	  of	  Politics	  36,	  2	  (1974),	  310-­‐311.	  Zashin	  and	  Chapman’s	  view	  is	  categorized	  as	  
a	  positivist	  perspective	  on	  metaphors	  by	  Richard	  Little.	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  “positivist	  view”	  on	  metaphors	  
see	  Little,	  The	  Balance	  of	  Power	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Metaphors,	  Myths,	  and	  Models,	  56-­‐57.	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general	  definition	  of	  what	  it	  entails	  to	  be	  a	  person	  are	  applicable	  to	  people	  and	  states	  alike.75	  In	  
that	   sense,	   “states	   are	   people	   too”	   because	   they	   share	   general	   characteristics	   with	   people.	  
States	  and	  people	  are	  essentially	  of	  the	  same	  kind.	  
In	   contrast	   to	   a	   deductive	   approach,	   metaphorical	   reasoning	   operates	   not	   hierarchically	   but	  
horizontally.	   The	  argument	  here	   is	   that	  parts	  of	  a	   concept	  of	  person	  can	  be	  used	   to	  generate	  
new	   knowledge	   about	   the	   seemingly	   more	   abstract	   concept	   of	   the	   state.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   an	  
argument	   from	  metaphor,	   the	  state	   is	  seen	  as	  a	  person	   in	  certain	  respects	  not	  because	  states	  
and	  people	  are	  of	  the	  same	  kind	  but	  because	  concepts	  of	  states	  are	  brought	  into	  contact	  with	  
concepts	   of	   persons	   to	   generate	   new	   insights	   about	   the	   former.	   However,	   it	   needs	   to	   be	  
stressed	   again	   that	   this	   is	   different	   from	   reasoning	   by	   analogy,	   understood	   in	   the	   narrower	  
sense,	   which	   states	   that	   similarities	   in	   some	   aspects	   necessarily	   imply	   similarities	   in	   other	  
aspects.	   In	   fact,	  while	   a	  metaphor	   highlights	   and	   creates	   commonalities	   between	   subjects,	   at	  
the	  same	  time,	  it	  can	  hide	  differences.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Compare	  for	  example	  the	  notion	  of	  moral	  agency	  of	  the	  state	  developed	  by	  Toni	  Erskine.	  Erskine,	  'Assigning	  
Responsibilities	  to	  Institutional	  Moral	  Agents:	  The	  Case	  of	  States	  and	  Quasi-­‐States'.	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Metaphors	  in	  IR	  theory	   	  
Although	   an	   increasing	   interest	   in	  metaphors	   can	   clearly	   be	   identified	   since	   the	   linguistic	   and	  
post-­‐modern	   turn	   in	   the	   social	   sciences,	   with	   few	   exceptions	   there	   is	   still	   no	   significant	   or	  
structured	   engagement	  with	  metaphors	   in	   IR	   scholarship	   and	   especially	   with	   the	   question	   of	  
how	  to	  utilise	  them	  in	  IR	  theorising.76	  Maasen	  and	  Weingart,	  for	  example,	  point	  out	  that	  while	  
an	  increasing	  number	  of	  social	  scientists	  take	  metaphors	  more	  seriously	  and	  allow	  for	  them	  to	  
take	  on	  functions	  beyond	  a	  role	  as	  figure	  of	  speech,	  studies	  on	  metaphors	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  
are	  still	  a	  “minority	  issue”	  and	  lack	  a	  “common	  approach”.77	  In	  IR	  scholarship,	  the	  constitutive,	  
as	  opposed	   to	  mere	  descriptive	  or	   rhetorical,	   role	  of	   language	  has	  gained	  some	   currency	  as	  a	  
potential	  aspect	  of	  study.78	  Yet,	  even	  where	  these	  approaches	  occupy	  a	  more	  central	  position	  in	  
the	   discipline,	   theoretical	   work	   on	   metaphors	   is	   still	   largely	   missing. 79 	  Richard	   Little,	   for	  
example,	  remarks	  critically	  that	  “[t]oo	  little	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  IR	  to	  the	  
metaphorical	  dimension	  of	  the	  subject.”80	  	  
What	   Little	   criticises	  as	   a	   lacuna	   in	   IR	   scholarship	  here	  has	   to	  be	  understood,	   at	   least	   in	  part,	  
before	   the	  background	  of	   the	   subject’s	  understanding	  of	  what	   it	  means	   to	  work	   scientifically.	  
Large	   parts	   of	   IR	   scholarship,	   especially	   in	   the	   mainstream,	   share	   Wendt’s	   unease	   about	  
metaphors,	  at	   least	  when	   it	  comes	  to	  their	  role	  as	  part	  of	  the	  “scientific	  process”.	  Drawing	  on	  
Colin	   Wight	   we	   can	   observe	   how	   “contemporary	   disciplinary	   practice	   equates	   science	   with	  
positivism”.81	  Keeping	   this	   in	   mind,	   the	  mainstream	   critique	   of	   metaphors	   that	   sees	   them	   as	  
lacking	   the	   precision	   of	   literal	   statements	   and	   thus	   being	   unsuitable	   for	   scientific	   purposes	   is	  
unsurprising.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Maasen	  and	  Weingart,	  Metaphors	  and	  the	  Dynamics	  of	  Knowledge,	  27.	  
77	  Ibid.	  
78	  Compare	   the	   constructivism	   of	   Karin	   Fierke	   and	   Nicholas	   Onuf	   for	   example.	   Fierke,	   'Wittgenstein	   and	  
International	   Relations	   Theory'.	   Nicholas	   Onuf,	  World	   of	   Our	   Making.	   Rules	   and	   Rule	   in	   Social	   Theory	   and	  
International	  Relations	  (Columbia,	  SC:	  University	  of	  South	  Carolina	  Press,	  1989).	  
79	  This	   is	  a	  critique	  issued	  by	  Rainer	  Hülsse	  for	  example.	  Rainer	  Hülsse,	   'Sprache	  Ist	  Mehr	  Als	  Argumentation.	  
Zur	  Wirklichkonstituierenden	  Rolle	  Von	  Metaphern	  ',	  Zeitschrift	  für	  Internationale	  Beziehungen	  10,	  2	  (2003).	  
80	  Little	  makes	  these	  remarks	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  mind.	  Little,	  'A	  'Balance	  of	  Power'',	  60.	  	  
81	  Wight,	  Agents,	   Structures	  and	   International	  Relations:	  Politics	  as	  Ontology,	   17.	  Compare	  also	   Jackson,	  The	  
Conduct	  of	  Inquiry	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  and	  Its	  Implications	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  World	  
Politics,	  3-­‐10.	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Yet,	   it	   is	  worth	   reminding	   ourselves	   that	   “science	  means	   different	   things	   to	   different	   people”	  
and	  each	  account	   is	  built	  on	  certain	  metaphysical	  assumptions.82	  The	  critique	  of	  metaphors	  as	  
unscientific	  is	  mostly	  voiced	  by	  scholars	  with	  an	  expressed	  commitment	  to	  positivism.	  However,	  
if	   we	   take	   the	   idea	   that	   science	   means	   different	   things	   to	   different	   people	   seriously,	   this	  
“suspicion”	   towards	   metaphors	   does	   not	   preclude	   scholars	   holding	   other	   metaphysical	  
assumptions	  from	  valuing	  metaphors	  as	  a	  key	  part	  of	  their	  scientific	  process.	  	  
With	  Jackson	  we	  can	  also	  argue	  that	  this	  drive	  for	  scientificness,	  and	  hence	  the	  denouncement	  
of	  metaphors	  as	  unscientific,	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  cultural	  prestige	  that	  comes	  with	  the	  label.	  Jackson	  
points	   out	   how	   “scientificness”	   can	   serve	   as	   a	   “very	   appealing	   rhetorical	   weapon”	   against	  
approaches	   that	   lie	   outside	   of	   what	   is	   deemed	   acceptable.83	  Hence,	   I	   argue	   that	   in	   a	   first	  
instance,	   describing	   a	   metaphor	   as	   unscientific,	   as	   a	   mere	   figure	   of	   speech,	   is	   in	   itself	   a	  
rhetorical	  move.	  Whether	  or	   not	  metaphors	   can	   serve	   as	  what	   I	   call	   scientific	  metaphors	   is	   a	  
question	   that	   can	   only	   be	   answered	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   specific	   philosophy	   of	   science	  
commitments	  made.84	  	  
Apart	   from	   the	   cultural	   prestige	   associated	   with	   the	   label	   “scientific”	   and	   its	   specific	  
understanding	   in	  mainstream	   IR,	   there	   is	   at	   least	   one	   other	   reason	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   account	  
when	   it	  comes	  to	  understanding	  the	  resistance	  against	  metaphors	   taking	  on	  a	  role	  other	   than	  
being	  a	   figure	  of	   speech.	  The	  need	   to	  establish	   the	   relatively	  young	  discipline	  of	   IR	  has	   led	   to	  
further	   suspicions	   with	   regard	   to	   metaphorical	   reasoning	   which	   “is	   thought	   not	   to	   have	   the	  
certainty	   of	   logical	   deduction	   or	   the	   firmness	   of	   scientific	   induction”	   and	   appears	   “to	   be	   less	  
than	   fully	   satisfactory”.85	  In	   addition,	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   tendency	   to	   emphasise	   the	   unique	  
character	  of	  IR	  and	  to	  regard	  the	  incorporation	  of	  findings	  from	  other	  disciplines	  with	  suspicion.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  Wight,	  Agents,	  Structures	  and	  International	  Relations:	  Politics	  as	  Ontology,	  17.	  
83	  Jackson,	  The	  Conduct	  of	  Inquiry	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  and	  Its	  Implications	  for	  the	  
Study	  of	  World	  Politics,	  17.	  
84	  This	   move,	   of	   linking	   an	   understanding	   of	   metaphors	   as	   an	   interanimation	   of	   thoughts	   with	   different	  
philosophy	  of	  science	  commitments	  regarding	  the	  relation	  between	  mind	  and	  world,	  will	  be	  introduced	  in	  the	  
last	  section	  of	  this	  chapter.	  The	  distinction	  between	  different	  philosophy	  of	  science	  commitments	  with	  regard	  
to	  how	  mind	  and	  world	  are	  said	  to	  relate	  to	  each	  other	  will	  be	  based	  on	  Jackson’s	  distinction	  between	  mind-­‐
world	  monism	  and	  mind-­‐world	  dualism.	  Compare	  ibid.,	  	  37.	  
85	  Hidemi	   Suganami,	   'Reflections	   on	   the	  Domestic	   Analogy:	   The	   Case	   of	   Bull,	   Beitz	   and	   Linklater',	  Review	   of	  
International	  Studies	  12,	  2	  (1986),	  146.	  Here	  Suganami	  summarizes	  the	  critique	  of	  “contemporary	  students	  of	  
international	  relations”	  regarding	  the	  domestic	  analogy.	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To	   illustrate	   this	   observation,	   it	   is	  worth	   taking	   a	   closer	   look	   at	  Hedley	   Bull’s	   rejection	   of	   the	  
domestic	  analogy	  that	  was	  alluded	  to	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  this	  chapter.86	  In	  the	  essay	  “Society	  
and	  Anarchy	  in	  International	  Relations”	  published	  in	  the	  seminal	  Diplomatic	  Investigations,	  Bull	  
discusses	  the	  anarchical	  character	  of	  IR,	  possibilities	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  society	  of	  states,	  and	  
the	   role	  of	   the	  domestic	  analogy.	  Bull’s	  aim	   is,	   first,	   to	   show	   that	  anarchy	   is	  not	   incompatible	  
with	  the	  formation	  of	  an	  international	  society.	  Secondly,	  he	  aims	  to	  argue	  against	  the	  so-­‐called	  
domestic	  analogy,	  the	  “argument	  from	  the	  experience	  of	  individual	  men	  in	  domestic	  society	  to	  
the	  experience	  of	  states”.87	  Undoubtedly,	  it	  is	  important	  for	  analytical	  purposes	  to	  point	  to	  the	  
differences	   between	   the	   domestic	   and	   the	   international	   realm.	   However,	   drawing	   this	   clear	  
dividing	   line	   between	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   the	   domestic	   realm	   and	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   the	  
international	  realm	  serves	  an	  important	  function	  here	  as	  a	  means	  of	  delineating	  discipline.	  For	  
Bull,	   “to	   determine	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   domestic	   analogy”	   is	   to	   “establish	   the	   autonomy	   of	  
international	  relations”.88	  And	  while	  he	  recognises	  a	  partial	  usefulness	  of	  the	  domestic	  analogy	  
he	  insists	  that	  	  
[w]e	   must,	   however,	   at	   some	   point	   abandon	   the	   domestic	   analogy	  
altogether.	   Not	   only	   is	   this	   because	   the	   attempt	   to	   understand	  
something	   by	   means	   of	   analogies	   with	   something	   else	   is	   a	   sign	   of	  
infancy	   in	   a	   subject,	   an	   indication	   of	   lack	   of	   familiarity	   with	   our	   own	  
subject-­‐matter.	   But	   also	   because	   international	   society	   is	   unique,	   and	  
owes	   its	   character	   to	   qualities	   that	   are	   peculiar	   to	   the	   situation	   of	  
sovereign	  states,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  those	  it	  has	  in	  common	  with	  the	  lives	  of	  
individuals	  in	  domestic	  society.89	  
In	  the	  passage	  following	  this	  quotation,	  Bull	  points	  out	  how	  the	  international	  realm	  differs	  from	  
the	  domestic	  and	  how	  the	  state	  differs	  from	  the	  person.	   I	  agree	  that	   it	   is	   indeed	   important	  to	  
point	  to	  these	  differences	  and,	  by	  the	  same	  token,	  point	  to	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  analogy	  by	  shedding	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Other	   English	   School	   thinkers	   who	   reject	   the	   domestic	   analogy	   are	   Charles	   Manning	   and	   James	   Mayall.	  
Compare	  ibid.,	  	  146	  as	  well	  as	  157,	  fn	  12.	  Manning,	  much	  like	  Bull,	  insists	  on	  the	  separateness	  of	  international	  
relations.	  However,	  his	  critique	  of	  the	  domestic	  analogy	  does	  not	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  a	  general	  critique	  of	  
metaphors	  in	  the	  scientific	  process.	  Compare	  Charles	  A.	  W.	  Manning,	  The	  Nature	  of	  International	  Society	  (New	  
York:	  Wiley,	  1962).	  
87	  Bull,	   'Society	   and	   Anarchy	   in	   International	   Relations',	   35.	   Compare	   also	   Suganami,	   'Reflections	   on	   the	  
Domestic	  Analogy:	  The	  Case	  of	  Bull,	  Beitz	  and	  Linklater'.	  
88	  Bull,	  'Society	  and	  Anarchy	  in	  International	  Relations',	  35-­‐36.	  
89	  Ibid.,	  	  45.	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light	   on	   the	  differences	   that	   remain	  hidden.90	  However,	   given	   the	   approach	   towards	   scientific	  
metaphors	   that	   forms	   the	   basis	   of	   this	   project,	   the	   claim	   that	   a	   subject	   could	   be	   studied	   in	  
isolation	  is	  unconvincing.	  	  
Further,	   Bull	   suggests	   that	   a	   greater	   familiarity	   with	   our	   subject	   will	   allow	   us	   to	   eventually	  
overcome	  any	  kind	  of	  metaphorical	  thinking.	  This	  suggests	  that	  we	  can	  make	  progress	  to	  a	  point	  
where	   we	   can	   shed	   metaphorical	   reasoning	   and	   are	   able	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   things	   in	  
themselves. 91 	  In	   contrast,	   the	   argument	   pursued	   here	   is	   that	   while	   it	   is	   important	   to	  
acknowledge	  that	  the	  international	  realm	  is	  unique,	  the	  point	  worth	  emphasising	  is	  that	   it	  can	  
neither	   be	   conceived	   nor	   studied	   without	   being	   first	   imagined.	   Before	   we	   can	   study	   IR,	   a	  
decision	   needs	   to	   be	   made	   with	   regard	   to	   what	   the	   key	   elements	   of	   the	   discipline	   are.	  
Metaphors	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  this	  process.	  Rather	  than	  seeing	  metaphors	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  infancy	  of	  
the	  subject,	  a	  careful	  analysis	  and	  selection	  of	  key	  metaphors	  of	  the	  discipline,	  be	  it	  the	  idea	  of	  
the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   or	   the	   balance	   of	   power,	   is	   a	   sign	   of	   maturity	   that	   acknowledges	   how	  
knowledge	  production	  often	  proceeds	  via	  a	  metaphorical	  process.	  	  
Starting	  from	  this	  premise,	  I	  pursue	  two	  aims	  in	  the	  following.	  In	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  section,	  I	  
aim	  to	  outline	  two	  approaches	  in	  IR	  theory	  that	  explicitly	  recognise	  the	  role	  of	  metaphors.	  Most	  
notably	  are	   the	  contributions	  by	  Michael	  Marks	  as	  well	  as	  Richard	  Little.92	  In	   these	   two	  cases,	  
metaphors	  are	  not	  seen	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  infancy	  of	  the	  subject	  but	  as	  an	  indispensable	  part	  of	  how	  
the	   discipline	  makes	   sense	   of	   its	   subject	  matter.	   Secondly,	   in	   the	   following	   section	   it	   will	   be	  
important	   to	   go	   back	   to	   Wendt’s	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	   The	   question	   raised	   here	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  As	   elaborated	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	   analogy	   in	   a	   very	   broad	   sense	   can,	   to	   a	   certain	   extent,	   be	   used	  
synonymously	  with	  metaphor.	  I	  am	  using	  the	  term	  analogy	  in	  this	  sense	  here	  and	  understand	  Bull	  to	  also	  use	  
the	  term	  in	  such	  a	  broader	  sense.	  	  
91	  It	   is	  worth	  noting	   that	  work	  by	  Richard	  Boyd	  would	   indeed	   suggest	  a	  process	   that,	  while	   it	   acknowledges	  
that	   metaphors	   are	   indispensable	   in	   theory	   building,	   ultimately	   aims	   at	   explication	   of	   the	   metaphors	   and	  
hence	  their	  abandonment.	  	  Boyd,	  'Metaphor	  and	  Theory	  Change:	  What	  Is	  "Metaphor"	  a	  Metaphor	  For?',	  489.	  
This	  perspective	  has	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  being	  related	  to	  Boyd’s	  commitment	  to	  philosophical	  realism	  which	  
becomes	  evident	  when	  he,	  for	  example,	  argues	  that	  “the	  use	  of	  metaphor	  is	  one	  of	  many	  devices	  available	  to	  
the	  scientific	  community	  to	  accomplish	  the	  task	  of	  accommodation	  of	  language	  to	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  the	  
world.”	  Ibid.,	  	  483.	  The	  view	  on	  metaphor	  taken	  here	  is	  a	  different	  one.	  Following	  a	  strong	  constructivism,	  the	  
metaphor	   is	   given	  a	   constitutive	   function.	   For	   this	   kind	  of	   constructivism	  compare	  Fierke,	   'Wittgenstein	  and	  
International	   Relations	   Theory'.	   And	   for	   similar	   suggestions	   regarding	   the	   role	   of	   metaphors,	   see	   Hülsse,	  
'Sprache	  Ist	  Mehr	  Als	  Argumentation.	  Zur	  Wirklichkonstituierenden	  Rolle	  Von	  Metaphern	  '.	  The	  last	  section	  of	  
this	  chapter	  will	  deal	  with	  this	  argument	  in	  more	  detail.	  	  
92	  Little,	  The	  Balance	  of	  Power	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Metaphors,	  Myths,	  and	  Models.	  Marks,	  Metaphors	  in	  
International	   Relations	   Theory.	   And	  Michael	   P.	   Marks,	   The	   Prison	   as	   Metaphor.	   Re-­‐Imagining	   International	  
Relations	  (New	  York:	  Peter	  Lang,	  2004).	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whether	  or	  not	  we	  can	  interpret	  Wendt’s	  work	  as	  being	  reliant	  on	  some	  form	  of	  metaphorical	  
reasoning	   despite	   his	   overt	   rejection	   of	   what	   he	   calls	   as-­‐if	   approaches.93	  I	   will	   argue	   that	   his	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	   and	   his	   concept	   of	   a	   quantum	   social	   science	   are	   reliant	   on	   a	   metaphorical	  
process.	   The	   quantum	   social	   science	   and	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   have	   theory	   constitutive	  
metaphors	   at	   their	   heart.	   This	   is	   an	   important	   point	   because	   this	   interpretation	   of	  Wendt,	   if	  
accepted,	  highlights	  how	  metaphorical	  processes	   cannot	  be	  escaped	   in	  knowledge	  production	  
entirely.	  	  
However,	  first,	  some	  recent	  engagements	  with	  metaphors	  that	  encourage	  the	  use	  of	  metaphors	  
as	  tools	  of	  knowledge	  construction	   in	   IR	  are	  worth	  noting.	   In	  The	  prison	  as	  metaphor	  Marks	   is	  
interested	   in	   developing	   a	   metaphor	   for	   states	   and	   inter-­‐state	   relations	   based	   on	   the	  
experiential	  context	  of	  the	  prison.	  After	  having	  analysed	  dynamics	  in	  prisons	  from	  a	  sociological	  
perspective	  he	  transfers	  these	  findings	  to	  the	   international	  realm	  and	  aims	  at	  drawing	   lessons	  
for	  IR.	  The	  first	  three	  chapters	  on	  metaphors	  in	  general	  and	  metaphors	  in	  IR	  are	  noteworthy	  for	  
they	  make	  a	  strong	  plea	   for	  greater	  acceptance	  of	  metaphors	   in	   IR	   theorising	  and	  knowledge-­‐
construction.	  Marks	   takes	   this	  aim	  a	   step	   further	   in	  his	  2011	  book	  Metaphors	   in	   International	  
Relations	  Theory,	  where	  he	  analyses	  metaphors	  of	  power	  and	   international	  security	  as	  well	  as	  
game	  theory	  metaphors	  in	  greater	  detail.	  In	  this	  context,	  metaphors	  are	  not	  seen	  as	  a	  weakness	  
of	  the	  subject	  but	  as	  an	  indispensable	  part	  of	  its	  analytic	  machinery.	  
Richard	   Little’s	   focus	   on	   the	   role	   that	   metaphors	   can	   potentially	   play	   in	   IR	   stems	   from	   his	  
interest	   in	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   balance	   of	   power.	   In	   his	   2006	   book,	   The	   Balance	   of	   Power	   in	  
International	   Relations,	   Little	   introduces	   two	   key	   moves	   with	   regard	   to	   metaphors.	   The	   first	  
move	   is	   to	   identify	   the	  balance	  of	  power	  as	   “a	   simple	  but	  extremely	  effective	  and	  universally	  
applicable	   metaphor”.94	  For	   Little	   this	   goes	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   also	   acknowledging	   that	   a	  
metaphor	   has	   “the	   capacity	   to	   transform	   the	   established	   meaning	   of	   a	   concept”.95	  And	   in	   a	  
second	  step	  he	  aims	  to	  “associate	  the	  concept	  with	  a	  model”	  and	  to	  “suggest	  that	  attempts	  to	  
model	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   directly	   or	   indirectly	   draw	   on	   its	   metaphorical	   and	   mythical	  
status”.96	  Little	  analyses	  four	  key	  IR	  scholars	  –	  Hans	  Morgenthau,	  Hedley	  Bull,	  Kenneth	  N.	  Waltz,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  289.	  
94	  Little,	  The	  Balance	  of	  Power	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Metaphors,	  Myths,	  and	  Models,	  13.	  
95	  Ibid.,	  	  19.	  
96	  Ibid.,	  	  13.	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and	  John	  Mearsheimer	  –	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  usage	  of	  balance	  of	  power	  concepts.	  He	  suggests	  
that	  we	   can	   start	   from	   the	  balance	  of	  power	  as	  a	   root	  metaphor,	   to	  use	  Stephen	  C.	  Peppers’	  
term	   introduced	   in	   the	   previous	   section	   again. 97 	  Taking	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   as	   a	   root	  
metaphor,	   Little	   outlines	   two	   possible	   interpretations.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   we	   encounter	   the	  
image	  of	  weighing	  scales	   that	  brings	  about	  the	   idea	  of	  an	  adversarial	  political	  equilibrium	  and	  
conflictual	  behaviour.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  can	  be	  imagined	  as	  an	  arch	  or	  a	  
body	   which	   is	   linked	   with	   an	   associational	   political	   equilibrium	   and	   the	   corresponding	   more	  
cooperative	  behaviour.98	  	  
These	  two	  examples	  van	  serve	  as	  a	  first	   indication	  of	  a	  change	  of	  perspective	  from	  a	  suspicion	  
towards	   metaphors	   to	   an	   acceptance	   of	   their	   potential	   role	   in	   theorising	   and	   knowledge	  
production.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	   it	   is	  crucial	  for	  Wendt	  to	  emphasise	  that	  
the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  metaphor	  but	  also	  engages	  the	  hard	  ontological	  question	  of	  
what	   the	   state	   really	   is.	   However,	   this	   makes	   asking	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   a	  
metaphorical	  process	  can	  be	  ascribed	  to	  his	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  all	  the	  more	  crucial.	  In	  a	  
similar	  vein,	  a	  look	  at	  the	  later	  developed	  concept	  of	  a	  quantum	  social	  science	  is	  also	  instructive.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  Little	  introduces	  Pepper	  specifically	  for	  this	  purpose.	  Compare	  ibid.	  
98	  For	  an	  overview	  compare	  ibid.,	  	  86.	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Metaphors	  in	  Wendt’s	  work	  
As	   argued	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   Wendt’s	   concept	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   an	   important	  
starting	  point	   for	   this	   project.	  His	   insistence	  on	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  being	   real	   stems	   from	  his	  
commitment	   to	   scientific	   realism	   which	   in	   turn	   is	   his	   solution	   to	   finding	   a	   via	   media	   for	  
combining	   a	   positivistic	   epistemology	   with	   an	   idealistic	   ontology. 99 	  Similarly,	   his	   sceptical	  
position	   towards	   and	   criticism	   of	   what	   he	   calls	   as-­‐if	   or	   metaphorical	   approaches	   that	   runs	  
through	  his	  most	  recent	  works	  on	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  comes	  from	  this	  commitment.100	  	  
To	  begin	  with,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  same	  firm	  rejection	  of	  metaphorical	  approaches	  
cannot	  be	   found	   in	  Wendt’s	  work	  prior	   to	  Social	   Theory.	   In	  his	  1992	  article,	   “Anarchy	   is	  what	  
states	  make	  of	  it”,	  Wendt	  does	  not	  reject	  terms	  such	  as	  analogy	  or	  metaphor.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  
he	  is	  happy	  to	  admit	  that	  anthropomorphic	  conceptions	  of	  the	  state	  are	  a	  form	  of	  analogy.	  He	  
“assume[s]	   that	   a	   theoretical	   productive	   analogy	   can	   be	   made	   between	   individuals	   and	  
states”.101	  In	  the	  same	  article,	  Wendt	  outlines	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  first	  contact	  between	  two	  actors	  in	  
IR.	  And	  he	  describes	  this	  first	  contact	  as	  a	  metaphorical	  situation.102	  He	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  use	  the	  
metaphor	   of	   a	   first	   contact	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   a	   thought	   experiment	   that	   illustrates	   how	   the	  
process	   of	   signalling,	   interpreting,	   and	   responding	   that	   takes	   place	   during	   the	   first	   encounter	  
creates	  social	  meaning	  and	  ultimately	  identities	  and	  interest.103	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  For	  a	   critical	  discussion	  of	   interpreting	   scientific	   realism	  as	  a	  via	  media	   position	  between	   these	   two	  poles	  
compare	  Wight,	  Agents,	  Structures	  and	  International	  Relations:	  Politics	  as	  Ontology,	  17-­‐18.	  
100	  Compare	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory'.	  
101	  Wendt,	   'Anarchy	   Is	   What	   States	   Make	   of	   It:	   The	   Social	   Construction	   of	   Power	   Politics',	   397,	   fn	   21.	   For	  
another	  example	  of	  the	  term	  analogy	  being	  employed	  in	  a	  positive	  context	  by	  Wendt	  see	  also	  ibid.,	  	  422-­‐423.	  
102	  He	  adds	  in	  a	  footnote	  that	  “[t]his	  situation	  is	  not	  entirely	  metaphorical	  in	  world	  politics”.	  Here,	  he	  aims	  at	  
pointing	   out	   that	   historically,	   first	   contacts	   have	   been	   taking	   place	   and	   that	   it	   is	   worth	   studying	   these	   as	  
historical	  case	  studies.	  However,	   this	  qualification	  does	  not	  take	  away	  from	  the	  point	  that	  the	   idea	  of	  a	   first	  
contact	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  metaphor	  which	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  useful	  thought	  experiment.	  Ibid.,	  	  404,	  fn	  47.	  
103	  Ibid.,	   	  404-­‐406.	  For	  a	  similar	  account	  compare	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  328-­‐329.	  It	   is	  
very	   interesting	   to	  note	   that	   in	  Social	  Theory,	  Wendt	  avoids	   the	   terms	  analogy	  and	  metaphor	   in	   connection	  
with	   what	   he	   now	   calls	   First	   Encounter.	   He	   uses	   the	   term	   “base	  model”	   (p.	   328)	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   First	  
Encounter	  and	  also	  distinguishes	   it	   from	  “real	   life	   situations”	   (p.	  329).	  Both	  phrases	  underline	   that	   the	  First	  
Encounter	   is	   an	   abstraction	   from	   reality.	   Yet,	   the	   absence	   of	   the	   term	   metaphor	   or	   analogy,	   which	   is	  
unsurprising	  given	  Wendt’s	  strong	  commitment	  made	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  book,	  is	  worth	  noting	  –	  especially	  
when	   seen	   in	   contrast	   to	   his	   1992	   article	   “Anarchy	   is	   what	   state	   make	   of	   it”.	   The	   argumentative	   and	  
theoretical	  move	  made,	  namely	  employing	  a	  thought	  experiment,	  is	  similar.	  It	  seems	  that	  only	  the	  terminology	  
used	  to	  describe	  what	  this	  move	  is,	  is	  different.	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Secondly,	   it	   is	  also	   important	   to	  note	  that	  at	   times,	  as	  will	  be	  argued	  below,	  Wendt’s	  outright	  
rejection	  of	  a	  metaphorical	  treatment	  of	  the	  state	  does	  seem	  to	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  how	  he	  then	  
actually	   proceeds	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   state	   is	   a	   person.	   This	   forms	   the	   question	   that	   will	   be	  
pursued	   in	   the	   following:	   can	  we	   identify	  a	  metaphorical	  process	   in	  Wendt’s	  work	  despite	  his	  
explicit	  rejection	  of	  metaphors?	  	  	  
In	  Social	  Theory,	  Wendt	  is	  critical	  of	  as-­‐if	  thinking	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  There	  are	  a	  
number	  of	  passages	  in	  the	  text	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  exemplify	  this	  position.	  For	  example,	  at	  the	  
beginning	  of	  his	  chapter	  on	  “The	  state	  and	  the	  problem	  of	  corporate	  agency”	  he	  argues	  “that	  
states	   are	   real	   actors	   to	   which	   we	   can	   legitimately	   attribute	   anthropomorphic	   qualities	   like	  
desires,	   beliefs	   and	   intentionality”. 104 	  This,	   for	   Wendt,	   establishes	   the	   state	   as	   a	   person.	  
However,	   far	   from	   establishing	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   in	   a	   self-­‐evident	   way,	   this	   and	   similar	  
quotations,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  raise	  the	  question	  of	  what	  it	  entails	  to	  attribute	  qualities	  to	  an	  entity.	  
To	   attribute	   qualities	   to	   an	   entity	   seems	   to	   be	   different	   from	   saying	   that	   an	   entity	  has	   these	  
qualities.	  The	  choice	  of	  words	  in	  the	  quotation	  seems	  to	  indicate	  that	  there	  is	  something	  more	  
going	  on	  than	  simply	  observing	  that	  the	  state	   is	  a	  person.	   It	  seems	  that	  an	  additional	  step,	  an	  
addition	  process	  is	  needed	  that	  the	  term	  “attribution”	  points	  to.	  Likewise,	  the	  criteria	  for	  what	  
counts	  as	  a	  “legitimate”	  attribution	  would	  need	  further	  elaboration.	   In	   line	  with	  the	  argument	  
advanced	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  we	  can	  ask	  whether	  this	  attribution	  is	  part	  of	  a	  deductive	  or	  a	  
metaphorical	   process.	   In	   other	   words,	   can	   these	   qualities	   be	   attributed	   because	   states	   and	  
persons	  are	  of	  the	  same	  kind	  or	  because	  ideas	  of	  states	  and	  ideas	  of	  persons	  are	  brought	  into	  an	  
interanimation	   of	   thoughts,	   to	   use	   Richards’	   term,	   that	   enables	   us	   to	   perceive	   states	   as	  
persons?105	  	  	  
In	   Social	   Theory,	   Wendt	   allows	   for	   metaphors	   to	   play	   a	   very	   confined	   role	   as	   sources	   of	  
inspiration	   and	   providers	   of	   ideas.	   This	   is	   linked	   to	   his	   philosophical	   realist	   commitments.	   He	  
points	   out	   that	   while	   metaphors	   can	   be	   sources	   of	   inspiration,	   beyond	   the	   stage	   of	   early	  
research	   they	   are	   to	   be	   replaced	   by	   non-­‐metaphorical	   concepts.	   It	   is	   worth	   looking	   at	   the	  
precise	  role	  that	  Wendt	  assigns	  to	  metaphors	  from	  this	  point	  of	  view.	  He	  argues	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  197.	  
105	  Richards,	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  Rhetoric.	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[i]n	  the	  realist	  view,	  the	  theorist	  baptizes	  an	  unobservable	  phenomenon	  
by	  proposing	  a	  description	  of	  its	  properties	  and	  some	  hypotheses	  about	  
how	   these	   relate	   to	   observable	   effects.	   Essentially	   when	   dealing	  with	  
unobservables	   the	   realist	   –	   in	   natural	   as	   much	   as	   social	   science	   –	   is	  
combining	   a	   causal	   with	   a	   description	   theory	   of	   reference.	   This	  
baptizing	  often	  occurs	  through	  metaphors.106	  	  
As	   an	   example	   of	   this	   baptising	   function,	   Wendt	   points	   to	   Waltz’s	   Theory	   of	   International	  
Politics.	  He	  points	  out	  how	  “[i]n	  good	  realist	  fashion,	  Waltz	  baptized	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  states	  
system	  with	  a	  three-­‐part	  definition	  (description),	  and	  a	  market	  metaphor	  for	  thinking	  about	  its	  
effects.”107	  This,	  utilising	  a	  market	  metaphor	  and	  thereby	  drawing	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  homo	  
economicus	   that	   is	   prevalent	   in	  micro-­‐economics,	   has	   profound	   consequences	   for	   how	  Waltz	  
conceptualises	   the	   interactions	   between	   states.108	  As	   we	   have	   seen	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	  
Waltz	  allows	  only	   for	   the	  behaviour	  of	  states	   to	  be	   influenced	  at	   the	  systemic	   level	  which	   is	  a	  
perspective	  in	  line	  with	  the	  micro-­‐economic	  conception	  of	  the	  market.109	  This	  is	  precisely	  what	  
Wendt	  argues	  against	  in	  his	  Social	  Theory	  by	  allowing	  systemic	  interactions	  to	  not	  only	  influence	  
behaviour	  but	  also	  identities	  and	  interests.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  63,	  emphasis	  added.	  
107	  Ibid.,	  	  63.	  In	  addition,	  it	  is	  worth	  debating	  whether	  Waltz’s	  approaches	  is	  indeed	  a	  scientific	  realist	  one,	  as	  
Wendt	  suggests.	  Jackson,	  for	  example,	  cites	  Waltz	  as	  a	  key	  example	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  analyticist	  tradition.	  
According	  to	  Jackson,	  the	  analyticist	  differs	  from	  the	  philosophical	  realist	  in	  two	  key	  ways.	  Focusing	  on	  one	  of	  
these	  dimensions,	  the	  question	  of	  philosophical	  ontology,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  the	  analyticist	  subscribes	  to	  a	  mind-­‐
world	  monist	  view	  whereas	  the	  critical	  realist	  is	  a	  mind-­‐world	  dualist.	  This	  is	  a	  key	  important	  difference.	  Waltz	  
as	  an	  analyticist	   is	  not	   interested	   in	  comparing	  theories	  with	  an	   independently	  existing	  world.	  Rather,	  Waltz	  
points	   out	   that	   theories	   “construct	   a	   reality,	   but	   no	   one	   can	   ever	   say	   that	   it	   is	   the	   reality”.	   This	   is	  
fundamentally	   different	   from	   a	   philosophical	   realist	   perspective	   and	   from	   Wendt’s	   approach.	   Kenneth	   N.	  
Waltz,	  Theory	  of	  International	  Realtiosn	  (New	  York:	  McGraw-­‐Hill,	  1979),	  9.	  As	  quoted	  in	  Jackson,	  The	  Conduct	  
of	  Inquiry	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  and	  Its	  Implications	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  World	  Politics,	  
113	  compare	  also	  37	  as	  well	  as	  112-­‐155.	  
108	  Compare	   for	   example	   Wendt,	   'Constructing	   International	   Politics',	   72.	   The	   other	   metaphor	   that	   Wendt	  
identifies	   in	   Waltz	   draws	   on	   sociobiology	   and	   introduces	   the	   concept	   of	   natural	   selection	   to	   international	  
relations.	  Compare	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  100.	  
109	  Wendt	  interprets	  Waltz’s	  metaphor	  as	  bringing	  together	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  state	  in	  international	  relations	  
on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  companies	  in	  a	  free	  market	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  He	  argues	  that	  “just	  as	  what	  
matters	  in	  assessing	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  market	  is	  only	  the	  number	  and	  size	  of	  firms,	  so	  in	  international	  politics	  
what	  matters	  is	  only	  the	  number	  and	  power	  of	  states”.	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  99.	  For	  
the	   concept	   of	  homo	   economicus	   in	  Waltz	   see	   also	   ibid.,	   	   321.	   For	   other	   analyses	   of	  Waltz’s	   use	   of	  micro-­‐
economics	   as	   a	   source	   domain	   for	   the	   metaphor	   of	   the	   international	   system	   compare	   Anna	   Wieslander,	  
'Metaphors,	   Thought	   and	   Theory:	   The	   Case	   of	   Neorealism	   and	   Bipolarity	   ',	   Statsvetenskaplig	   Tidskrift	   98,	   2	  
(1995),	  134.	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Having	   established	   the	   idea	   that	   metaphors	   are	   relevant	   for	   knowledge	   construction,	   this	  
difference	   can	  now	  be	   interpreted	   as	   resulting	   from	   two	  different	   root	  metaphors	   underlying	  
Wendt’s	   and	   Waltz’s	   work.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   systemic	   interactions	   between	   states	   are	  
conceptualised	   through	   recourse	   to	   the	   metaphor	   of	   the	   market	   and	   the	   person	   as	   a	   utility	  
maximiser	   as	   developed	   in	   micro-­‐economics.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   systemic	   interactions	   are	  
captured	  through	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  first	  encounter	  between	  people	  and	  symbolic	  exchanges	  that	  
create	   a	   common	   culture.	   Expressing	   this	   difference	   in	   a	   very	   oversimplified	  way,	  we	   can	   say	  
that	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   in	  Waltz,	   we	   encounter	   homo	   economicus	   and	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   in	  
Wendt,	  we	  encounter	  homo	  sociologicus.110	  Pointing	  to	  this	  difference	  in	  root	  metaphors	  is	  also	  
another	   way	   of	   highlighting	   the	   move	   away	   from	   a	   materialist	   conception	   of	   systemic	  
interactions	  in	  Waltz	  to	  an	  “ideas	  almost	  all	  the	  way	  down”	  conception	  of	  systemic	  interactions	  
in	  Wendt.	  	  
Interestingly,	   while	   Wendt	   points	   to	   the	   important	   role	   that	   the	   metaphor	   of	   the	   market	  
inspired	   by	   micro-­‐economics	   plays	   in	   Waltz’s	   structural	   account,	   his	   own	   conception	   of	   the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	  and	  systemic	  interactions	  conceived	  of	  as	  symbolic	  interactions	  is	  not	  portrayed	  
in	  similar	  terms.111	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Wendt	  reserves	  a	  limited	  role	  for	  metaphors	  to	  play	  as	  part	  
of	  a	  scientific	  realist	  perspective	  and	  uses	  Waltz’s	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics	  as	  an	  example.	  
However,	   what	   Wendt	   calls	   their	   baptising	   function	   is	   not	   taken	   up	   with	   regard	   to	   his	   own	  
concept	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  Wendt	  indentifies	  a	  market	  metaphor	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Waltz	  and	  
building	  on	  that	  we	  should	  also	  ask	  what	  baptising	  metaphor	  was	  utilised	  by	  Wendt	  himself.	  	  	  
The	  state	  already	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  person	  without	  a	  metaphorical	  baptising	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	  being	  needed.	  Wendt’s	  miracle	  argument,	  the	  notion	  that	  it	  would	  be	  a	  miracle	  
if	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  had	  survived	  for	  so	  long	  in	  IR	  without	  the	  state	  really	  being	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  For	  this	  distinction	  compare	  for	  example	  Kai	  Alderson.	  Alderson	  uses	   it	  to	  contrast	  two	  extreme	  positions	  
on	  conceptions	  of	  human	  beings.	  These	  are	  also	  reflected	  in	  IR	  and	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  
potentials	   for	   socialisation	   of	   states.	   Interestingly,	   he	   describes	   the	   homo	   economicus	   position	   as	   the	  
dominant	   one	   in	   IR	   and	   associates	   homo	   sociologicus	   with	   constructivism	   (more	   precisely	   with	   those	  
constructivist	  that	  are	  specifically	   interested	   in	  norms	  such	  as	  Finnemore	  and	  Sikkink).	  Kai	  Alderson,	   'Making	  
Sense	  of	  State	  Socialization',	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies	  27,	  3	  (2001),	  420-­‐422.	  
111	  When	   referring	   to	  Waltz’s	   conception	   of	   systemic	   interaction,	  Wendt	   uses	  mostly	   the	   term	   analogy,	   not	  
metaphor,	   throughout	   Social	   Theory.	   However,	   as	   outlined	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	   the	   two	   terms	   can	   be	  
understood	   synonymously	   in	   this	   case.	   For	   references	   to	  Waltz’s	  usage	  of	  an	  analogy	  with	  micro-­‐economics	  
compare	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  15-­‐16,	  19,	  40,	  99,	  285.	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a	  person,	  seems	  to	  provide	   the	  short-­‐cut	   from	  the	  metaphorical	  baptising	  of	  a	  concept	   to	   the	  
“reality”	  of	  the	  concept.112	  	  
This	  is	  problematic.	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  Wendt	  follows	  the	  scientific	  realist	  idea	  
of	  progress	  in	  science	  that	  holds	  that	  “the	  best	  explanation	  for	  the	  success	  of	  science	  is	  that	  we	  
are	  getting	  closer	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  reality”.113	  However,	  while,	  as	  Wendt	  argues,	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  current	  best	  explanation,	   it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  the	  current	  best	  
explanation	   also	   represents	   how	   things	   really	   are.	   While	   scientific	   realists	   would	   argue	   that	  
metaphors	   play	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   scientific	   process,	   they	   also	   argue	   that	   part	   of	   that	  
process	   is	  ultimately	  to	  explicate	  these	  metaphors.114	  Yet,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  current	  
best	  explanation,	  from	  Wendt’s	  perspective	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  could	  not	  (still)	  
be	  metaphorical	  in	  nature.	  	  
In	   the	   following,	   I	   introduce	   a	   few	   observations	   that	   support	   the	   belief	   that	   we	   do	   actually	  
encounter	  a	  metaphorical	  process	  in	  Wendt’s	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  To	  begin	  with,	  I	  maintain	  that	  in	  
Social	  Theory	  as	  well	  as	   in	  “The	  state	  as	  person”	  we	  can	  observe	  how	  aspects	  of	  two	  different	  
concepts	   are	   thought	   of	   at	   the	   same	   time	   and	   how	   they	   are	   brought	   into	   contact	  with	   each	  
other:	   the	   person	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   the	   state	   on	   the	   other.	   There	   is	   clearly	   a	   process	   of	  
transference	  of	  ideas	  taking	  place	  as	  part	  of	  which	  knowledge	  about	  individual	  human	  beings	  is	  
used	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  state.	  	  
In	  his	  2004	  article,	  “The	  state	  as	  person	  in	  international	  theory”,	  Wendt	  begins	  with	  a	  critique	  of	  
what	  he	   calls	   treatments	  of	   state	  personhood	  as	   a	   “useful	   fiction,	   analogy,	   [or]	  metaphor”.115	  
However,	   his	   starting	  point	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   state	   is	   a	   person	   is	   the	   individual	   human	  being.	  
Wendt	  asks,	  “What	  is	  a	  person?”116	  He	  then	  argues	  that	  “[a]s	  a	  baseline	  for	  thinking	  about	  the	  
psychological	   personhood	   of	   states	   we	   first	   need	   to	   define	   it	   at	   the	   individual	   level”.117	  This	  
indicates	  that	  in	  this	  case	  we	  do	  not	  encounter	  a	  deductive	  argument	  proceeding	  from	  a	  general	  
definition	   of	   what	   it	  means	   to	   be	   a	   person	   that	   is	   applicable	   to	   both,	   individuals	   and	   states.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  For	  an	  elaboration	  of	  Wendt’s	  miracle	  argument	  see	  ibid.,	  	  64-­‐67.	  
113	  Ibid.,	  	  65.	  
114	  Compare	  Boyd,	  'Metaphor	  and	  Theory	  Change:	  What	  Is	  "Metaphor"	  a	  Metaphor	  For?'.	  
115	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  291.	  
116	  Ibid.,	  	  292.	  
117	  Ibid.,	  	  295.	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Rather,	  Wendt	  proceeds	  from	  concepts	  associated	  with	  individual	  human	  beings	  to	  the	  concept	  
of	  the	  state.	  	  
As	   outlined	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   based	   on	   insights	   from	   the	   analysis	   of	   individual	   human	  
beings,	  Wendt	  identifies	  three	  requirements	  for	  personhood:	  intentionality,	  being	  an	  organism,	  
and	   possessing	   consciousness.118	  In	   further	   fleshing	   out	   these	   three	   criteria,	   we	   can	   see	   how	  
elements	  identified	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  individual	  human	  being	  in	  mind	  are	  utilised	  to	  structure	  
an	  understanding	  of	   the	  state.	  This	  underlines	   the	   impression	   that	  we	  encounter	  a	  process	  of	  
transference	   of	   ideas	   in	   this	   case	   and	   hence	   a	   case	   of	   metaphorical	   thinking.	   To	   utilise	   a	  
metaphor	  is	  to	  think	  of	  one	  thing	  in	  terms	  of	  another	  and	  to	  have	  these	  two	  thoughts	  present	  at	  
the	  same	  time.	  	  
Taking	   the	   criteria	   of	   “being	   an	   organism”	   as	   an	   example	   is	   instructive	   in	   this	   regard.	  Wendt	  
outlines	   in	  what	  ways	  criteria	   found	  at	   the	   individual	   level	   can	  be	  adopted	   to	  describe	   states.	  
Conceptually,	  we	  can	  see	  a	  subtle	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  person	  and	  towards	  a	  general	  notion	  of	  
organism	  taking	  place.	  Wendt	  concludes	  that	  “[i]n	  sum,	  with	  organisms	  states	  share	  substantial	  
individuality,	   organisation,	   homeostasis	   and	   autonomy,	   but	   they	   are	   also	   different	   in	   two	   key	  
aspects:	   states	   are	   composed	   of	   autonomous	   individuals,	   and	   they	   do	   not	   engage	   in	   genetic	  
reproduction.”119	  The	   solution	  Wendt	   offers,	   by	   drawing	   on	   the	   study	   of	   insect	   colonies,	   is	   to	  
conceive	  of	  states	  as	  “superorganisms”.120	  	  
From	  the	  perspective	  of	  scientific	  metaphors	  three	  points	  can	  be	  offered	  in	  response	  to	  Wendt.	  
First,	  we	  need	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  conceptual	  shift	  that	  is	  taking	  place	  here	  from	  the	  person	  
to	   the	   organism.	   Being	   an	   organism	   is	   one	   of	   the	   three	   criteria	   Wendt	   outlines	   with	   the	  
individual	  human	  being	  in	  mind.	  However,	  when	  outlining	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  state	  as	  an	  organism,	  he	  
draws	   on	   general	   definitions	   of	   life	   as	   put	   forward	   from	   within	   a	   philosophy	   of	   biology	  
framework.121	  While	  a	  general	  definition	  of	   life	  applies,	  of	  course,	  to	  the	  person	  as	  well,	  this	   is	  
nevertheless	   a	   subtle	   shift	   in	   the	   source	   domain	   of	   the	   metaphor	   which	   in	   turn	   leads	   to	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118	  Ibid.,	  	  296.	  
119	  Ibid.,	  	  309.	  
120	  Ibid.,	  	  309-­‐311.	  
121	  Wendt	  references	  for	  example	  Pier.	  L.	  Luisi,	  'About	  Various	  Definitions	  of	  Life',	  Origins	  of	  life	  and	  evolution	  
of	  the	  biosphere	  28,	  4-­‐6	  (1998).	  Kim	  Sterelny	  and	  Paul	  Griffiths,	  Sex	  and	  Death.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Philosophy	  of	  
Biology	   (Chicago,	   IL:	   University	   of	   Chicago	   Press,	   1999).	   And	   Carol	   E.	   Cleland	   and	   Christopher	   F.	   Chyba,	  
'Defining	  “Life”',	  Origins	  of	  life	  and	  evolution	  of	  the	  biosphere	  32,	  4	  (2002).	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fundamental	  shift	  regarding	  what	  aspects	  of	  states	  as	  highlighted	  and	  what	  aspects	  are	  hidden	  
and	  which	  ones	  are	  emphasised	  as	  being	  integral	  to	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  state	  in	  IR.	  	  
Second,	  Wendt	   then	  moves	   from	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   organism	  which	   according	   to	   him	   is	   not	  
applicable	  to	  the	  state	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  superorganism.	  The	  first	  point	  of	  caution	  to	  be	  noted	  
here	  is	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  superorganism	  as	  utilised	  in	  biology	  is	   itself	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  
metaphor.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   individual	   organism	   serves	   as	   a	   source	   domain	   to	   provide	   a	  
conceptual	   understanding	   of	   insect	   colonies.	   Here,	   I	   follow	   the	   argument	   that	   the	  
conceptualisation	  of	  a	  beehive	  as	  a	   single	  organism,	  a	   superorganism,	   is	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  
scientific	  metaphor.122	  Wendt	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  describes	  this	  perspective	  as	  “a	  more	  sceptical	  
view”	   and	   focuses	   on	   scholars	   who	   argue	   that	   superorganisms	   in	   biology	   actually	   exist.123	  	  
However,	  even	  if	  we	  accepted	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  superorganism	  in	  biology	  is	  not	  a	  metaphor,	  
it	   still	   remains	  to	  be	  argued	  why	  the	  state	  could	  also	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	  superorganism	   in	  a	  
non-­‐metaphorical	  way.	  Drawing	  on	  findings	  from	  biology,	  the	  concept	  cannot	  self-­‐evidently	  be	  
applied	  to	  states.	  It	  is	  this	  “application”,	  taking	  the	  form	  of	  a	  deduction	  or	  metaphorical	  process	  
that	   deserves	   further	   questioning.	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	   scientific	  metaphors,	   to	   employ	   a	  
concept	  developed	  within	   the	  domain	  of	  biology	   to	   the	   social	  world	  has	   to	  be	  understood,	  at	  
least	  in	  a	  first	  instance,	  as	  a	  metaphorical	  process.124	  	  
Interestingly,	  the	  claim	  that	  Wendt	  is	  essentially	  engaging	  in	  metaphorical	  thinking	  with	  regard	  
to	   his	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   has	   not	   been	   brought	   up	   by	   his	   critics	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   Iver	   B.	  
Neumann	   who	   focuses	   on	   organic	   metaphors	   in	  Wendt	   and,	   based	   on	   that,	   marks	   him	   as	   a	  
dated	  Durkheimian.125	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122	  Sandra	  D.	  Mitchell,	  'The	  Superorganism	  Metaphor:	  Then	  and	  Now',	  in	  Biology	  as	  Society,	  Society	  as	  Biology:	  
Metaphors.	  Yearbook	  in	  the	  Sociology	  of	  Science,	  ed.	  Sabine	  Maasen,	  Everett	  Mendelsohn,	  and	  Peter	  Weingart	  
(Dordrecht:	  Kluwer	  Academic,	  1995).	  	  
123	  Wendt	  draws	  on	  David	  S.	  Wilson	  and	  Elliott	  Sober	  who	  argue	  that	  “superorganisms	  	  are	  	  more	  	  than	  	  just	  	  a	  	  
theoretical	   	   possibility;	   	   they	   actually	   	   exist	   in	   nature.”	   David	   S.	   Wilson	   and	   Elliott	   Sober,	   'Reviving	   the	  
Superorganism',	  Journal	  of	  Theoretical	  Biology	  136,	  3	  (1989),	  338.	  Compare	  also	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  
International	  Theory',	  310,	  fn	  398.	  
124	  For	  an	  explicit	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  usage	  of	  the	  beehive	  as	  a	  metaphor	  to	  understand	  human	  sociality	  
compare	  Selin	  Kesebir,	   'The	  Superorganism	  Account	  of	  Human	  Sociality:	  How	  and	  When	  Human	  Groups	  Are	  
Like	  Beehives',	  Personality	  and	  Social	  Psychology	  Review	  16,	  3	  (2012).	  
125	  Neumann,	   'Beware	   of	   Organicism:	   The	   Narrative	   Self	   of	   the	   State'.	   For	   the	   term	   “dated	   Durkheimian”	  
compare	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  306.	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There	   is	   one	   additional	   example	   that	   can	   be	  mentioned	   in	   support	   of	   the	   claim	   that	  Wendt	  
might	   be	   engaging	   in	   metaphorical	   thinking	   despite	   openly	   shunning	   metaphors.	   His	   book	  
chapter	  “Social	  Theory	  as	  Cartesian	  science”	  is	  especially	  interesting	  in	  this	  regard.	  Wendt	  again	  
argues	   explicitly	   against	   a	   metaphorical	   approach,	   yet	   an	   argument	   can	   be	   made	   that	   he	   is	  
actually	  engaging	   in	  a	  metaphorical	  process.	   Indeed,	  this	  argument	  may	  even	  be	  preferable	  to	  
an	   insistence	   on	   the	   reality	   of	   a	   quantum	   social	  world.	  Wendt	   starts	   by	   pointing	   out	   how	   a	  
Cartesian	  worldview	   is	   influencing	  much	  of	   the	   social	   sciences,	   including	  his	  own	  argument	   in	  
Social	  Theory.	  He	  then	  points	  out	  that	  such	  a	  worldview	  is	  unsuitable	  to	  explain	  consciousness.	  
Wendt	  associates	  the	  Cartesian	  world	  view	  with	  classical	  physics.	  Hence,	  he	  suggests	  replicating	  
the	   move	   from	   classical	   physics	   to	   a	   quantum	   approach	   for	   the	   social	   sciences.	   Form	   the	  
perspective	  of	  scientific	  metaphors	  this	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  suggestion	  to	  change	  the	  world	  
hypothesis,	  the	  root	  metaphor,	  of	  social	  science	  in	  general	  and	  IR	  in	  particular.	  
After	  having	  outlined	  some	  of	  the	  basic	  assumptions	  of	  quantum	  theory	  and	  how	  they	  work	  in	  
overturning	   the	   classical	   worldview,	  Wendt	   turns	   to	   developing	   the	   “quantum	   consciousness	  
hypothesis”	   that,	   in	   his	   own	   words	   enables	   a	   “quantum	   explanation	   of	   human	  
consciousness”.126	  After	  having	  gone	   through	   these	  steps,	  Wendt	   introduces	   three	  hypotheses	  
that	  flow	  from	  his	  consideration	  and	  are	  meant	  to	  guide	  the	  way	  towards	  a	  quantum	  model	  of	  
men	   and	   society.	   “1)	   social	   systems	   have	   wave	   functions	   that	   constitute	   a	   collective	  
unconscious;	   2)	   these	   wave	   functions	   collapse	   by	   a	   process	   of	   ‘intra-­‐action’	   described	   by	  
quantum	   game	   theory;	   and,	   most	   speculatively,	   3)	   social	   systems	   are	   superorganisms	   with	  
collective	  consciousness”.127	  
Focusing	  on	  the	  first	  two	  points,	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  another	  instance	  in	  which	  we	  encounter	  the	  
workings	   of	   a	  metaphor.	   Similar	   to	   saying	   that	   the	   state	   is	   a	   person,	   a	   suggestion	   that	   social	  
systems	  have	  wave	   functions	   is	   not	   self-­‐evident.	  A	  wave	   function	   is	   defined	  and	  works	   in	   the	  
realm	  of	  quantum	  physics	  in	  what	  ways	  it	  also	  applies	  to	  social	  systems	  is	  something	  that	  needs	  
to	  be	  established	  first.128	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  Wendt,	  'Social	  Theory	  as	  Cartesian	  Science:	  An	  Auto-­‐Critique	  from	  a	  Quantum	  Perspective',	  190.	  
127	  Ibid.,	  	  197.	  
128	  This	  process	  is	   in	  part	  reflected	  in	  Wendt’s	  cautious	  emphasis	  that	  what	  he	  aims	  at	  is	  a	  “weak	  version”	  of	  
quantum	  theory.	  This	  weak	  version	  shares	  an	  isomorphic	  structure	  with	  the	  original	  but	  is	  modified	  to	  take	  the	  
macro-­‐world	  into	  account.	  Ibid.,	  	  196-­‐197,	  fn	  132.	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Similar	   to	   Social	   Theory	   and	   “The	   states	   as	   person	   in	   international	   theory”,	   Wendt	   explicitly	  
cautions	  against	  the	  use	  of	  metaphor.	  He	  argues:	  “[i]f	  the	  quantum	  consciousness	  hypothesis	  is	  
true	   then	   the	  elementary	  units	  of	   social	   life,	  human	  subjects,	  are	  quantum	  systems	  –	  not	   just	  
metaphorically	  or	  by	  analogy,	  but	  really.”129	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  why	  this	  “stronger”	  claim	  is	  
necessary	   for	  him.	  When	  guarding	  against	  a	  metaphorical	  perspective,	  Wendt	  cites	  Akrivoulis,	  
who	   develops	   a	   quantum	   reading	   of	   world	   politics	   by	   using	   a	   metaphorical	   approach	   to	  
quantum	   theory.	  Wendt	   answers:	   “I	   admire	   [Akrivoulis’s]	  work,	   but	   believe	   it	  would	   be	  more	  
compelling	   still	  with	  a	  naturalistic	   foundation.	  Metaphors	  are	  optional	   and	  may	  be	   contested,	  
whereas	  if	  the	  quantum	  consciousness	  hypothesis	  is	  true	  then	  we	  really	  have	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  
go	  quantum	  if	  we	  want	  to	  fully	  explain	  human	  behavior.”130	  	  	  
To	   summarise,	   there	   are	   three	   insights	   to	   be	   drawn	   from	   this	   engagement	   with	   the	   role	   of	  
metaphors	   in	  Wendt’s	  work.	  First,	   in	  Social	  Theory	  and	  subsequent	  publications	  we	  can	   find	  a	  
very	   adamant	   and	   explicit	   rejection	   of	   metaphors.	   To	   interpret	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   as	   a	  
metaphor	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  weakness	  from	  Wendt’s	  scientific	  realist	  perspective.	  It	  misses	  to	  engage	  
the	  hard	  ontological	  question	  of	  what	   the	  state	   really	   is	  and	   it	   is	   less	  convincing	  because	  as	  a	  
figure	  of	   speech,	   a	  metaphor	   is	   vague,	   “optional	   and	  may	  be	   contested”.131	  	   Second,	  we	  have	  
also	  seen	  how	  metaphors	  do	  have	  a,	  albeit	  limited,	  function	  in	  the	  scientific	  process	  as	  baptisers	  
of	   new	  concepts.	  Wendt	   for	   example	  emphasises	   the	   role	  of	   the	  market	  metaphor	   in	  Waltz’s	  
structural	  account.	  Yet,	   for	   the	  concept	  of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  such	  a	  baptising	   function	  of	  an	  
anthropomorphic	  metaphor	  is	  not	  acknowledged.	  The	  argument	  made	  here	  is	  that	  it	  should	  be.	  	  
Second,	  by	  interpreting	  Wendt’s	  work	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  scientific	  metaphors	  developed	  in	  
the	   first	   part	   of	   this	   chapter,	   I	   was	   able	   to	   highlight	   various	   aspects	   of	   Wendt’s	   work	   that	  
remained	  invisible	  before.	  The	  concept	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  root	  metaphor	  as	  well	  as	  the	  distinction	  
between	   source	   and	   target	   domain	   in	   a	   metaphor	   are	   of	   particular	   importance	   here.	   With	  
regard	   to	   root	   metaphors,	   I	   suggested	   that	   the	   difference	   between	   Waltz’s	   and	   Wendt’s	  
structural	  accounts	  of	  the	  international	  system	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  difference	  between	  two	  
root	  metaphors.	   In	  one	  case	  we	  encounter	  homo	  economicus	   in	   the	  other	  case	  we	  encounter	  
homo	  sociologicus.	  Further,	  Wendt’s	  work	  towards	  a	  quantum	  social	  science,	  it	  is	  argued,	  should	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  Ibid.,	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best	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   suggestion	   for	   changing	   IR’s	   root	   metaphor	   and	   for	   using	   thought	  
experiments	   and	   concepts	   from	   quantum	   theory	   to	   initiate	   such	   a	   process,	   instead	   of	   being	  
interpreted	  as	  a	  call	  for	  arguing	  that	  the	  social	  world	  really	  has	  a	  wave	  function.	  	  
And	   lastly,	   through	   recourse	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   scientific	   metaphor	   and	   especially	   the	   key	  
distinction	  between	  a	  metaphorical	  source	  and	  target	  domain,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  
source	  domain	  for	  Wendt’s	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  changes	  from	  being	  based	  on	  an	  understanding	  of	  
how	  we	  define	  psychological	  personhood	  at	  the	  individual	  level	  to	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  organism	  and	  
eventually	  the	  so-­‐called	  superorganism.	  This	   is	  particularly	  problematic	  as	  each	  source	  domain	  
leads	   to	   a	   fundamentally	   different	   metaphor	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   and	   hence	   to	   a	   very	  
different	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  state	  in	  IR.	  Dis-­‐entangling	  various	  root	  metaphors	  and	  source	  
domains	  is	  an	  important	  exercise	  to	  create	  clarity	  of	  what	  we	  mean	  when	  speak	  about	  the	  state-­‐
as-­‐person	   and	   to	   achieve	   clarity	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   implications	   of	  Wendt’s	   concept.	   At	   the	  
same	  time,	  it	  also	  creates	  impetus	  to	  carefully	  flesh	  out	  the	  source	  domain	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	  which	  will	  be	  further	  developed	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  	  
However,	  in	  addition	  to	  these	  three	  lessons,	  there	  are	  two	  further	  tensions	  in	  this	  analysis	  that	  
have	  yet	  to	  be	  addressed.	  I	  pointed	  out	  how	  Wendt	  argues	  that	  we	  “can	  legitimately	  attribute	  
anthropomorphic	  qualities	  like	  desires,	  beliefs	  and	  intentionality”	  to	  the	  state.132	  It	  was	  argued	  
that	  the	  meaning	  of	  “legitimate	  attribution”	  needs	  further	  investigation.	  Hence,	  in	  the	  following	  
section,	   I	   aim	   at	   illustrating	   how	   “legitimate	   attribution”	   can	   be	   understood	   from	   the	  
perspective	   of	   scientific	   metaphors	   by	   elaborating	   on	   what	   Gentner	   describes	   as	   structural	  
mapping	  between	  the	  source	  and	  target	  domain	  of	  a	  metaphor.	  	  
Further,	  as	  elaborated	  above	  it	  with	  regard	  to	  Wendt’s	  concept	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  psychological	  
person	  we	  encounter	  a	  number	  of	   changes	   in	   the	  metaphorical	   source	  domain.	   Engaging	   in	  a	  
process	   of	   structural	  mapping	  of	   a	  metaphor	   can	  be	  helpful	   in	   unambiguously	   identifying	   the	  
source	   domain	   of	   a	   metaphor	   and	   in	   establishing	   a	   clear	   relationship	   between	   elements	   of	  
source	  and	  target	  domain.	  	  
Lastly,	   underlying	  most	   of	  what	   has	   been	   said	   in	   this	   section	   is	   the	   by	   now	   familiar	   question	  
regarding	   the	   reality	   of	   the	   state	   and	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	   scientific	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  Social	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  of	  International	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metaphors,	   this	   is	   a	   question	   regarding	   the	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   relation	   between	   the	  
metaphorical	  concept	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  world	  “out	  there”	  on	  the	  other.	  At	  the	  beginning	  
of	   this	   chapter,	   I	   pointed	   out	   that	   there	   is	   a	   particular	   interest	   taken	   here	   in	   the	   role	   of	  
metaphors	  as	  tools	  for	  creating	  new	  knowledge.	  However,	  I	  have	  shied	  away	  from	  engaging	  the	  
harder	   question	   of	   how	   knowledge	   and	   world	   are	   related.	   This	   question	   becomes	   especially	  
pertinent	  with	   regard	   to	  Wendt’s	  position	  as	  a	   scientific	   realist.	  Hence,	   in	   the	   last	  part	  of	   this	  
chapter,	  I	  aim	  at	  addressing	  this	  question	  by	  utilising	  Jackson’s	  distinction	  between	  mind-­‐world	  
dualism	  and	  mind-­‐world	  monism.133	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  Jackson,	  The	  Conduct	  of	  Inquiry	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  International	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  and	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  Implications	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Constructing	  a	  metaphor:	  source	  domain	  selection	  and	  
structural	  mapping	  
One	   of	   the	   main	   reasons	   why	   metaphors	   are	   viewed	   with	   suspicion	   is	   to	   be	   found	   in	   their	  
polysemous	   character,	   their	   ability	   to	   take	  on	  multiple	  meanings.	   The	   same	  metaphor	   can	  be	  
interpreted	  in	  multiple	  ways	  and	  used	  to	  multiple	  ends.	  Maasen	  and	  Weingartner	  for	  example	  
stress	  that	  “the	  use	  of	  metaphor	  calls	  for	  ongoing	  vigilance.”134	  The	  interanimation	  of	  thoughts	  
inherent	   in	   a	   metaphor	   is	   potentially	   an	   open-­‐ended	   process	   with	   multiple	   possible	  
interpretations	   and	   multiple	   ways	   of	   connecting	   various	   discourses.	   This	   indeterminacy	   and	  
openness	  is	  precisely	  what	  makes	  metaphors	  powerful	  tools	  for	  persuasion	  as	  well	  as	  powerful	  
tools	   for	   creative	   thought	   and	   inspiration.	   References	   between	   concepts	   and	   objects	   in	   a	  
metaphor	  are	  only	  temporarily	  fixed.	  From	  a	  positivistic	  point	  of	  view,	  this	  potential	  conceptual	  
openness	  of	  metaphors	  is	  the	  main	  argument	  for	  confining	  them	  to	  a	  role	  as	  a	  figure	  of	  speech	  
and,	  at	  the	  most,	  a	  creative	  tool	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  scientific	  process.	  	  
For	  example,	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  with	  regard	  to	  Richard	  Little’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  balance	  of	  power,	  
the	  idea	  of	  a	  balance	  provides	  a	  very	  generic	  conceptualisation	  of	  relations	  between	  states.	  It	  is	  
generic	  because	  it	  can	  be	  “applied	  across	  a	  wide	  spectrum	  of	  relationships”.135	  How	  this	  generic	  
idea	   of	   a	   balance	   is	   conceived,	   whether	   as	   a	   set	   of	   weighing	   scales	   or	   rather	   as	   a	   body	   in	  
harmony,	  has	  profound	  implications	  for	  whether	  a	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  states	  is	  pursued	  
in	   a	   conflictual	   or	   cooperative	   way.	   The	   same	   can	   be	   said	   about	   general	   anthropomorphic	  
metaphors.	  They	  are	  applicable	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  contexts,	  entities	  and	  relationships	  and	  
can	   take	   on	   diverse	   meanings	   depending	   on	   what	   elements	   of	   the	   individual	   human	   being,	  
broadly	   understood,	   are	   singled	   out	   as	   the	   source	   domain.136 	  These	   observations	   pose	   a	  
significant	   challenge	   for	   the	   position	   taken	   here	   which	   stresses	   that	   metaphors	   are	   useful	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134	  Maasen	  and	  Weingart,	  Metaphors	  and	  the	  Dynamics	  of	  Knowledge,	  20.	  
135	  Little,	  The	  Balance	  of	  Power	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Metaphors,	  Myths,	  and	  Models,	  40.	  
136	  For	  an	  example	  of	  anthropomorphic	  metaphors	  being	  utilized	  in	  other	  contexts,	  compare	  for	  example	  the	  
work	   by	   Gareth	   Morgan	   who	   analyses	   the	   utility	   of	   metaphors	   in	   making	   sense	   of	   organisations.	   He,	   for	  
example,	  looks	  at	  the	  organisation	  as	  an	  organism	  as	  well	  as	  a	  brain;	  both	  of	  these	  can	  broadly	  be	  understood	  
as	   anthropomorphic	   metaphors.	   Gareth	   Morgan,	   Images	   of	   Organization	   (Beverly	   Hills:	   Sage	   Publications,	  
1986).	  Mark	  Neocleous	  for	  example	  points	  out	  how	  Hobbes’	  account	  of	  persons	  was	  focused	  on	  the	  specific	  
etymological	   background	   of	   “person”	   understood	   as	   “mask”	   being	   linked	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   being	   on	   stage.	  
Compare	  Neocleous,	  Imagining	  the	  State,	  78.	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beyond	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  theory-­‐building	  and	  are	  powerful	  tools	  for	  creating	  new	  knowledge.	  
The	  position	  taken	  here	  does	  not	  deny	  the	  polysemous	  character	  of	  metaphors.	  Metaphors	  are	  
nomadic	   between	   discourses	   and	  malleable	   according	   to	   contexts,	   in	   order	   to	   use	   them	   in	   a	  
theory-­‐constitutive	  manner,	  we	  need	  to	  find	  a	  way	  to,	  figuratively	  speaking,	  catch	  them	  and	  fix	  
them	  temporarily.	  The	  solution	  that	  is	  suggested	  here	  is	  that	  metaphors	  can	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  
part	   of	   a	   process	   that	   allows	   for	   fixing	   their	   meaning	   temporarily.	   To	   this	   end,	   I	   utilise	   the	  
process	  of	   structural	  mapping	   suggested	  by	  Gentner.	   I	   argue	   that	   this	   is	  where	   the	  difference	  
between	  a	  metaphor	  functioning	  as	  a	  figure	  of	  speech	  and	  one	  that	  works	  as	  a	  framework	  for	  
orientation	  and	  tool	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  is	  to	  be	  located.137	  
We	  have	  seen	  that	  to	  use	  a	  metaphor	  is	  to	  speak	  and	  think	  of	  one	  thing	  in	  terms	  of	  another,	  to	  
explain	  something	  unfamiliar	  or	  complex	  through	  reference	  to	  something	  that	   is	  or	  appears	  to	  
be	  more	  familiar.	  In	  this	  sense,	  metaphors	  can	  link	  two	  hitherto	  unrelated	  terms	  or	  can	  connect	  
different	   discourses	   by	   using	   a	   term	   familiar	   in	   one	   discourse	   in	   the	   context	   of	   another.	  
Examples	  from	  IR	  scholarship	  include	  the	  balance	  of	  power,	  anarchy,	  the	  domestic	  analogy,	  and	  
the	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	   In	   most	   of	   these	   cases,	   the	   process	   of	   transference	   and	   interaction	  
between	   source	   and	   target	   domain	   is	   implied,	   in	   some	   cases,	   such	   as	   Little’s	   analysis	   of	   the	  
balance	  of	  power,	  this	  relationship	  is	  made	  explicit.	  	  
Indeed,	   given	   the	  definition	  of	   scientific	  metaphor	  outlined	  above,	   the	  process	  of	  making	   this	  
relationship	  explicit	   is	  crucial.	   I	  argue	  that	   it	   is	  only	   then	  that	  we	  can	  transform	  the	  metaphor	  
into	   a	   useful	   tool	   for	   theory-­‐building.	   The	   process	   of	   what	   Gentner	   calls	   structural	   mapping	  
between	  source	  and	  target	  domain	  is	  the	  clearest	  conceptualisation	  of	  this	  relationship.	  
A	  lot	  can	  be	  gained	  from	  putting	  structural	  mapping	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  development	  and	  analysis	  
of	   scientific	   metaphors.	   Engaging	   in	   structural	   mapping	   forces	   us	   to	   make	   elements	   of	   the	  
metaphor	  explicit	  that	  would	  otherwise	  remain	  vague	  or	  only	  implied.	  The	  source	  domain,	  from	  
which	   the	  elements	  of	   the	  metaphor	  are	  drawn	  and	  which	   is	  generally	   said	   to	  be	   the	  domain	  
about	  which	  we	  have	  greater	  knowledge,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  target	  domain,	  which	  is	  the	  domain	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137	  Indeed,	  as	  will	   be	  pointed,	  Gentner	  utilises	   the	  process	  of	   structural	  mapping	   to	  pin-­‐point	   the	  difference	  
between	  a	  literary	  metaphor	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  what	  I	  would	  call	  a	  scientific	  metaphor	  on	  the	  other.	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inquiry	  about	  which	  we	  have	  comparatively	  less	  knowledge,	  have	  to	  be	  identified	  and	  explicated	  
in	  great	  detail	  for	  structural	  mapping	  to	  take	  place.138	  	  
Further,	   structural	  mapping	   as	   described	   by	   Gentner	   introduces	   a	   useful	   distinction	   between	  
attributes	  of	  and	  relations	  between	   the	  elements	  of	  the	  metaphor.	  Looking	  at	  what	  aspects	  of	  
the	  source	  domain	  are	  not	  mapped	  (since	  there	  inevitably	  is	  a	  process	  of	  selection	  involved)	  and	  
what	  aspects	  of	   the	   target	  domain	  are	   left	  out	  because	   they	  do	  not	   fit	   the	  structure	  map	  can	  
give	   valuable	   insights	   into	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   metaphor.	   Further,	   structural	   mapping	   lays	   bare	  
what	  the	  metaphor	  cannot	  explain	  and	  what	  it	  potentially	  hides.	  	  
In	   the	   following,	   I	   will	   mainly	   rely	   on	   Gentner’s	   “Are	   scientific	   analogies	   metaphors?”	   which	  
appeared	   in	   the	   seminal	  Metaphor:	   Problems	   and	   Perspectives.139	  Gentner	   aims	   to	   provide	   a	  
structural	  characterisation	  of	  analogies,	  here	  broadly	  understood	  to	  also	  include	  metaphors,	  in	  
order	  to	  contrast	  them	  with	   literal	  expression	  and	   literary	  metaphors	  and	  to,	  eventually,	  argue	  
how	  to	  distinguish	  between	  good	  and	  bad	  explanatory	  analogies.140	  Using	  Gentner’s	  definition,	  
a	   metaphor	   is	   a	   structure	   map	   that	   “asserts	   that	   identical	   operations	   and	   relationships	   hold	  
among	  non-­‐identical	  objects”.141	  The	  structural	  mapping	  that	  emerges	  is	  a	  representation	  of	  the	  
metaphor	   through	   object	   nodes,	   attributes	   of	   these	   nodes,	   and	   the	   relations	   between	   these	  
nodes.	  A	  strong	  distinction	  between	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  metaphor	  and	  their	  characteristics	  on	  the	  
one	   hand	   and	   the	   relationships	   between	   these	   objects	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   is	   vital.	   For	   the	  
mapping,	  many	  of	  the	  relational	  predicates	  that	  hold	  for	  the	  source	  domain	  are	  carried	  over	  and	  
must	  hold	  for	  the	  target	  domain.	  However,	  attributes	  and	  characteristics	  of	  the	  source	  domain	  
do	   not	   necessarily	   need	   to	   be	   carried	   over	   into	   the	   target	   domain.	   Indeed,	   in	   case	   of	   a	  
metaphor,	   in	   contrast	   to	   a	   literal	   similarity,	   very	   few	   attributes	   that	   are	   true	   for	   the	   source	  
domain	  will	  also	  hold	  for	  the	  target	  domain.	  In	  summary	  one	  can	  say	  that	  while	  the	  two	  objects	  
of	  a	  scientific	  metaphor	  are	  dissimilar,	  their	  structural	  relations	  are	  similar	  in	  substantial	  parts.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138	  Gentner,	  'Are	  Scientific	  Analogies	  Metaphors?',	  108-­‐109.	  
139	  Ibid.	  
140	  Ibid.,	  	  107.	  
141	  Ibid.,	  	  108.	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To	  use	  a	  scientific	  metaphor	  is	  to	  “apply	  the	  same	  relations	  to	  dissimilar	  objects”.142	  Therefore,	  a	  
scientific	  metaphor	  establishes	  a	  connection	  between	  systems	  and	  not	  between	  objects.143	  	  
To	  illustrate	  this,	   it	   is	  helpful	  to	  refer	  to	  Gentner’s	  usage	  of	  Rutherford’s	  model	  of	  the	  atom	  as	  
an	   example	   for	   structural	   mapping. 144 	  In	   the	   terminology	   introduced	   in	   this	   chapter,	  
Rutherford’s	  model	  of	  the	  hydrogen	  atom	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  scientific	  metaphor.	  For	  a	  time,	  it	  
represented	  the	  best	  possible	  understanding	  of	  sub-­‐atomic	  processes.	  The	  model	   is	  developed	  
based	   on	   an	   interanimation	   of	   thoughts	   between	   the	   atom	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   the	   solar	  
system	   on	   the	   other	   hand.	   At	   the	   time,	   a	   lot	   more	   was	   known	   about	   the	   structure	   of	   the	  
universe	   than	   about	   the	  world	   of	   atoms	   and	   in	   the	   construction	   of	   the	  metaphor	   knowledge	  
from	  the	  well-­‐researched	  domain	  was	  utilised	  to	  gain	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  subject	  that	  was	  
less	  well	  known.	  	  
When	   engaging	   in	   structural	   mapping,	   in	   a	   first	   instance,	   object	   nodes	   are	   identified	   in	   the	  
source	  domain	  that	  can	  usefully	  be	  mapped	  onto	  the	  target	  domain.	  As	  a	  basic	  structure	  of	  the	  
map,	   the	   sun	   and	   planets	   are	   selected	   as	   nodes	   of	   the	   source	   domain	   and	   the	   nucleus	   and	  
electrons	   are	  nodal	   points	   on	   the	   side	  of	   the	   target	   domain.	   By	  mapping	   the	  nodes	   from	   the	  
source	   domain,	   the	   sun	   and	   planets,	   onto	   the	   target	   domain,	   the	   nucleus	   and	   electrons,	   it	   is	  
assumed	  that	  relationships	  similar	  to	  those	  between	  sun	  and	  planets	  are	  also	  present	  between	  
nucleus	  and	  electrons.	  The	  following	  relationships	  are	  mapped:	  a	  centre	  object	  around	  which	  a	  
peripheral	  object	  revolves,	  an	  attraction	  between	  the	  two	  objects,	  and	  a	  substantial	  difference	  
in	  mass	  between	  the	  centre	  and	  peripheral	  object.	  	  
However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	  while	   these	   relationships	   between	   the	   two	   objects	   are	  
mapped,	  the	  specific	  characteristics	  of	  sun	  and	  planets	  are	  not	  mapped.	  For	  example,	  the	  mass,	  
radius,	  and	  temperature	  of	  the	  sun	  and	  planets	  are	  not	  mapped	  onto	  the	  nucleus	  and	  electrons	  
of	   the	   atom.	   In	   terms	   of	   these	   characteristics,	   the	   two	   objects	   differ	   fundamentally.	   Yet,	   this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  “…	  since	  object	  attributes	  are	  imported	  only	  to	  the	  degree	  that	  the	  objects	  themselves,	  as	  opposed	  to	  their	  
roles	  in	  their	  systems,	  are	  similar”.	  Ibid.,	  	  109,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  	  
143	  Gentner	  illustrates	  this	  point	  by	  comparing	  analogy	  and	  similarity.	  In	  her	  case,	  a	  literal	  similarity	  comparison	  
is	  characterised	  by	  overlap	  in	  object	  attributes	  as	  well	  as	  object	  relations	  between	  source	  and	  target	  domain.	  
In	   case	   of	   analogy,	   of	   which	   scientific	   metaphor	   is	   a	   sub-­‐set	   in	   her	   terminology,	   there	   is	   overlap	   in	   the	  
relational	   structures	   between	   objects	   of	   source	   and	   target	   domain	   but	   no	   or	   little	   overlap	   in	   object	  
characteristics.	   Ibid.,	   	   110.	   Given	   the	   insistence,	   following	   Max	   Black,	   on	   an	   interaction	   as	   opposed	   to	   a	  
comparison	  view	  of	  metaphors,	  the	  word	  comparison	  is	  used	  in	  quotation	  marks	  here.	  	  	  	  
144	  Ibid.,	  	  111-­‐113.	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difference	   does	   not	   affect	   the	   utility	   of	   the	  metaphor.	   This	   is	   a	   key	   observation	   to	  make	   and	  
reminds	  us	  that,	  going	  back	  to	  Black’s	  notion	  of	  the	  interaction	  view	  of	  metaphor,	  a	  metaphor	  is	  
not	  a	  comparison	  but	   rather	  entails	  a	  process	  of	  carefully	  selecting	  elements	   from	  source	  and	  
target	  domain	  in	  order	  to	  create	  an	  interanimation	  of	  thoughts.	  
While	  the	  process	  of	  selecting	  a	  suitable	  source	  domain	  for	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  process	  of	  structural	  mapping	  will	  be	  undertaken	   in	  subsequent	  chapters,	  a	  few	  
observations	  based	  on	  the	  above	  insights	  can	  already	  be	  made.	  First,	  the	  source	  domain	  needs	  
to	  be	  carefully	  selected	  while	  keeping	  the	  target	  domain	  in	  mind.	  The	  specific	  conception	  of	  the	  
person	  drawn	  upon	  for	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   in	  part	  determined	  by	  how	  the	  
state	   in	   IR	   is	   conceptualised.	   To	   give	   a	   simple	   example,	   whether	   we	   emphasise	   external	   or	  
internal	  sovereignty	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  state	  in	  IR	  influences	  our	  choice	  of	  a	  conception	  
of	  persons	  that	   is	  to	  be	  utilised	  as	  the	  source	  domain.	  Wendt	  for	  example	  uses	  the	  distinction	  
between	  external	  and	  internal	  sovereignty	  to	  point	  out	  how	  moral	  as	  well	  as	  legal	  personhood	  
are	   social	   conventions	   and	   best	   associated	   with	   external	   sovereignty,	   whereas	   psychological	  
personhood	  is	  more	  than	  a	  social	  convention	  because	  it	  also	  requires	  a	  “suitable	  inside”.145	  	  As	  
will	  become	  clear	  in	  the	  following	  chapters,	  I	  do	  not	  agree	  with	  Wendt’s	  view	  on	  psychological	  
personhood.	   However,	   this	   example	   is	   useful	   in	   showing	   how	   source	   and	   target	   domain	   are	  
selected	  keeping	  both	  in	  mind	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  As	  expressed	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  metaphor	  as	  
an	   interanimation	   of	   thoughts,	   this	   process	   is	   best	   imagined	   as	   a	   back-­‐and-­‐forth	   movement	  
between	  concepts,	   rather	   than	  a	  one-­‐directional	  application	  of	  elements	   from	  one	  concept	   to	  
another.	  	  
In	   addition,	  meta-­‐theoretical	   assumptions	   and	  ethico-­‐political	   commitments	  need	   to	  be	   taken	  
into	   account	  when	   choosing	   a	   suitable	   source	   domain.	   For	   example,	   in	   Social	   Theory,	  Wendt	  
aims	   to	   give	   a	   fuller	   picture	   of	   systemic	   interactions	   between	   states	   by	   emphasising	   that	  
ideational	   aspects	   matter	   and	   that	   identities	   and	   interests	   are	   constructed	   through	   systemic	  
interactions.	   Hence,	   in	   contrast	   to	  Waltz’s	   homo	   economicus,	   in	   Social	   Theory	   Wendt	   draws,	  
broadly	   speaking,	   on	   the	   notion	   of	   homo	   sociologicus	   to	   conceptualise	   systemic	   interactions	  
between	  states.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	   in	  “The	  state	  as	  person”,	  Wendt	  takes	  his	  starting	   from	  the	  
rational	  actor	  model,	  which	  he	  argues	  is	  “is	  the	  most	  familiar	  model	  of	  persons	  in	  IR	  scholarship	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  For	  this	  overview	  compare	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  294-­‐295.	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today”.146	  Defining	  the	  source	  domain	  of	  his	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  these	  terms	  is	  a	  choice	  with	  far-­‐
reaching	   consequences	   for	   the	   potential	   of	   understanding	   IR	   and	   this	   choice	   is	   justified	   by	  
arguing	   that	   it	   is	   the	   most	   familiar	   model	   in	   IR.	   Rather,	   these	   choices	   represent	   a	   certain	  
perspective	  on	  persons	  that	  is	  linked	  to	  larger	  meta-­‐theoretical	  and	  even	  ethical	  commitments.	  	  
Further,	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  human	  body	  is	  emphasised	  when	  selecting	  elements	  of	  the	  source	  
has	  important	  consequences	  for	  how	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  conceptualised.	  Historic	  examples	  of	  
conceptions	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   body	   politic	   as	   well	   as	   a	   conceptualisations	   of	   society	   based	   on	  
analogies	  with	   the	   (human)	  body	  proposed	  by	  early	   sociologists	   come	   to	  mind.	  These	   choices	  
have	  theoretical	  as	  well	  as	  ethico-­‐political	  consequences	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  problematic	  to	  treat	  
a	  definition	  of	  person	  as	  self-­‐evidently	  given.	  	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   these	   points,	  which	  will	   be	   further	   developed	   in	   subsequent	   chapters,	  we	   also	  
need	   to	   ask	   in	  what	  ways	   this	   structural	  map	   plays	   a	   role	   in	  making	   sense	   of	   the	  world	   –	   as	  
opposed	  to	  merely	  being	  an	  interaction	  between	  concepts.	  Having	  established	  the	  usefulness	  of	  
structural	  mapping	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  we	  need	  to	  ask	  how	  this	  
mapping	  relates	  to	  the	  world.	  This	  will	  be	  the	  task	  of	  the	  final	  section.	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  Ibid.,	  	  295.	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Relating	  mind	  and	  world:	  is	  the	  (metaphorical)	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	  real?	  	  
I	   argue	   that	   affirming	   the	   theory-­‐constitutive	   role	   of	   metaphors	   is	   compatible	   with	   most	  
philosophy	   of	   science	   positions.	   Here,	   I	   am	   focusing	   on	   metaphors	   and	   questions	   of	  
philosophical	   ontology	   and	   the	   implicit	   assumptions	   regarding	   the	   relationship	   between	  mind	  
and	   world	   that	   are	   made	   as	   part	   of	   taking	   an	   ontological	   position.	   Following	   Jackson’s	  
proposition	  of	  a	  key	  philosophical	  wager	  with	  regard	  to	  philosophical	  ontology,	  we	  can	  identify	  
two	  distinct	   positions.147	  A	  mind-­‐world	   dualist	   position	   argues	   that	   there	   is	   a	  world	   out	   there	  
that	   exists	   independently	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   we	   perceive	   it	   and	   of	   how	   we	   describe	   it;	   the	  
scientific	  process	  is	  directed	  towards	  finding	  ways	  of	  bridging	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  researcher’s	  
mind	   and	   the	   world	   “out	   there”.148	  In	   principle,	   from	   this	   perspective,	   our	   theories	   can	   be	  
evaluated	   in	   terms	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   they	   “resemble”	   the	   world.149	  In	   contrast,	   mind-­‐world	  
monism	   rejects	   this	   distinction	   between	   the	   knower	   and	   the	   known	   and	   “maintains	   that	   the	  
researcher	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  world	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  speaking	  of	  ‘the	  world’	  as	  divorced	  from	  the	  
activities	   of	   making	   sense	   of	   the	   world	   is	   literally	   nonsensical.”150	  Drawing	   on	   Suganami’s	  
critique	   of	   Jackson,	  we	  might,	  more	   usefully,	   describe	   these	   two	   perspectives	   as,	   on	   the	   one	  
hand,	   a	   belief	   in	   a	   mind-­‐independent	   world	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   a	   belief	   in	   the	   mind-­‐
dependence	  of	   the	  world.151	  It	   is	   important	   to	  note	   that,	   for	   Jackson,	   this	  philosophical	  wager	  
cannot	  be	  defended	  on	   logical	  or	  empirical	  grounds.	   It	   is	  best	  understood	  as	  an	  act	  of	   faith	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147	  Regarding	  philosophical	  wagers	  see	  Jackson,	  The	  Conduct	  of	  Inquiry	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Philosophy	  of	  
Science	  and	  Its	  Implications	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  World	  Politics,	  34-­‐35.	  
148	  Ibid.,	  	  30-­‐31.	  
149	  “Resemble”	   is	  put	   in	  quotation	  marks	  here	  as	   it	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  the	  concepts	  used	  in	  a	  
scientific	   theory	   simply	  mirror	   reality.	   A	  mind-­‐word	   dualist	   subscribes	   to	   a	   correspondence	   theory	   of	   truth	  
which	  means	  that	  “theories	  are	  true	  or	  false	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  relationship	  to	  states	  of	  the	  world.”	  However,	  as	  
Wendt	  for	  example	  stresses	  in	  Social	  Theory,	  making	  scientific	  progress	  does	  not	  entail	  a	  process	  whereby	  the	  
concepts	  we	  hold	  of	   the	  world	  and	   the	  world	  are	   simply	   compared	  with	  each	  other.	  Wendt	  points	  out	   that	  
theories	  are	  always	  tested	  against	  other	  theories.	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  58-­‐59.	  
150	  Jackson,	  The	  Conduct	  of	  Inquiry	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  and	  Its	  Implications	  for	  the	  
Study	  of	  World	  Politics,	  35-­‐36.	  
151	  Hidemi	  Suganami,	  'Meta-­‐Jackson:	  Rethinking	  Patrick	  Thaddeus	  Jackson's	  Conduct	  of	  Inquiry',	  Millennium	  41,	  
2	  (2013),	  253.	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support	  of	  a	  particular	  stance	  of	  the	  researcher	  towards	  the	  world	  that	  happens	  before	  research	  
has	  even	  begun.152	  	  	  
These	   two	   perspectives,	   paired	   with	   a	   position	   on	   whether	   or	   not	   knowledge	   is	   possible	  
“beyond	   the	   phenomenal	   realm	   which	   humans	   can	   in	   principle	   experience	   or	   observe”,	   are	  
assembled	   into	   a	   two-­‐by-­‐two	   table	   of	   ideal-­‐typical	   representations	   of	   philosophy	   of	   science	  
positions	   by	   Jackson.153	  The	   resulting	   four	   categories	   are	   neopositivism,	   analyticism,	   critical	  
realism,	   and	   reflexivity.154	  Neopositivism	   and	   critical	   realism	   are	   categorised	   as	   mind-­‐world	  
dualist	  approaches,	  and	  analyticism	  and	  reflexivity	  represent	  mind-­‐world	  monism.	  
Looking	   at	   these	   four	   categories,	   it	   is	   only	   one	   of	   them	   that	   is	   ruled	   out	   a	   priori	   by	   a	  
commitment	   to	   the	   theory-­‐constitutive	   role	   of	   metaphors.	   From	   the	   neopositivistic	   position,	  
metaphors	  are	  confined	  to	  a	  role	  as	  figures	  of	  speech.	  This	  emerges	  out	  of	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  
stance	  that	  the	  world	  is	  mind-­‐independent	  and	  that	  knowledge	  is	  confined	  to	  the	  phenomenal	  
realm.	   The	   suspicion,	   alluded	   to	   in	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   chapter,	   that	   metaphors	   are	  
unscientific	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  neopositivistic	  “fear	  that	  our	  elaborate	  intellectual	  constructs	  might	  
be,	   in	  whole	  or	   in	  part,	   nothing	  more	   than	   the	   fanciful	   products	  of	  our	  own	   imaginations”.155	  
From	   the	   neopositivistic	   perspective,	   knowledge	   is	   based	   on	   what	   can	   be	   experienced	   as	  
concrete	   phenomena.	   It	   claims	   that	   we	   have	   unmediated	   access	   to	   the	   world.	   From	   this	  
perspective,	  metaphors	  are	  not	  needed	  as	  mediators	  between	  what	  exists	  and	  our	  experience	  
and	  knowledge	  of	  it.	  At	  most,	  metaphors	  are	  tools	  for	  rhetorical	  embellishment	  of	  a	  description	  
of	  this	  experience,	  but	  because	  of	  their	  polysemy	  they	  are	  seen	  as	  doing	  more	  harm	  than	  good.	  
Hence,	   they	   add	   to	   the	   neopositivistic	   fear	   of	   failing	   to	   refer	   to	   something	   real	   with	   our	  
theoretical	  concepts.	  	  
The	  perspective	  taken	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  that	  metaphors	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously	  as	  a	  means	  of	  
mediating	  access	  to	  the	  world	  or	  as	  a	  means	  of	  constructing	  the	  world.	  Metaphors	  as	  mediators	  
of	  access	  to	  the	  world	  play	  a	  role	  for	  critical	  realists	  in	  investigating	  the	  transfactual	  realm	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152	  	  For	  this	  compare	  ibid.,	  	  251.	  
153	  The	  quotation	  is	  taken	  from	  ibid.,	  	  252.	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  two-­‐by-­‐two	  matrix,	  see	  Jackson,	  The	  Conduct	  
of	  Inquiry	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  and	  Its	  Implications	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  World	  Politics,	  
37.	  
154	  Jackson,	  The	  Conduct	  of	  Inquiry	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  and	  Its	  Implications	  for	  the	  
Study	  of	  World	  Politics,	  37.	  
155	  Ibid.,	  	  59.	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world.156	  Analyticists	   and	   reflectionists	   can	   rely	   on	   metaphors	   as	   means	   for	   constructing	   the	  
world	  by	  putting	  together	  its	  pieces	  in	  meaningful	  ways.157	  It	  is	  only	  the	  neopositivists	  who	  can	  
argue	  that	  metaphors	  only	  belong	   to	   the	  realm	  of	   rhetoric.	  All	  other	  approaches	  have	   to	   take	  
the	  potential	  of	  a	  metaphor	  playing	  a	  theory-­‐constitutive	  role	  seriously.	  This	   is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  
metaphors	  always	  take	  on	  this	  mode	  for	  scholars	  of	  these	  three	  philosophy	  of	  science	  positions.	  
However,	   this	   is	   to	   say	   that	  metaphors	   cannot	   be	   dismissed	   a	   priori	   from	   the	   critical	   realist,	  
analyticist,	  and	  reflectionist	  perspective.	  
Hence,	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  understood	  as	   a	  metaphor	   can	  potentially	   feature	   in	  projects	   that	  
belong	  to	  any	  of	  the	  three	  positions.	  Ultimately,	  how	  the	  metaphor	  and	  the	  world	  relate	  to	  each	  
other	  –	  the	  functions	  assigned	  to	  a	  metaphor	  in	  the	  scientific	  process	  –	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  specific	  
philosophy	  of	   science	  position	   taken.	   If	  we	   treat	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  as	  a	  metaphor,	  we	  could	  
still,	  potentially,	  hold	  a	  critical	  realist	  view	  –	  that	  is	  as	  long	  as	  the	  metaphor	  points	  to	  something	  
real.	   Hence,	   Wendt’s	   dichotomy,	   described	   in	   Chapter	   1,	   between	   either	   treating	   the	   state	  
metaphorically	  or	  accepting	   its	  reality,	   is	  a	   false	  one.	  An	   interest	   in	  metaphors	   in	  science	  does	  
not	  foreclose	  a	  particular	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  mind	  and	  world	  are	  related.	  
However,	  one	  question	  that	  has	  to	  be	  asked	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  ideas	  about	  states-­‐as-­‐persons	  and	  
critical	   realism	   can	   be	   usefully	   combined.	   In	   other	   words,	   are	   we	   gaining	   access	   to	   the	   real,	  
underlying	  structures	  of	  the	  world	  by	  thinking	  about	  states	  in	  terms	  of	  persons?	  Or,	  conversely,	  
are	  ideas	  about	  states-­‐as-­‐persons	  one	  way	  of	  telling	  a	  useful	  story	  about	  IR	  that	  does	  not	  refer	  
to	   a	   deeper	   reality?	   These	   questions	   become	   all	   the	  more	   important	   when	   one	   realises	   that	  
ideas	   about	   states	   as	   actors,	   let	   alone	   as	   persons,	   are	   viewed	  with	   suspicion	   by	  many	   critical	  
realists.	  For	  the	  following,	   I	  will	  mainly	  draw	  on	  Milja	  Kurki,	  Colin	  Wight,	  and	  Heikki	  Patomäki,	  
who	   are	   among	   the	   most	   prominent	   proponents	   of	   a	   critical	   realist	   perspective	   in	   the	  
discipline.158	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156	  Patomäki	  and	  Wight,	  'After	  Postpositivism?	  The	  Promises	  of	  Critical	  Realism',	  223-­‐224.	  
157	  In	  using	  the	  term	  construction	  in	  this	  context,	  I	  rely	  on	  Suganami’s	  critique	  of	  Jackson.	  He	  suggests	  that	  the	  
two	   mind-­‐world	   monist	   approaches	   are	   best	   described	   as	   constructionists.	   For	   a	   summary	   see	   Suganami,	  
'Meta-­‐Jackson:	  Rethinking	  Patrick	  Thaddeus	  Jackson's	  Conduct	  of	  Inquiry',	  263.	  
158	  The	   key	   publications	   in	   this	   context	   are	   Patomäki,	  After	   International	   Relations.	   Critical	   Realism	   and	   the	  
(Re)Construction	   of	  World	   Politics.	   Colin	  Wight,	   'A	  Manifesto	   for	   Scientific	   Realism	   in	   IR:	   Assuming	   the	   Can-­‐
Opener	  Won’t	  Work!',	  Millennium:	  Journal	  of	  International	  Studies	  35,	  2	  (2007).	  Wight,	  Agents,	  Structures	  and	  
International	   Relations:	   Politics	   as	   Ontology.	   Patomäki	   and	   Wight,	   'After	   Postpositivism?	   The	   Promises	   of	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The	  previous	  chapter	  outlined	  how	  Wendt	  uses	  scientific	   realism	  as	  his	  starting	  point	   in	  Social	  
Theory	   in	  order	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  are	  real.	   In	  his	  2004	  article,	  he	  
argues	   that	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   we	   are	   able	   to	   treat	   the	   state	   and	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
person	   in	   realist	   terms	   is	   crucial	   to	   the	   progress	   of	   the	   discipline.159	  However,	   other	   scientific	  
realists	  argue	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  unhelpful	  when	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  get	  closer	  
to	  the	  intransitive	  structures	  of	  the	  world.	  Their	  critique	  will	  be	  outlined	  in	  the	  following.	  
A	   critical	   realist	   account	   needs	   to	   be	   distinguished	   from	   positivism	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	  
narrativism	   on	   the	   other.160	  Positivism	   is	   criticised	   for	   remaining	   on	   the	   surface	   level	   of	   the	  
social	  world	  and	  for	  resorting	  to	  an	  as-­‐if	  treatment	  of	  those	  aspects	  of	  social	  reality	  that	  are	  not	  
directly	   observable.	  Narrativism	   is	   criticised	   for	   remaining	   at	   the	   level	   of	   language	   and	   shying	  
away	   from	   ontological	   questions.	   In	   both	   accounts,	   albeit	   from	   fundamentally	   different	  
positions	   regarding	   how	  mind	   and	  world	   are	   related,	   the	   state	   does	   not	   really	   exist.	   For	   the	  
critical	   realist,	   it	   is	   this	   “anti-­‐realism”	   that	   these	   otherwise	   disparate	   approaches	   share.161	  
Proponents	  of	  critical	  realism	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  where	  the	  value	  of	  their	  position	  is	  to	  be	  located.	  
It	  enables	  us	  to	  address	  deeper	  ontological	  questions	  instead	  of	  circumventing	  them	  and	  to	  give	  
a	  more	  nuanced	  account	  of	  social	  structure	  at	  deeper	  levels	  of	  reality.	  
Critically	   realism	   starts	   from	   ontology.	   Kurki,	   for	   example,	   argues	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   need	   to	  
reconceptualise	   social	   ontology	   in	   IR.	   She	   argues	   that	   this	   does	   not	   necessarily	   mean	   to	  
overcome	  concepts	  such	  as	   the	  state	  or	   the	   international	   system;	  but	   rather	   that	   their	   radical	  
reconceptualisation	   is	  needed.162	  The	  state	   is	  seen	  as	  real	   in	  the	  sense	  that	   it	   is	  a	  causal	  social	  
structure,	  not	  an	  agent.	  She	  points	  out	  that	  critical	  realism	  “directs	  us	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  state	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Critical	   Realism'.	   And	   Kurki,	   Causation	   in	   International	   Relations:	   Reclaiming	   Causal	   Analysis.	   Another	  
prominent	   proponent	   of	   critical	   realism	   in	   the	   discipline	   is	   Jonathan	   Joseph.	   Compare	   for	   example	   Joseph,	  
'Philosophy	  in	  International	  Relations.	  A	  Scientific	  Realist	  Approach'.	  
159	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory'.	  
160	  As	  a	  note	  on	   terminology	   it	   should	  be	  pointed	  out	   that	   I	  use	   the	   terms	  positivism	  and	  narrativism	   in	   line	  
with	   Wight’s	   account.	   Kurki	   prefers	   the	   terms	   positivism	   and	   reflectivism.	   In	   their	   2000	   article	   on	   the	  
possibilities	  of	  realism	  in	  IR,	  Wight	  and	  Patomäki	  use	  the	  terms	  positivism	  and	  postpositivism.	  Compare	  Wight,	  
'State	   Agency:	   Social	   Action	   without	   Human	   Activity',	   271.	   Kurki,	   Causation	   in	   International	   Relations:	  
Reclaiming	  Causal	  Analysis,	  252.	  Patomäki	  and	  Wight,	  'After	  Postpositivism?	  The	  Promises	  of	  Critical	  Realism',	  
216.	  
161	  Patomäki	  and	  Wight,	  'After	  Postpositivism?	  The	  Promises	  of	  Critical	  Realism',	  216.	  
162	  Kurki,	  Causation	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Reclaiming	  Causal	  Analysis,	  255.	  Kurki	  argues	  that	  “It	  is	  perhaps	  
preferable	  to	  avoid	  simplifying	  the	  nature	  of	  states	  and	  explicitly	  recognise	  the	  deep	  structural	  conditioning	  of	  
all	  social	  agency,	  individuals	  and	  states,	  within	  the	  world	  system.”	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is	  not	  just	  a	  useful	  abstraction,	  nor	  a	  metaphor,	  but	  that	  the	  concept	  has	  a	  referent:	  a	  real	  and	  
causal	   social	   structure”.163	  There	  are	   two	  aspects	   to	  be	  derived	   from	   this	  quotation	  and	   to	  be	  
further	   discussed.	   First,	   the	   way	   the	   term	   metaphor	   is	   used	   in	   this	   instance	   needs	   further	  
explanation.	  Second,	  the	  question	  of	  what	   it	  entails	  to	  explore	  real	  and	  causal	  structures	  of	   IR	  
needs	  to	  be	  clarified.	  	  
As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  when	  discussing	  Wendt’s	  position	  as	  a	  scientific	  realist,	  
one	   of	   the	   main	   assumptions	   is	   that	   a	   world	   exists	   independently	   of	   our	   observation.	   Some	  
phenomena	  might	  be	  unobservable,	  yet	  they	  are	  still	  real	  which	  is	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  they	  are	  
independent	  of	   individual	  agents	  and	  have	  causal	   impact	   in	   the	  world.	  Further,	  critical	   realists	  
distinguish	   between	   two	   kinds	   of	   truths,	   transitive	   and	   intransitive	   ones.	   The	   aim	   of	   the	  
scientific	  process	  is	  to	  get	  closer	  to	  intransitive	  truths.	  However,	  lacking	  direct	  insight	  into	  these,	  
transitive	  truths	  have	  to	  be	  used	  in	  a	  process	  of	  approximation	  which	  aims	  at	  getting	  ever	  closer	  
to	  the	  real	  underlying	  structures	  of	  the	  world.	  In	  that	  sense,	  the	  world	  is	  more	  than	  metaphor.	  
However,	   since	  we	   lack	   the	  ability	   to	  have	  direct	   insight	   into	   the	   intransitive	  structures	  of	   the	  
world,	  metaphors	  are	  one	  way	  of	  gaining	  epistemic	  access	  to	  intransitive	  truths.164	  	  
In	  this	  context,	  we	  need	  to	  ask	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  useful	  in	  
the	   process	   of	   getting	   closer	   to	   intransitives	   truths	   about	   international	   relations.	   Generally,	  
ideas	  about	  states	  as	  agents	  or	  persons	  are	  rejected	  by	  critical	  realists	  such	  as	  Kurki	  or	  Wight.	  
Specifically,	  anthropomorphisation	  of	  social	  structures	   is	  rejected	  as	  too	  simplistic.165	  Kurki,	  for	  
example,	  points	  out	  that	  “[t]o	  reify	  the	  state	  as	  a	  unitary	  actor	  at	  a	  ‘convenient’	  level	  of	  analysis	  
is	   to	   refuse	   to	   move	   to	   deeper	   levels	   of	   social	   explanation.”166	  She	   goes	   on	   to	   argue	   that	  
conceptualising	   states	   as	   agents	   represents	   an	   “individualistic,	   flat	   ontology”	   which	   critical	  
realists	   seek	   to	  overcome.167	  Thinking	  of	   states	   in	   terms	  of	  persons,	  Kurki	  argues,	   leaves	  us	  at	  
the	   superficial	   level	   of	   appearances	   and	   does	   not	   lead	   to	   uncovering	   deeper	   structures	   that	  
constitute	   and	   constrain	   behaviour.	   Keeping	   this	   in	  mind,	   it	   becomes	   clear	  why	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
person	  metaphor	  is	  regarded	  as	  unhelpful	  from	  the	  critical	  realist	  perspective.	  The	  argument	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163	  Ibid.,	  	  252.	  
164	  Compare	  also	  Patomäki	  and	  Wight,	  'After	  Postpositivism?	  The	  Promises	  of	  Critical	  Realism',	  224.	  
165	  Kurki,	  Causation	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Reclaiming	  Causal	  Analysis,	  255.	  	  
166	  Ibid.	   See	   also	   Patomäki,	  After	   International	   Relations.	   Critical	   Realism	   and	   the	   (Re)Construction	   of	  World	  
Politics,	  87.	  
167	  Kurki,	  Causation	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Reclaiming	  Causal	  Analysis,	  248	  and	  255.	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that	   it	   does	   not	   allow	   us	   to	   access	   a	   deeper	   level	   of	   social	   structure.	   Rather	   than	   revealing	  
intransitive	  truth,	  it	  obscures.	  
Similarly,	   Wight	   maintains	   that	   corporate	   entities	   are	   not	   individual	   agents,	   only	   individual	  
human	  beings	  are	  agents	  who	  can	  think	  and	  act.168	  There	  is	  an	  “ontological	  wall”	  that	  states	  do	  
not	  cross	  and	  that	  distinguishes	   individual	  agents	  from	  corporate	  entities.169	  Further,	  he	  warns	  
against	   treating	   the	   state	   instrumentality.170	  Giving	   an	  account	   in	  which	   the	   state	   is	   seen	  as	   a	  
person	  might	  be	  helpful	  in	  organising	  experience.	  However,	  the	  warning	  issued	  by	  Wight	  is	  that	  
such	   an	   instrumental	   account	   is	   to	   “conduct	   ‘business	   as	   usual’”	   by	   shying	   away	   from	  harder	  
ontological	  questions.171	  	  
Further,	   keeping	   with	   the	   critical	   aspiration	   in	   critical	   realism	   as	   outlined	   prominently	   by	  
Patomäki,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  normative	  implications	  of	  thinking	  about	  states	  in	  
terms	   of	   persons.	   Patomäki	   argues	   that	   the	   task	   of	   critical	   realism	   is	   an	   emancipatory	   one;	  
emancipation	   is	   furthered	   by	   enabling	   the	   refutation	   of	   false	   understandings	   and	   related	  
structures;	   in	   doing	   so,	   new	   room	   for	   social	   action	   is	   opened	   up.172	  Does	   treating	   states	   as	  
persons	   present	   such	   an	   argument?	   Kurki,	   for	   example,	   emphasises	   that	   we	   have	   to	   keep	   in	  
mind	  that	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  discourse	  serves	  the	  purpose	  of	  certain	  agents	  and	  structures.	  It	  is	  
not	  a	  neutral	  discourse	  but	  rather	  one	  that	  reifies	  statism.173	  She	  argues	  that	  “for	  ethico-­‐political	  
as	   well	   as	   explanatory	   reasons,	   it	   might	   be	   important	   to	   avoid	   treating	   social	   structures	  
simplistically	  as	  anthropomorphic	  agents.”174	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168	  Wight,	  Agents,	  Structures	  and	  International	  Relations:	  Politics	  as	  Ontology,	  compare	  chapter	  five.	  
169	  Wight,	   'State	   Agency:	   Social	   Action	   without	   Human	   Activity',	   279.	   And	   Wight,	   Agents,	   Structures	   and	  
International	  Relations:	  Politics	  as	  Ontology,	  188.	  
170	  Wendt,	  outlining	  scientific	  realist	  premises	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  Social	  Theory,	  also	  points	  to	  the	  dangers	  of	  an	  
instrumental	  account	  of	  IR’s	  most	  important	  “entities”.	  He	  argues	  that	  “[i]f	  theories	  are	  merely	  instruments	  for	  
organizing	  experience,	  then	  it	  does	  not	  matter	  whether	  their	  assumptions	  are	  realistic.”	  This	  poses	  a	  problem	  
for	  scientific	  progress.	  Hence,	  Wendt	  argues,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  realist	  thinkers	  outlined	  in	  this	  section,	  that	  the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  real	  and	  not	  merely	  an	  instrument	  for	  organising	  our	  knowledge	  of	   international	  relations.	  
Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  61.	  
171	  Wight,	  'State	  Agency:	  Social	  Action	  without	  Human	  Activity',	  271.	  
172	  Patomäki,	   After	   International	   Relations.	   Critical	   Realism	   and	   the	   (Re)Construction	   of	   World	   Politics,	   10.	  
Heikki	  Patomäki	  and	  Colin	  Wight,	  'After	  Postpositivism?	  The	  Promise	  of	  Critical	  Realism',	  International	  Studies	  
Quarterly	  44	  (2000),	  235.	  	  
173	  Kurki,	  Causation	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Reclaiming	  Causal	  Analysis,	  250.	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  Ibid.,	  	  255.	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As	   we	   have	   seen,	   exploring	   the	   reality	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   has	   been	   linked	   to	   disciplinary	  
progress	   by	   Wendt.	   Yet,	   other	   critical	   realists	   such	   as	   Kurki	   and	   Wight	   reject	   the	   idea	   that	  
treating	   states	   as	   persons	   is	   helpful	   in	   getting	   closer	   at	   deeper	   levels	   of	   reality	   and,	  
consequently,	   in	   making	   disciplinary	   progress.	   Hence,	   the	   treatment	   of	   states	   in	   terms	   of	  
persons	  would	  have	  to	  be	  given	  up.	  However,	  this	  discourse	  can	  be	  slightly	  re-­‐framed	  when	  we	  
ask,	  what	  kind	  of	   realist	  we	  can	  and	   should	  be	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	  Wight	  and	  
Patomäki	  introduce	  the	  idea	  of	  three	  kinds	  of	  realism	  to	  IR	  debates:	  empirical	  realism,	  linguistic	  
realism,	  and	  critical	  realism.175	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  researcher	  always	  has	  to	  presuppose	  that	  he	  
or	  she	  is	  engaging	  reality,	  otherwise,	  research	  would	  not	  be	  possible.	  Linguistic	  realism	  locates	  
its	  reality	   in	  discourse;	  empirical	  realism	  builds	  on	  the	  reality	  of	  what	  can	  be	  perceived.176	  The	  
researcher,	   taking	   the	  position	  of	  empirical	   realism,	  will	  have	   to	   treat	   the	  state	  as	   if	   it	  existed	  
and	  then	  look	  for	  phenomenal	  aspects	  that	  can	  be	  researched	  empirically,	  at	  the	  level	  of	  what	  
can	  be	  perceived.	  Robert	  G.	  Gilpin’s	  position	  that	  IR	  scholars	  work	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  state	  
but	   of	   course	   know	   that	   “the	   state	   does	   not	   really	   exist”	   is	   an	   example	   of	   this	   position.177	  
Linguistic	   realism,	   in	   contrast,	   is	   able	   to	   treat	   the	   state	   and	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   as	   objects	   of	  
discourse	  and	  can	  assert	  their	  reality	  within	  discourse.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Jackson	  and	  Neumann’s	  
contributions	   to	   the	   2004	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   debate	   belong	   to	   this	   category.	   From	   the	   critical	  
realist	  perspective	  neither	   locating	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  empirical	  
phenomena	  nor	  locating	  it	  in	  discourse	  is	  quite	  enough.	  	  
It	   is	  worth	   stressing	   that	   the	  critical	   realist	  position	   is	  not	   that	  empirical	  and	   linguistic	   realism	  
are	  necessarily	  wrong.	  Rather,	  the	  argument	  is	  that	  they	  do	  not	  go	  far	  enough.	  By	  not	  exploring	  
“a	   deeper	   realism”,	   they	  miss	   out	   on	   the	   potential	   for	   getting	   closer	   at	   intransitive	   truth	   and	  
hence	  for	  furthering	  the	  scientific	  process.178	  Moreover,	  the	  argument	  of	  critical	  realists	   is	  that	  
the	   emancipatory	   potential	   that	   comes	   from	   opening	   up	   new	   avenues	   for	   social	   action	   by	  
exploring	  deeper	  levels	  of	  social	  reality.	  
The	  position	  taken	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  the	  critical	  realist	  argument	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	   is	   important.	   Acknowledging	   a	   deeper	   level	   of	   social	   reality	   which	   enables	   and	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  Patomäki	  and	  Wight,	  'After	  Postpositivism?	  The	  Promises	  of	  Critical	  Realism',	  223.	  
176	  Ibid.,	  	  218.	  
177	  Gilpin,	  'The	  Richness	  of	  the	  Tradition	  of	  Political	  Realism',	  318.	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  For	   the	   phrase	   “deeper	   realism”	   compare	   Patomäki	   and	   Wight,	   'After	   Postpositivism?	   The	   Promises	   of	  
Critical	  Realism',	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constraints	  possibilities	  for	  social	  action	  is	  crucial.	  Yet,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  state-­‐
as-­‐person	   is	  approached	  at	   the	   level	  of	   linguistic	   realism.	  And,	  as	  will	  be	  argued	  below,	   this	   –	  
despite	  not	  getting	  at	  the	  deeper	  levels	  of	  social	  reality	  –	  has	  value	  for	  furthering	  the	  discipline	  
and	  opening	  up	  the	  potential	  for	  change	  of	  current	  practices	  of	  international	  relations.	  	  	  	  
I	   argue	   that	   engaging	   with	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   important	   as	   it	   is	   a	   prevalent	  
assumption	   in	   the	   discipline.	   The	   state	   as	   an	   intentional	   actor	   forms	   part	   of	   intersubjectively	  
agreed	   upon	   disciplinary	   knowledge.	   As	   argued	   in	   Chapter	   1,	   this	   point	   alone	   makes	   an	  
investigation	  into	  the	  concept	  valuable.	  From	  the	  critical	  realist	  perspective,	  the	  argument	  that	  
it	  is	  common	  practice	  to	  treat	  the	  state	  as	  a	  person	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  justify	  an	  acceptance	  of	  its	  
reality.	  A	  critical	  realist	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  state	  cannot	  be	  solely	  understood	  by	  exploring	  the	  
intersubjective	  understandings	  we	  have	  of	  it.	  These	  intersubjective	  understandings	  of	  the	  social	  
world	   still	   matter	   a	   great	   deal	   but	   for	   a	   scientific	   realist	   they	   “do	   not	   exhaust	   the	   social	  
world”.179	  This	   is	   an	   important	   point,	   yet	   this	   should	   not	   prevent	   us	   from	   working	   with	   and	  
improving	   upon	   our	   most	   important	   concepts	   without	   necessarily	   always	   also	   engaging	   the	  
question	  of	  their	  relation	  with	  a	  deeper	  social	  reality.	  	  
By	   slightly	   altering	   and	   extending	   Wendt’s	   miracle	   argument,	   as	   elaborated	   in	   the	   previous	  
chapter,	  another	  argument	  for	  remaining	  at	  the	  level	  of	  linguistic	  realism	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  
idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  can	  be	  added.	  Wendt	  argues	  that,	  given	  the	  prevalence	  of	  the	  idea	  
of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  the	  discipline,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  miracle	  if	  the	  concept	  would	  not	  also	  refer	  
to	   something	  “real”,	  understood	   in	   the	  scientific	   realist	   sense	  of	   the	   term.	  He	  argues	   that	   the	  
concept	  allows	  us	  to	  successfully	  explain	  and	  even	  predict	  IR.180	  Hence,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  miracle	  if	  it	  
would	  not	  also	  refer	  to	  some	  deeper	  level	  of	  social	  reality.	  The	  following	  is	  a	  slightly	  re-­‐focused	  
and	  extended	  version	  of	   the	  miracle	  argument:	   the	  prevalence	  of	   the	  concept	  of	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	  in	  IR	  indicates	  that	  it	  is	  a	  useful	  concept	  because	  if	  it	  were	  not	  useful	  the	  discipline	  would	  
have	  replaced	  it	  with	  a	  more	  suitable	  one.	  Hence,	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  not	  shown	  that	  there	  are	  better	  
concepts	   of	   the	   state,	   we	   can	   accept	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   as	   our	   current	   best	  
explanation	  and,	  therefore,	  can	  justify	  doing	  further	  conceptual	  work	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  state-­‐
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  Ibid.,	  	  225.	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  Wendt,	  1999,	  64‒65	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as-­‐person.181	  This	  position	  allows	  for	  remaining	  agnostic	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  deeper	  reality	  of	  the	  
concept	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  Its	  value	  is,	  in	  a	  first	  instance,	  not	  located	  in	  its	  reality	  but	  in	  its	  
disciplinary	  position	  and	  its	  intersubjective	  acceptance	  which	  are	  taken	  as	  an	  indication	  that	  we	  
have	  “gotten	  something	  right”.182	  
This	  argument	  can	  be	  developed	  further.	  The	  critical	  realist	  perspective	  stresses	  that	  the	  deeper	  
social	  structure	  enables	  and	  constrains	  social	  action.	  “[E]very	  social	  act,	  event,	  or	  phenomenon	  
is	   only	   possible	   insofar	   as	   the	   conditions	   for	   action	   exist	   as	   well	   as	   the	   agents	   which	   act;	  
conditions	   which	   […]	   are	   real	   and	   not	   reducible	   the	   discourses	   and/or	   experiences	   of	   the	  
agents.”183	  In	  other	  words,	  conditions	  of	  the	  deeper	  reality	  of	  the	  social	   realm	  of	   international	  
relations	  enable	   and	   constrain	  our	  discourses	   and	  experiences.	   If	   the	   concept	  of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
person	  has	  survived	  for	  so	  long	  in	  the	  discipline	  as	  well	  as	  in	  lay	  discourses,	  as	  Wendt	  points	  out,	  
it	   is	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  it	  somehow	  works	  in	  line	  with	  at	  least	  part	  of	  these	  structures.	  
Therefore,	  we	  can	  again	  argue	  that	  we	  must	  have	  gotten	  something	  right.	  	  
Most	   importantly,	  what	   kind	  of	   level	   of	   reality	   –	   empirical,	   linguistic,	   or	  deeper	   structural	   –	   a	  
given	   research	   project	   is	   engaging	   depends	   on	   the	   kinds	   of	   question	   that	   the	   researcher	   is	  
asking.	  I	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  a	  plurality	  here	  that	  can	  be	  justified	  on	  grounds	  of	  appropriateness.	  
We	  need	   to	  ask	  whether	  or	  not	   a	   commitment	   to	  a	   certain	   level	  of	   reality	   is	   justified	  given	  a	  
specific	  research	  interest.	  For	  certain	  purposes	  it	  seems	  entirely	  justified	  to	  remain	  at	  the	  level	  
of	  discourse	  and	  hence	  to	  work	  at	  the	  level	  of	  linguistic	  realism.	  The	  critique	  and	  development	  
of	  Wendt’s	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  position	  undertaken	  here	   is	   primarily	   interested	   in	  developing	   the	  
concept	  further	  by	  looking	  at	  how	  people	  make	  sense	  of	  themselves	  and	  utilising	  this	  to	  create	  
an	  understanding	  of	  the	  state-­‐a-­‐person.	  Building	  on	  that,	  the	  motivation	  behind	  this	  project	  is	  to	  
modify	  IR’s	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  person	  in	  order	  to	  open	  up	  new	  avenues	  for	  
understanding	   international	   relations,	   especially	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   role	   of	   emotions,	   and	   to	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  Judging	   whether	   or	   not	   a	   concept	   is	   useful	   or	   better	   than	   another	   concept	   means	   different	   things	   to	  
proponents	  of	  different	  approaches.	   I	  deliberately	   leave	  its	  meaning	  open	  in	  this	  context.	  Nevertheless,	   I	  am	  
mindful	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   in	   the	   mind-­‐world	   monist	   traditions	   “useful”	   is	   taken	   to	   mean	   that	   a	   concept	   is	  
valuable	  in	  organizing	  appearances	  and	  experiences.	  Concepts	  are	  intersubjectively	  agreed	  upon.	  In	  the	  mind-­‐
world	  dualist	  traditions,	  a	  useful	  concept	  always	  needs	  to	  be	  judged	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  reference	  to	  the	  world.	  
182	  I	  am	  quoting	  Wendt	  here	  and	  put	  his	  description	  of	  the	  scientific	  realist	  idea	  of	  progressive	  approximation	  
to	   reality	   as	   the	   central	   indication	   of	   scientific	   process	   in	   the	   context	   of	  my	   own	   argument.	  Wendt,	   Social	  
Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  66,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  	  
183	  Patomäki	  and	  Wight,	  'After	  Postpositivism?	  The	  Promises	  of	  Critical	  Realism',	  230.	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open	  up	  potential	   for	  change.	  However,	   this	  also	  means	   that	   the	  present	   thesis	   is	  not	  able	   to	  
engage	   with	   arguments	   regarding	   the	   question	   of	   the	   deeper	   social	   realities	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
person	  and	  the	  critique	  of	  critical	  realists.	  Hence,	  the	  charge	  of	  treating	  the	  state	  instrumentally	  
cannot	  be	  entirely	  escaped.	  	  
	  




This	  chapter	  aimed	  at	  arguing	  that	  metaphors	  cannot	  be	  dismissed	  as	  mere	  figures	  of	  speech.	  As	  
a	  first	  step,	  the	  chapter	  builds	  on	  a	  three-­‐part	  taxonomy	  of	  metaphors	  to	  facilitate	  the	  argument	  
that	   follows.	   What	   I	   call	   modes	   of	   metaphor	   describes	   three	   ideal	   typical	   functions	   of	  
metaphors.	   They	   can	  be	   rhetorical	   devices	   for	   persuasion;	   they	   can	   serve	   as	   heuristic	   devices	  
and	  offer	  orientation	   in	  a	   complex	  and	  sometimes	  not	  directly	  observable	  world;	  and	   last	  but	  
not	   least,	   they	   can	   serve	   as	   world-­‐making	   devices	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   a	   metaphor	   can	   either	  
facilitate	   the	   exploration	   of	   underlying	   structures,	   a	   critical	   realist	   stance,	   or	   become	  
constitutive	   of	   the	   (social)	   world,	   a	   constructivist	   stance	   in	   the	   tradition	   of	   Nicholas	   Onuf.	   It	  
needs	   to	  be	   stressed	   that	   these	  are	  not	   clear-­‐cut	  distinctions.	  But	  more	   interestingly,	   it	   is	   the	  
ability	  of	  a	  metaphor	  to	  serve	  in	  all	  three	  functions	  simultaneously	  and	  across	  various	  discourses	  
that	  makes	  it	  such	  a	  powerful	  tool.	  	  
While	   the	   literature	   on	  metaphors	   has	   enormously	  multiplied	   since	   the	   linguistic	   turn	   in	   the	  
social	   sciences,	   the	   selection	   of	   key	   authors	   used	   to	   support	   the	   argument	   in	   this	   chapter,	  
among	   them	   Black,	   Richards,	   Hoffman,	   Boyd,	   and	   Gentner,	   is	   driven	   by	   the	   need	   to	   answer	  
Wendt’s	   critical	  position	   towards	  what	  he	  calls	  as-­‐if	   approaches	  and,	   therefore,	   is	  driven	  by	  a	  
focus	  on	   the	  potential	   role	   of	  metaphors	   in	   science.	   Lakoff	   and	   Johnson’s	   seminal	  Metaphors	  
We	  Live	  By	  is,	  of	  course,	  present	  throughout	  the	  chapter.	  	  
The	   first	  part	  of	   the	  chapter	   introduces	  a	  number	  of	   crucial	  distinctions.	   In	   this	   context,	  Black	  
and	  Richards	  are	  drawn	  upon	  as	  they	  are	  generally	  credited	  with	  being	  the	  originators	  of	  a	  shift	  
away	   from	   the	   traditional	   view	   of	   metaphor,	   often	   and	   wrongly	   attributed	   to	   Aristotle,	   as	   a	  
mere	  rhetorical	  device	  that	  can	  and	  should	  be	  replaced	  by	  a	  more	  accurate,	   literal	  expression.	  
Richards	  poignantly	  describes	  a	  metaphor	  as	  an	  “intercourse	  of	  thoughts”	  and	  Black	  introduces	  
the	   key	   distinction	   between	   the	   comparison	   view	   of	   metaphors,	   which	   he	   rejects,	   and	   the	  
interaction	   view	   of	   metaphors.	   Both	   works	   are	   important	   if	   we	   want	   to	   highlight	   that	   a	  
metaphor	  brings	  two	  different	  objects	  or	  ideas	  in	  contact	  and	  that	  in	  the	  interaction	  of	  the	  two	  
something	  new,	  irreducible	  to	  either,	  is	  created.	  Following	  arguments	  by	  Robert	  Hoffmann,	  this	  
is	  seen	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  scientific	  discovery	  and	  theory	  building	  across	  disciplines.	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Further,	  Boyd	  draws	  another	  helpful	  distinction	  between	  two	  different	  roles	  of	  metaphors	  in	  the	  
scientific	   process	   that	   needs	   to	   be	  maintained.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   he	   identifies	   what	   he	   calls	  
pedagogical	  metaphors	  that	  function	  as	  tools	  to	  explain	  and	  communicate	  a	  theory	  but	  do	  not	  
form	   part	   of	   its	   theory	   itself.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   there	   are	   so-­‐called	   theory	   constitutive	  
metaphors	  that	  form	  the	  core	  of	  a	  theory.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
can	  and	  does	  fulfil	  both	  functions.	  However,	  this	  thesis	  insists	  that	  its	  potential	  role	  as	  a	  theory	  
constitutive	  metaphor	  needs	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously.	  	  
Drawing	  on	  more	  recent	  work	  in	  conceptual	  metaphor	  theory,	  the	  seminal	  Metaphors	  We	  Live	  
By	  for	  instance,	  the	  interaction	  view	  can	  be	  described	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  relation	  between	  the	  so-­‐
called	   target	   and	   source	   domains.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   the	   source	   domain	   is,	  
broadly	  speaking,	  formed	  by	  concepts	  of	  persons	  and	  the	  target	  domain	  consists	  of	  concepts	  of	  
the	  state.	  	  
Keeping	   these	   initial	   distinctions	   in	   mind,	   the	   chapter,	   in	   a	   second	   step,	   suggests	   a	   working	  
definition	  for	  what	  can	  now	  be	  called	  a	  scientific	  metaphor.	  A	  scientific	  metaphor	  is	  described	  as	  
potentially	   open-­‐ended	   interanimation	   of	   thoughts	   that	   invites	   further	   research	   and	  
exploration.	   It	  determines	  assumptions	  within	  a	   theoretical	   framework	   in	   important	  ways	  and	  
can	   facilitate	   exchange	   between	   different	   discourses	   and	   disciplines.	   To	   further	   illustrate	   the	  
relation	  between	  source	  and	  target	  domain	  and	  to	  find	  a	  way	  of	  making	  the	  process	  of	  exchange	  
between	   the	   two	   domains	   useful	   for	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   structural	   mapping	   is	  
introduced.	  Building	  on	  Gentner,	   it	   is	  described	  as	  a	  process	  whereby	  relational	  aspects	   found	  
among	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  source	  domain	  are	  mapped	  onto	  the	  target	  domain.	  The	  emphasis	  
on	  relational	  aspects	  is	  important	  to	  note.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  mapping	  between	  persons	  and	  
states,	  this	  means	  that	  it	  is	  not	  characteristics	  of	  people,	  such	  as	  specific	  physical	  attributes,	  that	  
are	  mapped.	   It	   is	  also	   important	   to	  note	  that	   this	   is	  not	  a	  one-­‐directional	  process.	  Rather,	   the	  
selection	  of	  elements	  of	  the	  source	  domain	  is	  done	  with	  the	  target	  domain	  in	  mind.	  This	  process	  
will	   form	  part	   of	   later	   arguments	   regarding	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   developed	   in	   this	  
thesis.	  	  
Lastly,	  and	  especially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  theoretical	  perspective	  underlying	  Wendt’s	  state-­‐as-­‐
person,	  the	  crucial	  question	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  our	  concepts	  and	  the	  world	  is	  addressed	  in	  
this	   chapter.	   Jackson’s	   distinction	   between	   mind-­‐world	   monism	   and	   mind-­‐world	   dualism	   is	  
	  	   	   	  
	  
144	  
taken	  as	  a	  useful	  starting	  point.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  in	  both	  cases	  metaphors	  can	  play	  a	  crucial	  role.	  
From	  a	  mind-­‐world	  dualist	  assumption,	   in	  contrast	  to	  Wendt’s	  rejection	  of	  metaphors	  as	  mere	  
figures	  of	   speech,	  we	  can	   indeed	   identify	  a	  very	  specific	   role	   for	  metaphors	  within	  a	   scientific	  
realist	   paradigm.	   From	   a	   scientific	   realist	   perspective,	   metaphors	   are	   tools	   to	   reveal	   and	  
understand	  deeper	  structures,	  powers	  and	  tendencies	  that	  are	  neither	  directly	  observable	  nor	  
to	   be	   located	   in	   discourse	   alone.	   From	   a	   mind-­‐world	   monist	   perspective,	   metaphors	   are	  
constitutive	  of	  the	  social	  world	  by	  shaping	  how	  we	  speak	  about	  the	  world	  and	  hence	  moulding	  
our	  most	  important	  concepts	  and	  our	  ability	  to	  make	  the	  world	  intelligible.	  This	  thesis	  explores	  
the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   as	   a	   metaphor	   in	   the	   latter	   context.	   However,	   this	   is	   not	   to	   deny	   the	  
usefulness	  and	  necessity	  of	  asking	  mind-­‐world	  dualist	  questions	  with	  regard	  to	  the	   idea	  of	  the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  a	  later	  research	  step.	  	  
Going	   back	   to	   the	   distinction	   between	   scientific	   and	   philosophical	   ontology	   introduced	   in	   the	  
previous	   chapter,	   this	   thesis	   is	   ultimately	   interested	   in	   asking	   questions	   of	   scientific	   ontology	  
while	   remaining	   agnostic	   about	   the	   philosophical	   ontology	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	   In	   other	  
words,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  exists	  –	  a	  question	  of	  philosophical	  
ontology	  –	  is	  not	  engaged.	  Rather,	  the	  focus	  will	  be	  on	  contributing	  to	  the	  scientific	  ontology	  of	  
the	   state,	   in	   the	   form	   of	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   addressed	   at	   the	   level	   of	   linguistic	  
realism.	  The	  question	  asked	  is	  how	  we	  can	  develop	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  persons	  and,	  by	  
metaphoric	  extension,	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	   the	  state.	   	   In	  a	   first	   instance,	   this	   is	  done	  on	  
the	  level	  of	  linguistic	  realism	  while	  remaining	  agnostic	  regarding	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  
the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  allows	  us	  to	  get	  at	  the	  deeper	   levels	  of	  the	  social	  world.	  Having	  made	  this	  
decision,	   the	   suggested	  constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  will	   not	  entirely	  escape	   the	   critique	  of	   an	  
instrumentalist	   treatment,	   issued	  by	  Wendt	  and	  Wight,	  of	   the	  most	   important	   concept	   in	   the	  
discipline.	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Chapter	  4:	  A	  psychological	  and	  
emotional	  turn	  in	  IR	  	  
Building	  on	  some	  of	  Alexander	  Wendt’s	  ideas	  about	  psychological	  state	  personhood	  and	  aiming	  
at	  formulating	  an	  alternative	  concept	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  this	  chapter	  draws	  on	  the	  so-­‐called	  
emotional	  turn	  in	  IR.	  As	  outlined	  in	  the	  first	  chapter,	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐agent	  is	  crucial	  
for	  IR	  as	  a	  discipline.	  In	  line	  with	  one	  of	  the	  key	  insights	  of	  the	  emotional	  turn,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
recognise	   that	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  should	  not	  be	  conceptualised	   in	  purely	   rational	   terms.	  This	  
observation	  mirrors	  Wendt’s	   point	   that	   systemic	   interactions	   of	   states	   do	   not	   only	   influence	  
behaviour	  but	  also	  identities	  and	  interests	  of	  states.	  
However,	  the	  challenge	  here	  is	  to	  theorise	  about	  states-­‐as-­‐persons	  and	  to	  bring	  in	  emotions	  at	  
the	   level	   of	   the	   state	   and	   the	   state	   system.	   This	   proposed	   focus	   on	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	  
however,	  is	  only	  mentioned	  in	  passing,	  if	  at	  all,	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  can	  be	  subsumed	  under	  the	  
recent	  emotional	  turn	  in	  IR.	  Neta	  C.	  Crawford,	  one	  of	  the	  key	  proponents,	  for	  example	  supposes	  
that	   “research	   on	   emotions	   may	   lead	   to	   a	   fundamental	   reconceptualization	   of	   agents	   and	  
agency	   in	  world	   politics.”1	  And	  with	   regard	   to	   agents	   she	   has	   both,	   individuals	   and	   groups	   in	  
mind.	  Richard	  Ned	  Lebow	  and	  Jonathan	  Mercer	  are	  two	  other	  proponents	  of	  the	  emotional	  turn	  
whose	  theories	  operate	  at	  the	  “level”	  of	  the	  state.2	  
As	  we	   have	   seen	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   the	   argument	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   that	   the	   idea	   of	   the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	  a	  valuable	  one	  as	   long	  as	   it	   is	  understood	  as	  a	  metaphor.	  States	  are	  people	  
too,	  but	  they	  are	  so	  only	  metaphorically.	  Starting	  from	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  encounter	  a	  metaphor	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Crawford,	  'The	  Passion	  of	  World	  Politics:	  Propositions	  on	  Emotion	  and	  Emotional	  Relationships',	  156.	  
2	  Jonathan	  Mercer	  draws	  on	  social	  identity	  theory	  to	  show	  that	  states	  are	  inevitably	  self-­‐interested.	  Mercer,	  
'Anarchy	  and	  Identity'.	  In	  one	  of	  his	  most	  recent	  works,	  Lebow	  is	  interested	  in	  the	  role	  of	  passions,	  drawing	  on	  
ancient	  Greek	  insights,	  in	  understanding	  state	  behaviour.	  Richard	  Ned	  Lebow,	  A	  Cultural	  Theory	  of	  
International	  Relations	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008).	  For	  the	  link	  between	  Lebow’s	  2008	  
book	  and	  the	  discipline’s	  renewed	  interest	  in	  psychology	  compare	  Jacques	  E.	  C.	  Hymans,	  'The	  Arrival	  of	  
Psychological	  Constructivism',	  International	  Theory	  2,	  3	  (2010).	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in	   this	   instance,	   an	   investigation	   into	   the	   so-­‐called	   source	   domain	   of	   the	  metaphor	   becomes	  
necessary.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  need	  to	  ask	  how	  to	  conceptualise	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  person	  
and	  what	  knowledge	  to	  draw	  from	  in	  this	  pursuit.	  	  
Hence,	  conceptualising	  the	  state	  as	  a	  person	  presupposes	  an	  understanding	  of	  what	  a	  person	  is	  
or	  what	   it	   is	   like	   to	   be	   a	   person.	  An	   answer	   to	   such	   a	   question	   can	  draw	  on	   a	  wide	   range	  of	  
disciplines	   and	   approaches.	   I	   remain	   sceptical	   whether	   it	   is	   at	   all	   possible	   to	   define	   what	   a	  
person	   is	   in	   the	   abstract	   and	   tend	   to	   point	   to	   the	  process	   of	   personation,	   how	  we	  become	  a	  
person,	  as	  a	  more	  relevant	  re-­‐formulation	  of	  the	  question	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  state	  is	  a	  person.3	  	  
However,	  as	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  idea	  of	  psychological	  state	  personhood	  as	  put	  forward	  by	  
Wendt	   in	   2004	   suggests	   a	   turn	   to	   psychology.	   For	   Wendt,	   psychological	   personhood	   is,	   in	  
contrast	   to	   moral	   or	   legal	   personhood,	   marked	   by	   the	   ability	   to	   subjectively	   experience	   the	  
world.	  Further,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  stress	  that	  a	  subjective	  perspective	   is	  also	  closely	   linked	  with	  
emotions.	   Indeed,	   psychology	   understood	   “as	   the	   science	   of	   thinking,	   feeling,	   acting	   and	  
perceiving”4	  seems	  like	  an	  ideal	  place	  to	  search	  for	  conceptualisations	  of	  subjective	  experience	  
and	  emotions.	  	  
Further,	  IR	  as	  a	  subject	  has	  been	  marked	  by	  occasional	  attempts	  to	  “bring	  psychology	  in”.	  Most	  
recently,	  the	  so-­‐called	  emotional	  turn	  represents	  renewed	  efforts	  in	  this	  regard.	  This,	  I	  believe,	  
makes	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  make	  findings	  from	  psychology	  useful	  for	  IR	  well	  worth	  exploring.	  
In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   aim	   to	   show	  how	  such	  a	   step	   could	  be	   taken	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   idea	  of	   the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  chapter	  brings	  together	  the	  recent	  emotional	  turn	  in	  IR	  with	  
the	   concept	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	   In	   the	   following,	   I	   point	   to	   two	   additional	   examples	   and	  
three	  questions	  that	  underscore	  the	  rationale	  behind	  this	  chapter.	  	  	  
With	   regard	   to	   “bringing	   psychology	   in”,	   the	   chapter	   takes	   its	   starting	   point	   from	   two	  
preliminary	   observations.	   First,	   IR	   scholarship	   often	   draws	   upon	   psychology	   to	   support	   the	  
argument	   in	  places	  where	  assumptions	  about	  human	  nature	  or	  human	  cognition	  need	   further	  
substantiation.	   Wendt,	   for	   example,	   while	   drawing	   on	   structuration	   theory	   and	   symbolic	  
interactionism	  inspired	  by	  George	  Herbert	  Mead	  and	  Herbert	  Blumer	   in	  his	  Social	  Theory,	  also	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  This	  is,	  as	  mentioned	  in	  chapter	  two,	  of	  course	  based	  on	  Patrick	  T.	  Jackson’s	  critique	  of	  Wendt’s	  2004	  article.	  
Jackson,	  'Hegel's	  House,	  or	  'People	  Are	  States	  Too''.	  
4	  Rom	  Harré,	  Key	  Thinkers	  in	  Psychology	  (London:	  Sage,	  2006),	  225.	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includes	   the	   occasional	   insight	   from	   (social)	   psychology	   to	   support	   his	   argument.	   He	   mainly	  
draws	  on	  Henri	  Tajfel’s	  social	  identity	  theory	  and	  the	  concepts	  of	  in-­‐group	  favouritism	  and	  out-­‐
group	  discrimination	  to	  illustrate	  how	  the	  distinction	  between	  self	  and	  other,	  which	  is,	  for	  him,	  
crucial	   to	   states’	   corporate	   identity,	   can	   be	   “shown	   experimentally”.5	  Second,	   the	   attempt	   to	  
incorporate	   findings	   from	   psychology	   into	   IR	   is	   not	   a	   recent	   phenomenon.	   In	   line	   with	   the	  
behaviourist	  turn	  of	  the	  1960s,	  early	  attempts	  by	  J.	  David	  Singer	  and	  others	  can	  be	  identified.6	  
Similarly,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  study	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  war	  (as	  far	  as	  they	  are	  located	  at	  the	  level	  of	  
what	   Kenneth	  N.	  Waltz	  would	   call	   the	   first	   image),	  we	   can	   identify	   several	   early	   attempts	   to	  
utilise	  insights	  from	  psychology	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  IR	  scholarship.7	  	  
One	   key	   observation	   that	   will	   guide	   the	   chapter	   can	   be	   drawn	   from	   these	   preliminary	  
observations.	  One	  underlying	  assumption	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  IR	  is	   lacking	  something	  that	  could	  be	  
added	   by	   drawing	   on	   psychology.	   Singer,	   being	   part	   of	   what	   can	   be	   called	   “the	   behavioural	  
revolt”	   in	   IR,	   can	   easily	   be	   read	   as	   an	   unveiled	   attempt	   to	   put	   some	  of	   IR’s	   assumption	   on	   a	  
more	   rigorous	   scientific	   –	   understood	   as	   meaning	   neopositivistic	   –	   	   footing.8	  Interestingly,	   a	  
similar	   sense	   can	   be	   gained	   from	  Wendt	   who	   stresses	   that	   the	   insights	   he	   takes	   from	   social	  
identity	   theory	  are	  based	  on	  experimentation	  and	  hence	  conform	  to	   the	   rules	  of	  a	  positivistic	  
science.	   This	   observation	   seems	   to	   act	   as	   a	   validation.	  What	   can	   be	   identified	   in	   the	   case	   of	  
Singer	   and	   others	   is	   a	   tendency	   to	   draw	   on	   psychology	   for	   “scientific”	   findings	   in	   order	   to	  
supplement	  the	  study	  of	  IR.	  In	  these	  cases,	  IR	  is	  often	  conceived	  of	  as	  lacking	  scientific	  rigor	  with	  
regard	  to	  assumptions	  about	  people	  or	  groups	  and	  psychology	   is	  seen	  as	  being	  able	  to	  fill	   this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  241f,	  356.	  Henri	  Tajfel,	  ed.,	  Social	  Identity	  and	  Intergroup	  
Relations	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1982).	  Here,	  Wendt	  also	  refers	  to	  Jonathan	  Mercer	  who	  
criticised	  the	  idea	  of	  “anarchy	  is	  what	  states	  make	  of	  it”	  utilising	  social	  identity	  theory.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  
influence	  of	  Mead	  and	  Blumer	  on	  Wendt’s	  Social	  Theory	  compare	  Maja	  Zehfuss,	  Constructivism	  in	  
International	  Relations.	  The	  Politics	  of	  Reality	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  12.	  
6	  J.	  David	  Singer,	  'Psychological	  Research	  and	  the	  Study	  of	  World	  Politics',	  Background	  in	  World	  Politics	  4,	  2	  
(1960).	  
7	  Compare	  Kenneth	  N.	  Waltz,	  Man,	  the	  State	  and	  War	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2001	  [1954]),	  
43ff.	  
8	  Colin	  Wight,	  'Philosophy	  of	  Social	  Science	  and	  International	  Relations',	  in	  Handbook	  of	  International	  
Relations,	  ed.	  Walter	  Carlsnaes,	  Thomas	  Risse-­‐Kappen,	  and	  Beth	  A.	  Simmons	  (Thousand	  Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage,	  2002),	  
28-­‐32.	  Wight	  attributes	  the	  term	  “behavioural	  revolt”	  to	  John	  Vasquez.	  Compare	  John	  A.	  Vasquez,	  The	  Power	  
of	  Power	  Politics:	  From	  Classical	  Realism	  to	  Neotraditionalism	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  
39.	  For	  the	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  neopositivism,	  compare	  Jackson’s	  analysis.	  Jackson,	  The	  Conduct	  of	  Inquiry	  in	  
International	  Relations:	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  and	  Its	  Implications	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  World	  Politics.	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gap.9	  At	   the	   very	   least,	   the	   role	   that	   is	   given	   to	   psychology	   here	   needs	   to	   be	   questioned	   and	  
especially	   the	   concept	   of	   “science”	   that	   is	   underlying	   some	   of	   these	   accounts	   deserves	   our	  
scrutiny.	  	  
Given	   these	   examples,	   three	   further	   questions	   that	   guide	   the	   following	   investigation	   emerge.	  
First,	  it	  becomes	  important	  to	  ask	  what	  findings	  from	  psychology	  should	  be	  utilised	  and	  how	  and	  
with	  what	   intentions	   they	   should	   be	   incorporated	   into	   IR.	   Secondly,	  we	   also	   need	   to	  wonder	  
about	  the	  level	  at	  which	  we	  bring	  in	  findings	  from	  psychology.	  Using	  the	  language	  introduced	  by	  
Waltz	   as	   a	   means	   of	   orientation,	   are	   we	   operating	   at	   the	   first,	   second	   or	   third	   image?	   And	  
thirdly,	  we	  also	  need	  to	  question	  the	  ontological	  and	  epistemological	  premises	  of	  the	  particular	  
insights	  that	  we	  incorporate	  from	  psychology	  into	  IR.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  with	  regard	  to	  metaphors,	  this	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “science”	  is	  to	  be	  
understood	  before	  the	  background	  of	  a	  disciplinary	  mainstream	  wedded	  to	  neopositivism.	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Psychology,	  emotions,	  and	  the	  discipline	  
Suggestions	   that	   IR	   as	   a	   discipline	   can	   benefit	   from	   drawing	   on	   psychology	   are	   not	   new.	   As	  
mentioned	  in	  the	  introduction,	  Singer	  was	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  and	  strongest	  proponents	  of	  the	  
incorporation	   of	   findings	   from	   psychology.	   Singer	   was	   an	   American	   political	   scientists	   and	  
founder	  of	  the	  Correlates	  of	  War	  Project.	  In	  1960	  he	  pointed	  out	  that	  “it	  may	  safely	  be	  predicted	  
that	  when	   the	   important	   contributions	   to	   the	   theory	   of	   international	   relations	   of	   the	   coming	  
decades	  are	  weighed	  and	  appraised,	  they	  will	  turn	  out	  to	  have	  drawn	  heavily	  upon	  the	  methods,	  
findings,	   and	   concepts	   of	   the	   behavioural	   sciences.” 10 	  With	   behaviourism	   in	   mind,	   Singer	  
predicted	   three	   broad	   areas	   in	   which	   IR	   could	   benefit	   from	   the	   input	   of	   findings	   from	  
psychology:	  “techniques	  and	  methods,	  data	  and	  findings,	  and	  concepts	  and	  models”.11	  Writing	  
at	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   psychologist	   Herbert	   C.	   Kelman	   is	   another	   early	   proponent	   who	  
investigated	   possibilities	   of	   bringing	   findings	   from	   psychology	   to	   bear	   on	   the	   study	   of	   IR.12	  
Interestingly,	   more	   than	   50	   years	   after	   the	   publication	   of	   Singer’s	   article	   and	   Kelman’s	  
contribution,	  the	  discipline	  still	  confronts	  suggestions	  like	  these	  as	  potentialities,	  not	  as	  works	  in	  
progress.	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  specific	  research	  programme	  with	  regard	  to	  “bringing	  psychology	  in”,	  
is	   partly	   to	   blame.	   This	   absence,	   it	   is	   suggested	   here,	   derives	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   there	   is	   no	  
agreement	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  goal	  that	  is	  furthered	  by	  “bringing	  psychology	  in”.	  As	  alluded	  to	  in	  
the	  introduction,	  Singer	  is	  a	  behaviouralist	  and	  for	  him	  bringing	  psychology	  in	  serves	  the	  distinct	  
purpose	  of	  uncovering	   regularities	   in	  human	  behaviour	   that	   IR	  has	  missed	   so	   far	  but	   that	   are	  
crucial	   for	   its	   goals	   of	   study.	   As	   we	   will	   see	   when	   looking	   at	   the	   exponents	   of	   the	   recent	  
emotional	  turn	  in	  IR	  in	  more	  detail,	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  turn	  to	  psychology	  are	  varied	  and	  some	  
of	  them	  are	  clearly	  opposed	  to	  Singer’s	  position.13	  
More	   recent	   engagements	  with	   this	   question	   include	   the	   argument	   that	  many	   theories	   of	   IR	  
build	   on	   some	   implicit	   assumptions	   about	   human	   nature	   or	   human	   cognition	   that	   could	   be	  
deepened	   by	   explicitly	   applying	   concepts	   or	   methods	   from	   psychology	   to	   IR	   theory.	   James	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Singer,	  'Psychological	  Research	  and	  the	  Study	  of	  World	  Politics',	  89.	  
11	  Ibid.,	  	  88.	  
12	  Herbert	  C.	  Kelman,	  'Social	  Psychological	  Approaches	  to	  the	  Study	  of	  International	  Relations',	  in	  International	  
Behaviour,	  ed.	  Herbert	  C.	  Kelman	  (New	  York:	  Holt,	  Rinehart	  and	  Winston,	  1965).	  
13	  The	  work	  by	  Emma	  Hutchison	  and	  Roland	  Bleiker	  clearly	  belongs	  to	  the	  opposing	  camp.	  Bleiker	  and	  
Hutchison,	  'Fear	  No	  More:	  Emotions	  and	  World	  Politics'.	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Goldgeier	   and	   Philip	   Tetlock,	   for	   example,	   point	   out	   how	   various	   IR	   theories	   –	   they	   look	   at	  
realism,	  institutionalism	  (liberalism),	  and	  constructivism	  –	  can	  benefit	  from	  acknowledging	  and	  
incorporating	  findings	  from	  psychology.14	  “[P]sychological	  explanations”,	  they	  argue,	  “fill	  logical	  
holes	  in	  existing	  theoretical	  coverage.”15	  	  
Generally,	   it	   is	   especially	   IR’s	   political	   realism	   that	   is	   often	   taken	   as	   an	   example	   of	   how	  
psychology	  and	   the	   study	  of	   emotions	   can	   contribute	  by	   filling	   gaps	   in	   the	   theories	  especially	  
with	   regard	   to	   assumptions	   about	   human	   nature.	   The	   argument	   is	   that	   IR	   already	   makes	   a	  
number	  of	  implicit	  assumptions	  about	  emotions	  that	  need	  further	  substantiation	  by	  drawing	  on	  
other	   disciplines.16	  Recently,	   Robert	   Schuett,	   for	   example,	   pointed	  out	   how	  Hans	  Morgenthau	  
might	   have	   been	  more	   influenced	   by	   Sigmund	   Freud	   than	   by	   Reinhold	   Niebuhr.17	  While	   that	  
conclusion	  is	  of	  course	  contested,	  it	   is	  at	  least	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  it	   is	  possible	  to	  point	  to	  
psychological	   assumptions	   in	   the	  work	  of	  a	   key	   thinker	  of	   classical	   realism	  and	   link	   them	   to	  a	  
specific	  psychologist.	  	  
More	  specifically,	  many	  scholars	  of	  the	  recent	  emotional	  turn	  in	  IR	  call	  for	  the	  need	  to	  explicitly	  
acknowledge	  emotions’	  role	  in	  international	  relations.	  Roland	  Bleiker	  and	  Emma	  Hutchison,	  for	  
example,	   argue	   that	   “emotions	   should	   be	   placed	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   disciplinary	   debates.”18	  
Similarly,	  Crawford	  points	  out	  that	   the	  “[s]ystematic	  analysis	  of	  emotions	  may	  have	   important	  
implications	  for	  international	  relations	  theory.”19	  They	  and	  others	  to	  whom	  the	  label	  “emotional	  
turn	  in	  IR”	  can	  be	  applied	  also	  share	  a	  criticism	  of	  the	  conventional	  conception	  of	  rationalisms	  in	  
the	  discipline.	  Mercer	  devoted	  several	  articles	  to	  arguing	  that	  rationality	  and	  emotions	  are	  not	  
distinct	  or	  mutually	  exclusive	  and	  that	  acknowledging	  the	  role	  of	  emotions	  in	  rational	  decision-­‐
making	  is	  key	  for	  better	  understanding	  international	  relations.20	  Being	  interested	  in	  cooperation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Here,	  the	  term	  “theory”	  is	  applied	  to	  constructivism	  with	  caution	  –	  acknowledging,	  as	  it	  is	  done	  explicitly	  in	  
chapter	  two,	  that	  constructivism	  is	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  broad	  approach	  and	  does	  not	  fit	  in	  a	  list	  that	  also	  includes	  
realism	  and	  liberalism.	  	  
15	  James	  Goldgeier	  and	  Philip	  Tetlock,	  'Psychological	  Approaches',	  in	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  International	  
Relations,	  ed.	  Chris	  Reus-­‐Smit	  and	  Duncan	  Snidal	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  476.	  
16	  See	  for	  example	  Crawford,	  'The	  Passion	  of	  World	  Politics:	  Propositions	  on	  Emotion	  and	  Emotional	  
Relationships',	  121.	  
17	  Robert	  Schuett,	  Political	  Realism,	  Freud,	  and	  Human	  Nature	  in	  International	  Relations	  (London:	  Palgrave	  
Macmillan,	  2010).	  Robert	  Schuett,	  'Freudian	  Roots	  of	  Political	  Realism:	  The	  Importance	  of	  Sigmund	  Freud	  to	  
Hans	  J.	  Morgenthau's	  Theory	  of	  International	  Power	  Politics',	  History	  of	  the	  Human	  Sciences	  20,	  4	  (2007).	  
18	  Bleiker	  and	  Hutchison,	  'Fear	  No	  More:	  Emotions	  and	  World	  Politics',	  118.	  
19	  Crawford,	  'The	  Passion	  of	  World	  Politics:	  Propositions	  on	  Emotion	  and	  Emotional	  Relationships',	  116.	  
20	  Mercer,	  'Anarchy	  and	  Identity'.	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in	   international	   relations,	   Lebow	  argues	   that	   “we	  must	   look	   at	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   reason	   and	  
emotions	   interact	   to	   create	   and	   sustain	   common	   identities.”21	  According	   to	   him,	   the	   dividing	  
line	   drawn	   between	   rationality	   and	   emotions	   is	   an	   artificial	   one	   and	   a	   product	   of	   the	  
Enlightenment.22	  Similar	  points	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Crawford	  and	  Bleiker	  and	  Hutchison	  and	  many	  
others	  that	  have	  developed	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  role	  of	  emotions.23	  	  
Crawford	  and	  Bleiker	  and	  Hutchison	  point	  out	  how	  there	  is	  no	  systematic	  overview	  of	  emotions	  
in	   IR	   and	   call	   for	   the	   need	   to	   think	   about	   appropriate	   methods	   to	   incorporate	   them.24	  
Approaches	  that	  form	  part	  of	  the	  emotional	  turn	  can	  be	  categorised	  by	  their	  aims:	  an	  improved	  
meta-­‐theoretical	   understanding	   of	   IR	   theories,25	  a	   better	   understanding	   of	   key	   concepts,26	  
building	   better	   theories, 27 	  or	   a	   contribution	   to	   understanding	   ethics	   in	   IR. 28 	  While	   these	  
categories	   are	   by	   no	  means	  mutually	   exclusive,	   they	  work	  well	   in	   giving	   a	   broad	   overview	   of	  
what	   is	   studied	  and	  argued	  under	   the	   label	   “emotional	   turn”.	   Further,	  we	  need	   to	  distinguish	  
between	   those	   approaches	   that	   suggest	   that	   the	   discipline	   incorporates	   findings	   from	  
psychology	   more	   explicitly,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   those	   approaches	   that	   	   acknowledge	   the	  
importance	  of	  emotions	  but	  seek	  to	  make	  a	  contribution	  by	  looking	  towards	  “alternative	  forms	  
of	  insight,	  most	  notably	  those	  stemming	  from	  aesthetic	  sources”	  for	  an	  answer.29	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Richard	  Ned	  Lebow,	  'Reason,	  Emotion	  and	  Cooperation',	  International	  Politics	  42,	  3	  (2005),	  283.	  
22	  For	   a	   historical	   perspective	   regarding	   the	   separation	  of	   rationality	   and	   emotions	   compare	   also	   Jon	   Elster,	  
Alchemies	  of	  the	  Mind.	  Rationality	  and	  the	  Emotions	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999).	  
23	  The	  most	  common	  point	  of	  reference	  for	  them	  is	  Antonio	  Damasio,	  Descartes'	  Error	  :	  Emotion,	  Reason,	  and	  
the	  Human	  Brain	  (New	  York:	  Putnam,	  1996).	  	  
24	  Bleiker	  and	  Hutchison,	  'Fear	  No	  More:	  Emotions	  and	  World	  Politics',	  115.	  And	  Crawford,	  'The	  Passion	  of	  
World	  Politics:	  Propositions	  on	  Emotion	  and	  Emotional	  Relationships',	  119-­‐120	  and	  155.	  
25	  This	  aim	  is	  shared	  by	  most	  scholars	  of	  the	  emotional	  turn.	  	  
26	  Brian	  C.	  Rathbun	  is,	  for	  example,	  interested	  in	  trust.	  Similarly,	  Jonathan	  Mercer	  argues	  that	  purely	  rational	  
approaches	  to	  trust,	  identity,	  justice,	  and	  reputation	  are	  incomplete.	  Brian	  C.	  Rathbun,	  'It	  Takes	  All	  Types:	  
Social	  Psychology,	  Trust,	  and	  the	  International	  Relations	  Paradigm	  in	  Our	  Minds',	  International	  Theory	  3,	  1	  
(2009).	  Mercer,	  'Rationality	  and	  Psychology	  in	  International	  Politics'.	  
27	  For	  example	  Goldgeier	  and	  Tetlock,	  'Psychological	  Approaches',	  476.	  
28	  Andrew	  Linklater	  points	  to	  the	  role	  of	  emotional	  identification	  and	  sympathy	  in	  establishing	  cosmopolitan	  
harm	  conventions.	  Andrew	  Linklater,	  The	  Problem	  of	  Harm	  in	  World	  Politics.	  Theoretical	  Investigations	  
(Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  see	  especially	  chapter	  five.	  Similarly,	  Richard	  Ned	  Lebow	  and	  
Toni	  Erskine	  emphasize	  the	  role	  of	  emotions	  in	  cooperation	  and	  building	  empathy.	  And	  moreover,	  they	  
highlight	  the	  danger	  of	  “instrumental	  reason	  divorced	  from	  emotional	  commitments”.	  Toni	  Erskine	  and	  
Richard	  Ned	  Lebow,	  'Learning	  from	  Tragedy	  and	  Refocusing	  International	  Relations',	  in	  Tragedy	  and	  
International	  Relations,	  ed.	  Toni	  Erskine	  and	  Richard	  Ned	  Lebow	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2012),	  209.	  
29	  For	  this	  quotation	  compare	  Bleiker	  and	  Hutchison,	  'Fear	  No	  More:	  Emotions	  and	  World	  Politics',	  115,	  ibid.	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It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  scholars	  of	  the	  emotional	  turn	  do	  not	  touch	  upon	  ideas	  of	  states-­‐as-­‐
persons.	   Already	   in	   1960,	   Singer	   warned	   against	   the	   simplification	   that	   would	   see	   individual	  
behaviour	   applied	   to	   group	   and	   then	   to	   state	   behaviour.30	  Similarly,	   there	   is	   a	   scepticism	  
towards	   theorising	   about	   emotions	   at	   the	   systemic	   level.	  Nevertheless,	   Crawford	  points,	  with	  
caution,	  to	  this	  possibility.	  She	  highlights	  that	  there	  is	  a	  	  
wariness	  about	  generalizing	  from	  individual	  to	  group	  behaviour	  and	  the	  
attributes	   of	   organizations,	   including	   states.	   These	   are	   formidable	  
concerns	   but	   not	   necessarily	   fatal	   to	   theorizing	   and	   empirical	  
research.31	  
More	  encouragingly,	  she	  suggests	  a	  possible	  avenue	  for	  further	  research	  at	  the	  systemic	  level	  of	  
IR:	  	  
What	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  generalization	  from	  individual	  attributes	  to	  the	  
behaviour	  of	  groups?	  The	  link	  maybe	  that	  fear	  and	  other	  emotions	  not	  
only	   are	   attributes	  of	   agents,	   but	   are	   institutionalised	   in	   the	   structure	  
and	  processes	  of	  world	  politics.32	  
Having	   outlined	   in	   very	   broad	   terms	   where	   those	   who	   are	   interested	   in	   psychology	   and	  
emotions	   in	   IR	   see	   potential	   areas	   of	   contribution	   for	   psychology	   in	   general	   and	   emotions	  
specifically,	   the	   question	   as	   to	   how	   psychology	   and	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   assumption	   can	   be	  
brought	  together	  remains.	  
For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  project,	  I	  see	  three	  key	  contributions.	  The	  first	  contribution	  is	  related	  to	  
the	  meta-­‐theoretical	  questions	  described.	  If	  we	  accept	  the	  assumption	  that	  some	  aspects	  of	  IR	  
theory	  are	  built	  on	  implicit	  psychological	  assumptions	  and	  that	  some	  key	  IR	  concepts	  could	  be	  
improved	  by	  recourse	  to	  psychology,	  the	  questions	  remains:	  what	  about	  the	  key	  concept	  of	  IR,	  
what	  about	   the	   state?	   	   In	   the	   first	   instance,	   I	   argue	   that	  we	  have	   to	  acknowledge	  a	  potential	  
cognitive	   bias	   of	   IR	   researchers	   that	   results	   in	   treating	   the	   state	   as	   a	   unitary	   actor	   and,	  
potentially,	   in	   anthropomorphising	   or	   personifying	   the	   state.	   Secondly,	   while	   having	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Singer,	  'Psychological	  Research	  and	  the	  Study	  of	  World	  Politics',	  88.	  Waltz,	  for	  example,	  joins	  this	  scepticism	  
and	  argues	  that	  “[t]o	  attempt	  to	  explain	  social	  forms	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  psychological	  date	  is	  to	  commit	  the	  error	  
of	  psychologism:	  the	  analysis	  of	  individual	  behaviour	  used	  uncritically	  to	  explain	  group	  phenomena”.	  Waltz,	  
Man,	  the	  State	  and	  War,	  28.	  
31	  Crawford,	  'The	  Passion	  of	  World	  Politics:	  Propositions	  on	  Emotion	  and	  Emotional	  Relationships',	  118-­‐119.	  
32	  Ibid.,	  	  155.	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acknowledged	   the	   state	   as	   an	   abstract	   concept	   that	   might	   have	   characteristics	   of	   individual	  
human	  beings,	   the	   referent	   object	   of	   this	   concept	   needs	   to	   be	   put	   into	   focus	   as	  well.	  Having	  
rejected	   a	   reductionist	   account	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   contributions	   such	   as	   Brent	   Sasley’s	  
“Theorizing	  states’	  emotions”	  in	  which	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  state	  is	  best	  conceptualised	  as	  a	  group	  
are	   important	   here.33	  	   However,	   we	   need	   to	   question	   the	   underlying	   assumption	   that	   would	  
allow	   us	   to	   define	   the	   state	   as	   a	   group.	   From	   the	   perspective	   outlined	   in	   Chapter	   1	   which,	  
drawing	  on	  Thomas	  Hobbes,	   sees	   the	   state	  as	  distinct	   from	   the	   ruler	   and	   the	   ruled,	   any	   such	  
equation	   remains	   doubtful.	   Thirdly,	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   assumptions,	   understood	   as	   a	  metaphor,	  
blend	  two	  distinct	  realms:	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  individual	  human	  being	  and	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  state.	  
Drawing	   on	   psychology	   for	   an	   understanding	   of	   individual	   human	   beings	   can	   help	   to	  
conceptualise	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  This	  acknowledges	  the	  tendency	  to	  personify	  the	  state	  but,	  
at	   the	   same	   time,	  draws	  explicitly	   rather	   than	   implicitly	  on	   findings	   from	  psychology	   to	  do	   so	  
and	   thus	   potentially	   results	   in	   a	   concept	   of	   the	   person	   that	   is	   preferable	   to	   rational	   actor	  
assumptions	  and	  hence	   takes	   calls	   from	  scholars	  of	   the	  emotional	   turn	   seriously.	   These	   three	  
aspects	  will	  structure	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  chapter.	  While	  the	  first	  two	  will	  be	  rejected	  for	  the	  
project	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  the	  third	  will	  form	  the	  background	  before	  which	  the	  
potential	  of	  psychology	   for	  generating	  an	  understanding	  of	   the	  process	  of	  personation	  will	  be	  
further	  elaborated.	  	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Brent	  E.	  Sasley,	  'Theorizing	  States'	  Emotions',	  International	  Studies	  Review	  13	  (2011).	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Possibilities	  for	  utilising	  psychology:	  the	  cognitive	  bias	  of	  the	  
researcher	  
Within	  the	  literature	  that	   is	  part	  of	  the	  recent	  emotional	  turn,	  we	  can	  find	  several	  suggestions	  
for	  greater	  reflexivity	  of	  the	  discipline.	  Making	  the	  discipline	  and	  the	  researchers	  themselves	  an	  
object	   of	   inquiry,	   some	   proponents	   of	   the	   emotional	   turn	   suggest	   that	   (implicit)	   assumptions	  
about	  emotions,	  for	  example	  in	  both	  the	  realist	  and	  idealist	  camps,	  have	  shaped	  the	  discipline	  in	  
important	   ways.34	  However,	   this	   can	   be	   taken	   further	   than	   looking	   into	   what	   has	   been	   said	  
about	   love,	   hate,	   fear,	   cooperation,	   trust,	   and	   empathy	   in	   various	   schools	   of	   IR.	   In	   addition,	  
maybe	   the	  most	   important	   aspect	   of	   the	   discipline,	   the	   state,	   has	   been	   shaped	   by	   cognitive	  
biases.	  
Bleiker	  and	  Hutchison	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  examine	  “processes	  of	  representation,	  such	  
as	   visual	   depictions	  of	   emotions	   and	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   they	   shape	  political	  perceptions”.35	  
There	  is	  yet	  an	  additional	  process	  that	  should	  be	  put	  into	  focus:	  the	  level	  of	  the	  researcher	  and	  
the	  cognitive	  processes	  [processes	  of	  simplification	  and	  abstraction	  for	  instance]	  that	  are	  taking	  
place	   as	   part	   of	   the	   research.	   Partially	   related	   to	   that,	   Crawford,	   like	   many	   others	   with	   an	  
interest	   in	   psychology	   and	   IR,	   points	   to	   cognitive	   biases	   of	   decision-­‐makers	   in	   IR	   as	   a	   typical	  
example	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  emotions	  in	  the	  discipline.36	  	  
However,	   the	   focus	   on	   emotion	   and	   cognition	   is	   not	   a	   recent	   phenomenon.	   Robert	   Jervis’s	  
Perception	   and	   Misperception	   is	   the	   most	   prominent	   example	   and	   one	   of	   the	   earliest	  
comprehensive	   contributions	   in	   this	   area.37	  What	   should	   be	   added	   here	   is	   a	   self-­‐reflexive	  
perspective.	   Hence,	   we	   need	   to,	   at	   least	   tentatively,	   ask	   what	   these	   insights	   lead	   to	   when	  
applied	   to	   IR	   scholars	   themselves.	   It	   is	  worth	   pointing	   out	   that	  with	   this,	   the	   focus	   is	   shifted	  
from	  ontology,	  the	  question	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  to	  epistemology,	  the	  question	  
of	  how	  we	  get	  to	  know	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  This	  has	  overtones	  of	  the	  more	  radical	  suggestion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  This	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  suggestions	  made	  by	  Crawford	  regarding	  the	  study	  of	  emotions	  can	  further	  the	  
discipline.	  Crawford,	  'The	  Passion	  of	  World	  Politics:	  Propositions	  on	  Emotion	  and	  Emotional	  Relationships',	  
155-­‐156.	  
35	  Bleiker	  and	  Hutchison,	  'Fear	  No	  More:	  Emotions	  and	  World	  Politics',	  118,	  my	  emphasis.	  
36	  Crawford,	  'The	  Passion	  of	  World	  Politics:	  Propositions	  on	  Emotion	  and	  Emotional	  Relationships',	  137.	  
37	  Robert	  Jervis,	  Perception	  and	  Misperception	  in	  International	  Politics	  (Princeton,	  NY:	  Princeton	  University	  
Press,	  1976).	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that,	   at	   bottom,	   epistemology	   is	   about	   cognitive	   psychology.38	  Three	   findings	   from	   cognitive	  
psychology	  seem	  most	  relevant	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  ideas	  related	  to	  states-­‐as-­‐persons.	  They	  will	  
be	  briefly	  discussed	   in	   turn:	   the	  organisational	  analogue	  of	   the	   fundamental	  attribution	  error,	  
anthropomorphisation	  and	  personification,	  and	  metaphorical	  reasoning.	  	  
The	  fundamental	  attribution	  error	  describes	  the	  tendency	  to	  attribute	  the	  behaviour	  of	  others	  
to	   their	  decisions	  and	  personal	  dispositions	   rather	   than	   to	   the	  situational	  circumstances,	  even	  
though	  the	  circumstances	  offer	  a	  much	  better	  explanation.	  For	  example,	  the	  hostility	  of	  an	  actor	  
is	  ascribed	  to	  certain	  decisions	  and	  characteristics	  that	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  intrinsic,	  rather	  than	  
taking	  the	  environment	  and	  specific	  circumstances	  into	  account	  that	  offer	  a	  better	  explanation	  
of	  the	  hostile	  behaviour.	  Tetlock	  points	  out	  how	  the	  fundamental	  attribution	  error	  might	  lead	  to	  
another	   misperception	   which	   he	   calls	   the	   organisational	   analogue	   of	   the	   fundamental	  
attribution	  error:	  “the	  tendency	  to	  perceive	  governments	  as	  unitary	  causal	  agents	  rather	  than	  as	  
complex	  amalgams	  of	  bureaucratic	  and	  political	  subsystems,	  each	  pursuing	  its	  own	  missions	  and	  
goals”.39	  Similarly,	  already	  in	  1976	  Jervis	  pointed	  out	  that	  “alliances	  usually	  appear	  more	  durable	  
[…]	   from	   the	   outside	   than	   from	   the	   inside.”40	  He	   later	   identified	   the	   same	   tendency	   among	  
domestic	  groups	  in	  conflict	  and	  it	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  the	  same	  reasoning	  can	  be	  applied	  
to	   states.	   For	   both	   Jervis	   and	   Tetlock	   the	   danger	   lies	   in	   overemphasising	   the	   coherence	   and	  
unity	  of	  a	  group	  or	  state,	  when	  seen	  from	  the	  outside.	  While	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  fundamental	  
attribution	   error	   focuses	   on	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐makers,	   it	   seems	   just	   as	   applicable	   to	  
scholars	  of	  international	  relations.	  By	  acknowledging	  that	  this	  is	  a	  cognitive	  bias,	  and	  maybe	  one	  
that	   is	  unavoidable	  or	  even	  necessary	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  complexities	  of	   international	  relations,	  
new	   avenues	   for	   analysing	   and	   improving	   the	   perspective	   on	   one	   of	   the	   most	   important	  
concepts	  in	  IR,	  the	  state,	  open	  up.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Compare	  Wight,	  Agents,	  Structures	  and	  International	  Relations:	  Politics	  as	  Ontology,	  239.	  Here,	  Wight	  
quotes	  W.	  V.	  Quine,	  Ontological	  Relativity	  and	  Other	  Essays	  (London:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1969),	  75.	  
39	  Philip	  Tetlock,	  'Social	  Psychology	  and	  World	  Politics',	  in	  Handbook	  of	  Social	  Psychology,	  ed.	  Daniel	  Gilbert,	  
Susan	  T.	  Fiske,	  and	  Gardner	  Lindzey	  (New	  York:	  McGraw	  Hill,	  1998).	  
40	  Jervis,	  Perception	  and	  Misperception	  in	  International	  Politics,	  326	  ff.	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The	   second	   cognitive	   bias	   worth	   mentioning	   is	   anthropomorphisation	   and	   personification.41	  
Voices	   from	   within	   psychology	   call	   for	   research	   into	   how	   humans	   understand	   not	   just	   other	  
humans,	  but	  other	  agents.	  The	  tendency	  for	  anthropomorphisation	  is	  a	  key	  object	  of	  interest.	  It	  
describes	   the	   tendency	   to	   attribute	   “characteristics	   that	   people	   intuitively	   perceive	   to	   be	  
uniquely	  human	  to	  nonhuman	  agents	  or	  events”42	  which	   includes	  physical	  characteristics	  and/	  
or	  mental	  capacities.	  Further,	  	  
Anthropomorphism	  involves	  using	  existing	  knowledge	  about	  the	  self	  or	  
the	  concept	  ‘human’	  to	  make	  an	  inference	  about	  a	  relatively	  unknown	  
nonhuman	   agent,	   and	   factors	   that	   increase	   the	   accessibility	   and	  
applicability	  of	  this	  knowledge	  therefore	  increase	  anthropomorphism.43	  
Whether	  scholars	  of	  international	  relations	  who	  talk	  about	  states	  as	  thinking,	  acting,	  feeling,	  or	  
as	  having	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	  are	  “guilty”	  of	  anthropomorphisation	  is	  a	  question	  that	  can	  
only	  be	  answered	  by	  analysing	  each	  work	   individually.	  However,	  this	  cognitive	  tendency	  might	  
be	   part	   of	   the	   explanation	   as	   to	   why	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   metaphor	   was	   so	   successful	   for	  
centuries	   and	   is	   still	   prevalent	   in	   general,	   non-­‐academic	   discourses.44	  It	   might	   even	   be	   an	  
important	  element	   in	  how	  the	  state	   is	  constructed	  as	  a	  person.	  Wendt	  for	  example	  points	  out	  
how	  the	   idea	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  person	  is	  a	  key	  point	  that	  transforms	  the	  state	  from	  a	  structure	  
into	   an	   agent.45	  He	   argues	   that	   “[t]he	   first	   requirement	   is	   that	   individuals’	   shared	   knowledge	  
reproduces	  an	  Idea	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  corporate	  ‘person’	  or	   ‘group	  Self.’”46	  Whether	   it	  concerns	  
the	  scholar	  or	  of	  the	  “lay”	  person,	  anthropomorphisation	  as	  a	  cognitive	  bias	  is	  something	  to	  be	  
recognised	  and	  investigated	  when	  talking	  about	  states-­‐as-­‐persons.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  I	   introduced	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  in	  chapter	  one,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  section,	  however,	  they	  
can	  be	  treated	  synonymously.	  Further,	  in	  this	  passage	  I	  follow	  the	  linguistic	  conventions	  found	  in	  the	  relevant	  
psychological	  literature.	  	  
For	   an	   explicit	   treatment	   of	   anthropomorphic	   perceptions	   of	   the	   state	   compare	   Faizullaev,	   'Individual	  
Experiencing	  of	  States'.	  	  
42	  Adam	  Waytz,	  Nicholas	  Epley,	  and	  John	  T.	  Cacioppo,	  'Social	  Cognition	  Unbound:	  Insights	  into	  
Anthropomorphism	  and	  Dehumanization',	  Current	  Directions	  in	  Psychological	  Science	  19,	  1	  (2010),	  58.	  
43	  Ibid.,	  	  59.	  
44	  In	  “A	  cognitive	  theory	  of	  religion”,	  Stewart	  Guthrie,	  for	  example,	  points	  out	  that	  anthropomorphisation	  is	  
“common	  in	  the	  cognition	  of	  daily	  life	  and	  universal	  in	  religion”.	  As	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  one,	  Mika	  Luoma-­‐Aho	  
uses	  observations	  by	  Guthrie	  to	  argue	  that	  IR,	  based	  on	  the	  prevalence	  of	  anthropomorphising	  the	  state,	  is	  a	  
form	  of	  religion.	  	  Stewart	  Guthrie,	  'A	  Cognitive	  Theory	  of	  Religion',	  Current	  Anthropology	  21,	  2	  (2008),	  181.	  
Luoma-­‐Aho,	  'Political	  Theology,	  Anthropomorphism,	  and	  the	  Person-­‐Hood	  of	  the	  State:	  The	  Religion	  of	  IR'.	  
45	  For	  a	  discussion	  see	  Wight,	  Agents,	  Structures	  and	  International	  Relations:	  Politics	  as	  Ontology,	  183.	  
46	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  218.	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The	  last	  cognitive	  bias	  relevant	  here	  is	  the	  tendency	  for	  analogical	  or	  metaphorical	  reasoning.47	  
This	  type	  of	  reasoning	  tries	  to	  understand	  a	  new	  situation,	  object	  or	  idea	  through	  reference	  to	  a	  
more	   familiar	   one.	   	  Many	   scholars	   interested	   in	   psychology	   and	   IR	   point	   towards	   the	   use	   of	  
analogies	  and	  metaphors	   in	   foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making;	  most	   commonly	   they	  point	   to	   the	  
danger	  posed	  by	  using	  metaphors	  and	  analogies	  that	  are	  inadequate	  for	  the	  situation,	  leading	  to	  
erroneous	   judgements	   and	   decisions.	   The	   domino	   theory	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   US	   involvement	   in	  
Vietnam	   is	   one	   example	   commonly	   cited.48	  As	   argued	   in	   Chapter	   3,	   while	   metaphors	   can	  
mislead,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  they	  play	  an	  important	  part	  in	  making	  sense	  of	  
the	   world.	   Similar	   to	   my	   argument	   pursued	   in	   Chapter	   3,	   I	   think	   the	   answer	   cannot	   lie	   in	  
attempting	  to	  avoid	  metaphors.	  	  
Going	   back	   to	   the	   starting	   point	   for	   this	   chapter,	   scholars	   of	   the	   emotional	   turn	   argue	   that	  
“rational”	   decision-­‐making	   is	   always	   tied	   up	   with	   emotions.	   They	   argue	   against	   the	   strict	  
dichotomy	  of	  emotions	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  rationality	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  Pure	  rationality,	  they	  
argue,	   is	  a	  myth.49	  A	  similar	  point	  can	  and	  should	  be	  made	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  cognitive	  biases	  
outlined	  above.	  The	  conclusion,	  therefore,	  cannot	  be	  to	  try	  harder	  to	  purge	  decision-­‐making	  and	  
our	  understanding	  of	  IR	  of	  cognitive	  biases	  and	  emotions;	  rather,	  we	  need	  to	  accept	  that	  we	  are	  
“creatures	  of	  bounded	  rationality”.50	  	  
None	  of	  the	  above	  is	  to	  say	  that	  those	  thinking	  about	  states	  in	  terms	  of	  persons	  are	  necessarily	  
subject	   to	   one	   or	   all	   of	   these	   tendencies.	   However,	   being	   aware	   of	   the	  work	   these	   cognitive	  
tendencies	  are	  potentially	  doing	  in	  developing	  an	  understanding	  of	  IR	  helps	  in	  approaching	  IR’s	  
most	   important	   concepts	   critically.	   Taken	   together,	   these	   cognitive	   biases	   provide	   a	   powerful	  
reason	  for	  entering	  the	  debate	  on	  states-­‐as-­‐persons	   from	  the	  perspective	  of	   the	  psychological	  
and	  emotional	  turn	  in	  IR.	  What	  I	  have	  outlined	  are	  reasons	  for	  greater	  self-­‐reflexivity	  of	  IR	  as	  a	  
subject	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  theorising	  about	  its	  most	  important	  unit,	  the	  state.	  And	  in	  line	  with	  the	  
emotional	  turn,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  conclusion	  from	  confronting	  these	  potential	  biases	  cannot	  be	  to	  
strive	   to	   eliminate	   them.	   I	   argue	   that	   they	   are	   an	   inevitable	   occurrence	   of	   our	   “bounded	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Compare	  Richard	  P.	  Honeck	  and	  Clare	  T.	  Kibler,	  'Representation	  in	  Cognitive	  Psychological	  Theories	  of	  
Figurative	  Language',	  in	  The	  Ubiquity	  of	  Metaphor:	  Metaphor	  in	  Language	  and	  Thought,	  ed.	  Wolf	  Paprotté	  and	  
René	  Dirven	  (Amsterdam:	  John	  Benjamins,	  1985).	  
48	  For	  an	  overview	  see	  Tetlock,	  'Social	  Psychology	  and	  World	  Politics'.	  
49	  Most	  eloquently	  done	  by	  Mercer,	  'Rationality	  and	  Psychology	  in	  International	  Politics'.	  
50	  Tetlock,	  'Social	  Psychology	  and	  World	  Politics'.	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rationality”.	   What	   we	   should	   strive	   for	   is	   to	   continue	   searching	   for	   useful	   or	   best-­‐possible	  
explanations	   while	   accepting	   that	   as	   researchers	   we	   will	   be	   susceptible	   to	   cognitive	   biases.	  
However,	  acceptance	  of	  cognitive	  biases	   is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  saying	  that	  “any	  story	  goes”.	  With	  
regard	  to	  states-­‐as-­‐persons,	  it	  might	  be	  useful	  to	  entertain	  the	  thought	  that	  the	  development	  of	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	   ideas	   in	   IR	   were	   subject	   to	   the	   cognitive	   biases	   outlined	   above.	   In	   a	   first	  
instance,	  this	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  incentive	  to	  rid	  IR	  of	  these	  “false	  assumptions”.	  Rather,	  it	  
is	  an	  invitation	  to	  questioning	  the	  meta-­‐theoretical	  assumptions	  of	  the	  discipline	  from	  this	  point	  
view.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  what	  has	  been	  outlined	  above	  is	  compatible	  with	  a	  mind-­‐
world	   dualist	   as	  well	   as	  with	   a	  mind-­‐world	  monist	   perspective.	   In	   other	  words,	   the	   cognitive	  
biases	  are	  relevant	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  researcher	  predominantly	  sees	  their	  role	  as	  one	  of	  
discovering	  the	  world	  or	  of	  constructing	  the	  world.	  	  
This	   is	   potentially	   an	   important	   contribution	   to	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   debate	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
question	   of	   state	   agency	   in	   general.51	  However,	   this	   project,	   taking	   its	   staring	   point	   from	  
Wendt’s	  work,	   focuses	  on	  questions	  of	  ontology.	   It	  asks	   the	  question	  of	  “what	   is”	   rather	   than	  
“how	  do	  we	  know”.	  Hence,	  while	  these	  cognitive	  biases	  are	  interesting	  from	  an	  epistemological	  
perspective,	  they	  tell	  us	  little	  about	  what	  kind	  of	  person	  the	  state	  is.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Compare	  Faizullaev,	  'Individual	  Experiencing	  of	  States'.	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Possibilities	  for	  utilising	  psychology:	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐individuals	  
and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐group	  
In	  Chapter	  1,	  Hobbes’s	  key	  contribution	   to	   the	  modern	   idea	  of	   the	  state	  has	  been	  outlined.	   It	  
was	  argued	  that	  Hobbes	  is	  the	  first	  modern	  thinker	  of	  the	  state	  and	  that	  his	  conceptualisation	  of	  
the	   relation	   between	   ruler,	   ruled	   and	   state	   still	   matters	   for	   today’s	   IR.	   The	   key	   innovation	  
introduced	  by	  Hobbes	  is	  what	  Quentin	  Skinner	  described	  as	  the	  “doubly	  abstract	  notion	  of	  [the]	  
state”.52	  Hobbes	   is	   the	   first	   thinker	   to	   establish	   the	   state	   as	   an	   independent	   institution.	   In	  
Hobbes’s	   account,	   the	   state	   becomes	   a	   person	   through	   the	   process	   of	   agreeing	   upon	  
transference	  of	  authority	  and	  a	  system	  of	  representation.53	  The	  resulting	  person	  of	  the	  state	  is	  
separate	  from	  both	  the	  ruler	  and	  the	  ruled.	  	  
Before	   this	   background,	   this	   section	  will	   outline	   and	   ultimately	   reject	   two	   additional	  ways	   of	  
how	   the	   discipline	   aims	   at	   making	   psychology	   useful	   for	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   state	   in	  
international	  relations:	  focusing	  on	  the	  psychology	  of	  individual	  leaders	  and	  representatives	  on	  
the	  one	  hand	  and	  treating	  the	  state	  as	  a	  group	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  It	  is	  not	  denied	  that	  the	  focus	  
on	   individuals	   in	   international	   relations	   can	   generate	   important	   insight.	  However,	   it	   is	   argued	  
that	   these	   insights	   are	   not	   furthering	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   state.	   In	   line	   with	   arguments	  
presented	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  a	  reductionist	  view	  of	  the	  state	  that	  would	  see	  it	  reduced	  to	  the	  actions	  
of	   individuals	   is	   rejected.	   Further,	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   the	   state	   is	   also	   not	   a	   group	   and,	  
consequently,	   findings	  of	  social	  psychology	  are	  not	  applicable.	  Drawing	  on	  findings	  from	  social	  
psychology	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  state	  is	  to	  suggest	  a	  unity	  and	  coherence	  of	  the	  state	  that	  
has	   no	   basis	   in	   empirical	   reality	   and	   is	   also	   problematic	   for	   its	   ethico-­‐political	   implications.	  
Hence,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  neither	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐individuals	  nor	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐group	  approach	  can	  be	  
used	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  arguing	  about	  states’	  emotions.	  	  
Looking	  at	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐individuals	  approach,	  we	  can	  point	  to	  a	  number	  of	  scholars	  who	  aim	  at	  
bringing	   psychology	   into	   the	   discipline	   by	   focusing	   on	   individual	   leaders,	   decision-­‐makers	   and	  
representatives.	   One	   of	   the	   earliest	   and	   most	   prominent	   accounts	   is	   Jervis’s	   Perception	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  Skinner,	  Visions	  of	  Politics.	  Volume	  2.	  Renaissance	  Virtues,	  394.	  
53	  Skinner,	  'Hobbes	  and	  the	  Purely	  Artificial	  Person	  of	  the	  State',	  Runciman,	  'What	  Kind	  of	  Person	  Is	  Hobbes's	  
State?	  A	  Reply	  to	  Skinner'.	  David	  Runciman,	  'The	  Concept	  of	  the	  State:	  The	  Sovereignty	  of	  a	  Fiction',	  in	  States	  
and	  Citizens.	  History,	  Theory,	  Prospects,	  ed.	  Quentin	  Skinner	  and	  Bo	  Stråth	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  
Press,	  2003a).	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Misperception.	   Approaches	   that	   fall	   into	   this	   category	   focus	   on	   studying	   decision-­‐makers	  
personalities	  and	  cognitive	  biases,	  explore	  the	  boundaries	  of	  rational	  decision-­‐making,	  the	  role	  
of	   emotions	   in	   decision-­‐making,	   and	   explore	   the	   inter-­‐personal	   relationships	   between	   key	  
decision-­‐makers.54	  I	   argue	   that	   these	  approaches	  add	  value	   to	  our	  understanding	  of	  how	   IR	   is	  
practised.	  However,	  they	  tell	  us	  very	   little	  about	  the	  state.	  With	  Bleiker	  and	  Hutchison	  we	  can	  
observe	  that	  studying	  emotions	  at	  the	  level	  of	  decision-­‐makers	  “fall[s]	  short	  of	  explaining	  how	  
emotions	  are	  enmeshed	  in	  larger	  socio-­‐political	  dynamics”.55	  Further,	  the	  whole	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
debate,	  as	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  presents	  powerful	  arguments	  as	  to	  why	  a	  reductionist	  account	  
of	  the	  state,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐individuals,	  is	  to	  be	  rejected.	  
Treating	  the	  state	  as	  a	  group	  seems	  more	  promising	  as	  it	  represents	  a	  non-­‐reductionist	  account	  
that,	   depending	   on	   the	   definition	   utilised,	   sees	   the	   state	   as	   more	   than	   an	   aggregation	   of	  
individuals.	   However,	   in	   the	   following,	   I	   argue	   that	   equating	   the	   state	   in	   IR	   with	   a	   group	  
understood	  in	  social	  psychological	  terms	  is	  highly	  problematic.	  In	  a	  first	  step,	  we	  can	  pin-­‐point	  a	  
few	  suggestions	   in	  Wendt’s	  Social	  Theory	  towards	  treating	  the	  state	  as	  a	  group.56	  Two	  aspects	  
are	  important	  to	  note:	  the	  motivation	  behind	  this	  borrowing	  from	  psychology	  and	  the	  rhetorical	  
moves	   performed	   in	   order	   to	   bridge	   the	   evident	   gap	   between	   the	   laboratories	   of	   the	   social	  
psychologist	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  and	   the	   system	  of	   states	  on	   the	  other.	   In	  a	  number	  of	  parts	  of	  
Social	  Theory,	  Wendt	  draws	  on	  the	  early	  social	  psychologist	  Tajfel.	  For	  example,	  with	  regard	  to	  
intergroup	  processes,	  Wendt	  points	  out	  that	  	  
[a]	  substantial	  body	  of	  scholarship	  in	  social	  psychology,	  known	  as	  ‘social	  
identity	   theory,’	  has	   shown	  experimentally	   that	   the	  process	  of	  making	  
[…]	   cognitive	   differentiations	   [between	   ‘self’	   and	   ‘other’]	   is	   routinely	  
accompanied	   by	   discrimination	   against	   the	  members	   of	   out-­‐groups	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  For	   an	   overview	   compare	   George	   E.	   Marcus,	   'Emotions	   in	   Politics',	   Annual	   Review	   of	   Political	   Science	   3	  
(2000).	  Examples	  include	  Robert	  Jervis,	  Richard	  Ned	  Lebow,	  and	  Janice	  Gross	  Stein,	  Psychology	  and	  Deterrence	  
(Baltimore:	   Johns	  Hopkins	  University	   Press,	   1985).	   Alexander	   L.	   	   George	   and	   Juliette	   L.	   George,	  Presidential	  
Personality	  and	  Performance	  (Boulder:	  Westview	  Press,	  1998).	  
55	  Bleiker	  and	  Hutchison,	  'Fear	  No	  More:	  Emotions	  and	  World	  Politics',	  117.	  
56	  In	   his	   “Anarchy	   is	   what	   states	   make	   of	   it”,	  Wendt	  makes	   tentative	   suggestions	   towards	   the	   inclusion	   of	  
findings	   from	  social	  psychology	   in	   constructivist	   IR.	  He	  argues	   that	   “[a]	   full	   	   theory	   	  of	   	   state	   	   identity-­‐	   	   and	  	  
interest-­‐formation	  would	  	  nevertheless	  	  need	  	  to	  	  draw	  	  insights	  	  from	  	  the	  	  social	  	  psychology	  	  of	  	  groups	  	  and	  	  
organizational	  	  theory”.	  Wendt,	  'Anarchy	  Is	  What	  States	  Make	  of	  It:	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  Power	  Politics',	  
397,	  fn	  21.	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favour	  of	  the	  in-­‐group.	  This	  tendency	  is	  clearly	  manifested	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  state.57	  	  
In	  this	  passage,	  Wendt	  also	  points	  to	  Mercer	  who,	  in	  a	  reply	  to	  Wendt’s	  “Anarchy	  is	  what	  states	  
make	   of	   it”,	   uses	   social	   psychology	   to	   argue	   that	   states	   can	   only	   ever	   be	   self-­‐interested	   and	  
therefore	  do	  not	  have	  a	  choice	  to	  create	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  anarchical	  system,	  contrary	  to	  what	  
Wendt	  suggests.58	  A	  similar	  emphasis	  can	  be	  found	  in	  another	  passage	  of	  Social	  Theory,	  Wendt	  
stresses	  that	  	  
[t]he	   experimental	   findings	   supporting	   [social	   identity	   theory]	   strongly	  
suggest	   that	   states	   may	   indeed	   have	   a	   predisposition	   to	   be	   self-­‐
interested,	   since	   the	  members	  of	   a	   human	  group	  almost	   always	   show	  
favoritism	   toward	   each	   other	   in	   dealing	   with	   the	   members	   of	   out-­‐
groups.59	  
Using	  the	   idea	  of	  group	   identification	  taken	  from	  Tajfel’s	  social	   identity	  theory	  and	  specifically	  
referencing	  Mercer	  again,	  Wendt	  tentatively	  suggests	  that	  a	  process	  similar	  to	  the	  relationships	  
between	   smaller	   groups	   might	   be	   at	   play	   at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   state.	   However,	   in	   contrast	   to	  
Mercer’s	  argument,	  Wendt	  also	  adds	  a	  point	  of	  caution	  that	  while	  the	  experimental	  results	  of	  
social	   identity	   theory	   might	   explain	   certain	   tendencies	   towards	   self-­‐interest	   and	   prejudices	  
against	   out-­‐groups,	   they	   should	   not	   be	   used	   to	   argue	   that	   anarchy	   necessarily	   brings	   forth	  
selfish	  behaviour	  and	  a	  systemic	  self-­‐help	  culture.	  In	  this	  context,	  Wendt	  adds	  a	  further	  step	  to	  
his	  argument	  and	  thereby	  moves	  from	  the	  state	  understood	  as	  a	  group	  to	  the	  system	  of	  states.	  
He	   argues	   that	   “[c]ollective	   identification	   among	   states	   is	   simply	   one	   more	   level	   of	   group	  
organisation	  to	  which	  selection	  processes	  might	  be	  applied”.60	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  there	  
are	   several	  moves,	   several	   leaps	   between	   “levels”,	   that	   are	   being	  made	   here.	   A	   first	  move	   is	  
made	  from	  the	  group,	  the	  realm	  of	  social	   identity	  theory,	  to	  the	  state.	  A	  second	  move	   is	  then	  
made	  from	  the	  state	  to	  the	  “group	  of	  states”.	  The	  last	  move	  also	  represents	  a	  shift	  in	  focus	  from	  
the	  individual	  human	  being	  as	  an	  actor	  to	  the	  state	  as	  an	  actor.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  241.	  
58	  For	  Wendt’s	  comments	  compare	  ibid.	  Also	  see	  Mercer,	  'Anarchy	  and	  Identity'.	  And	  Wendt,	  'Anarchy	  Is	  What	  
States	  Make	  of	  It:	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  Power	  Politics'.	  
59	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  322.	  
60	  Ibid.,	  	  351,	  emphasis	  added.	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Ultimately,	   what	   we	   find	   here	   is	   an	   argument	   that	   takes	   findings	   from	   the	   experimental	  
laboratory	   of	   social	   psychologists	   and	   suggests,	   if	   only	   tentatively,	   how	   these	   findings	   can	   be	  
relevant	   for	   understanding	   IR.	   We	   need	   to	   wonder	   what	   the	   experimental	   findings	   of	   social	  
psychology,	  often	  based	  on	  laboratory	  tests	  with	  college	  students,	  can	  really	  tell	  us	  about	  states.	  
Kelman	  was	  highly	   critically	  of	   attempts	  of	   interdisciplinary	   collaboration	  between	  psychology	  
and	   IR	   that	   would	   proceed	   in	   this	   fashion.	   He	   argued	   that	   even	   when	   these	   tests	   directly	  
simulate	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  in	  group	  situations,	  we	  still	  need	  to	  wonder	  what	  “one	  
can	  learn	  …	  from	  observing	  the	  simulation	  of	  these	  processes	  in	  a	  group	  of	  college	  students”.61	  
The	   findings	  Wendt	   and	  Mercer	   utilise	   essentially	   stem	   from	  Tajfel’s	   famous	   experiment	  with	  
school	  children	  which	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  two	  groups.	  In	  the	  experiment	  their	  behaviour	  
towards	   “their”	   group	   in	   comparison	   to	   the	   behaviour	   towards	   “the	   other”	   group	   was	  
recorded.62	  It	   showed	  that	   it	   takes	  very	   little	   to	  create	  out-­‐group	  bias.63	  This	   is	  not	   to	  say	   that	  
the	  findings	  might	  not	  also	  be	  relevant	  for	  IR.	  After	  all,	  in	  order	  to	  suggest	  the	  relevance	  of	  his	  
approach,	   Tajfel	   begins	   his	   seminal	   article	   with	   an	   example	   that	   belongs	   to	   the	   world	   of	  
international	  relations.	  However,	  a	  lot	  more	  would	  need	  to	  be	  done	  if	  we	  were	  to	  show	  how	  the	  
same	  tendencies	  are	  indeed	  relevant	  for	  the	  relations	  between	  states.	  	  	  	  
Further,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  quotations	  from	  Wendt’s	  Social	  Theory,	   it	   is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  
the	   term	  “experimentally”	  and	   its	   connotation.	   In	   this	   context,	   it	   seems	   that	   it	   is	  used	   to	  add	  
value	  and	  convey	  authority.	  If	  one	  adopts	  a	  neopositivistic	  stance,	  a	  view	  of	  science	  that	  defines	  
scientific	  value	  through	  empirical	  tests	  and	  the	  Popperian	  criteria	  of	  falsifiability,	  this	  is	  of	  course	  
unsurprising.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  question	  whether	  neopositivistic	  criteria	  of	  science	  are	  
of	  any	  relevance	  for	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  	  
These	   two	   aspects,	   the	  move	   from	   the	   level	   of	   the	   social	   group	   to	   the	   state	   and	   the	   implicit	  
acceptance	  of	  a	  neopositivistic	  understanding	  of	  science,	  need	  to	  be	  scrutinised	  further.	  This	  can	  
be	  done	  with	  the	  help	  of	  a	  more	  recent	  approach	  to	  the	  state	  that	  treats	  the	  state	  as	  a	  group	  in	  
order	  to	  argue	  the	  case	  for	  state	  emotions.	  In	  his	  “Theorizing	  states’	  emotions”,	  Sasley	  suggests	  
a	  way	  of	  “understanding	  the	  state	  as	  a	  group	  and	  following	  the	  internal	  process	  by	  which	  group	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Kelman,	  'Social	  Psychological	  Approaches	  to	  the	  Study	  of	  International	  Relations',	  compare	  579	  for	  the	  
quotation	  and	  579f	  for	  additional	  points.	  
62	  Henri	  Tajfel,	  'Experiments	  in	  Intergroup	  Discrimination',	  Scientific	  American	  223,	  5	  (1970),	  99.	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  Ibid.,	  	  102.	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members’	   (state	  decision	  makers’)	  cognitive	  and	  emotional	  practices	  represent,	  comprise,	  and	  
reflect	  that	  of	  the	  group	  (state)	  and	  so	  determine	  how	  the	  state	  will	  act”.64	  Sasley’s	  article	  aims	  
at	  suggesting	  a	  way	  forward	  for	  research	  into	  states’	  emotions	  based	  on	  defining	  the	  state	  as	  a	  
group	  and	  applying	  findings	  from	  social	  psychology,	  starting	  with	  social	  identity	  theory,	  to	  it.	  The	  
group	   (state)	   is	   understood	   “not	   just	   as	   a	   corporate	   entity,	   but	   as	   a	   psychological	   process”.65	  
This	  psychological	  process	   is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  link	  between	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  group	  and	  
also	  in	  the	  way	  how	  people	  experience	  emotions	  not	  as	  individuals	  but	  as	  members	  of	  a	  group.66	  
Group	  emotions	  are	  defined	  as	  “emotions	   that	  arise	  when	  people	   identify	  with	  a	   social	  group	  
and	   respond	   emotionally	   to	   events	   or	   objects	   that	   impinge	  on	   the	   group”.67	  Hence,	   based	  on	  
group	   membership	   and	   depending	   on	   levels	   of	   identification,	   individuals	   experience	   group	  
emotions.	   Sasley	   is	   particularly	   interested	   in	   decision-­‐makers	   and	   shows	   how	   their	   group	  
membership	  leads	  them	  to	  take	  decisions	  not	  as	  individuals	  but	  as	  members	  of	  a	  group.68	  Group	  
emotions	  are	  not	  simply	  an	  aggregation	  of	   individuals’	  emotions	  but	  are	  seen	  as	  a	  “process	  by	  
which	  the	  group	  becomes	  part	  of	  the	  individual	  self	  and	  the	  convergence	  of	  emotions	  within	  the	  
group	   to	   a	   prototypical	   emotion”.69	  Sasley’s	   approach	   is	   valuable	   in	   that	   he	   is	   able	   to	   speak	  
about	  states’	  emotions	  but,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  is	  still	  able	  to	  leave	  agency	  with	  individual	  human	  
beings.	  He	  locates	  the	  experience	  of	  emotions	  with	  the	  individuals,	  while	  conceptualising	  group	  
emotions	  as	  more	  than	  an	  aggregation	  of	  individual	  emotions.70	  	  
However,	   everything	   hinges	   on	   accepting	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state	   as	   a	   group	   which	   is	   an	  
assumption	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  questioned.	  Sasley	  points	  out	  that	  ultimately	  whether	  the	  state	  is	  a	  
group	  is	  “open	  to	  empirical	  verification”.71	  He	  suggests,	  first,	  that	  all	  citizens	  of	  a	  state	  need	  to	  
be	  defined	  as	  group	  members.72	  And	  second,	  he	  argues	  that	  a	  group	  depends	  on	   its	  members	  
perceiving	  themselves	  as	  members	  and	  on	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  interaction	  between	  them.73	  He	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  Sasley,	  'Theorizing	  States'	  Emotions',	  454.	  
65	  Ibid.	  
66	  Ibid.	  
67	  Ibid.,	  	  459.	  
68	  Ibid.,	  	  465.	  
69	  Ibid.	  
70	  In	  this	  sense	  Sasley	  provides	  a	  useful	  answer	  to	  Wendt’s	  critique	  of	  locating	  states	  emotions	  with	  individual	  
persons	  that	  according	  to	  Wendt	  would	  give	  states	  only	  an	  “ersatz	  subjectivity”.	  Compare	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  
Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  314.	  
71	  Sasley,	  'Theorizing	  States'	  Emotions',	  470.	  
72	  Ibid.,	  	  469.	  
73	  Ibid.	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uses	   the	   Israeli-­‐Palestinian	   conflict	   as	   an	   example	   and	   focuses	   on	   moments	   of	   increased	  
violence.74	  Given	  the	  above	  definition	  of	  group,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  chosen	  example	  indeed	  offers	  
opportunities	   for	   treating	   states	   as	   groups	   and	   for	   utilising	   insights	   from	   social	   psychology.	  
However,	  it	  seems	  problematic	  to	  extend	  this	  to	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  the	  state	  in	  IR.	  My	  objection	  
is	  that	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  state	  can	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  group	  are	  incredibly	  limited.	  	  
A	  number	  of	  scholars	  argue	  that	  a	  transformation	  away	  from	  traditional	  concepts	  of	  the	  state,	  
such	   as	   the	   nineteenth-­‐century	   ideal	   of	   a	   nation	   state,	   towards	   what	   can	   be	   called	   a	   post-­‐
modern	  state	   is	  underway.75	  As	  the	  relationship	  between	  citizens	  and	  the	  state	  –	  the	  basis	   for	  
the	   “community	   of	   citizens”	   –	   changes	   so	   does,	   in	   George	   Sørensen’s	   terms,	   the	   “emotional	  
attachment	  to	  the	  nation”.	  He	  argues	  that	  “the	  ‘national	  community	  of	  sentiment’	  must	  also	  be	  
expected	  to	  change	  in	  the	  new	  context	  of	  more	  intense	  transnational	  relations”.76	  This,	  I	  argue,	  
has	  profound	  consequences	  for	  the	  possibilities	  of	  incorporating	  findings	  from	  social	  psychology	  
into	  IR	  and	  making	  them	  useful	  for	  theorising	  the	  state.	  Any	  theory	  that	  builds	  on	  assumptions	  
about	   a	   community	   of	   citizens	   or	   the	   identity-­‐building	   function	   of	   the	   (nation-­‐)state	   faces	  
profound	  challenges	   in	   light	  of	   these	  transformations	  of	   the	  relationship	  between	  citizens	  and	  
the	  state.	  	  
Already	   in	   the	   1960s,	   Kelman	   argued	   that	  while	   in	   times	   of	   crisis	   “the	   national	   role	   becomes	  
paramount	  in	  the	  citizen’s	  hierarchy	  of	  roles”,	  in	  modern	  pluralistic	  societies	  we	  find	  a	  variety	  of	  
group	   memberships	   that	   compete	   for	   dominance	   and	   hence	   a	   “multiplicity	   of	   conflicts	  
crisscrossing	  society”.77	  	  	  
Further,	   it	  might	  be	  useful	  to	  remind	  ourselves	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  society	  and	  state	   in	  
this	   context.	   In	   his	  A	   Cultural	   Theory	   of	   International	   Relations,	   Lebow	   offers	   and	   interesting	  
answer.	  Drawing	  on	  Emile	  Durkheim	  he	  argues	  that	  “the	  state	  is	  too	  remote	  from	  individuals,	  its	  
connections	  with	  them	  too	  superficial	  and	  irregular,	  to	  be	  able	  to	  penetrate	  the	  depths	  of	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  Ibid.,	  	  466.	  
75	  For	  this	  term	  compare	  Georg	  Sørensen,	  'The	  Transformation	  of	  the	  State',	  in	  The	  State.	  Theories	  and	  Issues,	  
ed.	  Colin	  Hay,	  Michael	  Lister,	  and	  David	  Marsh	  (Houndmills,	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2006),	  191,	  ibid.	  
However,	  it	  is	  also	  worth	  questioning	  if	  the	  state	  ever	  produced	  a	  kind	  of	  social	  interaction	  that	  would	  allow	  us	  
to	  treat	  it	  is	  a	  group.	  For	  example,	  Benedict	  Anderson	  famously	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  the	  lack	  of	  face-­‐to-­‐
face	  contact	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  nation	  is	  only	  an	  imagined	  community.	  Their	  community	  is	  an	  image	  of	  the	  
mind.	  Anderson,	  Imagined	  Communities.	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Origin	  and	  Spread	  of	  Nationalism,	  6.	  
76	  Sørensen,	  'The	  Transformation	  of	  the	  State',	  197.	  
77	  Kelman,	  'Social	  Psychological	  Approaches	  to	  the	  Study	  of	  International	  Relations',	  575	  and	  577.	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consciousness	   and	   socialise	   them	   from	   within”	   and,	   therefore,	   rejects	   drawing	   on	   social	  
psychology	  for	  his	  theory	  which	  aims	  at	  exploring	  the	  role	  of	  emotions,	  in	  his	  words	  “passions”,	  
at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  state.78	  	  
Lastly,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  look	  at	  how	  social	  identity	  theory	  defines	  a	  social	  group	  for	  its	  purposes.	  As	  
we	  have	  seen,	  Wendt	  points	   to	  experimental	   findings	   regarding	   in-­‐group	   favouritism	  and	  out-­‐
group	  discrimination	  to	  support	  his	  case	  of	  state	   identity	  formation.	  Similarly,	  Sasley	  draws	  on	  
social	  identity	  theory	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  his	  state-­‐as-­‐group	  assumption.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  fact	  that	  
these	   theories	   are	   built	   upon	   findings	   from	   the	   laboratory	   of	   the	   psychologist	   is	   seen	   as	   an	  
advantage.	  Central	  to	  the	  findings	  of	  Tajfel	  and	  others	  is	  a	  definition	  of	  group	  that	  builds	  on	  the	  
following	  criteria.	  Tajfel	  argues	  that	  	  
[t]he	   	   two	   	   necessary	   	   components	   [of	   group	   identification]	   are:	   	   a	  	  
cognitive	   	   one,	   	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   awareness	   of	   membership	   and	   an	  
evaluative	  one,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  this	  awareness	  is	  related	  to	  some	  value	  
connotations.	  The	  third	  component	  consists	  of	  an	  emotional	  investment	  
in	   the	   awareness	   and	   evaluations.	   The	   empirical	   reality	   of	   [these]	  
criteria	   is	   a	   necessary	   condition	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   group	   in	   the	  
psychological	  sense	  of	  the	  term.79	  
This	   constrains	   any	   direct	   application	   of	   these	   findings	   to	   the	   state	   fundamentally,	   especially	  
before	  the	  background	  of	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  state	  towards	  what	  Sørensen	  calls	  a	  post-­‐
modern	  state.	  I	  agree	  with	  Sasley	  that	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  state	  can	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  social	  group	  
has	  to	  be	  shown	  empirically.	  Yet,	  given	  the	  above	  brief	  discussion,	  the	  chances	  of	  its	  usefulness	  
beyond	   a	   very	   limited	   number	   of	   cases,	   such	   as	   the	   one	   selected	   by	   him,	   seems	   unlikely.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Émile	  Durkheim,	  The	  Division	  of	  Labour	  in	  Society,	  2nd	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  Macmillan,	  1984),	  liv.	  As	  quoted	  in	  
Lebow,	  A	  Cultural	  Theory	  of	  International	  Relations,	  114.	  It	  has	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  observation	  is	  the	  reason	  
why	  Durkheim	  saw	  the	  necessity	  for	  a	  number	  other	  groups,	  “secondary	  groups”,	  existing	  between	  the	  state	  
and	  individuals,	  with	  which	  association	  and	  identification	  was	  said	  to	  be	  possible.	  In	  this	  context,	  he	  was	  
primarily	  concerned	  with	  the	  role	  of	  professional	  groups	  and	  their	  role	  in	  “fulfilling	  the	  social	  organisation	  of	  
peoples”.	  For	  this	  point	  compare	  Engin	  F.	  Isin,	  Being	  Political.	  Genealogies	  of	  Citizenship	  (Minneapolis,	  MN:	  
University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2002),	  232.	  Also	  Durkheim,	  The	  Division	  of	  Labour	  in	  Society,	  preface	  to	  the	  2nd	  
edition,	  p.	  xxxi.	  
79	  Henri	  Tajfel,	  'Social	  Psychology	  of	  Intergroup	  Relations',	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Psychology	  33	  (1982),	  2.	  Compare	  
also	  the	  following	  definition	  by	  John	  Turner.	  “At	  a	  minimum,	  a	  group	  has	  been	  defined	  as	  two	  or	  more	  persons	  
who	  are	   in	  some	  way	  socially	  or	  psychologically	   interdependent:	   for	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  needs,	  attainment	  of	  
goals	  or	  consensual	  validation	  of	  attitudes	  and	  values”.	   John	  C.	  Turner,	   'Towards	  a	  Cognitive	  Redefinition	  of	  
the	   Social	   Group',	   in	   Social	   Identity	   and	   Intergroup	   Relations,	   ed.	   Henri	   Tajfel	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  1982),	  15.	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Therefore,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐group	  does	  not	  offer	  any	  ground	  on	  which	  to	  build	  
a	  general	  concept	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  psychological	  person.	  	  	  
In	   conclusion	   of	   this	   section,	   I	   reject	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐individuals	   and	   the	   idea	   of	   the	  
state-­‐as-­‐group.	  Neither	  of	  them	  is	  useful	  for	  a	  reformulation	  of	  state	  psychological	  personhood.	  
Based	  on	  this,	  I	  argue	  that	  what	  we	  are	  left	  with	  is	  a	  concept	  –	  Hobbes’s	  fictitious	  person	  of	  the	  
state	   –	   that	   is	   given	   life	   through	   the	   personal	   and	   emotional	   stories	   we	   tell	   about	   it.	   These,	  
however,	  are	  given	  meaning	  through	  the	  ways	  people	  make	  sense	  of	  themselves.	  In	  this	  regard,	  
psychology	  can	  be	  instructive.	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The	  state-­‐as-­‐person:	  yet,	  which	  psychology?	  
Having	   located	   this	   project	   within	   the	   emotional	   turn	   in	   IR	   as	   well	   as	   within	   a	   strong	  
constructivist	   approach	   and	   aiming	   to	   comment	   on	   Wendt’s	   idea	   of	   the	   psychological	  
personhood	   of	   states,	   we	   need	   to	   ask:	   “Which	   psychology?”80	  As	   we	   have	   seen,	   from	   the	  
perspective	  of	  some	  of	  the	  scholars	  that	  can	  be	  located	  as	  part	  of	  the	  emotional	  turn	  in	  IR,	  it	  is	  
generally	   assumed	   that	   incorporating	   findings	   from	   psychology	   into	   IR	   can	   be	   a	   useful	  
endeavour.	  	  
However,	   those	   that	   can	   be	   classified	   as	   being	   part	   of	   the	   emotional	   turn	   and	   that	   draw	   on	  
psychology	   often	   neglect	   a	   detailed	   engagement	   with	   the	   ontological	   and	   epistemological	  
commitments	   that	   go	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   such	   a	   “borrowing”.	   Findings	   from	   psychology,	   a	  
discipline	  which	   is	   often	  portrayed	  as	  having	  a	   firm	   scientific	   basis,	   are	   seldom	  problematised	  
with	  regard	  to	  their	  fundamental	  assumptions	  about	  the	  world	  and	  how	  we	  come	  to	  know	  it.	  As	  
argued	  above,	  some	  accounts	  of	  those	  who	  argue	  that	   incorporating	  findings	  from	  psychology	  
has	  great	  value	  for	  IR	  do	  seem	  to	  implicitly	  suggest	  that	  IR’s	  findings	  and	  theories	  can	  be	  made	  
more	  scientific	  with	  regard	  to	  understanding	  cognitive	  processes	  and	  behaviour.	  This	  needs	  to	  
be	  thoroughly	  questioned	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  epistemological	  and	  ontological	  commitments	  that	  
are	  thereby	  incorporated	  into	  IR	  as	  well	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  compatibility	  of	  these	  commitments	  
with	  the	  ontological	  and	  epistemological	  positions	  taken	  as	  part	  of	  a	  specific	  research	  project.	  	  
This	  thesis	  is	  interested	  in	  developing	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  psychological	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  further,	  
however,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  this	  should	  neither	  result	  in	  interpreting	  the	  state	  as	  a	  group	  nor	  in	  
focusing	  on	  those	  individuals	  who	  represent	  the	  state.	  Further,	  as	  outlined,	  this	  is	  also	  not	  a	  look	  
towards	  psychology	  in	  order	  to	  investigate,	  in	  a	  self-­‐reflexive	  and	  meta-­‐theoretical	  manner,	  the	  
cognitive	  biases	  of	  the	  researcher	  and	  the	  discipline.	  Keeping	  this	  in	  mind,	  the	  psychology	  that	  is	  
drawn	  upon	   in	   the	   following	  needs	  to	   fulfil	   specific	   requirements.	  The	  assumption	   is	   that	  how	  
we	   make	   sense	   of	   ourselves	   is	   also	   how	   we	   make	   sense	   of	   the	   state.	   In	   looking	   towards	  
psychology,	   I	   am,	   hence,	   looking	   for	   an	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   of	   how	   we	   make	   sense	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  This	  is	  also	  the	  title	  of	  one	  of	  the	  chapters	  in	  Rom	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  
of	  Personhood	  (London:	  Sage,	  1998a),	  21ff.	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ourselves	   as	   people	   among	  other	  people.	   Keeping	   the	   critique	  of	  Wendt’s	   approach	   issued	   in	  
Chapter	  2	  in	  mind,	  this	  is	  done	  from	  a	  strong	  constructivist	  position.	  	  
In	   the	   following,	   I	   aim	   to	   argue	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   usefulness	   of	   so-­‐called	   constructionist	  
psychology	  for	  working	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  states-­‐as-­‐persons.	  In	  addition	  to	  providing	  a	  useful	  
answer	   with	   regard	   to	   how	   people	   make	   sense	   of	   themselves	   in	   a	   world	   of	   people,	  
constructionist	   psychology	   allows	   me	   to	   question	   assumptions	   about	   persons,	   minds,	   selves,	  
and	   emotions	  made	   in	  mainstream	  psychology	   as	  well	   as	   in	  Wendt’s	   account	   of	   persons	   and	  
states-­‐as-­‐persons.	   Further,	   building	   on	   the	   linguistic	   turn	   in	   psychology,	   discursive	   psychology	  
offers	   a	   useful	   anchorage	   point	   with	   the	   more	   radical	   constructivist	   stance	   taken	   here.	   In	  
contrast	   to	  Wendt	   and	  mainstream	  psychology,	   the	   perspective	   on	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   taken	  
here	   emphasises	   discourse	   and	   cultural	   practices	   and	   de-­‐emphasises	   essentialism	   and	  
materialism	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  an	  understanding	  of	  people	  in	  a	  world	  of	  people.81	  
Introductory	  textbooks	  on	  psychology	  stress	  that	  psychology	  is	  a	  science	  and	  are	  quick	  to	  point	  
out	   that	   the	   discipline	   is	   committed	   to	   scientific	   methods	   such	   as	   naturalistic	   and	   clinical	  
observations,	  correlational	  studies,	  and	  experiments.82	  The	  goals	  of	  psychology	  are	  described	  as	  
description,	   understanding	   (in	   the	   sense	   of	   being	   able	   to	   “state	   the	   cause	   of	   a	   behavior”),	  
prediction,	   and	   control. 83 	  Choices	   for	   book	   sub-­‐titles	   such	   as	   “Psychology	   the	   Science	   of	  
Behaviour”	  and	  chapter	  titles	  such	  as	  “The	  Science	  of	  Psychology”	  are	  instructive	  in	  this	  regard	  
and	  seem	  to	  point	  to	  the	  need	  of	  the	  discipline	  to	  define	  itself	  as	  scientific.84	  Being	  scientific	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  I	  use	  the	  phrase	  “people	  in	  a	  world	  of	  people”	  by	  drawing	  on	  Rom	  Harré’s	  distinction	  between	  two	  different	  
ontologies:	  a	  world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐molecular-­‐clusters	  and	  a	  world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people.	  A	  more	  detailed	  elaboration	  of	  
this	  key	  distinction	  follows	  in	  chapter	  five.	  Compare	  Rom	  Harré,	  'Discourse	  and	  the	  Embodied	  Person',	  in	  Social	  
Constructionist	  Psychology.	  A	  Critical	  Analysis	  of	  Theory	  and	  Practice,	  ed.	  David	  J.	  Nightingale	  and	  John	  Cromby	  
(Buckingham:	  Open	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  107.	  
82	  See	  for	  example	  Neil	  R.	  Carlson	  et	  al.,	  Psychology:	  The	  Science	  of	  Behaviour,	  6th	  ed.	  (London:	  Pearson	  
Education	  Limited,	  2007),	  29.	  See	  also	  Dennis	  Coon,	  Psychology:	  A	  Modular	  Approach	  to	  Mind	  and	  Behavior	  
(Belmont,	  CA:	  Wadsworth/Thomson	  Learning,	  2006),	  31-­‐48.	  This	  emphasis	  on	  the	  scientific	  method	  can	  be	  
used	  as	  a	  divisive	  rhetorical	  instrument	  that	  aims	  at	  devaluing	  approaches	  that	  do	  not	  fulfil	  the	  scientific	  
standard	  (however	  defined).	  For	  this	  point	  see	  Jackson,	  The	  Conduct	  of	  Inquiry	  in	  International	  Relations:	  
Philosophy	  of	  Science	  and	  Its	  Implications	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  World	  Politics,	  1-­‐23.	  
83	  Coon,	  Psychology:	  A	  Modular	  Approach	  to	  Mind	  and	  Behavior,	  17.	  
84	  For	  the	  book	  sub-­‐title	  compare	  Carlson	  et	  al.,	  Psychology:	  The	  Science	  of	  Behaviour,	  1.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  
reference	  to	  scienctificness,	  virtually	  any	  introductory	  textbook	  on	  psychology	  could	  serve	  as	  an	  example.	  
Here,	  see	  for	  example	  Miles	  Hewstone,	  Frank	  D.	  Fincham,	  and	  Jonathan	  Foster,	  Psychology	  (Malden,	  MA:	  
Blackwell	  Pub.,	  2005),	  2-­‐23.	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  psychology	  as	  a	  science	  see	  Carlson	  et	  al.,	  Psychology:	  The	  
Science	  of	  Behaviour,	  11.	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this	  context	  is	  often	  taken	  to	  mean	  being	  materialist	  and	  empiricist.85	  Psychology	  as	  a	  discipline	  
can	  be	  divided	  into	  various	  approaches,	   larger	  historical	  phases,	  and	  great	  debates.	  Looking	  at	  
the	  twentieth	  century,	  one	  can,	  for	  example,	  distinguish	  between	  three	  key	  schools	  of	  thought	  
that	   shaped	   the	   discipline	   and	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   contributing	   to	   the	   “great	   debates”	   of	  
psychology.86	  Psychoanalysis	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   and	   early	   twentieth	   century	   was	   soon	   to	   be	  
replaced	   by	   behaviourism	   in	   the	   1950s	   which	   in	   turn	   was	   replaced	   by	   cognitive	   psychology	  
emerging	   in	  the	  1960s.	  Behaviourism	  rejected	  the	  unobservables	  postulated	  by	  psychoanalysis	  
and	   emphasised	   empirical	   data	   and	   overt	   behaviour.	   Cognitive	   psychology,	   being	   heavily	  
influenced	  by	   the	   emergence	  of	   information-­‐processing	   theory	   and	   computer	   science,	   argued	  
against	   behaviourism	   and	   its	   exclusive	   focus	   on	   overt	   behaviour	   and	   direct	   observation	   by	  
postulating	   covert	  processes	  of	   the	  mind.	   This	  debate	  between	  behaviourist	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  
and	  cognitive	  psychologists	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  is	  also	  known	  as	  the	  (first)	  cognitive	  revolution	  in	  
psychology.87	  In	   this	   regard,	   a	   parallel	   between	   psychology	   and	   a	   larger	   development	   in	   the	  
natural	   sciences	   as	   part	   of	   which	   the	   positivistic	   framework	   was	   questioned	   by	   an	   emerging	  
scientific	  realist	  one	  can	  be	  drawn.88	  	  
Generally	   speaking	   though,	  psychology	  has	  a	   strong	   focus	  on	  materialism	  and	  empiricism	  and	  
this	   is	  already	  reflected	  in	  its	  founding	  myth.	  Wilhelm	  Wundt	  (1832–1920)	  is	  usually	  portrayed	  
as	   the	   founding	   father	  of	  modern	  psychology.	  Most	   text	  books	  emphasise	  his	   laboratory	  work	  
and	  hence	  confirm	   the	   roots	  of	   the	  discipline	   in	  empiricism.89	  Wundt’s	  usage	  of	  empirical	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  For	  another	  overview	  of	  basic	  psychology	  textbooks	  that	  confirm	  the	  “Psychology-­‐as-­‐One-­‐of-­‐the-­‐Sciences”	  
story	  see	  also	  Rom	  Harré,	  'The	  Relevance	  of	  Philosophy	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Psychology',	  in	  The	  Mind	  as	  a	  Scientific	  
Object:	  Between	  Brain	  and	  Culture,	  ed.	  Christina	  E.	  Erneling	  and	  David	  M.	  Johnson	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  
Press,	  2005).	  
86	  Obviously,	  any	  such	  post-­‐factum	  narrative	  can	  only	  serve	  as	  a	  general	  orientation	  for	  those	  outside	  the	  
discipline	  or	  new	  to	  it.	  The	  notion	  of	  great	  debates,	  in	  IR	  as	  in	  psychology,	  is	  of	  course	  a	  useful	  narrative	  that	  
very	  often	  loses	  	  its	  power	  as	  soon	  as	  a	  closer	  look	  is	  taken	  at	  the	  work	  of	  those	  scholars	  said	  to	  represent	  a	  
certain	  school	  of	  thought	  that	  is	  portrayed	  in	  opposition	  to	  another	  one.	  I	  think	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  assume	  that	  a	  
critique	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  levelled	  against	  IR’s	  various	  great	  debates	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  portraying	  psychology	  
as	  a	  succession	  of	  great	  debates.	  However,	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  psychology	  like	  this,	  aimed	  at	  an	  audience	  
outside	  the	  discipline,	  it	  will	  suffice	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  orientation.	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  great	  debates	  in	  IR	  see	  for	  
example	  Brian	  C.	  Schmidt,	  'On	  the	  History	  and	  Historiography	  of	  International	  Relations',	  in	  Handbook	  of	  
International	  Relations,	  ed.	  Walter	  Carlsnaes,	  Thomas	  Risse-­‐Kappen,	  and	  Beth	  A.	  Simmons	  (Thousand	  Oaks,	  
CA:	  Sage,	  2002).	  The	  following	  overview	  of	  psychology	  as	  a	  series	  of	  debates	  is	  based	  on	  Don	  Baucum,	  
Psychology	  (Hauppauge,	  N.Y.:	  Barron's	  Educational	  Series,	  1999),	  2-­‐10.	  
87	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Personhood,	  31.	  
88	  Ibid.	  
89	  See	  for	  example	  Carlson	  et	  al.,	  Psychology:	  The	  Science	  of	  Behaviour,	  10-­‐11.	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laboratory	   methods	   is	   seen	   as	   the	   key	   turning	   point	   in	   establishing	   psychology	   as	   an	  
independent	  discipline	  by	  developing	  a	  distinct	  identity	  separate	  from	  philosophy.90	  Yet,	  Wundt	  
himself	   appears	   to	   have	   seen	   his	   experimental	  work	  more	   as	   a	   useful	   addition	   to	   philosophy	  
rather	   than	   as	   the	   attempt	   to	   establish	   a	   discipline	   in	   its	   own	   right.91	  Indeed,	  most	   textbooks	  
acknowledge	   certain	   philosophical	   foundations	   of	   psychology,	   pointing	   out	   that	   the	   discipline	  
“began	   long	  ago	  as	  part	  of	  philosophy,	   the	   study	  of	  knowledge,	   reality,	  and	  human	  nature”.92	  
Usually,	  a	  lineage	  of	  philosophers	  from	  Descartes,	  representing	  dualism	  and	  sometimes	  referred	  
to	   as	   the	   father	   of	   modern	   psychology,	   to	   Berkely	   and	   Locke	   (empiricism)	   and	   James	   Mill	  
(materialism)	   is	   cited	  as	  being	  among	  some	  of	   the	  key	   foundational	  premises	  of	  psychology.93	  
Empiricism	  and	  materialism	  are	  described	  as	  the	  principles	  that	  make	  the	  scientific	  study	  of	  the	  
mind	  and	  human	  behaviour	  possible.	  This	  is	  an	  interesting	  point	  to	  note	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  
IR	   as	   a	   discipline,	   in	   contrast	   to	   psychology,	   debates	   questions	   of	   ontology	   and	   epistemology	  
more	  openly	  and	  regards	  these	  questions	  as	  far	  from	  settled.94	  Given	  the	  variety	  of	  approaches	  
in	   IR,	   there	   might	   not	   necessarily	   be	   a	   good	   fit	   between	   certain	   positions	   in	   IR	   and	   the	  
philosophy	  of	  science	  commitments	  of	  mainstream	  psychology.	  Secondly,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  in	  the	  
following,	   constructionist	   psychology	   thoroughly	   questions	   the	   philosophy	   of	   science	   basis	   of	  
mainstream	   psychology	   and	   takes	   a	   very	   different	   position.	   In	   textbooks	   and	   mainstream	  
approaches,	   the	   debates	   about	   the	   philosophical	   foundations	   of	   psychology	   often	   appear	   as	  
already	  decided.95	  Yet,	  a	   turn	  to	  constructionist	  psychology	  reveals	  how	  these	   foundations	  are	  
far	   from	  permanently	  settled	  and	  how	  the	  different	  sides	   in	  such	  debates	  offer	   fundamentally	  
different	   perspectives	   on	   the	   self,	   mind,	   and	   emotions.	   Rom	   Harré,	   a	   key	   proponent	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  Rom	  Harré,	  Cognitive	  Science:	  A	  Philosophical	  Introduction	  (Thousand	  Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage,	  2002),	  15.	  Also	  Coon,	  
Psychology:	  A	  Modular	  Approach	  to	  Mind	  and	  Behavior,	  19.	  
91	  Compare	  Robert	  M.	  Farr,	  'Wilhelm	  Wundt	  (1832–1920)	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  Psychology	  as	  an	  Experimental	  
and	  Social	  Science',	  British	  Journal	  of	  Social	  Psychology	  22,	  4	  (1983).	  Kurt	  Danziger,	  'Wundt's	  Psychological	  
Experiment	  in	  the	  Light	  of	  His	  Philosophy	  of	  Science',	  Psychological	  Research	  42,	  1-­‐2	  (1980).	  And	  Emily	  D.	  
Cahan	  and	  Sheldon	  H.	  White,	  'Proposals	  for	  a	  Second	  Psychology',	  American	  Psychologist	  47,	  2	  (1992).	  
92	  Coon,	  Psychology:	  A	  Modular	  Approach	  to	  Mind	  and	  Behavior,	  19.	  
93	  For	  the	  overview	  given	  here,	  see	  Carlson	  et	  al.,	  Psychology:	  The	  Science	  of	  Behaviour,	  10-­‐12.	  Other	  accounts	  
point	  to	  David	  Hume	  in	  stead	  of	  Mill.	  See	  for	  example	  Hewstone,	  Fincham,	  and	  Foster,	  Psychology,	  10.	  
94	  Compare	  for	  example	  Jackson,	  The	  Conduct	  of	  Inquiry	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  and	  
Its	  Implications	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  World	  Politics.	  
95	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  multitude	  of	  debates	  on	  the	  philosophical	  foundation	  of	  psychology	  now	  which	  is	  not	  
yet	  reflected	  in	  textbooks	  on	  psychology	  or	  mainstream	  approaches.	  An	  early	  debate	  was	  channelled	  in	  the	  
edited	  collection	  of	  	  A.	  Phillips	  Griffiths.	  A.	  Phillips	  Griffiths,	  ed.,	  Philosophy,	  Psychology	  and	  Psychiatry	  
(Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1994).	  Journals	  such	  as	  the	  Journal	  of	  Theoretical	  and	  Philosophical	  
Psychology,	  Review	  of	  Philosophy	  and	  Psychology,	  as	  well	  as	  Philosophy,	  Psychiatry,	  &	  Psychology	  have	  started	  
picking	  up	  this	  debate.	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constructionist	  psychology,	  calls	  for	  a	  (new)	  philosophy	  of	  psychology	  because	  psychology	  “has	  
been	  in	  thrall	  to	  unexamined	  and	  highly	  unsatisfactory	  conceptual	  presuppositions”.96	  He	  labels	  
the	  critique	  levelled	  by	  constructionist	  psychology	  the	  second	  cognitive	  revolution	  in	  psychology.	  
The	   premises	   of	   this	   second	   cognitive	   revolution	   will	   be	   looked	   at	   in	   more	   detail	   in	   the	  
following.	  	  
As	   already	  mentioned,	   I	   suggest	   that	   constructionist	   psychology	   is	   the	  most	   fruitful	   approach	  
from	  within	  psychology	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  states-­‐as-­‐persons	  conceptually.	  Two	  reasons	  need	  to	  
be	  stressed.	  Constructionist	  psychology	  allows	  me	  to	  criticise	  taken	  for	  granted	  assumptions	  of	  
mainstream	  psychology	  that	  often	  find	  their	  way	  into	  IR	  via	  interdisciplinary	  approaches.	  Harré,	  
being	   located	   on	   a	   middle	   ground	   between	   philosophy	   and	   psychology	   and	   sharing	   some	  
scientific	   realist	   commitments,	   offers	   a	   useful	   starting	   point	   for	   further	   reflections.	   He,	   for	  
example,	   offers	   a	   very	   different	   reading	   of	   Wundt’s	   contribution	   and	   the	   founding	   of	  
psychology.97	  Harré	  argues	  that	  in	  the	  Wundtian	  conception	  psychology	  is	  a	  “metaphysical	  and	  
methodological	  double	  science”.98	  Hence,	  building	  on	  Wundt,	  Harré	  argues	  that	  “psychologists	  
must	  accept	  […]	  that	  their	  ‘science’	  is	  built	  on	  a	  dual	  ontology,	  molecules	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  
persons	  on	  the	  other”,99	  and	  this	  ultimately	  requires	  two	  “radically	  different	  methodologies”.100	  
Generally	  speaking,	  we	  can	  compare	  Harré’s	  reading	  of	  psychology	  as	  a	  dual	  science	  to	  debates	  
in	   IR,	  especially	  among	  constructivists,	   regarding	   the	   relation	  between	  material	  and	   ideational	  
factors	  and	   the	   role	  of	   language.	   It	  needs	   to	  be	  noted	   that	  Harré	  argues	   for	   keeping	   the	  dual	  
character	  of	  psychology.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   it	  consists	  of	   the	  study	  of	  human	  bodies	  organised	  
into	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  organs	  and	  functions.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  psychology,	  he	  argues,	  should	  be	  
interested	  in	  the	  conversational	  world	  of	  people.	  Neither	  of	  the	  two	  ontologies	  and	  the	  resulting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Harré,	  'The	  Relevance	  of	  Philosophy	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Psychology'.	  
97	  With	  regard	  to	  Harré’s	  scientific	  realist	  commitments	  compare	  Rom	  Harré	  and	  Roy	  Bhaskar,	  'How	  to	  Change	  
Reality:	   Story	   Vs.	   Structure	   -­‐	   a	   Debate	   between	   Rom	   Harré	   and	   Roy	   Bhaskar',	   in	  After	   Postmodernism.	   An	  
Introduction	  to	  Critical	  Realism,	  ed.	  José	  López	  and	  Gary	  Potter	  (London:	  Athlone	  Press,	  2001).	  As	  well	  as	  the	  
critique	  offered	  by	  Margaret	  Archer	  Margaret	  S.	  Archer,	   'Being	  Human:	  The	  Problem	  of	  Agency',	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press.	  For	  Harré’s	  position	  between	  philosophy	  and	  psychology	  compare	  Harré,	   'The	  Relevance	  of	  
Philosophy	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Psychology'.	  Harré,	  Key	  Thinkers	  in	  Psychology.	  And	  Rom	  Harré	  and	  Michael	  Tissaw,	  
Wittgenstein	  and	  Psychology.	  A	  Practical	  Guide	  (Aldershot:	  Ashgate,	  2005).	  
98	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Personhood,	  30.	  
99	  Ibid.,	  	  ix.	  
100	  Ibid.	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methods	   are	   privileged.	   Rather,	   they	   exist	   side-­‐by-­‐side	   and	   the	   choice	   of	   one	   or	   the	   other	  
depends	  on	  the	  kinds	  of	  questions	  that	  are	  of	  interest	  for	  a	  particular	  research	  programme.101	  	  
Generally,	  constructionist	  psychology	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  being	  part	  of	  a	  linguistic	  turn	  in	  psychology	  
as	  part	  of	  which	  new	  developments	   in	  social	   theory	  have	  been	  utilised	  to	  bear	  on	  psychology.	  
Harré	   outlines	   two	   general	   constructionist	   assumptions.	   First,	   there	   is	   the	   assumption	   that	  
“[h]uman	   beings	   acquire	   their	   typical	   human	   psychological	   characteristics,	   powers	   and	  
tendencies	  in	  ‘symbiotic’	  interaction	  with	  other	  human	  beings”.102	  This	  first	  basic	  premise	  points	  
to	  how	  only	  a	  small	  part	  of	  what	  constitutes	  the	  mental	  life	  of	  human	  beings	  is	  based	  in	  biology	  
and	  therefore	  how	  only	  a	  small	  part	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  given	  prior	  to	  social	   interaction.	  Second,	  
following	  from	  that,	  Harré	  and	  others	  stress	  the	  role	  of	  language	  and	  interaction	  in	  constituting	  
human	   beings	   understood	   as	   part	   of	   a	   world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people.	   Harré	   argues	   that	   “[t]he	  
psychological	   process	   of	   mature	   human	   beings	   are	   essentially	   collective,	   and	   contingently	  
privatised	  and	  individualised”.103	  	  
Constructionist	   psychology	   started	   to	   emerge	   as	   a	   distinct	   perspective	   in	   the	  1980s.	   It	   rejects	  
both	  behaviourism	  and	  cognitivism.	  From	  the	  discursive	  perspective	   in	  psychology,	   language	  is	  
not	  seen	  as	  transporting	  an	  underlying	  thought	  or	  emotion,	  as	  the	  cognitive	  perspective	  would	  
maintain.	   Selves	   and	   emotions	   are	   not	   seen	   as	   being	   behind	   talk	   but	   as	   being	   brought	   about	  
only	  in	  discourse.	  Inner	  experience,	  cognitive	  states,	  and	  mental	  events	  –	  all	  of	  which	  are	  ideas	  
relevant	  for	  cognitivism	  –	  are	  rejected.	  This	  means	  that,	  despite	  sharing	  an	  interest	  in	  language,	  
constructionist	   psychology	   is	   fundamentally	   different	   from	   “psycholinguistics”	   which	   is	  
interested	  in	  “a	  cognitivist	  and	  information	  processing	  view	  of	  the	  human	  actor	  and	  attempts	  to	  
explicate	   the	   cognitive	  machinery	   that	   is	   taken	   to	  underlie	   and	   generate	   talk”.104	  	   In	   contrast,	  
constructionist	  psychology	  does	  not	  posit	  mental	  processes,	  attributions,	  or	  emotions	  as	  being	  
behind	   discourse	   or	   underlying	   it.	   Harré	   summarises	   this	   point	   by	   arguing	   “that	  what	  we	   are	  
studying	   when	   we	   are	   ‘doing	   psychology’	   are	   discursive	   practices	   of	   various	   kinds,	   some	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  For	  an	  explanation	  of	  these	  two	  ontologies	  in	  reference	  to	  Wundt	  compare	  ibid.,	  	  176.	  For	  Harré’s	  
reconceptualisation	  of	  psychology	  that	  embodies	  this	  dual	  character	  more	  fully	  compare	  Harré,	  Cognitive	  
Science:	  A	  Philosophical	  Introduction.	  
102	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Personhood,	  18.	  For	  a	  critique	  compare	  
Archer,	  'Being	  Human:	  The	  Problem	  of	  Agency'.	  
103	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Personhood,	  18.	  
104	  Jonathan	  Potter,	  'Editor's	  Introduction.	  Volume	  1:	  Theory	  and	  Method',	  in	  Discourse	  and	  Psychology.	  
Volume	  1,	  ed.	  Jonathan	  Potter	  (London:	  Sage,	  2007a).	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which	  could	  exist	  only	  in	  actual	  or	  potential	  interpersonal	  interactions”.105	  Emphasising	  the	  role	  
of	  language,	  he	  further	  argues	  that	  	  
both	   […]	   social	   habits	   and	   […]	   conscious	   social	   manipulations	   as	  
patterned	  according	  to	  rules.	  In	  the	  former	  case	  these	  are	  like	  the	  rules	  
of	  language,	  a	  system	  of	  norms	  whose	  expression	  in	  explicit	  statements	  
awaits	   the	   grammarian	   of	   the	   social	   world,	   the	   new-­‐style	   social	  
psychologist.106	  
Key	  proponents	  of	  what	  I	  broadly	  call	  constructionist	  psychology	  are	  the	  aforementioned	  Harré	  
as	   well	   as	   John	   Schotter,	   both	   being	   strongly	   influenced	   by	   Wittgenstinian	   philosophy	   of	  
language	   as	   well	   as	   Vygotskyian	   insights	   regarding	   early	   childhood	   development.107	  Jonathan	  
Potter	   and	   Derek	   Edwards,	   who	   label	   their	   approach	   discursive	   psychology,	   can	   also	   be	  
mentioned	   as	   being	   part	   of	   a	   general	   constructionist	   movement	   in	   psychology.108	  For	   the	  
approach	  taken	  in	  this	  thesis,	  the	  constructionist	  perspective	  in	  (social)	  psychology	  represented	  
by	   Kenneth	   J.	   Gergen	   also	   deserves	   to	   be	   mentioned.109	  In	   terms	   of	   a	   research	   agenda	   and	  
practical	   guidelines	   for	   further	   research,	   Potter	   and	   Edwards	   have	   developed	   constructionist	  
psychology	  furthest.110	  Describing	  what	  they	  call	  discursive	  psychology	  as	  applying	  “theory	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105	  Rom	  Harré,	  'The	  Epistemology	  of	  Social	  Representations',	  in	  The	  Psychology	  of	  the	  Social,	  ed.	  Uwe	  Flick	  
(Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1998b).	  
106 	  Rom	   Harré,	   'Blueprint	   for	   a	   New	   Science',	   in	   Reconstructing	   Social	   Psychology,	   ed.	   N.	   Armistead	  
(Harmondsworth:	  Penguin	  Books,	  1974),	  248-­‐249.	  
107	  With	  regard	  to	  this	  terminology,	  compare	  for	  example	  the	  following	  edited	  volumes	  Peter	  Stearns	  and	  Rom	  
Harré,	  Discursive	  Psychology	  in	  Practice	  (Thousand	  Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage,	  1995).	  Also	  Rom	  Harré	  and	  Grant	  Gillett,	  
The	  Discursive	  Mind	  (Thousand	  Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage,	  1994).As	  well	  as	  the	  following	  essay	  Rom	  Harré,	  'Discursive	  
Psychology',	  in	  Rethinking	  Psychology,	  ed.	  Jonathan	  A.	  Smith,	  Rom	  Harré,	  and	  Van	  Langenhove	  Luk	  (Thousand	  
Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage,	  1995b).	  But	  compare	  also	  the	  following	  edited	  volumes	  Rom	  Harré,	  ed.,	  The	  Social	  
Construction	  of	  Emotions	  (Oxford:	  Basil	  Blackwell,	  1986).	  David	  J.	  Nightingale	  and	  John	  Cromby,	  eds.,	  Social	  
Constructionist	  Psychology.	  A	  Critical	  Analysis	  of	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  (Buckingham:	  Open	  University	  Press,	  
1999).	  
108	  In	  addition	  to	  Vygotsky	  and	  Wittgenstein,	  for	  Schotter	  a	  key	  influence	  is	  M.	  Bakhtin.	  	  Compare	  for	  example	  
M.	  M.	  Bakhtin,	  The	  Dialogical	  Imagination:	  Four	  Essays	  (Austin:	  University	  of	  Texas	  Press,	  1981	  [1941]).	  
Michael	  Billig	  is	  another	  key	  influence	  for	  Schotter	  but	  especially	  for	  Edwards	  and	  Potter.	  With	  regard	  to	  Billig	  
compare	  for	  example	  Michael	  Billig,	  Arguing	  and	  Thinking.	  A	  Rhetorical	  Approach	  to	  Social	  Psychology	  
(Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1987).	  And	  Michael	  Billig,	  Ideology	  and	  Opinions.	  Studies	  in	  Rhetorical	  
Psychology	  (London:	  Sage,	  1991).	  	  
109	  Kenneth	  J.	  Gergen,	  'The	  Social	  Constructionist	  Movement	  in	  Modern	  Psychology',	  American	  Psychologist	  40,	  
3	  (1985b).	  
110	  Their	  development	  of	  DAM,	  a	  Discursive	  Action	  Model,	  in	  1992	  is	  such	  an	  early	  example.	  See	  Derek	  Edwards	  
and	  Jonathan	  Potter,	  Discursive	  Psychology	  (London:	  Sage,	  1992),	  154ff.	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methods	   of	   discourse	   analysis	   to	   psychological	   topics”,111	  they	   are	   also	   the	   most	   specific	   in	  
terms	  of	  defining	  how	   research	   in	   this	  new	   field	   should	  or	   could	  be	  carried	  out.	   Interestingly,	  
Edwards	   and	   Potter,	   at	   the	   end	   of	   a	   passage	   analysing	   the	   First	   Gulf	   War	   with	   tools	   from	  
discourse	  analysis,	  mention	  how	  they	  “hope	  that	  these	  developments	  will,	  for	  example,	  provide	  
a	  distinctive	  input	  into	  post-­‐structuralist	  debates	  about	  politics	  and	  international	  relations”.112	  	  
However,	   beyond	   these	   methodological	   considerations,	   constructionist	   psychology	   enters	   a	  
meta-­‐theoretical	   debate	   on	   some	   of	   the	   basic	   premises	   of	   psychology.	   It	   is	   this	   aspect	   that	  
makes	   it	  most	   valuable	   for	   developing	   ideas	   about	   states-­‐as-­‐persons	   and	   for	  making	   a	   useful	  
contribution	  to	  IR	  theory.	  Given	  the	  project	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  the	  focus	  will	  be	  
on	   the	   reconceptualisation	   of	   the	   person,	   self,	   mind,	   and	   emotions	   that	   is	   provided	   via	   the	  
meta-­‐theoretical	   discussion	   introduced	   by	   constructionist	   psychology.	   Further,	   it	   is	   in	  
constructionist	   psychology	   that	   we	   find	   an	   explicit	   engagement	   with	   emotions	   that	   is	   highly	  
critical	   of	   the	   cognitivistic	   perspective,	   which,	   does	   not	   easily,	   if	   at	   all,	   combine	   with	   a	  
constructivism	  in	  IR	  that	  emphasises	  the	  role	  of	  language.	  If	  we	  are	  to	  take	  the	  emotional	  turn	  in	  
IR	   seriously	   and	   find	   the	   incorporation	   of	   findings	   from	   psychology	   into	   IR	   useful,	   these	   are	  
questions	   that	   deserve	   explicit	   treatment.	   In	   order	   to	   engage	   with	   Wendt’s	   idea	   of	   state	  
psychological	   personhood	  and	   to	  ultimately	   formulate	   an	  alternative,	   the	  detailed	   and	   critical	  
engagement	   with	   traditional	   conceptualisations	   of	   persons	   offered	   by	   constructionist	  
psychology	  is	  an	  ideal	  starting	  point.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  Derek	  Edwards,	  'Emotion	  Discourse',	  in	  Discourse	  and	  Psychology.	  Volume	  3,	  ed.	  Jonathan	  Potter	  (London:	  
Sage,	  2007	  [1999]).	  
112	  They	  specifically	  point	  to	  Der	  Derian,	  Michael	  Shapiro,	  and	  R.	  J.	  B.	  Walker.	  See	  	  Edwards	  and	  Potter,	  
Discursive	  Psychology,	  175.	  




The	  chapter	  starts	   from	  the	  assumption	  that	  how	  we	  make	  sense	  of	  ourselves	   is	  also	  how	  we	  
make	  sense	  of	  the	  state	  and	  it	  turns	  to	  psychology	  to	  find	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  it	  is	  
like	  to	  be	  person.113	  Going	  back	  to	  the	  ideas	  on	  metaphors	  introduced	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  
this	   represents	   an	   investigation	   into	   the	   source	   domain	   of	   the	   metaphor	   of	   the	   constructed	  
state-­‐as-­‐person.	   In	   addition,	   this	   chapter	   is	   also	   to	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   commentary	   on	   IR’s	  
previous	  and	  current	  attempts	  to	  “bring	  psychology	  in”	  and	  the	  more	  recent	  emotional	  turn	  in	  
the	   discipline.	   One	   key	   general	   insight	   for	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   taken	   from	   the	  
scholars	   of	   the	   emotional	   turn	   in	   IR.	   Generally	   speaking,	   they	   are	   critical	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
discipline	  remains	  wedded	  to	  a	  rationalist	  account	  of	  the	  person.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  emotional	  turn,	  
as	  for	  example	  outlined	  in	  a	  key	  article	  by	  Crawford,	  is	  to	  argue	  against	  dichotomising	  rationality	  
and	  emotions,	   and	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   important	   role	   played	  by	   emotions	   in	   IR.	   The	   chapter	  
begins	  with	  a	  critique	  of	  attempts	  to	  incorporate	  findings	  from	  psychology	  into	  IR	  in	  order	  to	  put	  
IR’s	   assumption	   about	   people	   and	   groups	   on	   a	   more	   scientific	   footing.	   Such	   approaches	   are	  
often	   driven	   by	   the	   conviction	   that	   psychology	   is	   valuable	   for	   its	   adherence	   to	   a	   positivistic	  
framework	  and	  specifically	  its	  strict	  empirical	  methods.	  First,	  this	  raises	  a	  philosophy	  of	  science	  
question	   about	   how	   to	   best	   generate	   an	   understanding	   of	   people.	   Secondly,	   and	   more	  
importantly,	   this	   view	   of	   psychology	   is	   at	   odds	   with	   the	   critique	   of	  Wendt’s	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	  
especially	  the	  call	  for	  exploring	  a	  more	  radical	  constructivism	  with	  regard	  to	  people	  and	  states,	  
put	   forward	   in	   Chapter	   2.	   After	   giving	   a	   brief	   overview	   of	   recent	   efforts	   in	   IR	   that	   can	   be	  
interpreted	  as	  being	  part	  of	  the	  emotional	  turn,	  the	  chapter	  turns	  to	  highlighting	  three	  possible	  
ways	  in	  which	  psychology	  can	  be	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  In	  the	  first	  
instance	  psychology,	  more	  precisely	   cognitive	  psychology,	   can	  point	   to	   cognitive	  biases	  of	   the	  
researcher	   that	  can	  help	  explain	   IR’s	  prevalence	  towards	   treating	  states	  as	  persons.	  The	  three	  
tendencies	   that	   are	  highlighted	   are	   the	   fundamental	   attribution	   error,	   anthropomorphisation,	  
and	  metaphorical	  reasoning.	  In	  this	  sense,	  drawing	  on	  psychology	  can	  contribute	  to	  greater	  self-­‐
reflexivity	   of	   the	  discipline.	   This,	   for	   instance,	   is	   a	   key	   aim	  of	   some	   scholars	   of	   the	   emotional	  
turn.	   However,	   this	   is	   largely	   a	   question	   of	   epistemology	   whereas	   this	   thesis	   is	   focused	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113	  Compare	   Thomas	   Nagel,	   'What	   Is	   It	   Like	   to	   Be	   a	   Bat?',	   The	   Philosophical	   Review	   83,	   4	   (1974).	   For	   the	  
connection	  with	  Wendt	  see	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  296.	  Compare	  also	  ibid.	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questions	   of	   (scientific)	   ontology.	   A	   second	   potential	   contribution	   is	   what	   I	   call	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
individuals	   approach	   which	   is	   rejected	   based	   on	   the	   commitment	   to	   a	   non-­‐reductionist	  
approach	   to	   the	   state.	   The	   third	   important	   potential	   contribution	   of	   psychology	   comes	   from	  
treating	   the	   state	   as	   a	   social	   group	   and	   thereby	  making	   social	   psychology	   applicable	   to	   it.	   A	  
number	  of	   scholars	  of	   the	  emotional	   turn,	   such	  as	  Mercer	  and	  Sasley,	  do	   so	  and	  utilise	   social	  
identity	   theory	   to	   find	  ways	   of	   theorising	   emotions	   at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   state.	   Approaches	   like	  
these	   raise	   the	  question	  whether	   the	   state	   can	  be	   treated	  as	  a	  group.	  Ultimately,	   it	   is	   argued	  
that	   the	   instances	   in	  which	   the	   state	   can	  be	   said	   to	   fulfil	   the	   criteria	  of	  a	   social	   group,	  as	  put	  
forward	  by	  social	  identity	  theorists	  such	  as	  Tajfel,	  are	  rare.	  While	  it	  is	  acknowledged	  that	  there	  
might	   be	   instances	   where	   social	   identity	   theory	   can	   be	   made	   useful,	   this	   is	   ultimately	   an	  
empirical	  question	  that	  has	  to	  be	  solved	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  Further,	  keeping	  the	  discussion	  
of	   the	  “opaque	  state”	  of	  Chapter	  1	   in	  mind,	  and	  especially	   the	  argument	   that	   the	  state	   is	  not	  
easily	  identifiable	  with	  a	  territory	  or	  a	  group	  of	  people,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed	  on	  a	  conceptual	  level	  first.	  Utilising	  social	  identity	  theory	  in	  IR	  can	  
make	   an	   important	   contribution	   to	   the	   discipline	   with	   regard	   to	   studying	   the	   behaviour	   of	  
relevant	  groups.	  However,	  it	  is	  of	  little	  utility	  for	  theorising	  the	  state	  or	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  
Keeping	  with	  the	  perspective	  that	  there	  is	  a	  metaphorical	  link	  between	  how	  we	  make	  sense	  of	  
ourselves	   and	   how	   we	   make	   sense	   of	   the	   state,	   the	   last	   part	   of	   the	   chapter	   asks	   ‘which	  
psychology?’	   After	   a	   discussion	   of	   key	   philosophy	   of	   science	   commitments	   of	   mainstream	  
psychology,	  so-­‐called	  constructionist	  psychology,	  especially	  the	  work	  of	  Harré,	  is	  suggested	  as	  a	  
good	   fit.	  A	  key	  assumption	  of	   the	  constructionist	  approach,	   in	   line	  with	  broader	  constructivist	  
commitments,	   is	   that	   psychological	   characteristics	   are	   acquired	   through	   social	   interaction.	  
Further,	  and	  in	  contrast	  to	  cognitive	  psychology,	  self	  and	  emotions	  are	  not	  seen	  as	  being	  located	  
inside	  the	  mind.	  Hypothesis	  about	  inner	  experiences,	  cognitive	  states,	  and	  mental	  process	  –	  all	  
rooted	   in	   cognitive	   science	   –	   are	   rejected.	   From	   the	   constructionist	   perspective,	   selves	   and	  
emotions	  are	  not	   located	  behind	   talk,	   and	  only	  expressed	   through	   language;	   they	  are	   created	  
through	  discourse.	  Ultimately,	  the	  argument	  subscribed	  to	  is	  that	  psychologists	  study	  discursive	  
practices	  which	  exist	  only	  by	  virtue	  of	  human	  interactions.	  While	  we	  can	  remain	  agnostic	  with	  
regard	   to	   whether	   we	   acknowledge	   this	   perspective	   as	   the	   best	   possible	   approach	   to	  
understanding	   individual	  human	  beings,	   it	   is	  certainly	  the	  most	  fruitful	  perspective	  to	  draw	  on	  
with	  regard	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	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Chapter	  5:	  Person,	  self,	  and	  emotions	  
from	  the	  perspective	  of	  
constructionist	  psychology	  	  
In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   aim	   to	   present	   the	   elements	   of	   an	   alternative	   conception	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
person.	  In	  doing	  so,	  this	  chapter	  builds	  on	  the	  arguments	  presented	  previously	  –	  the	  critique	  of	  
Alexander	   Wendt’s	   “states	   are	   people	   too”,	   the	   defense	   of	   metaphorical	   thinking,	   the	   key	  
insights	  of	  the	  emotional	  turn	  in	  IR,	  and	  the	  potential	  contribution	  of	  constructionist	  psychology.	  
As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  thinking	  of	  states	  as	  if	  they	  were	  persons	  is	  still	  prevalent	  
in	   IR.	  This	  alone	  makes	   the	   following	  account	  a	  worthwhile	   inquiry.	  Further,	  as	  pointed	  out	   in	  
Chapter	   3,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   best	   understood	   as	   a	   metaphor.	   Although	   the	  
state-­‐as-­‐structure	  is	  real,	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  not.	  Conceptualising	  the	  state	  as	  a	  person	  is	  an	  
inherently	  metaphorical	  endeavour.	  The	  world	  of	  as-­‐if	   thinking	  seems	  safe	  because,	  at	   first,	   it	  
appears	   to	   have	   no	   ontological	   implications.	   However,	  my	   argument	   is	   that	   even	   though	   the	  
state	   is	   not	   really	   a	   person,	   thinking	   about	   states	   in	   terms	   of	   persons	   helps	   instantiate	   and	  
perpetuate	  the	  current	  structure	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  system	  of	  states.1	  	  
Wendt	  argues	  that	  “[o]ur	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  state	  is	  a	  person	  will	  depend	  
first	  on	  how	  we	  conceptualise	  persons,	  which	  is	  equally	  contested.”2	  This	  is	  indeed	  an	  important	  
question	  and	  my	  answer	  differs	  fundamentally	  from	  Wendt’s.	  When	  looking	  for	  a	  definition	  of	  
what	  a	  person	  is,	  the	  first	  problem	  encountered	  is	  the	  question	  of	  what	  framework	  to	  draw	  on.	  
For	   example,	   why	   would	   we	   privilege	   a	   psychological	   account	   over	   a	   sociological	   or	  
anthropological	  one?	  Why	  wouldn’t	  we	  draw	  on	  folk	  psychology	  or	  fictional	  accounts?	  And	  even	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Compare	  for	  example	  Charles	  Beitz	  critique	  that	  today’s	  international	  system	  builds	  on	  a	  nineteenth-­‐century	  
version	  of	  liberalism	  and	  the	  rights	  and	  duties	  it	  ascribed	  to	  persons.	  Beitz,	  Political	  Theory	  and	  International	  
Relations,	  esp.	  66.	  
2	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  292.	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after	  we	  have	  decided	  to	  give	  an	  account	  informed	  by	  psychology,	  it	  would	  still	  remain	  unclear	  
which	  psychological	  account	  to	  draw	  on.	  	  
In	  trying	  to	  approach	  Wendt’s	  question,	  I	  start	  from	  the	  following	  assumption:	  the	  way	  we	  make	  
sense	  of	  ourselves	  as	  people	  in	  a	  world	  of	  people	  is	  also	  the	  way	  we	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  state	  in	  
IR	   and	   ultimately	   come	   to	   think	   of	   it	   as	   a	   person.3	  This	   has	   important	   consequences	   for	   our	  
starting	  point	  in	  the	  search	  for	  an	  answer.	  My	  contention,	  as	  outlined	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  is	  
that	  constructionist	  psychology,	  taking	  its	  starting	  point	  from	  emphasising	  the	  role	  of	  language	  
in	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  self	  and	  emotions,	  can	  provide	  key	  insights	  in	  this	  regard.	  
By	  drawing	  on	  constructionist	  psychology,	  the	  answer	  given	  as	  part	  of	  this	  account	   is	  one	  that	  
de-­‐emphasises	   materialism	   and	   supposed	   essential	   qualities	   and	   looks	   to	   language	   for	   an	  
answer.	  It	  is	  also	  an	  account	  that	  starts	  from	  the	  everyday	  experiences	  of	  people.	  This	  particular	  
starting	   point	   distinguishes	   this	   project	   at	   the	   outset	   from	  Wendt’s	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person.	  The	  emphasis	  will	  be	  on	  the	  stories	  we	  tell	  about	  people,	  selves,	  and	  emotions.	  
Searching	  for	  the	  essence	  of	  a	  person	  or	  locating	  emotions	  and	  consciousness	  somehow	  “inside”	  
the	  person	  is	  rejected	  for	  the	  project	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  	  
Further,	   the	  move	   towards	  constructionist	  psychology	  also	  connects	  with	   the	   importance	   that	  
was	  given	   to	   the	   role	   that	  metaphors	  play	   in	  making	   the	  world	   intelligible	  and	   in	  creating	   the	  
social	  world	  in	  the	  first	  place	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  I	  agree	  with	  Erik	  Ringmar	  who,	  outlining	  a	  narrative	  
account	  of	  self,	  remarks	  that	  “[w]hat	  we	  take	  ourselves	  to	  be	  is	  not	  a	  question	  of	  what	  essences	  
constitute	  us,	  but	  instead	  a	  questions	  of	  what	  metaphors	  we	  apply	  to	  ourselves.”4	  	  	  
This	   chapter	   illustrates	   what	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   project	   looks	   like	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	  
constructionist	  psychology.	  I	  argue	  that	  self	  and	  emotions	  are,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  understanding	  
people	  in	  a	  world	  of	  people,	  best	  described	  as	  discursively	  established.	  Insights	  are	  drawn	  from	  
Rom	  Harré’s	  work	  and	  his	  The	  Singular	  Self	  in	  particular.	  Following	  his	  position	  and	  applying	  it	  to	  
the	  context	  of	  the	  state,	   it	   is	  argued	  that	  the	  state	  is	  constructed	  as	  a	  person	  by	  applying	  to	  it	  
the	  same	  language	  games	  that	  we	  use	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  ourselves	  and	  other	  people.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Compare	   Patrick	   T.	   Jackson	   for	   the	   suggestion	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   process	   of	   personation	   as	   a	   response	   to	  
Wendt’s	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   argument.	   Compare	   also	   the	   corresponding	   section	   in	   Chapter	   1.	   Jackson,	   'Hegel's	  
House,	  or	  'People	  Are	  States	  Too''.	  
4	  Ringmar,	   Identity,	   Interest	   and	   Action.	   A	   Cultural	   Explanation	   of	   Sweden's	   Intervention	   in	   the	   Thirty	   Years	  
War,	  75.	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I	   proceed	   in	   five	  main	   steps.	   First,	   I	   outline	   a	   fundamental	   distinction	   between	   two	   different	  
ontologies	  that	  Harré	   introduces.	  He	  argues	  that	  depending	  on	  choices	  about	  ontology	  we,	  on	  
the	  one	  hand,	   encounter	   a	  world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people	   and,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   encounter	   a	  world-­‐
seen-­‐as-­‐molecular-­‐clusters. 5 	  The	   choice	   of	   ontology,	   or	   grammar	   as	   Harré	   calls	   it,	   has	  
fundamental	  consequences	   for	  how	  we	  create	  an	  understanding	  of	   individual	  human	  beings.	   I	  
argue	  that	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  can	  only	  be	  usefully	  looked	  at	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  world-­‐
seen-­‐as-­‐people	  grammar.	  	  
Second,	   I	   outline	  Harré’s	   concepts	   of	   person	   and	   self	   and	   contrast	   it	  with	  Wendt’s	   approach.	  
Here,	   the	   emphasis	   will	   be	   on	   discursive	   construction	   of	   the	   self	   and	   its	   social	   and	  
intersubjective	  character.	  Third,	   I	   specifically	   look	  at	  Harré’s	   ideas	  about	   the	  self	  and	  how	   it	   is	  
discursively	   constructed.	  These	   insights	  will	  be	  used	   in	   the	   following	  chapter	   to	  work	   towards	  
showing	   what	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   looks	   like	   and	   to	   point	   to	   its	   implications	   for	  
systemic	  IR	  theorising	  about	  the	  state.	  	  
In	   a	   fourth	   step,	   the	   specific	   perspective	   of	   constructionist	   psychology	   on	   emotions	   is	  
introduced.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis,	  with	  its	  focus	  on	  psychological	  state-­‐personhood,	  this	  is	  
an	   important	   step	   to	   fill	   what	   has	   been	   perceived	   as	   a	   gap	   in	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   literature.	  
Further,	   in	   light	   of	   the	   emotional	   turn	   in	   IR	   and	   the	   association	   of	   this	   thesis	   with	   this	  
movement,	   constructionist	   psychology	   presents	   an	   important	   addition	   to	   an	   emerging	  
scholarship.	  	  
In	   the	   final	   part,	   I	   show	   that	  even	   from	   the	  perspective	  of	   constructionist	  psychology	  with	   its	  
emphasis	  on	  discourse,	  the	  body	  does	  matter	  after	  all.	  I	  take	  this	  point	  to	  further	  the	  argument	  
that	   the	   state	   is	   only	   ever	   a	   second-­‐order	   person.	   Even	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   scholars	   like	  
Harré	  with	  accounts	  that	  are	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  late	  Wittgenstinian	  insights,	  the	  state	  never	  
becomes	  a	  “real”	  person.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Compare	  for	  example	  Harré,	  'Discourse	  and	  the	  Embodied	  Person'.	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A	  world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people	  and	  a	  world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐molecules	  
Central	  to	  this	  chapter	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  how	  we	  make	  sense	  of	  ourselves	  is	  also	  how	  we	  
make	  sense	  of	  the	  state.	  To	  put	  this	  into	  the	  terminology	  that	  will	  be	  explained	  below	  one	  could	  
say	   that	  we	   can	   and	   do	   apply	   the	   same	   language	   game	   that	  we	   use	   to	  make	   sense	   of	   other	  
people	  and	  ourselves	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  states.	   In	  that	   limited	  sense,	  states	  are	  people,	  too.	  Or	  
rather,	  in	  that	  sense	  they	  are	  made	  into	  people,	  too.	  	  
Taking	   this	   as	   a	   staring	   point,	   it	   becomes	   important	   to	   ask	   how	   people	   make	   sense	   of	  
themselves.	   The	   previous	   chapter	   suggested	   a	   turn	   to	   psychology	   in	   order	   to	   answer	   this	  
question.	  However,	  as	  Chapter	  4	  illustrated,	  it	  is	  by	  no	  means	  clear	  what	  field	  of	  psychology	  to	  
draw	   on.	   I	   argued	   that	   the	   source	   domain	   for	   the	  metaphorical	   construction	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
person	  cannot	  be	  found	  in	  the	  entities	  and	  mechanisms	  postulated	  by	  a	  psychology	  rooted	  in	  a	  
materialist	   ontology	   and	   the	   epistemology	   and	  methods	   of	   the	   physical	   sciences.	   Rather,	   the	  
focus	  should	  be	  on	  the	  person	  being	  among	  other	  persons	  and	  not	  on	  hypothetical	  mechanisms	  
in	  the	  mind.	  	  
This	   chapter	   is	   best	   introduced	   by	   distinguishing	   between	   different	   ways	   of	  making	   sense	   of	  
people.	  I	  take	  this	  distinction	  from	  Harré	  who	  introduces	  two	  different	  approaches	  to	  studying	  
people	  by	  asking:	  “What	  if	  the	  nouns	  ‘body’,	  ‘mind’,	  ‘spirit’	  did	  not	  refer	  to	  parts	  of	  the	  person,	  
one	  visible	  and	  two	  invisible,	  but	  to	  ways	  of	  talking	  about	  people?”6	  He	  argues	  that	  body,	  mind,	  
and	  spirit	  are	  not	  entities	  we	  find	  in	  the	  world	  out	  there	  but	  represent	  different	  ways	  of	  making	  
sense	   of	   people.	   From	   these	   commonly	   encountered	   nouns	   Harré	   abstracts	   two	   different	  
“grammars	  of	  discourses	  on	  human	  life”.7	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  can	  speak	  about	  human	  beings	  
from	   the	   perspective	   of	   a	   “world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people”	   and	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   they	   can	   be	  
approached	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  “world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐molecular-­‐clusters”.8	  The	  term	  grammar,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Ibid.,	  	  99.	  
7	  Ibid.,	   	   102.	   It	   is	   worth	   noting	   here	   that	   in	   Cognitive	   Science,	   Harré	   distinguishes	   between	   four	   kinds	   of	  
grammars	   used	   to	   describe	   human	   beings.	   He	   sees	   three	   of	   them	   as	   valuable	   for	   developing	   psychology	  
further.	   These	   are	   the	   person	   grammar,	   the	   organism	   grammar,	   and	   the	   molecule	   grammar.	   See	   Harré,	  
Cognitive	  Science:	  A	  Philosophical	  Introduction,	  147-­‐166.	  
8	  Harré,	   'Discourse	  and	  the	  Embodied	  Person',	  100.	  See	  page	  102	  for	  a	  schematic	  overview	  and	  page	  107	  for	  
this	  exact	  terminology.	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building	   on	  Wittgenstinian	   insights	   and	   being	   consciously	   employed	   as	   a	  metaphor	   by	   Harré,	  
points	  to	  “a	  set	  of	  rules	  for	  the	  use	  of	  a	  symbolic	  system”.9	  	  
What	  does	  it	  mean	  then	  to	  look	  at	  states	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  person	  grammar?	  In	  the	  person	  
grammar,	   the	   focus	   is	   on	   “rule-­‐governed	   sequences	   of	   meanings”,	   rather	   than	   on	   a	   causal	  
picture.10	  Meanings	  and	   rules,	   in	   contrast	   to	  causal	  mechanism,	  are	   the	  preferred	  explanatory	  
mode.	  Further,	  the	  person	  grammar	  does	  not	  suppose	  any	  hidden	  thought	  processes,	  feelings,	  
and	   perceptions.11	  Rather,	   “it	   can	   be	   used	   to	   express	   what	   is	   presupposed	   when	   we	   treat	  
embodied	  persons	  as	  the	  basic	  particulars	  and	  originating	  sources	  of	  activity.	   It	   is	  expressed	  in	  
ways	   of	   doing	   things	   that	   we	   see	   everywhere	   in	   everyday	   life.”12	  The	   person	   grammar	   also	  
includes	  the	  rules	  for	  assigning	  responsibility	  and	  using	  moral	  concepts.13	  	  
Both	  grammars	  are	  drawn	  upon	  when	  we	   talk	  about	  human	  beings	  and	  each	  makes	  different	  
aspects	   visible.	   However,	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   firmly	   positioned	   in	   the	   “world-­‐
seen-­‐as-­‐people”	   grammar,	   the	   same	   grammar	   that	   is	   central	   to	   Harré’s	   research	   on	   persons,	  
selves,	   and	  emotions.	   This	   choice	  of	   grammar	  has	   far-­‐reaching	   implications	   for	  how	  we	   “see”	  
people	  and	  how	  we	  “see”	  states.	  	  
Ultimately,	   however,	   this	   is	   more	   than	   a	   decision	   on	   the	   kinds	   of	   words	   we	   use	   to	   describe	  
people	   or	   states.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   stress	   that	   deciding	   between	   these	   two	   grammars	   is	   a	  
decision	   on	   ontology.	   The	   “two	  worlds”	   each	   represent	   a	   fundamentally	   different	   ontology.14	  
According	  to	  Harré,	  the	  key	  question	  to	  ask	  for	  developing	  any	  kind	  of	  ontology	  is:	  What	  is	  the	  
source	   of	   the	   activity	   that	   we	   are	   interested	   in	   understanding?15	  Each	   of	   the	   grammars	   he	  
outlines	  is	  based	  on	  that	  question.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  person	  grammar,	  the	  source	  of	  
activity	  is	  the	  person.16	  Intentions,	  actions,	  and	  emotions	  originate	  from	  the	  person	  and	  cannot	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Ibid.	   Harré	   describes	   “grammar”	   as	   “one	   of	   the	   great	   metaphors	   of	   the	   age”.	   The	   “grammar”	   metaphor	  
serves	   as	   a	   useful	   description	   and	   orientation	   of	   his	   research	   focus.	   For	   the	   view	   of	   the	   grammar	   as	   a	  
metaphor	   see	   ibid.	   For	   explicit	   references	   to	   Wittgenstein	   see	   Harré,	   Cognitive	   Science:	   A	   Philosophical	  
Introduction,	  145,	  148	  and	  165.	  
10	  Harré,	  Cognitive	  Science:	  A	  Philosophical	  Introduction,	  152.	  
11	  Ibid.,	  	  163.	  
12	  Ibid.,	  	  148,	  emphasis	  added.	  
13	  Ibid.,	  	  148	  and	  165.	  
14	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Personhood,	  103	  and	  176.	  
15	  Harré,	  Cognitive	  Science:	  A	  Philosophical	  Introduction,	  162.	  
16	  This	   has	   to	   be	   understood	   in	   connection	  with	   the	   argument	   that	   persons	   are	   the	   basic	   particulars	   of	   the	  
person	   grammar.	   For	   the	   terminology	   “basic	   particular”	   compare	   also	   P.	   F.	   Strawson	   who	   connects	   “basic	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be	  ascribed	  to	  the	  world	  of	  molecules.	  Activities	  like	  reasoning,	  acting,	  and	  feeling	  cannot	  have	  
any	  other	  source	  but	  the	  person.	  Hence,	  the	  basic	  particular	  of	  this	  world	  is	  the	  person.	  I	  agree	  
with	  Harré	  and	   follow	  him	   in	   this	   important	  distinction.	  However,	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐
person,	  an	  important	  difference	  needs	  to	  be	  emphasised.	  People	  are	  the	  basic	  particulars	  in	  the	  
ontology	  of	   the	  world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people.	   In	   IR,	  many	  believe,	   and	   I	   join	   them	   in	   this	   belief,	   that	  
states	   are	   the	   basic	   particulars.	   However,	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   stressed	   that	   states	   are	   the	   basic	  
particulars	  only	  notionally.17	  The	  idea	  that	  the	  state	  is	  the	  source	  of	  activity	  in	  IR	  is	  based	  on	  the	  
assumption	   that	   states	   are	   the	   agents	   of	   IR.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   keep	   in	   mind	   that	   individual	  
human	  beings	  are	  the	  actual	  source	  of	  activity	  in	  IR.	  
I	  also	  follow	  Harré	   in	  arguing	  that	  the	  two	  ontologies	  cannot	  be	  separated	  completely.18	  Harré	  
argues	  that,	   roughly	  speaking,	  one	  ontology	  can	  be	  associated	  with	  materialism	  and	  the	  other	  
with	  constructivism.	  In	  Harré’s	  understanding,	  both	  are	  defined	  by	  what	  the	  other	  is	  not.	  Hence,	  
each	  perspective	   implies	  and	  depends	  on	  the	  existence	  of	   its	  opposite.19	  Harré	  argues	  that	  we	  
need	   to	   realise	   that	   the	  world	   of	   psychology	   is	   both:	   “It	   is	  molecular,	   though	  not	   constituted	  
wholly	   of	  molecules.	   It	   is	   a	   storied	  world,	   though	   it	   is	   not	  wholly	   constituted	  of	   narratives.”20	  
Yet,	  we	  usually	  only	  tell	  one	  of	  these	  stories	  at	  a	  time.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  case	  of	  one	  story	  mattering	  
more	  than	  the	  other;	  they	  are	  both	  valid	  for	  their	  respective	  purposes.	  To	   illustrate	  this	  point,	  
Harré	   uses	   the	   analogy	   of	   staining	   bacteria	   with	   a	   dye	   to	   render	   them	   visible	   under	   a	  
microscope.21	  A	   certain	   dye	  will	   only	  make	   certain	   bacteria	   visible.	   Choosing	   another	   dye	  will	  
make	  other	  bacteria	  visible.	  Broadly	  speaking	  we	  can	  tell	  two	  different	  stories	  about	  the	  human	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
particulars”	  with	   “being	  ontologically	  prior”.	  P.	   F.	   Strawson,	   Individuals.	  An	  Essay	   in	  Descriptive	  Metaphysics	  
(London:	  Methuen,	  1959),	  59.	  
17	  For	   the	   term	   notionally	   and	   its	   usage	   compare	   C.	   A.	   W.	   Manning,	   The	   Nature	   of	   International	   Society	  
(London	  and	  Basingstoke:	  Macmillan	  Press,	  1975	  [1962]),	  most	  explicitly	  27.	  
18	  In	   the	   introduction	   to	  The	   Singular	   Self,	  Harré	   refers	   to	   the	  pioneer	  psychologist	  Wilhelm	  Wundt	   and	   the	  
Wundtian	   understanding	   of	   psychology	   as	   a	   dual	   science.	   In	   the	   course	   of	   the	   book,	  Harré	   chooses	   to	   only	  
focus	  on	  one	  aspect	  of	  this	  dual	  science,	  namely	  the	  world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people	  shaped	  by	  discursive	  interactions.	  In	  
Cognitive	  Science,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  Harré	  is	  interested	  in	  conceptualising	  psychology	  as	  a	  “hybrid	  discipline”	  
that	  incorporates	  both	  aspects	  while	  keeping	  them	  distinct.	  See	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  
Psychology	  of	  Personhood,	  ix.	  See	  also	  Harré,	  Cognitive	  Science:	  A	  Philosophical	  Introduction,	  165.	  	  
19	  This	  is	  Harré’s	  argument	  in	  Harré,	  'Discourse	  and	  the	  Embodied	  Person',	  98.	  
20	  Ibid.	  
21	  Ibid.,	  	  101.	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world.	  In	  one	  case	  the	  world	  is	  seen	  as	  people	  and	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  things	  and	  other	  people,	  
and	  in	  the	  other	  case	  the	  world	  is	  seen	  as	  clusters	  of	  molecules.22	  	  
I	  argue	  that	  both	  of	  these	  stories	  can	  be	  told	  about	  people	  but	  only	  one	  of	  these	  stories	  can	  be	  
told	   about	   states-­‐as-­‐persons.	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   molecule	   ontology,	   the	   basic	  
particulars	   are	   molecules	   and	   the	   main	   mode	   of	   investigation	   is	   causation. 23 	  A	   molecule	  
ontology	   is	  not	  useful	  and	  not	  desirable	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	  We	  have	   seen	  
that	  in	  Social	  Theory	  Wendt	  aims	  to	  strike	  a	  middle	  ground	  between	  a	  materialist	  and	  an	  idealist	  
ontology	  by	  postulating	  rump	  materialism	  and	  by	  arguing	  that	  it	  is	  not	  “ideas	  all	  the	  way	  down.”	  
However,	   the	   key	   move	   in	   Social	   Theory	   is	   to	   introduce	   states’	   identities	   and	   interests	   to	  
systemic	   theorising.	   This,	   at	   least	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   Harré’s	   dual	   ontology,	   positions	  
Wendt’s	   states	   systemic	  project	   firmly	   in	   the	  person	  grammar	  where	   the	  basic	  particulars	  are	  
persons	  and	  not	  molecules.	  We	  need	   to	   firmly	   reject	   the	  molecular	  grammar	   for	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	   because	   none	   of	   the	   issues	   that	  matter	   ‒	   such	   as	   identities,	   interests,	   emotions,	   and	  
moral	   judgements	  ‒	  would	  be	   in	   focus.	  Harré	   cautions	   that	   “[h]uman	  beings	   in	   the	  molecular	  
ontology	  are	  machines	  with	  no	  moral	  attributes.”24	  Such	  a	  view	   is	  neither	   the	  aim	  of	  Wendt’s	  
state	  systemic	  project	  nor	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  suggested	  here.	  	  
With	   regard	   to	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   there	   is	   an	  even	   stronger	   reason	   for	  operating	  within	   the	  
person	   grammar.	   While	   both	   grammars	   are	   applicable	   to	   individual	   human	   beings,	   only	   the	  
person	   grammar	   can	   be	   used	   to	   understand	   the	   state.	   To	   illustrate	   this,	   another	   distinction	  
made	  by	  Harré	  needs	  to	  be	  introduced.	  Like	  the	  concept	  of	  grammar,	  it	  is	  also	  Wittgenstinian	  in	  
origin	  and	  also	  metaphorical	  in	  nature.	  	  
According	  to	  Harré,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  task	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  tool	  on	  
the	  other.25	  Tasks	  are	  set	  discursively	  and	  belong	  to	  the	  person	  grammar.	  Tools	  are	  material	  and	  
belong	   to	   the	   molecular	   grammar.	   Similar	   to	   what	   has	   already	   been	   said	   about	   the	   relation	  
between	   the	   two	   grammars,	   tasks	   and	   tools	   cannot	   be	   separated	   completely	   and	   depend	   on	  
each	  other.	  Neural	  mechanisms	  that	  belong	  to	  the	  material	  world	  of	  the	  molecule	  grammar	  are	  
tools	   that	   can	   be	   used	   for	   accomplishing	   tasks	   rooted	   in	   the	   person	   grammar.	  How	   the	   tools	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  For	  an	  overview	  see	  ibid.,	  	  102.	  	  
23	  Harré,	  Cognitive	  Science:	  A	  Philosophical	  Introduction,	  163.	  
24	  Ibid.	  
25	  For	  this	  and	  the	  following	  compare	  ibid.	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work	   is	   described	   and	   explained	   within	   the	   grammar	   of	   molecules.	   However,	   the	   role	   and	  
meaning	   of	   these	   tools,	   how	   they	   are	   used	   and	   why,	   can	   only	   be	   understood	   from	   the	  
perspective	  of	  the	  person	  grammar.	  	  
This	  means	  that	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  person	  ontology,	  the	  world	  of	  molecules	  matters	  in	  
so	  far	  as	  it	  provides	  the	  tools	  that	  enable	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  discursively	  set	  tasks.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  it	  
is	   useful	   for	   analytical	   purposes	   to	   separate	   the	   two	   while	   they	   are	   intertwined	   in	   practice.	  
However,	  beyond	  analytical	  convenience	  and	  the	  difficulties	  involved	  in	  attempting	  to	  tell	  both	  
stories	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  there	  are	  strong	  philosophical	  reasons	  to	  make	  and	  maintain	  the	  task/	  
tool	   division.	   Harré	   argues	   that	   “[t]here	   is	   a	   persistent	   and	  malign	   tendency	   in	   philosophy	   of	  
psychology,	   no	   less	   than	   in	   psychology	   itself,	   to	   assimilate	   the	   task	   to	   the	   tool.”26	  He	   warns	  
against	  establishing	  causation	  between	  material	  states	  and	  peoples’	  perceptions.27	  Reducing	  the	  
singular	  perceptual	  point	  of	  view	  of	  people	  to	  its	  material	  basis	  “would	  be	  like	  saying	  that	  in	  a	  
tennis	  match	   the	   racquets	  have	   scored	  40/30”.28	  To	   keep	  with	   the	   tennis	   image,	   racquets	   are	  
material	  tools	  that	  are	  used	  to	  accomplish	  the	  discursively	  established	  task	  of	  playing	  a	  game	  of	  
tennis.	  The	  rules	  of	   the	  game	  are	  not	  determined	  by	  the	  tools	   in	  any	  way.	  Further,	   the	  task	   is	  
only	  accomplished	  by	  virtue	  of	  a	  person	  connecting	  task	  and	  tool	  to	  play	  the	  game	  and	  achieve	  a	  
certain	   score.	  And	  both	   the	  game	  and	   the	   score	  only	  have	  meaning	  when	   looked	  at	   from	   the	  
person	  ontology.	  	  
With	   regard	   to	   individual	   human	   beings,	   the	   task/	   tool	   metaphor	   serves	   as	   an	   analytical	  
distinction	  but	  also	  as	  a	  warning	  against	  reducing	  the	  world	  of	  people	  to	  the	  world	  of	  molecules.	  
However,	   with	   regard	   to	   states-­‐as-­‐persons,	   the	   task/	   tool	   metaphor	   does	   more.	   It	   provides	  
another	   reason	  why	   states	   can	  only	  be	  persons	  notionally.	   Simply	  put,	  despite	  acknowledging	  
that	  tasks	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  tools,	  we	  still	  need	  to	  face	  the	  fact	  that	  states-­‐as-­‐persons	  have	  
the	  tasks	  but	  they	  do	  not	  have	  the	  tools.	  This	  means	  that	  states	  can	  only	  accomplish	  tasks	  on	  
the	   backs	   of	   individual	   human	   beings	   because	   “tools”	   are	   only	   available	   to	   embodied	   human	  
beings.	  Hence,	  I	  caution	  that	  the	  grammar	  of	  molecules	  is	  not	  applicable	  to	  state-­‐as-­‐persons.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Personhood,	  103.	  
27	  Ibid.,	  	  100.	  
28	  Ibid.	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Starting	   from	  the	  person	  grammar	  of	   constructionist	  psychology,	   in	   the	   following	   sections	   the	  
concepts	  of	  person	  and	  self	  as	  well	  as	  the	  role	  of	  emotions	  will	  be	  the	  focus.	  For	  the	  concept	  of	  
person	   and	   self,	   I	   will	   rely	   heavily	   on	   the	   conceptual	   framework	   developed	   by	   Harré	   in	   The	  
Singular	  Self.	  With	  regard	  to	  emotions,	  I	  will	  be	  looking	  at	  the	  wider	  literature	  on	  constructionist	  
psychology.	   A	   number	   of	   theories	   about	   emotions	   emphasise	   their	   bodily,	   neurological,	   or	  
biochemical	  basis.29	  While	  the	  explanatory	  value	  of	  these	  processes	  for	  certain	  purposes	  is	  not	  
denied,	   from	   the	   constructionist	   perspective,	  molecules	   are	   not	   part	   of	   the	   ontology.	   Hence,	  
what	  I	  will	  be	  emphasising	  in	  the	  following	  account	  is	  the	  discursive	  establishment	  of	  emotions	  
as	  well	  as	  their	  social	  role.	  	  	  
What	   follows	   from	  all	   of	   this	   is	   that	  we	   can	  argue	   that	   states	   are	  people	   too,	  but	  only	   in	   the	  
sense	  that	  the	  same	  language	  game	  that	  applies	  to	  people,	  their	  selves,	  and	  their	  emotions	  can	  
also	   be	   applied	   to	   states.	   On	   the	   level	   of	   language,	   states	   are	   people	   too,	   when	   the	   same	  
discourses	  applied	  to	  people	  are	  also	  applied	  to	  states.	  Ultimately,	  states	  are	  people	  too,	  as	  long	  
as	  we	  continue	  to	  play	  the	  language	  game	  of	  states-­‐as-­‐people.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  For	  an	  overview	  see	  for	  example	  Hewstone,	  Fincham,	  and	  Foster,	  Psychology,	  118-­‐119.	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Person	  and	  self	  in	  Harré’s	  account	  
People	   are	   an	   inevitable	   feature	  of	   how	  we	  experience	   the	  world.	   They	   form	  an	   inescapable,	  
fundamental	   aspect	  of	   our	  daily	   experience.30	  Given	   this	   centrality,	   it	   is	   un-­‐surprising	   that	   the	  
concept	   also	   features	   heavily,	   albeit	   most	   often	   in	   the	   more	   abstract	   sense	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
person,	  in	  IR.	  Related	  to	  this	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  “self”.	  Both	  are	  closely	  linked	  in	  everyday	  discourse.	  
For	  example,	  Wendt’s	  statement	  that	  “states	  are	  people	  too”	  goes	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  asserting	  
that	   states	  have	  selves.	  For	  Wendt,	   to	  be	  a	  person	  also	  means	   to	  have	  a	   self.	  For	  example,	   in	  
Social	   Theory	  he	   aims	   to	   show	   that	   “the	   state	   has	   a	   ‘Self,’	   as	   suggested,	   for	   example	   by	   the	  
realist	  assumption	   that	   states	  are	   ‘self’-­‐interested.”31	  Indeed,	   the	  notion	  of	   self-­‐interest	   is	  one	  
that	  features	  prominently	  in	  IR	  and	  especially	  among	  political	  realists.	  It	  is	  therefore	  paramount	  
to	  be	  precise	  regarding	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  “self”	  from	  a	  constructionist	  perspective	  and	  especially	  
how	  this	  idea	  works	  when	  used	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  state.	  	  
When	  speaking	  about	  individual	  human	  beings,	  the	  terms	  person	  and	  self	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  clear	  
location	   and	  meaning.	   The	   discursive	   conventions	   of	   everyday	   life	   allow	   for	   them	   to	   be	   used	  
intuitively	   without	   necessarily	   reflecting	   on	   them	   from	   a	   psychological	   or	   philosophical	  
perspective.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  state	  the	  same	  vocabulary	  is	  often	  used	  in	  a	  similarly	  intuitive	  
way.	  However,	  when	  speaking	  about	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  terms	  such	  as	  person	  and	  self	  demand	  
further	  reflection.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  This	  observation,	  which	  I	  make	  with	  Harré	  and	  his	  world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people	  in	  mind,	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  
unmovable	  certainty	  from	  which	  to	  start	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  culturally	  and	  historically	  specific	  conceptualisation	  of	  
persons.	  In	  his	  seminal	  essay	  “The	  category	  of	  the	  human	  mind”	  Marcel	  Mauss	  points	  to	  out	  how	  the	  ideas	  of	  
person	  has	  substantially	  changed.	  Our	  current	   focus	  on	  persons	  as	   the	  basic	  particulars	  of	  our	  world	  can	  be	  
seen	   as	   resulting	   from	   this	   development,	   but	   this	   connection	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   person	   with	   thought,	  
action,	  and	  moral	  values	  has	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  fairly	  recent	  phenomena.	  “From	  a	  simple	  masquerade	  to	  
the	  mask,	  from	  a	  ‘role’	  (personnage)	  to	  a	  ‘person’	  (personne),	  to	  a	  name,	  to	  an	  individual;	  from	  the	  latter	  to	  a	  
being	  possessing	  metaphysical	  and	  moral	  value;	  from	  a	  moral	  consciousness	  to	  a	  sacred	  being;	  from	  the	  latter	  
to	  a	  fundamental	  form	  of	  thought	  and	  action	  –	  the	  course	  is	  accomplished.”	  Marcel	  Mauss,	  'A	  Category	  of	  the	  
Human	   Mind:	   The	   Notion	   of	   Person;	   the	   Notion	   of	   Self',	   in	   The	   Category	   of	   the	   Person.	   Anthropology,	  
Philosophy,	  History,	  ed.	  Michael	  Carrithers,	  Steven	  Collins,	  and	  Steven	  Lukes	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  
Press,	  1985	  [1938]),	  22.	  For	  a	  useful	  critique	  of	  Mauss	  see	  Stanley	  Rudman,	  Concepts	  of	  Person	  and	  Christian	  
Ethics	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1997).	  Se	  also	  Michael	  Carrithers,	  'An	  Alternative	  Social	  History	  
of	   the	  Self',	   in	  The	  Category	  of	   the	  Person.	  Anthropology,	  Philosophy,	  History,	  ed.	  Michael	  Carrithers,	  Steven	  
Collins,	  and	  Steven	  Lukes	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1985).	  
31	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  215.	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Here,	  I	  aim	  at	  providing	  an	  alternative	  conception	  of	  persons	  and	  selves	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  
constructionist	   psychology.	   The	   key	   point	   underlying	   this	   alternative	   is	   the	   assumption	   that	  
persons,	   selves,	   and	   emotions	   are	   socially	   constructed.	   With	   regard	   to	   persons	   and	   selves,	  
Marcel	  Mauss	  remarks	  that	  “[f]ar	  from	  existing	  as	  the	  primordial	   innate	   idea,	  clearly	  engraved	  
since	  Adam	  in	  the	  innermost	  depths	  of	  our	  being,	   it	  continues	  …	  to	  be	  built	  upon,	  to	  be	  made	  
clearer	   and	   more	   specific,	   becoming	   identified	   with	   self-­‐knowledge	   and	   the	   psychological	  
consciousness.”32	  Linked	   to	   that	   is	   the	  contention	   that	  a	  project	   like	   the	  one	  undertaken	  here	  
cannot	  operate	  with	  definitions	  of	  persons	  and	  selves	  that	  are	  removed	  from	  how	  the	  terms	  are	  
used	  in	  social	  interaction.	  	  
Hence,	  I	  argue	  that	  understanding	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  necessitates	  an	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  
means	  to	  be	  a	  person	  with	  regard	  to	   individual	  human	  beings.33	  	  This	  brings	   the	  question	  of	  a	  
definition	   of	   “person”	   into	   our	   focus	   which	   is,	   even	   when	   “only”	   concerned	   with	   individual	  
human	   beings,	   a	   highly	   contested	   one.	   Drawing	   on	   different	   disciplines	   will	   bring	   out	  
dramatically	  different	  results	  and	  it	  remains	  unclear	  how	  privileging	  one	  over	  the	  other	  could	  be	  
justified.34	  Further,	   as	   Amélie	   O.	   Rorty	   reminds	   us	   “[t]he	   class	   of	   persons	   and	   the	   criteria	   for	  
their	   identity	   are	   defined	   by	   reference	   to	   a	   range	   of	   activities	   that	   are	   regarded,	   often	  
unselfconsciously,	  as	  centrally	  and	  normatively	  important	  to	  a	  culture,	  a	  historical	  period,	  or	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Mauss,	  'A	  Category	  of	  the	  Human	  Mind:	  The	  Notion	  of	  Person;	  the	  Notion	  of	  Self',	  20.	  
33	  This	   point	   is	   in	   line	   with	   the	   idea	   that	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   metaphorical,	   an	  
understanding	  according	  to	  which	  the	  individual	  human	  being	  serves	  as	  the	  source	  domain	  for	  understanding	  
the	  state.	  There	  is,	  in	  addition,	  also	  a	  philosophical	  argument	  to	  be	  made.	  In	  his	  famous	  essay	  “Freedom	  of	  the	  
Will	  and	   the	  concept	  of	  a	  person”	  Harry	  Frankfurt	  argues	   that	   the	   term	  person	  should	  only	  apply	   to	  human	  
beings	  and	  that	   its	  extension	   (to	  other	  species)	  “diminishes	  our	  philosophical	  vocabulary”.	  Most	  suggestions	  
for	  a	  definition	  of	  the	  concept	  are	  not	  actually	  about	  persons	  and	  lead	  to	  “the	  misappropriation	  of	  a	  valuable	  
philosophical	   term”.	   The	   terms	   person	   and	   people	   are	   designed	   “to	   capture	   those	   attributes	  which	   are	   the	  
subject	  of	  our	  most	  humane	  concern	  with	  ourselves	  and	  the	  source	  of	  what	  we	  regard	  as	  most	  important	  and	  
most	  problematical	  in	  our	  lives”.	  By	  utilising	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  aspects	  that	  are	  “the	  subject	  
of	  our	  most	  humane	  concern”	  become	  applicable	  to	  the	  state	  and	  IR.	  Harry	  G.	  Frankfurt,	  'Freedom	  of	  the	  Will	  
and	  the	  Concept	  of	  a	  Person',	  The	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  68,	  1	  (1971),	  5	  and	  6.	  
34	  For	  two	  key	  philosophical	  works	  on	  the	  person	  see	  for	  example	  A.	  J.	  Ayer,	  The	  Concept	  of	  a	  Person	  and	  Other	  
Essays	   (London,	   New	   York:	   Macmillan,	   St.	   Martin's	   Press,	   1963).	   And	   Strawson,	   Individuals.	   An	   Essay	   in	  
Descriptive	  Metaphysics.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  both	  are	  criticised	  by	  Frankfurt	  for	  being	  concerned	  with	  “the	  
problem	  of	  understanding	  	  the	  relation	  	  between	  mind	  and	  body,	  	  rather	  	  than	  the	  quite	  different	  	  problem	  	  of	  
understanding	  	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  	  a	  	  creature	  	  that	  not	  only	  has	  a	  mind	  	  and	  a	  body	  	  but	  	  is	  	  also	  a	  person.”	  This	  is	  
just	   one	   example	   that	   highlights	   how	   highly	   contested	   the	   concept	   of	   “person”	   is	   in	   philosophy.	   Frankfurt,	  
'Freedom	  of	  the	  Will	  and	  the	  Concept	  of	  a	  Person',	  5	  fn.	  1.	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  various	  approaches	  claiming	  to	  
identify	   necessary	   conditions	   of	   personhood	   see	   also	   Daniel	   Dennett,	   'Conditions	   of	   Personhood',	   in	   The	  
Identities	  of	  Persons,	  ed.	  Amélie	  Oksenberg	  Rorty	  (Berkeley	  and	  Los	  Angeles,	  CA:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  
1976).	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investigative	   context.”35	  Hence,	  a	   search	   for	  a	   timeless	  and	  cultureless	  definition	  misses	   those	  
aspects	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   person	   and	   self	   that	   are	   made	   and	   not	   given	   and	   that	   take	   on	   a	  
normative	  form.	  	  	  	  
In	  addition,	  making	   sense	  of	  psychological	  personhood,	  and	   related	   to	   that	   the	   self	  as	  well	   as	  
subjective	   experience	   expressed	   through	   emotions,	   poses	   particular	   challenges.	   As	   we	   have	  
seen,	   Harré	   argues	   that	   persons	   are	   the	   basic	   particulars	   of	   our	   world.	   In	   addition,	   we	   are	  
fundamentally	  bound	  up	  with	  our	  own,	   first-­‐person	  perspective	  of	   the	  world;	  we	  start	   from	  a	  
specific	  vantage	  point	  and	  cannot	  escape	   it.	  Harré	  argues	   that	  “[e]ach	  person	  experiences	   the	  
environment	  and	  his/her	  own	  body	  as	  centered	  on	  a	  vantage	  point	  …	  from	  which	  each	  person	  
perceives	   the	   world.	   For	   each	   person	   there	   is	   just	   one	   such	   field	   of	   objects	   and	   events	  
perceived,	  with	  just	  one	  center.”36	  Similarly,	  the	  philosopher	  Thomas	  Nagel	  in	  “What	  is	  it	  like	  to	  
be	  a	  bat?”	  points	  to	  the	  subjective	  character	  of	  our	  experience	  that	  is	  linked	  to	  a	  single	  point	  of	  
view.	  This	  particular	  view	  point	  is	  linked	  with	  consciousness	  as	  the	  expression	  of	  what	  “it	  is	  like	  
to	  be	   that	  organism	  –	  something	   it	   is	   like	   for	   the	  organism”.37	  We	  know	  what	   it	   is	   like	   to	  be	  a	  
person	   because	   we	   are	   psychological	   persons.	   This	   provides	   us	   with	   an	   inescapable	   point	   of	  
view	  from	  which	  we	  perceive	  the	  world.	  For	  example,	  the	  so-­‐called	  other	  minds	  problem	  points	  
to	  the	  challenge	  of	  knowing	  whether	  or	  not	  other	  people	  are	  psychologically	  complex	  and	  have	  
an	   inner	   life.	  We	  usually	  tend	  to	  assume	  that	  this	   is	   the	  case	  but	  can	  only	  do	  so	  based	  on	  the	  
overt	  behaviour	  that	  is	  perceivable	  and	  by	  analogy	  to	  our	  own	  experience.38	  	  
Before	   working	   towards	   an	   alternative	   conception	   of	   person	   and	   self,	   two	   points	   of	   caution	  
need	  to	  be	  expressed.	  First,	  while	  the	  political	  dimension	  of	  the	  status	  of	  personhood	  is	  not	  to	  
be	  underestimated,	  the	  pertinent	  question	  of	  who	  is	  allowed	  to	  enjoy	  the	  rights	  that	  come	  with	  
being	   recognised	   as	   a	   person	   socially	   and	   politically	   and	   who	   is	   denied	   these	   cannot	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Amélie	  Oksenberg	  Rorty,	  Mind	  in	  Action.	  Essays	  in	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Mind	  (Boston,	  MA:	  Beacon	  Press,	  1988),	  
6	  	  see	  also	  27ff.	  
36	  Harré,	  Cognitive	  Science:	  A	  Philosophical	  Introduction,	  155.	  	  
37	  Ultimately	  though	  –	  and	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  perspective	  of	  constructionist	  psychology	  pursued	  here	  –	  Nagel	  
writes	  to	  disentangle	  subjective	  and	  objective	  perspectives	  and	  to	  salvage	  a	  physicalist	  idea	  of	  mental	  states.)	  
Nagel,	  'What	  Is	  It	  Like	  to	  Be	  a	  Bat?',	  436.	  	  	  
38	  Compare	  Ayer	  but	  also	  note	  that	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  problematise	  this	  view.	  Ayer,	  The	  Concept	  of	  a	  Person	  and	  
Other	  Essays,	  86-­‐87.	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addressed	   from	   within	   this	   framework.39	  Secondly,	   I	   also	   differ	   from	   Wendt	   who,	   given	   his	  
alignment	  with	  philosophical	  realism	  and	  his	  emphasis	  on	  physicalism,	  searches	  for	  the	  “inside	  
constitution”	   of	   persons	   which	   presents	   the	   “hard	   case”	   for	   state	   personhood	   from	   his	  
perspective.40	  One	   of	   the	   key	   factors	   in	   his	   framework	   is	   a	   “self-­‐organising	   quality”	   which	  
provides	   for	   a	   “suitable	   inside”	   for	   persons	   and	   states-­‐as-­‐persons. 41 	  He	   argues	   that	  
“[p]sychological	  persons	  possess	  certain	  mental	  or	  cognitive	  attributes.”42	  This	  is	  fundamentally	  
different	  from	  the	  constructionist	  approach	  proposed	  here.	  	  
The	   starting	   point	   taken	   here	   is	   the	   question	   how	   individual	   human	   beings	   come	   to	   see	  
themselves	   and	   others	   as	   persons.	   Drawing	   on	   Harré,	   this	   is	   best	   accomplished	   by	   an	  
investigation	  into	  how	  the	  word	  “person”	  is	  used	  in	  everyday	  discourse	  and	  how	  it	  is	  a	  necessary	  
requirement	   for	   person-­‐oriented	   discourses	   to	   function.	   This	   also	   pays	   respect	   “to	   the	  
intellectual	   capacities	   of	   ordinary	   human	   beings	   as	   managers	   and	   interpreters	   of	   the	   social	  
world”.43	  Taking	  this	  point	   further,	  Harré	  argues	  that	  “[e]veryone	   is,	   in	  a	  certain	  sense,	  a	   fairly	  
competent	  social	  scientist,	  and	  we	  must	  not	  treat	  his	  (or	  he)	  theory	  about	  the	  social	  world	  and	  
his	  place	  in	  it	  with	  contempt.”44	  	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  to	  accomplish	  this	  we	  need	  to	  operate	  from	  within	  what	  Harré	  calls	  the	  person	  
grammar.	  	  
A	   Person	   or	   P	   grammar	   can	   be	   used	   to	   express	   what	   is	   presupposed	  
when	   we	   treat	   embodied	   persons	   as	   the	   basic	   particulars	   and	  
originating	   sources	   of	   activity.	   It	   is	   expressed	   in	   ways	   of	   doing	   things	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  A	  helpful	  distinction	  is	  the	  one	  introduced	  by	  Wendt	  regarding	  moral,	  legal,	  and	  psychological	  personhood.	  
Here,	   the	   focus	   will	   only	   be	   on	   psychological	   personhood.	  Wendt	   takes	   this	   distinction	   from	   Vincent,	   'Can	  
Groups	   Be	   Persons?'.	   The	   political	   dimension	   of	   personhood	   is	   also	   expressed	   in	   what	  Wendt	   calls	   “social	  
constitution”	  of	  persons.	  What	  comes	   into	  focus	   from	  this	  perspective	  are	  social	  conventions	  through	  which	  
personhood	  is	  bestowed	  onto	  some	  but	  not	  onto	  others.	  The	  status	  of	  personhood,	  being	  linked	  to	  rights	  and	  
obligations	   has	   far-­‐reaching	   consequences.	   From	   this	   perspective	   personhood	   is	   highly	   political.	   Compare	  
Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  293.	  For	  the	  argument	  to	  interpret	  state	  personhood	  as	  
personhood	  qua	  status	  see	  Kustermans,	  'The	  State	  as	  Citizen:	  State	  Personhood	  and	  Ideology'.	  
40	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  295.	  For	  physicalism	  and	  persons	  see	  also	  A.	  J.	  Ayer’s	  
The	  concept	  of	  a	  person.	  Ayer	  describes	  the	  physicalist	  point	  of	  view	  as	  having	  no	  other	  way	  to	  identify	  persons	  
than	  to	  identify	  their	  body.	  Experiences	  from	  the	  physicalist	  point	  of	  view	  are	  the	  same	  as	  statements	  about	  
conditions	  or	  movements	  of	  a	  body.	  Ayer,	  The	  Concept	  of	  a	  Person	  and	  Other	  Essays,	  90.	  
41	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  295.	  
42	  Ibid.,	  	  294.	  
43	  Harré,	  'Blueprint	  for	  a	  New	  Science',	  244.	  
44	  Ibid.,	  	  244,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	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that	  we	  see	  everywhere	   in	  everyday	   life.	   It	   is	  widely	  used	  to	  comment	  
on	  the	  actions	  of	  oneself	  and	  others.45	  
For	  the	  following	  discussion	  of	  persons	  and	  selves,	  I	  will	  heavily	  draw	  on	  Harré	  and	  especially	  his	  
The	   Singular	   Self.	   In	   The	   Singular	   Self	   he	   is	   mainly	   interested	   in	   “how	   	   people	   	   appear	   	   to	  
themselves	   and	   others	   as	   singular,	   individual	   and	   even	   unique	   beings”,46	  which	   brings	   the	  
“personal	   psychological	   attributes	   [that]	   are	   generated	   in	   the	   flow	  of	   talk	   and	  other	   forms	  of	  
action”47	  into	  the	  focus	  of	  his	  study.	  A	  key	  point	  for	  him	  is	  to	  argue	  against	  the	  Cartesian	  idea	  of	  
the	   self	   as	   an	   entity.48	  From	   the	   Cartesian	   perspective	   “there	  must	   be	   a	   substantive	  mind	   in	  
association	  with	  the	  body	  for	  there	  to	  be	  any	  person	  at	  all.”49	  For	  Harré	  the	  self	   is	  discursively	  
constructed	   and	   can	   only	   be	   “found”	   in	   the	   flow	   of	   interactions	   between	   people	   and	   not	  
somehow	  inside	  the	  person.	  	  
This	  leads	  to	  the	  thesis	  that	  persons	  are	  real,	  but	  selves	  are	  fictions.	  He	  explains	  that	  the	  self	  as	  
a	  fiction	   is	  taken	  to	  mean	  “that	  certain	  features	  of	  the	  flow	  of	  activity	  produced	  by	  persons	   in	  
interaction	  with	  one	  another	  are	  picked	  out	  in	  our	  ways	  of	  speaking	  and	  writing	  as	  entities,	  as	  if	  
they	  had	  an	  existence	  of	  their	  own”.50	  The	  self	  is	  a	  fiction	  that	  is	  necessary	  for	  person-­‐oriented	  
ways	  of	  thinking	  and	  speaking.	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  fiction	  of	  the	  self	  is	  necessary	  for	  us	  to	  be	  able	  
to	  orient	  ourselves	  in	  a	  world	  of	  people.	  	  
From	   this	   perspective,	   the	   self	   is	   a	   narrative.	   The	   key	   point	   is	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   the	   self	  
cannot	  be	   located	   inside	   the	  person	  or	   inside	   the	  mind.	  For	  Harré,	  building	  on	  Wittgenstinian	  
insights,	   “there	   is	   no	   epistemological	   gap	   between	   a	   sense	   of	   self	   and	   the	   expression	   of	   that	  
sense	  in	  one’s	  use	  of	  pronouns	  and	  other	  indexical	  devices.”51	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  is	  no	  sense	  
of	  self	  “inside”	  us	  that,	  after	  it	  is	  felt,	  is	  then	  expressed.52	  The	  sense	  of	  self	  comes	  about	  only	  in	  
the	  utterance;	  it	  is	  a	  pre-­‐requisite	  for	  us	  to	  function	  in	  a	  social	  world	  populated	  by	  people.	  The	  
idea	  of	  self	  is	  also	  bound	  up	  with	  the	  conventions	  of	  language.	  The	  person	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  a	  really	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Harré,	  Cognitive	  Science:	  A	  Philosophical	  Introduction,	  148.	  
46	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Personhood,	  126.	  
47	  Ibid.,	  	  127.	  
48	  See	  for	  example	  ibid.,	  	  4.	  	  
49	  Ibid.	  
50	  Ibid.,	  	  ix.	  
51	  Ibid.,	  	  45..	  
52	  This,	  of	  course,	  builds	  on	  “Wittgenstein’s	  thesis	  of	  the	  holism	  of	  expression	  and	  experience”.	  Ibid.,	  	  178.	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existing	  entity	  and	  provides	  a	   location	   for	   the	  self.	   	  The	  sense	  of	  self	  does	  not,	  however,	  exist	  
prior	  to	  its	  expression.	  Selves	  are	  fictions	  created	  as	  part	  of	  discourse	  rather	  than	  being	  an	  entity	  
alluded	  to	  or	  expressed	  through	  discourse.53	  	  
This	  marks	  a	  first	  important	  distinction	  with	  regard	  to	  states-­‐as-­‐person.	  While	  the	  person	  is	  said	  
to	  be	  a	  location	  in	  time	  and	  space,	  existing	  prior	  to	  discourse	  and	  making	  discourse	  possible	  in	  
the	  first	  place,	  the	  self	  is	  established	  only	  through	  discourse.	  Following	  Harré’s	  account,	  there	  is	  
a	   physical	   component	   that	   marks	   people	   as	   persons,	   but	   their	   identity,	   interests	   and	  
characteristics	  are	  established	  discursively.	  This	  physical	   component,	  providing	  an	   identifiable,	  
continuous	   location	   in	  time	  and	  space,	   is	   the	  minimum	  criterion	  for	  the	  application	  of	  person-­‐
oriented	  discourses.	  Going	  back	   to	  Patrick	  T.	   Jackson’s	   critique	  of	  Wendt,	  we	  can	   call	   this	   the	  
minimal	  criteria	  for	  the	  process	  of	  personation.54	  
Keeping	  these	  points	  in	  mind,	  we	  can	  argue	  that	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  needs	  to	  have	  
a	  location	  in	  space	  and	  time	  that	  enables	  us	  to	  unmistakably	  identify	   it	  and	  thus	  enables	  us	  to	  
utilise	   person-­‐oriented	  ways	  of	   speaking	  with	   regard	   to	   it.	   Further,	   the	   state’s	   characteristics,	  
interests,	  and	  identity	  are	  only	  established	  and	  maintained	  in	  dialogue.	  However,	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  
to	  argue	  that	  the	  state	  as	  such	  is	  a	  participant	  in	  this	  a	  dialogue.	  Rather,	  I	  argue	  that	  by	  applying	  
the	  conventions	  of	  person-­‐orientated	  talk	  to	  the	  state,	  the	  state	  is	  established	  as	  a	  person	  with	  
a	  sense	  of	  self.	  
In	  some	  ways,	  this	  sounds	  similar	  to	  Wendt’s	  contention	  that	  “we	  can	  properly	  attribute	  human	  
qualities	   like	   identities,	   interests,	   and	   intentionality”	   to	   the	   state.55	  There	   are	   a	   number	   of	  
similar	  passages	  in	  Wendt’s	  Social	  Theory	  that	  stress	  that	  human	  qualities	  are	  attributed	  to	  the	  
state	  which	   is	   different	   from	   saying	   that	   the	   state	  has	   these	   attributes.	   If	   only	   these	   kinds	   of	  
statements	  about	  “anthropomorphic	  talk	  about	  corporate	  agents”	  were	  taken	  into	  account,	  one	  
could	   almost	   be	   led	   to	   think	   that	  Wendt’s	   project	   is	   a	  metaphorical	   one,	   too.56	  However,	   this	  
needs	   to	   be	   contrasted	   with	   the	   Wendt	   who,	   given	   his	   philosophy	   of	   science	   view,	   has	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  It	   is	  worth	  emphasising	  how	  this	   runs	  counter	  to	  a	  Cartesian	  conception	  of	   the	  self	   (the	  ego)	  as	  an	  entity.	  
This	   serves	   as	   another	   reminder	   that	   the	   approach	   taken	   here	   differs	   from	   mainstream	   conceptions	   in	  
psychology.	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  this,	  see	  Chapter	  4.	  Compare	  ibid.,	  	  4.	  	  
54	  Jackson,	  'Hegel's	  House,	  or	  'People	  Are	  States	  Too''.	  
55	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  215.	  On	  attributing	  human-­‐like	  qualities	  to	  states,	  see	  also	  the	  
introduction	  to	  Wendt’s	  2004	  article.	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  289.	  
56	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  215.	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ultimately	   insist	   that	   the	   state	   really	   is	   a	   person	   qua	   its	   internal	   self-­‐organising	   structure.	  
Further,	  it	  is	  this	  view	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  establish	  a	  via	  media	  constructivism	  that	  leads	  Wendt	  to	  
search	  for	  essential	  characteristics	  of	  the	  state	  and	  to	  postulate	  a	  minimal	  rump	  materialism.57	  
In	  his	   2004	  essay,	  Wendt	  emphasises	  physicalism	  as	   the	   starting	  point	   for	  discussing	  whether	  
the	  state	  is	  a	  person,	  thus	  ruling	  out	  a	  discursive	  grounding	  for	  self	  and	  emotions.58	  Ultimately,	  
for	  him	  the	  state	  is	  a	  person	  and	  has	  a	  sense	  of	  self.59	  This	  is	  a	  key	  difference	  in	  the	  ontological	  
assumptions	   underlying	   Wendt’s	   project	   and	   the	   account	   of	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  
given	  here.	  	  
The	   important	  difference	   is	   that	  by	  drawing	  on	  constructionist	  psychology	  and	  by	   treating	   the	  
idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  as	  a	  conceptual	  metaphor,	  a	  search	  for	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐
person,	  for	  its	  mind	  or	  body	  is	  no	  longer	  necessary.	  In	  Social	  Theory,	  Wendt	  proposes	  that	  not	  
just	  behaviour	  but	  also	  states’	  identities	  and	  interests	  are	  shaped	  through	  interaction.	  The	  idea	  
of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  presented	   follows	  a	   similar	   line	  and	   takes	   this	   constructedness	   further.	  
Drawing	   on	   constructionist	   psychology	   allows	  me	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   very	   self	   of	   the	   person	   is	  
shaped	  entirely	   through	   interaction.60	  There	   is	   no	   self	  without	   and	   before	   the	  other.	   Hence,	   I	  
argue	   that	   the	   account	   developed	   here	   sees	   states-­‐as-­‐persons	   as	   more	   fundamentally	  
constructed	  than	  Wendt	  would	  allow	  for.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  This	  rump	  materialism	  is	  linked	  to	  his	  commitment	  to	  scientific	  realism.	  Wendt	  further	  points	  to	  two	  kinds	  of	  
rump	  materialism.	  For	  the	  state	   it	   is	  given	  by	  the	  brute	  material	   factors	  that	  have	   influence	  on	   international	  
life	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	   individual	  human	  beings	   it	   is	  given	  by	  human	  nature	  that	  creates	  fundamental	  human	  
needs.	  Ibid.,	  	  96,	  110-­‐111,	  as	  well	  as	  130-­‐132.	  
58	  Wendt,	   'The	  State	  as	  Person	   in	   International	  Theory',	  290.	   	  For	  physicalism	  and	  the	  concept	  of	   the	  person	  
also	  compare	  Ayer,	  The	  Concept	  of	  a	  Person	  and	  Other	  Essays,	  90.	  
59	  Compare	  for	  example,	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  215.	  
60	  Note	   however,	   how,	   in	   contrast	   to	   Wendt,	   in	   this	   account	   it	   is	   not	   the	   state	   that	   participates	   in	   the	  
discourses	  that	  shape	  states’	  selves	  but	  individual	  human	  beings.	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One	  person,	  three	  selves	  
Harré	  criticises	  that	  person	  and	  self	  are	  often	  used	  interchangeably.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  person	  is	  
taken	   to	   denote	   a	   location	   in	   time	   and	   space	   that	   allows	   us	   to	   identify	   and	   distinguish	   one	  
person	  from	  the	  other.	  In	  his	  account,	  the	  term	  self	  does	  “duty	  for	  the	  many	  aspects	  of	  personal	  
being	   that	   appear	   in	   personal	   and	   private	   regard”.61	  Based	   on	   this,	   he	   further	   distinguishes	  
between	  three	  kinds	  of	  self.	  Each	  of	  them	  is	  useful	   in	  further	  clarifying	  what	   is	   included	  in	  the	  
narrative	  of	  the	  self	  and	  what	  aspects	  might	  be	  relevant	  for	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  	  
To	  summarise,	  we	  can	  say	   that	  Self	  1	   is	   the	  sense	  of	  oneself,	   the	   idea	  of	  being	  separate	   from	  
others,	  and	  possessing	  a	  unique	  point	  of	  view.	  Self	  2	  describes	  the	  self-­‐concepts	  we	  hold	  about	  
personal	  characteristics	  as	  well	  as	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses.	  Self	  3	  is	  the	  presented	  self.	  On	  the	  
one	  hand	   it	   includes	   the	  picture	  we	   try	   to	  portray	   in	   interaction;	   on	   the	  other	   it	   includes	   the	  
impressions	  other	  people	  have	  of	  us.62	  Harré	  points	  out	   that	   it	   is	  highly	  problematic	  when	  the	  
“’self’	  in	  any	  of	  these	  senses	  is	  …	  treated	  as	  if	  it	  were	  an	  entity”.63	  This	  idea	  of	  entativity	  of	  the	  
self	   is,	   according	   to	   him,	   deeply	  misleading.64	  What	  matters	   to	   understand	   the	   self	   in	   any	   of	  
these	  senses	  is	  its	  narrative	  construction.	  
Self	  1	  is	  “a	  sense	  of	  one’s	  own	  point	  of	  view,	  at	  any	  moment	  a	  location	  in	  space	  from	  which	  one	  
perceives	   and	  acts	  upon	   the	  world,	   including	   that	  part	   that	   lies	  within	  one’s	  own	   skin”.65	  This	  
first	   self	   expresses	   the	   distinctiveness	   from	   other	   beings;	   and	   through	   the	   use	   of	   personal	  
pronouns	   indicates	   a	   distinctive	   location.66	  It	   describes	   the	   person	   as	   actor	   and	   perceiver.	   It	  
alludes	  to	  having	  a	  specific	  point	  of	  view	  from	  which	  to	  perceive	  the	  world	  and	  from	  which	  to	  
act.67	  Perception	  and	  agency	  are	  key	   features	  of	  Self	  1.	  Perception	   is	  based	  on	   the	   location	  of	  
the	  body	  and	   its	  perceptual	   field.68	  Agency,	  Harré	  argues,	   can	  be	  no	   further	  grounded	   than	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Personhood,	  73.	  
62	  Ibid.,	  	  137.	  
63	  Ibid.,	  	  4.	  
64	  Ibid.	   Compare	   also	   Kenneth	   J.	   Gergen,	   The	   Concept	   of	   Self	   (New	   York:	   Holt,	   Rinehart	   and	  Winston,	   Inc.,	  
1971),	  14.	  	  
65	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Personhood,	  4.	  	  
66	  Ibid.,	  	  95.	  Harré	  takes	  this	  from	  Michael	  J.	  Apter’s	  definition	  of	  consciousness.	  He	  refers	  to	  Michael	  J.	  Apter,	  
'Negativism	   and	   the	   Sense	   of	   Identity',	   in	   Threatened	   Identities,	   ed.	   Glynis	   M.	   Breakwell	   (Chichester:	   John	  
Wiley	  &	  Sons,	  1983),	  76.	  
67	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Personhood,	  123	  and	  126,	  compare	  also	  177.	  
68	  Ibid.,	  	  95.	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the	  person.69	  Agency,	  when	  discursively	  accounted	  for	  as	  it	  is	  done	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  Self	  1,	  is	  
“a	  social	  construction	  created	  in	  the	  course	  of	  telling	  the	  story	  of	  an	  action”.70	  This	  is	  also	  linked	  
to	  taking	  responsibility	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  “the	  first	  person	  [pronoun]	  is	  used	  not	  only	  to	  index	  a	  
statement	  with	   the	   location	  of	   the	   embodied	   speaker	   in	   space	  but	   also	   as	   a	  means	   by	  which	  
responsibility	  is	  taken.”71	  	  
Self	  2	  points	  to	  the	  set	  of	  attributes	  that	  are	  unique	  to	  a	  person	  and	  distinguish	  that	  person	  from	  
others.72	  This	   includes	   dispositions	   and	   powers	   as	   well	   as	   public	   and	   private	   thoughts	   and	  
feelings.73	  Self	   2	   is	   expressed	  when	   the	  person	   takes	  on	   the	   role	  of	   the	  narrator	   and	  gives	   an	  
autobiographical	  account.	  For	  example,	  replies	  to	  a	  questionnaire	  about	  self-­‐esteem	  give	  insight	  
into	  Self	  2.	  However,	  in	  that	  sense,	  the	  answers	  to	  such	  a	  questionnaire	  do	  not	  allude	  to	  hidden	  
causal	   attributes.	   Rather,	   they	   present	   a	   summary	   of	   what	   characteristics	   a	   person	   believes	  
themselves	   to	   have.74	  Moreover,	   in	   reporting	   about	   these,	  we	   “must	   draw	  on	   certain	   implicit	  
conventions	   for	   talking	  or	  writing	  about	  oneself	   to	  others,	   such	  as	  when	   it	   is	  proper	   to	  give	  a	  
catalogue	  of	  one's	  achievements,	  whether	  self-­‐deprecation	  is	  in	  order	  and	  so	  on”.75	  It	  is	  in	  that	  
sense	  that	  Self	  2	  already	  involves	  other	  people	  and	  the	  wider	  social	  and	  cultural	  context.	  	  
Self	   3	   refers	   to	   the	   “totalities	   of	   personal	   impressions”	   made	   on	   others.76	  What	   a	   person	  
believes	  the	  Self	  2	  to	  be	  about	  is	  expressed	  in	  Self	  3.	  It	  describes	  how	  we	  present	  ourselves	  and	  
involves	   choices	   about	   this	   presentation.	   Self	   3	   then	   involves	   two	   aspects:	   what	   the	   person	  
intends	   to	   project	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   the	   impressions	   made	   on	   others	   through	   their	  
interpretation	   of	   actions	   and	   speech	   on	   the	   other.77	  Self	   3	   is	   very	   much	   guided	   by	   social	  
expectations	  and	  norms	  of	  behaviour	  and	  rules	  for	  appropriateness.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Ibid.,	  	  116.	  
70	  Ibid.,	  	  123.	  
71	  Ibid.	  
72	  Ibid.,	  	  4.	  
73	  Ibid.,	  	  126.	  
74	  Ibid.,	  	  132.	  
75	  Ibid.,	  	  131.	  
76	  Ibid.,	  	  5.	  
77	  Ibid.,	  	  177.	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Taking	   these	   points	   together,	   it	   becomes	   clear	   how	   important	   narrative	   is	   for	   the	   self	   to	   be	  
established.78	  It	   is	   realised	   through	   narrative	   conventions,	   which	   matter	   more	   than	   logically	  
coherent	   accounts.	   In	   trying	   to	   understand	   the	   self,	   storytelling	   conventions	   need	   to	   be	  
emphasised	  rather	  than	  hypothetico-­‐deductive	  methods.79	  In	  this	  sense,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  “[l]ives	  
are	   lived	   according	   to	   the	   same	   conventions	   in	   accordance	  with	  which	   lives	   are	   told.”80	  Here,	  
Harré	   points	   to	   similarities	   between	   the	   stories	   of	   our	   own	   lives,	   Greek	   mythology,	   classical	  
dramas,	  as	  well	  as	  soap	  operas.	  From	  this	  it	  is	  not	  a	  big	  step	  to	  also	  argue	  that	  the	  stories	  about	  
the	   state	   and	   the	   self	   of	   the	   state	   can	   be	   said	   to	   follow	   along	   similar	   patterns	   of	   storytelling	  
conventions.	  	  
However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  note	   that	   these	  narrative	   conventions	   are	   culturally	   specific.81	  For	  
example	   with	   regard	   to	   agency	   and	   responsibility,	   we	   can	   note	   some	   prominent	   cultural	  
differences.	  According	  to	  modern	  Western	  language	  conventions,	   in	   line	  with	  an	  individualistic	  
culture,	  the	  phrase	  “I	  did	  this”	  is	  a	  means	  of	  ascribing	  agency	  and	  taking	  responsibility	  (Self	  1).	  In	  
contrast,	  Harré	  points	  out	  how	  in	  Japanese	  “first	  person	  expressions	  …	  are	  used	  to	  diffuse	  rather	  
than	   to	   take	   responsibilities”.82	  Further,	   more	   fundamental	   for	   and	   indicative	   of	   the	   relation	  
between	  language	  and	  possible	  concepts	  of	  self	  is	  the	  observation	  made	  by	  Richard	  Ned	  Lebow	  
who	   points	   out	   that	   “[t]he	   Japanese	   word	   for	   self-­‐esteem	   –	   serufu	   esutimo	   –	   comes	   from	  
English	   as	   there	   is	   no	   indigenous	   term	   that	   captures	   the	   concept	   of	   feeling	   good	   about	  
oneself.”83	  
Having	  introduced	  Harré’s	  three	  senses	  of	  self,	  there	  are	  some	  interesting	  parallels	  to	  be	  drawn	  
with	   regard	   to	  Wendt’s	   conception	  of	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  For	  Wendt,	   it	   is	  a	   sense	  of	   “I”	   that	  
distinguishes	  humans	  (agents)	  from	  non-­‐humans	  (non-­‐agents).84	  If	  we	  follow	  Harré,	  this	  sense	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  From	  within	  IR,	  compare	  for	  example	  Erik	  Ringmar	  for	  a	  similar	  point	  Ringmar,	  Identity,	  Interest	  and	  Action.	  
A	  Cultural	  Explanation	  of	  Sweden's	   Intervention	   in	   the	  Thirty	  Years	  War,	  75-­‐78.	  He	   references	  among	  others	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   Time,	   Narrative	   and	   History	   (Bloomington:	   Indiana	   University	   Press,	   1986).	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  Harré,	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  141	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   Bruner,	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   (1991).	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   Harré,	   The	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  An	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  the	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  of	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  142.	  
81	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Personhood,	  123	  as	  well	  as	  141.	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  Ibid.,	  	  123.	  
83	  Lebow,	  A	   Cultural	   Theory	   of	   International	   Relations,	   129.	   For	   this	   observation	   Lebow	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   on	   Richard	   E.	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  Geography	  of	  Thought:	  How	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  Why	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  York:	  Free	  
Press,	  2004),	  54.	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  Wendt,	  Social	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“I”	   (Harré’s	   Self	   1)	   is	   established	   discursively	   and	   cannot	   be	   searched	   for	   inside	   the	   mind.	  
Despite	   Wendt’s	   insistence	   on	   materialism	   and	   his	   argument	   in	   favour	   of	   essential	  
characteristics	   of	   persons	   and	   states-­‐as-­‐persons,	   we	   do	   find	   a	   similar	   account	   in	   his	   Social	  
Theory.	  Here,	  Wendt	  also	  describes	   this	   sense	  of	  “I”	  as	  a	  narrative.	  He	  adds	   that	  “[t]his	   is	   still	  
more	  true	  of	  states,	  which	  do	  not	  even	  have	  ‘bodies’	  if	  their	  members	  have	  no	  joint	  narrative	  of	  
themselves	  as	  a	  corporate	  actor.”85	  We	  can	  conclude	  that	  Wendt	  also	  describes	  the	  self	   in	  the	  
three	   senses	   introduced	   above	   as,	   at	   least	   in	   part,	   established	   by	   narrative.	   His	   assumption,	  
underlying	   Social	   Theory,	   that	   identities	   and	   interests	   are	   established	   in	   symbolic	   exchanges	  
paves	  the	  way	  for	  this	  point.	  What	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  though	  is	  that	  narrative	  seems	  to	  play	  
an	  even	  more	  important	  role	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  state.	  The	  statement	  implies	  that	  narrative	  
stands	   in	  for	  the	  body	  that	  a	  corporate	  actor	  such	  as	  the	  state	   lacks.	   In	  this	  passage,	  Wendt	   is	  
closer	   to	   Harré’s	   position	   on	   the	   person	   and	   self	   than	   the	   rump	   materialism	   and	   essential	  
characteristics	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   introduced	   in	   earlier	   parts	   of	   Social	   Theory	   seem	   to	  
suggest.	  Yet,	  in	  his	  2004	  article,	  Wendt	  emphasises	  physicalism,	  which	  ultimately	  prevents	  him	  
from	  allowing	  for	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  entirely	  “by	  thought”.86	  
However,	  Harré’s	  conception	   is	  still	  more	  radical	   in	  the	  sense	  that	   it	  allows	  us	  to	  question	  the	  
constitution	  of	  the	  person	  more	  fundamentally	  and	  brings	  us	  almost	  “all	   the	  way	  down”	   in	  an	  
idealist	  ontology.	  The	  person	  is	  described	  as	  little	  more	  than	  a	  location	  in	  time	  and	  space;	  and	  
the	  self	  is	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	  narrative	  which	  gives	  individual	  characteristics	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  “I”	  to	  
the	   person.	   This	   conception	   frees	   us	   from	   having	   to	   make	   assumptions	   about	   fundamental	  
biological	   drives	   that	   often	   go	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   speaking	   about	   persons.	   It	   is	   grounded	   in	  
Harré’s	  clear	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  kinds	  of	  ontology:	  a	  world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐molecules	  on	  the	  
one	   hand	   and	   a	   world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people	   on	   the	   other.	   In	   a	   world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people,	   the	   person’s	  
body	  provides	  a	  location	  in	  time	  and	  space	  that	  is	  a	  requisite	  for	  a	  people-­‐orientated	  discourse	  
to	  take	  place.	  However,	  everything	  that	  matters	  with	  regard	  to	  people	  in	  a	  social	  context	  is	  not	  
seen	  as	  being	  given	  to	  them	  by	  “molecules”	  but	  only	  through	  discursive	  interaction.	  	  
In	   his	   2004	   article,	   “The	   state	   as	   person	   in	   international	   theory”,	   after	   having	   addressed	   the	  
intentionality	  of	   states-­‐as-­‐persons,	  Wendt	   aims	  at	  walking	   the	   reader	   through	  possibilities	   for	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  State	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“thicker	   ways	   in	   which	   states	   might	   be	   persons”87	  and	   therefore	   addresses	   the	   state	   as	   an	  
organism	   as	   well	   as	   possibilities	   for	   state	   consciousness.	  While	   rejecting	   the	   idea	   that	   states	  
might	   be	   organisms,	   he	   argues	   that	   they	   might	   be	   superorganisms	   “whose	   identity	   is	  
constituted	  not	  physically	  but	  by	  thought”.88	  In	  Wendt’s	  conception,	  much	  like	  in	  Harré’s,	  being	  
a	  person	   is	   linked	  to	  having	  a	  spatio-­‐temporal	   identity.89	  He	  further	  argues	  that	  this	   identity	   is	  
given	   in	   physical	   terms	   for	   humans;	   it	   is	   their	   skin	   that	   creates	   spatio-­‐temporal	   identity.	   But	  
since	   states	   can	  at	  most	  be	   superorganisms,	   their	   spatio-­‐temporal	   identity	   cannot	  be	  given	   in	  
physical	  terms.	  However,	  	  
instead	   of	   a	   physical	   criterion	   we	   might	   use	   thought	   to	   define	  
superorganism	  identity	  …	  The	  idea	  here	  is	  that	  it	  is	  the	  participation	  of	  
individuals	  in	  a	  collective	  thought	  process	  (in	  this	  case,	  in	  a	  ‘narrative	  of	  
state’),	  whose	  boundaries	  are	  instantiated	  by	  the	  practices	  that	  produce	  
and	  reproduce	  that	  process,	  which	  enables	  superorganisms	  to	  survive.90	  	  	  
Again,	  we	  find	  similarities	  between	  Wendt’s	  conception	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  and	  Harré’s	  ideas	  
on	  persons	  and	  selves.	  As	  already	  mentioned,	  this	   is	  surprising	  given	  Wendt’s	  physicalism	  with	  
regard	  to	  persons	  and	  his	  materialist	  and	  essentialist	  leanings	  that	  are	  evident	  in	  other	  passages	  
of	  Social	  Theory	  and	  the	  “The	  state	  as	  person”.	  	  
However,	   the	   difference	   between	   person	   and	   self	   teased	   out	   by	   Harré	   is	   key.	   To	   clearly	  
differentiate	   the	   two,	   as	   in	  Harré’s	   account,	   seems	   to	   be	   an	   important	   first	   step.	  On	   the	   one	  
hand,	  there	  is	  a	  spatio-­‐temporal	  existence	  which	  is	  addressed	  as	  “person”.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
there	  is	  the	  self	  that	  is	  created	  in	  interaction	  with	  others.	  In	  this	  account	  of	  human	  beings,	  which	  
belongs	  to	  the	  world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people	  ontology,	   the	  physical	   (the	  person)	   is	  a	  mere	   location	  for	  
the	  narrated	  (the	  self).	  	  
Wendt	  suggests	   that	   the	  state,	  understood	  as	  a	  superorganism,	   is	   instantiated	  by	   thought.	  He	  
argues	   that	   while	   the	   state	   cannot	   be	   said	   to	   be	   an	   organism	   because	   it	   is	   composed	   of	  
autonomous	   individuals	  and	  does	  not	  engage	   in	  genetic	   reproduction,	  we	  can	  conceptualise	   it	  
as	   a	   superorganism.	   However,	   this	   intertwines	   the	   two	   worlds	   that	   Harré	   proposes	   to	   keep	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  following	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distinct,	  the	  world	  of	  people	  and	  the	  world	  of	  molecules.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  this	  project,	  
this	  is	  an	  unhelpful	  union.	  While,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  it	  is	  possible	  yet	  questionable	  to	  
utilise	  organismic	  metaphors	  for	  the	  state,	  this	  is	  irrelevant	  for	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  
person	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  constructionist	  psychology.	  	  
Some	  of	  Wendt’s	  suggestions	  do	  fit	  very	  well	  with	  the	  view	  of	  people	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  
constructionist	   psychology	   introduced	   here	   through	   a	   focus	   on	   Harré’s	   account.	   However,	  
ultimately,	  Wendt	   arrives	   at	   a	   different	   conclusion	   regarding	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   because	   the	  
material	  world	  still	  matters	  substantially	  in	  his	  account	  and	  he	  proposes	  essential	  characteristics	  
of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  	  	  
In	   this	   context,	   it	   is	   also	  worth	   looking	   at	  Wendt’s	   discussion	   of	   the	   idea	   of	   consciousness	   of	  
states-­‐as-­‐persons.	   In	   his	   account,	   consciousness	   is	   strongly	   linked	   to	   the	   ability	   for	   subjective	  
experience	   and	   emotions	   are	   taken	   to	   be	   an	   important	   instance	   of	   subjective	   experience.91	  
Regarding	  the	  possibility	  of	  consciousness	  he	  argues	  that	  it	  might	  be	  narratives	  that	  give	  states	  
their	  subjective,	  emotional	  perspective.92	  Again,	   this	  suggestion	   is	  similar	  to	  the	  perspective	  of	  
constructionist	  psychology.	  However,	  Wendt	  stresses	  that	  subjectivity	  is	  also	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  
narrative;	   hence	   narratives	   in	   themselves	   are	   not	   enough	   to	   constitute	   consciousness.93	  He	  
discusses	   the	   possibility	   that	   the	   state	  might	   hold	   “an	   ersatz	   subjectivity”,	   which	   describes	   a	  
situation	  where	  individual	  human	  beings	  experience	  emotions	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  state.94	  	  
Yet,	  Wendt	   stresses	   that	   this	   is	   not	   sufficient	   to	   argue	   that	   states	   have	   consciousness	   from	  a	  
philosophical	  realist	  view.	  While	  he	  argues	  that	  “[t]here	  is	  certainly	  much	  interesting	  work	  to	  be	  
done	   even	  with	   this	   distributed	   approach	   to	   state	   emotions”,	   given	   his	   philosophy	   of	   science	  
commitments,	  he	  rejects	  a	  view	  of	  states-­‐as-­‐persons	  that	  describes	  individual	  human	  beings	  as	  
experiencing	  emotions	  on	  behalf	  of	  states.95	  In	  contrast	  to	  that,	  approaching	  persons	  from	  the	  
perspective	  of	  constructionist	  psychology	  allows	  for	  not	  placing	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  experience	  
of	  an	  emotion;	  what	  matters	  is	  the	  expression	  of	  an	  emotion	  through	  language	  and	  interaction.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  Note	  how	  there	   is	  a	  marked	  difference	  between	  Wendt’s	  and	  Harré’s	  accounts	  from	  the	  beginning.	   	  Harré	  
argues	  that	  the	  study	  of	  consciousness	  is	  exhausted	  by	  the	  study	  of	  perception	  which	  is	  part	  of	  his	  first	  sense	  
of	  self.	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Personhood,	  95.	  	  
92	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  313-­‐314.	  
93	  Ibid.,	  	  314.	  
94	  Ibid.,	  	  314,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
95	  Ibid.,	  	  314.	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Constructionist	  psychology	  refuses	  to	  speculate	  about	  or	  attempt	  to	  investigate	  what	  is	  going	  on	  
inside	   the	   mind.	   It	   rejects	   the	   idea	   that	   we	   can	   understand	   or	   explain	   what	   the	   “actual”	  
emotions	   behind	   actions	   are.	   All	  we	   should	   focus	   on,	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   constructionist	  
psychology,	   and	   all	  we	   actually	   can	   focus	   on	   is	   the	   expression	   of	   the	   self	   and	   of	   emotions	   in	  
interaction.	  	  
What	   can	   be	   noted	   from	   this	   is	   that,	   at	   least	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   Wendt	   is	  
relatively	  close	  to	  a	  position	  taken	  in	  constructionist	  psychology.	  However,	  this	  closeness	  comes	  
in	  the	  form	  of	  concessions	  that	  are	  made	  because	  the	  state	  is	  a	  corporate	  actor.	  This	  is	  a	  heavy	  
qualification	  to	  the	  statement	  that	  “states	  are	  people	  too”.	  Hence,	  for	  Wendt,	  states-­‐as-­‐persons	  
seem	  to	  be	  part	  of	  a	  more	  radical	  process	  of	  construction	  than	  he	  would	  be	  happy	  to	  admit	  with	  
regard	  to	  individual	  human	  beings.	  	  
It	   also	   becomes	   clearer	   how	   the	   conception	  of	   states-­‐as-­‐persons	   developed	  here	   differs	   from	  
Wendt’s.	  To	  mark	  this	  difference,	  the	  distinction	  between	  person	  and	  self	  made	  by	  Harré	   is	  of	  
importance.	  The	  (individual)	  self	  is	  established	  as	  part	  of	  a	  narrative.	  And	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  same	  
language	  game	  used	  by	  individual	  human	  beings	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  themselves	  and	  others	  can	  be	  
applied	  to	  states.	  The	  person	  from	  this	  perspective	  is	  first	  and	  foremost	  a	  location	  in	  space	  and	  
time	   necessary	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   narrative	   of	   the	   self.	   Wendt	   stresses	   that	   engaging	   in	   a	  
narrative	  of	  emotions	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  a	  experiencing	  these	  emotions.	  For	  Wendt,	  this	  point	  
poses	   a	   problem	   for	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   from	   a	   philosophical	   realist	   perspective.	   For	   my	  
account,	   being	   based	   in	   constructionist	   psychology,	   it	   does	   not.	   The	   two	   positions	   reflect	  
different	   views	   on	   human	   embodiment	   and	   its	   role	   in	   establishing	   persons,	   selves,	   and	  
emotions.	   These	   two	   positions	   also	   reflect	   different	   epistemological	   and	   ontological	  
commitments:	  Wendt’s	  position	  is	  grounded	  in	  scientific	  realism	  combined	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  
material	   factors	   whereas	   the	   position	   taken	   here	   is	   grounded	   in	   a	   strong	   version	   of	  
constructivism	   which	   gives	   primacy	   to	   ideational	   factors	   and	   argues	   for	   the	   primacy	   of	  
language.96	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  This	   is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  scientific	  realism	  and	  constructivism,	  understood	  broadly,	  are	   incompatible.	   Jackson	  
elaborates	   on	   this	   point	   very	   clearly	   and	   in	   fact	   convincingly	   shows	   how	   constructivism	   can	   be	   seen	   as	  
compatible	  with	  all	  four	  scientific	  stances	  (including	  critical	  realism	  and	  empiricism)	  that	  he	  outlines.	  The	  key	  
distinction	  made	  here,	   rather	   than	  being	  between	   scientific	   realism	  and	   constructivism,	   focuses	  on	  possible	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One	  last	  point	  that	  matters	  in	  this	  context	  is	  the	  question	  of	  where	  the	  elements	  for	  the	  story	  of	  
the	  self	  come	  from.	  As	  can	  be	  expected	  from	  the	  account	  presented	  so	  far,	  essential	  qualities	  of	  
persons	  and	  especially	  those	  that	  are	  elements	  of	  the	  world	  of	  molecules	  do	  not	  matter.	  Selves	  
are	  not	  given;	  they	  are	  neither	  given	  to	  us	  through	  our	  biochemistry	  nor	  our	  neuro-­‐physiology.	  
The	   elements	   of	   the	   story	   of	   the	   self	   are	   fundamentally	   social:	   they	   are	   shared	   and	   they	   are	  
acquired.	   Harré	   points	   out	   that	   “’selves’	   are,	   by	   and	   large,	   produced	   discursively,	   that	   is	   in	  
dialogue	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  joint	  action	  with	  real	  and	  imagined	  others.	  Selves	  are	  not	  entities,	  
but	  evanescent	  properties	  of	  the	  flow	  of	  public	  and	  private	  action.”97	  	  	  
The	  perspective	  taken	  here	  denies	  the	  essential	  qualities	  of	  persons	  outlined	  by	  Wendt.	  There	  is	  
nothing	   essential	   about	   persons	   that,	   given	   an	   interest	   in	   states-­‐as-­‐persons,	   we	   could	   try	   to	  
identify	   and	   then	  use	   to	  make	   sense	  of	   the	   state.	  What	  matters	  are	   the	   stories	  we	   tell	   about	  
persons	  and	  the	  applicability	  of	  these	  stories	  to	  the	  state.	  	  
This	  also	  means	  that	  while	  the	  stories	  of	  the	  self	  might	  share	  some	  similarities	  across	  cultures,	  
they	  are	  fundamentally	  intertwined	  with	  culture	  and	  local	  practices.98	  Any	  story	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	  will	  therefore	  be	  culturally	  specific.	  Both	  self	  and	  emotions	  are	  socially	  constructed.	  But	  
Harré	   stresses	   that	   the	   self	   is	   more	   fundamentally	   constructed	   “all	   the	   way	   down”.99	  Taking	  
these	  observations	  into	  account,	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  say	  that	  the	  current	  story	  of	  IR	  is	  one	  dominated	  by	  
a	  Western	  conception	  of	  persons	  and	  the	  self.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
positions	  in	  the	  relation	  between	  material	  and	  ideational	  factors	  in	  making	  the	  world.	  Jackson,	  The	  Conduct	  of	  
Inquiry	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  and	  Its	  Implications	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  World	  Politics,	  206.	  
97	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Personhood,	  68.	  
98	  Compare	  for	  example	  Godfrey	  Lienhardt	  who	  writes	  on	  the	  self	  representation	  of	  an	  African	  tribe,	  the	  Dinka,	  
and	  notes	  how	  in	  their	  conceptualisation	  the	  self	  is	  much	  more	  intertwined	  with	  the	  body	  and	  how	  the	  self	  is	  
interpreted	  much	  less	  individualistic	  than	  in	  a	  Western	  context.	  Godfrey	  Lienhardt,	  'Self:	  Public,	  Private.	  Some	  
African	   Representations',	   in	   The	   Category	   of	   the	   Person.	   Anthropology,	   Philosophy,	   History,	   ed.	   Michael	  
Carrithers,	  Steven	  Collins,	  and	  Steven	  Lukes	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1985	  [1980]).	  Compare	  
also	  Mauss’	  seminal	  text	  on	  person	  and	  self.	  Mauss,	  'A	  Category	  of	  the	  Human	  Mind:	  The	  Notion	  of	  Person;	  the	  
Notion	  of	  Self'.	  
99	  He	  argues	   that	   “[w]hile	   	   there	   	   is	   an	   	  ethology	  of	   	   feeling	   	   there	   	   is	   	  no	   	  ethology	   	  of	   	   the	   	  expression	   	  of	  	  
selfhood.”	   Harré,	   The	   Singular	   Self.	   An	   Introduction	   to	   the	   Psychology	   of	   Personhood,	   128.	   Though,	   it	   is	  
important	   to	   stress	   that	   in	   this	   quotation,	   Harré	   refers	   explicitly	   to	   expressions	   of	   selfhood.	   He	   does	  
acknowledge	   a	   general	   foundation	   for	   the	   self,	   found	   in	   the	   conditions	   that	   make	   human	   language	   itself	  
possible	   such	  as	  natural	  expressions	  of	   feelings	  and	   the	  human	  perceptual	  point	  of	   view	  “without	  which	  no	  
symbolic	  system	  of	  any	  degree	  of	  sophistication	  could	  even	  begin.”	  Ibid.,	  	  19.	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion,	  
see	  the	  section	  on	  “Yet,	  the	  body	  matters	  after	  all”	  in	  this	  chapter.	  
	  	   	   	  
	  
201	  
With	   the	   interest	   in	   psychological	   personhood	   of	   states-­‐as-­‐persons,	   the	   hard	   question	   of	  
emotions	  is	  still	  left	  to	  be	  addressed.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  for	  Wendt,	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	  psychological	  
personhood	  is	  a	  subjective	  point	  of	  view	  and	  this	   is	   linked	  strongly	  with	  emotions.	   I	  agree.	  For	  
Wendt,	   this	   is	   the	   hard	   test	   of	   state	   personhood	   and	   the	   one	   where	   he	   sees	   his	   realist	  
framework	  reaching	  its	  limits.	  Unsurprisingly,	  the	  question	  of	  emotions	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  state-­‐
as-­‐person	  will	  be	  answered	  in	  a	  different	  way	  given	  the	  perspective	  taken	  here.	  	  
In	   the	   following	   look	   at	   emotions	   from	   the	  perspective	  of	   constructionist	   psychology,	   by	  now	  
familiar	  themes	  will	  be	  re-­‐examined:	  the	  key	  distinction	  between	  two	  ontologies	  (one	  rooted	  in	  
the	  world	  of	  molecules,	  the	  other	  rooted	  in	  the	  world	  of	  people),	  the	  primacy	  of	  language,	  and	  
the	  social	  constitution	  of	  aspects	  of	  human	  life	  that	  often	  appear	  as	  given	  qua	  biology.	  	  
	   	  




Psychological	  personhood,	  Wendt	  argues,	  includes	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  question	  of	  consciousness,	  
which	   is	   taken	   to	   mean	   having	   a	   “first-­‐person	   perspective”,	   “subjective	   experience”,	   and	  
emotions.100	  	  
[I]n	  both	  academic	   and	   lay	  discourse	  we	  often	   refer	   casually	   to	   states	  
‘as	   if’	   they	   have	   emotions	   and	   are	   therefore	   conscious.	   States	   are	  
routinely	  characterised	  as	  angry,	  greedy,	  guilty,	  humiliated,	  and	  so	  on	  –	  
all	  conditions	  that,	  in	  individuals	  at	  least,	  are	  associated	  with	  subjective	  
experience.101	  
As	  illustrated	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  IR’s	  interest	  in	  emotions	  is	  usually	  not	  located	  at	  the	  level	  
of	   the	   state.	   At	   best,	   the	   possibility	   of	   locating	   emotions	   at	   this	   level	   is	   hinted	   at.102	  This	  
represents	   a	   first	   challenge	   and	   here	   it	   is	   proposed	   that	  we	   start	  with	   the	   individual	   level	   to	  
clarify	  various	  possibilities	  of	  theorising	  emotions	  and	  that	  it	  is	  indeed	  this	  individual	  level	  from	  
which	   psychological	   state	   personhood	   flows.103	  A	   second	   challenge	   is	   presented	   by	   the	  more	  
general	  problem	  that	   if	   IR	   is	   interested	   in	   incorporating	  emotions	   in	   its	   theorising,	   it	  needs	   to	  
face	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  incredibly	  difficult	  to	  theorise.	  There	  is	  no	  agreement	  in	  psychology	  
on	  how	   to	   approach	   emotions;	   there	   is	   also	   little	   agreement	   on	   a	   definition	   of	   emotion.	   And	  
many	   psychological	   theories	   on	   the	   emotions,	   as	   we	   shall	   see,	   are	   incredibly	   reliant	   on	   folk	  
wisdom.	  Hence,	  any	  project	  interested	  in	  bringing	  emotions	  into	  IR	  theorising	  needs	  to	  grapple	  
with	   the	   fact	   that	   psychology	   does	   not	   offer	   timeless	   and	   ultimate	   insights	   into	   emotions.	  
Neither	  does	   it	  offer	  a	   singular	  perspective	   from	  which	   to	  approach	  emotions.	  Each	  approach	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 	  Wendt,	   'The	   State	   as	   Person	   in	   International	   Theory',	   311-­‐312.	   For	   consciousness	   and	   first-­‐person	  
perspective	  also	  compare	  Nagel,	  'What	  Is	  It	  Like	  to	  Be	  a	  Bat?'.	  
101	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  313.	  
102	  Crawford,	  'The	  Passion	  of	  World	  Politics:	  Propositions	  on	  Emotion	  and	  Emotional	  Relationships'.	  
103	  Wendt	   for	  example	  argues	   that	  at	   the	   individual	   level	  we	  know	   intuitively	   that	  we	  possess	  consciousness	  
because	  we	  know	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  be	  a	  person.	  However,	  he	  does	  not	  argue	  that	  individual	  consciousness	  can	  
serve	  as	  the	  framework	  for	  state	  consciousness.	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  312.	  But	  
since	   individual	  consciousness,	  at	   least	  with	   regard	   to	  ourselves,	   is	   something	  we	  can	  be	  sure	  of,	   it	   is	  worth	  
starting	   here.	   In	   this	   context,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   though	   that	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   constructionist	  
psychology	   taken	  here,	   the	  person	   is	  not	   constituted	   from	   the	   inside.	  Persons	  do	  not	   carry	   an	  essence	   that	  
could	   be	   discovered	   by	   looking	   “inside”.	   The	   person	   is	   constituted	   discursively	   in	   interaction	   –	   a	   social	   and	  
cultural	  (group)	  perspective	  is	  implied	  in	  this.	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brings	  with	   it	   a	   set	   of	   epistemological	   and	   ontological	   assumptions	   that	   need	   to	   be	   carefully	  
scrutinised.	  	  
Keeping	  this	   in	  mind,	   it	   is	  worth	  pointing	  out	  that	  this	  section	  on	  emotions	  will	   reflect	   the	  by-­‐
now-­‐familiar	  theme	  of	  the	  two	  stories	  to	  tell:	  one	  story	  of	  the	  world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐molecules	  and	  one	  
in	   which	   the	  world	   is	   seen	   as	   a	   world	   of	   people	   in	   interaction.	   Further,	   when	   engaging	  with	  
psychological	   approaches	   to	   emotions,	   a	   second,	   albeit	   related,	   theme	   also	   comes	   into	   focus	  
more	   clearly.	   This	   second	   theme	   reflects	   a	   question	   that	   any	   constructivist	   approach	   has	   to	  
grapple	  with:	  Where	  do	  we	  draw	   the	   line	  between	  nature	  and	  nurture;	   is	   it	   ideas	  all	   the	  way	  
down?104	  Unsurprisingly,	  neither	  philosophy	  nor	  psychology	  have	  found	  a	  clear	  position	  on	  this	  
question	  and	  we	  can	  find	  a	  huge	  variety	  of	  positions	  among	  the	  current	  approaches,	  reflecting	  a	  
broad	  spectrum	  of	  possible	  stances	  between	  two	  possible	  extremes.	  This	  question	  of	  finding	  a	  
position	   between	   the	   extremes	   of	   pure	   idealism	   and	   pure	   materialism	   is	   also	   prominently	  
addressed	   in	  Wendt’s	  Social	   Theory	   and	   his	   approach	   to	   states-­‐as-­‐persons.	  Wendt’s	   stance,	   a	  
constructivism	   with	   a	   strong	   emphasis	   on	   philosophical	   realism,	   is	   one	   that	   stresses	   the	  
importance	  of	  material	  factors	  and	  does	  not	  see	  room	  for	  “ideas	  all	  the	  way	  down”.	  This	  is	  also	  
reflected	   in	  Wendt’s	   remarks	   on	   state	   consciousness,	   elaborated	   above,	   as	   part	   of	   which	   he	  
argues	  that	  the	  constitution	  of	  a	  state-­‐person’s	  consciousness	  by	  thought	  alone	  is	  ultimately	  not	  
enough.105	  In	   contrast,	   the	   constructionist	   psychology	   favoured	   here	   is	   to	   be	   located	   towards	  
the	  extreme	  end	  of	  “nurture”,	  where	  what	  matters	  is	  the	  socially	  constructed	  nature	  of	  the	  self	  
and	  emotions	  and	  where	  the	  emphasis	  lies	  on	  social	  interaction.	  	  
The	  difference	   in	  philosophy	  of	   science	  positions	  between	  Wendt’s	   stance	   and	   the	  one	   taken	  
here	  has	  profound	  consequences	  for	  the	  way	  the	  state	  as	  a	  psychological	  person	  is	  constituted.	  
In	  order	  to	  tease	  out	  this	  difference	  and	  ultimately	  develop	  a	  different	  stance	  on	  psychological	  
state	   personhood,	   a	   look	   into	   the	   variety	   of	   psychological	   approaches	   on	   emotions	   and	   their	  
underlying	  assumptions	  is	  needed.	  In	  the	  following,	  it	  will	  be	  illustrated	  how,	  from	  the	  position	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104	  I	  take	  this	  expression	  from	  P.	  N.	  Johnson-­‐Laird	  and	  Keith	  Oatley	  who	  call	  the	  variety	  of	  approaches	  and	  the	  
heated	  debates	  between	   them	  a	   “special	   case	  of	   the	  nature-­‐nurture	  puzzle”.	   Johnson-­‐Laird	   and	  Oatley	   also	  
offer	   a	   useful	   overview	  of	   the	   two	  perspectives.	   P.	  N.	   Johnson-­‐Laird	   and	  Keith	  Oatley,	   'Cognitive	   and	   Social	  
Construction	  in	  Emotions',	  in	  Handbook	  of	  Emotions,	  ed.	  Michael	  Lewis	  and	  Jeannette	  M.	  Haviland-­‐Jones	  (New	  
York	   and	   London:	   The	   Guilford	   Press,	   2000),	   459-­‐461.	   For	   a	   similar	   overview	   and	   distinction	   compare	   also	  
Peter	  N.	  Stearns,	   'Emotion',	   in	  Discursive	  Psychology	  in	  Practice,	  ed.	  Peter	  Stearns	  and	  Rom	  Harré	  (Thousand	  
Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage,	  1995).	  
105	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  314.	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of	  constructionist	  psychology,	  the	  body	  and	  the	  bodily	  constitution	  of	  the	  person	  and	  emotions	  
can	  be	  neglected	  for	  understanding	  human	  emotions.	  	  
In	  the	  following,	  I	  aim	  to	  give	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  various	  accounts	  of	  emotions	  to	  illustrate	  how	  
the	  constructionist	  psychology	  utilised	  here	  represents	  a	   fundamental	  point	  of	  departure	  with	  
regard	  to	  epistemological	  and	  ontological	  assumptions.	  In	  mainstream	  accounts,	  the	  two	  stories	  
to	  be	  told	  about	  emotions	  are	  usually	   intertwined	  and	  each	  account	  differs	  only	   in	  the	  way	   in	  
which	  the	  two	  stories	  are	  assembled	  and	  a	  causal	  chain	  is	  postulated.106	  However,	  psychological	  
theories	  on	  emotions	  differ	  widely	  on	  the	  questions	  of	  what	  triggers	  the	  feeling	  of	  an	  emotion	  
and	  the	  sequential	  order	  in	  which	  cognition,	  feeling,	  expression,	  and	  behaviour	  occur.107	  	  
One,	  by	  now	  outdated,	  approach	  for	  example	  postulates	  a	  causal	  chain	  that	  sees	  bodily	  arousal	  
as	   the	   first	   response	   to	   an	   emotional	   stimulus	   which	   then	   triggers	   action;	   the	   “feeling”	   and	  
cognitive	   appraisal	   of	   an	   emotion	   only	   occur	   after	   that	   (James-­‐Lange	   Theory).108	  Another,	   by	  
now	  also	  dated,	  approach	  sees	  bodily	  arousal	  and	  emotional	  feeling	  as	  occurring	  simultaneously	  
and	   action	   following	   from	   that	   (Cannon-­‐Bard	   Theory).	   Again,	   the	   conscious	   evaluation	   of	   the	  
stimulus,	   becoming	   aware	   of	   the	   emotion	   and	   being	   able	   to	   label	   it	   appropriately	   only	   occur	  
after	  that.	  In	  contrast,	  a	  more	  recent	  theory	  that	  emerged	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  cognitive	  turn	  
in	  psychology	  argues	   that	  an	  emotional	   feeling	  and	   the	   resulting	  behaviour	  only	  occur	  after	  a	  
stimulus	   and	   the	   bodily	   arousal	   have	   been	   interpreted	   and	   judged	   cognitively	   (Schachter’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  Here,	   “mainstream	  approach”	   refers	   to	   the	  perspective	  presented	   in	   standard	   introductory	   textbooks	  on	  
psychology	   which	   do	   not	   include	   references	   to	   constructionist	   psychology	   (see	   for	   example	   those	   cited	   in	  
Chapter	  4	  under	  in	  “Which	  psychology?”).	  Much	  like	  in	  IR	  textbooks,	  these,	  unsurprisingly,	  reflect	  a	  simplified	  
perspective	  that	  by	  its	  very	  nature	  can	  only	  point	  to	  a	  very	  limited	  number	  of	  approaches	  and	  scholars.	  Yet,	  for	  
simplicity	   it	   is	   still	   useful	   to	  maintain	   this	   distinction	   between	   the	  mainstream	   and	   non-­‐mainstream	   in	   the	  
psychology	  of	  self	  and	  emotions.	  Moreover,	  it	  illustrates	  how	  the	  mainstream	  of	  psychology	  is	  firmly	  wedded	  
to	  a	  positivist	  framework.	  	  
107	  See	  Coon,	  Psychology:	  A	  Modular	  Approach	  to	  Mind	  and	  Behavior,	  402-­‐405.	  	  
108	  See	  ibid.,	  	  402-­‐5.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  some	  of	  these	  theories	  have	  found	  their	  way	  into	  engagements	  
with	  the	  state.	  For	  example,	  in	  his	  seminal	  “The	  myth	  of	  the	  state”,	  Ernst	  Cassirer	  draws	  on	  William	  James	  and	  
Carl	  Georg	  Lang	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  emotions.	  He	  starts	  from	  asking	  the	  question	  why	  people	  “prefer	  to	   live	   in	  a	  
world	  of	  illusions”	  instead	  of	  approaching	  “the	  reality	  of	  things	  and	  see	  it	  face	  to	  face”.	  By	  drawing	  on	  James	  
and	  Lang,	  the	  prevalent	  theory	  of	  emotions	  at	  the	  time,	  Cassirer	  can	  argue	  that	  the	  “emotional”	  is	  prior	  to	  the	  
“rational”	  which	  in	  turn	  allows	  him	  to	  show	  how	  “mythical	  representations”,	  that	  engage	  the	  emotions	  survive	  
despite	  being	  part	  of	  a	  “world	  of	  illusions”.	  Ernst	  Cassirer,	  The	  Myth	  of	  the	  State,	  ed.	  Birgit	  Recki,	  vol.	  25,	  Ernst	  
Cassirer.	   Gesammelte	   Werke	   Hamburger	   Ausgabe	   (Hamburg:	   Felix	   Meiner	   Verlag,	   2007	   [1946]),	   for	   the	  
quotation	  see	  27,	  see	  also	  27-­‐32.	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cognitive	   theory	  of	   emotion).	   It	   is	   argued	   that	   a	   situation	  has	   to	  be	   labelled	  with	   an	  emotion	  
such	  as	  “anger”,	  fear”,	  or	  “happiness”	  before	  action	  can	  follow.109	  	  
According	   to	   the	   cognitive	   theory	   of	   emotion,	   the	   act	   of	   labelling	   and	   judging	   is	   important	  
because	   the	   same	   stimulus	   and	  bodily	   feeling	   could	  be	   implicated	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   emotions;	   a	  
situation	   could	   be	   either	   frightening	   or	   exciting	   depending	   on	   circumstances	   and	   individual	  
experience;	   physiological	   arousal	   on	   its	   own	   does	   not	   constitute	   emotions.110	  This	   cognitive	  
approach	   to	  emotions	   in	  which	   the	   cognitive	  appraisal	  of	   a	   stimulus	   comes	  before	  expression	  
and	  behaviour	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  most	  widely	  accepted	  contemporary	  mainstream	  model.	  	  
What	  is	  noteworthy	  is	  that	  all	  these	  theories	  rely	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  assumptions	  about	  how	  body,	  
mind,	   and	   action	   relate	   to	   each	   other.	   While	   the	   body	   as	   a	   source	   of	   emotions	   remains	  
important,	   the	  “story”	  presented	   in	   textbooks	  also	  shows	  a	  progression	   towards	   theories	   that	  
stress	  the	  meaning	  that	  an	  emotion	  is	  given.	  We	  are	  told	  for	  example	  that	  current	  theories	  start	  
with	   cognitive	   appraisal,	   which	   is	   to	   a	   large	   part	   governed	   by	   the	   “personal	   meaning	   of	   a	  
stimulus”	  and	  that	  “emotion	  is	  greatly	  influenced	  by	  how	  you	  think	  about	  an	  event.”111	  Stanley	  
Schachter’s	   cognitive	   theory	   of	   emotions	   represents	   a	   middle	   ground	   position	   between	   the	  
extremes	  of	  nature	  and	  nurture.	  Many	  newer	  theories	  follow	  in	  these	  footsteps.112	  However,	  it	  
is	   important	   to	  note	   that,	   for	   Schachter,	   external	   stimulus	   and	  physical	   arousal	   still	   represent	  
the	  first	  link	  in	  a	  causal	  chain.	  	  
Following	   in	   these	   footsteps,	   a	   number	   of	   recent	   approaches	   to	   emotions	   are	   interested	   in	  
finding	   a	   middle	   ground	   between	   the	   poles	   of	   nature	   and	   nurture.	   Often,	   we	   find	   that	   they	  
postulate	  a	  number	  of	  basic	  emotions	  that	  are	  said	  to	  be	  instinctive	  and	  natural	  and	  a	  number	  
of	  more	  complex	  emotions	  that	  are	  said	  to	  be	  shaped	  by	  culture.113	  Basic	  emotions	  are	  thought	  
of	  as	  natural	  and	  being	  similar	  across	  cultures	  and	  historical	  periods.	  Complex	  emotions	  are	  said	  
to	  be	  built	  on	  the	  more	  basic	  ones	  and	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  more	  abstract	  and	  further	  removed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  For	  the	  above	  see	  Coon,	  Psychology:	  A	  Modular	  Approach	  to	  Mind	  and	  Behavior,	  402-­‐405.	  
110	  The	  experiments	  underlying	   this	  were	  conducted	  by	  Stanley	  Schachter	  and	   J.	  Singer.	  For	  a	  brief	  overview	  
see	  Jeff	  Coulter,	  'Affect	  and	  Social	  Context:	  Emotional	  Definition	  as	  a	  Social	  Task',	  in	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  
Emotions,	  ed.	  Rom	  Harré	  (Oxford:	  Basil	  Blackwell,	  1986),	  125.	  
111	  Coon,	  Psychology:	  A	  Modular	  Approach	  to	  Mind	  and	  Behavior,	  405.	  
112	  For	  an	  overview	  see	  for	  example	  Johnson-­‐Laird	  and	  Oatley,	  'Cognitive	  and	  Social	  Construction	  in	  Emotions'.	  
113	  See,	  for	  example,	  ibid.,	  	  461-­‐462.	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from	  nature.	  The	  more	  complex	  emotions	  are	  symbolic	  and	  reflect	  a	  conscious	  evaluation	  based	  
on	  cultural	  norms.	  	  
Yet,	  once	  we	  accept	   that	  an	  emotion	   is	   the	  result	  of	  both	  nature	  and	  nurture	  and	  that	   it	   is	   in	  
part	   created	   by	   how	   we	   think	   of	   an	   event,	   the	   question	   of	   how	   the	   appraisal	   of	   a	   certain	  
situation	  comes	  about	  is	  put	  into	  clearer	  focus	  and	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  question	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  
physical	  more	  fundamentally.	   In	  turn,	  the	  role	  of	  society	   in	  shaping	  these	  kinds	  of	   judgements	  
and	  the	  role	  of	  concepts	  as	  carriers	  of	  these	  judgements	  become	  relevant.	  From	  there,	  the	  turn	  
to	  constructionist	  psychology	  can	  take	  place.	  	  
James	  Russell	  and	  Ghyslaine	  Lemay	  for	  example	  propose	  to	  study	  emotions	  as	  concepts	  rather	  
than	  biological	   facts	  and	  argue	  that	  by	   focusing	  on	  emotions	  as	  concepts	  we	  can	  more	  clearly	  
see	  how	  emotions	  can	  serve	  as	  filters	  for	  what	  is	  perceived	  and	  how	  a	  perception	  is	  judged.114	  In	  
addition,	  this	  conceptualisation	  reminds	  us	  that	  concepts	  are	  made	  and	  not	  found;	  thus	  the	  role	  
of	   culture	   in	   shaping	   a	   concept	   as	   well	   as	   the	   role	   of	   language	   in	   shaping	   and	   conveying	  
concepts	  also	  become	  important.	  While	  this	  approach,	  as	  Russell	  and	  Lemay	  readily	  admit,	  does	  
not	  exhaust	  the	  study	  of	  emotions,	  their	  perspective	  offers	  some	  interesting	  additional	  insights.	  	  
And	  while	  they	  also	  admit	  that	  some	  reactions	  might	  be	  determined	  by	  nature,	  they	  stress	  that	  
the	  concepts	  of	  emotions	  that	  developed	   in	  a	  certain	  culture	  will	  at	   least	  act	  as	  a	  kind	  of	   lens	  
through	   which	   the	   world	   is	   perceived.	   This	   makes	   ideational	   or	   nurtured	   aspects	   in	   the	  
understanding	  of	  emotions	   relevant.	  Further,	  approaching	  emotions	  as	  a	  concept	  allows	  them	  
to	   argue	   that	   there	   is	   a	   close	   connection	   between	   everyday	   experience,	   folk	   theories	   of	  
emotions,	  as	  well	  as	  scientific	  theories.	  For	  them,	  scientific	  theories	  of	  emotions	  are	  not	  neutral	  
and	  are	  not	  free	  from	  everyday	  conceptions.	  They	  point	  out	  that	  	  	  	  
[h]uman	   beings	   are	   amateur	   scientists;	   scientists	   are	   human	   beings.	  
Here	  we	  suggest	  a	  deep	  continuity	  from	  a	  child’s	  cognitive	  development	  
to	  the	  folk	  psychology	  of	  everyday	  thinking	  to	  the	  working	  models	  and	  
successful	  theories	  of	  advanced	  science.115	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  James	  A.	  Russell	  and	  Ghyslaine	  Lemay,	  'Emotion	  Concepts',	  in	  Handbook	  of	  Emotions,	  ed.	  Michael	  Lewis	  and	  
Jeannette	  M.	  Haviland-­‐Jones	  (New	  York	  and	  London:	  The	  Guilford	  Press,	  2000),	  491.	  
115	  Ibid.,	  	  492.	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They	   argue	   that	   given	   the	   ways	   emotions	   can	   be	   studied,	   the	   researcher	   never	   escapes	   the	  
everyday	  conceptions	  present	   in	  both	  the	  people	  studied	  and	  the	  researcher	  studying	  them.	  If	  
we	  consider	  the	  tools	  available	  to	  study	  emotions,	  such	  as	  self	  reports,	  psychometric	  tests	  (e.g.	  
personality	   questionnaires)	   or	   laboratory	   observations,	   in	   each	   case	   the	   result	   is	   always	  
inevitably	  intertwined	  with	  everyday	  conceptions	  of	  emotions	  and	  with	  lay	  theories	  about	  them.	  
The	  result	  is	  always	  relative,	  always	  situated	  in	  a	  certain	  culture	  and	  a	  certain	  time.116	  	  
This	   is	   an	   important	   insight	   for	   a	   project	   interested	   in	   psychological	   state	   personhood	   that	  
locates	   itself	  within	   the	  emotional	   turn	   in	   IR,	   for	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	   any	   kind	  of	  borrowing	  
from	  psychology	  cannot	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  borrowing	  of	  cultureless	  and	  timeless	  insights.	  When	  it	  
comes	  to	  emotions,	  the	  clear	  dividing	  line	  between	  nature	  and	  nurture	  breaks	  down.	  	  
It	  is	  also	  worth	  pointing	  out	  how	  these	  theories	  are	  intertwined	  with	  folk	  wisdom.	  It	  seems	  that	  
formal	  scientific	  theories	  of	  emotions	  cannot	  entirely	  do	  away	  with	  everyday	  concepts.	  Indeed,	  
it	   seems	   that	   emotion	   researchers	   have	   been	   “highly	   conservative”	   in	   the	   concepts	   they	  
proposed	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  have	  remained	  close	  to	  received	  wisdom.117	  This	  seems	  to	  apply	  
to	   the	  conceptualisation	  of	   the	  mind	  as	  a	   “container”	   for	   thoughts	  and	   feelings	   that	   cognitive	  
psychology	  makes	  use	  of	  as	  well	  as	  to	  concepts	  of	  emotions.118	  	  It	  seems	  that	  an	  emotion	  such	  
as	  anger	  cannot	  be	  studied	  without	  an	  understanding	  of	  what	  is	  generally	  referred	  to	  as	  anger.	  
Separating	  the	  study	  of	  emotions	  from	  their	  cultural	  component,	  how	  they	  are	  conceived	  of	  in	  
folk	   wisdom	   and	   everyday	   conversations,	   is	   difficult	   if	   not	   impossible.	   This	   is	   an	   important	  
insight	   and	   provides	   another	   link	   with	   the	   starting	   point	   for	   this	   account	   of	   the	   constructed	  
state-­‐as-­‐person;	  namely,	   the	   idea	   that	  how	  we	  make	   sense	  of	  ourselves	   is	  also	  how	  we	  make	  
sense	  of	  the	  state.	  	  
Ultimately,	  we	  have	  to	  ask	  the	  question	  whether	  or	  not	  emotions	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  distinct	  from	  
biological	  aspects	  for	  our	  purposes.	  Hence,	  the	  approaches	  located	  towards	  the	  extreme	  end	  of	  
nurture,	   constructionist	   psychology,	   should	   be	   put	   into	   clearer	   focus.	   A	   weak	   constructionist	  
stance	  on	   emotions	   and	   self	  would	   see	   some	  aspects	   as	   given	  by	  nature:	   some	  emotions	   are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  Ibid.,	  	  496.	  
117	  Ibid.,	  	  499	  and	  501.	  
118	  For	   the	   relation	  between	   lay	   theories	  of	   emotions	   and	   scientific	   theories	   see	   Zoltán	  Kövecses,	  Metaphor	  
and	  Emotion.	  Language,	  Culture,	  and	  Body	  in	  Human	  Feeling	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  
18-­‐19	  as	  well	  as	  Chapter	  7.	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natural	   and	  a	   sense	  of	   self	   is	   already	   implanted	   inside	  us	   independent	  of	   social	   interaction	  or	  
cultural	  influences.	  In	  contrast	  to	  that,	  the	  approaches	  by	  Rom	  Harré,	  John	  Schotter,	  Kenneth	  J.	  
Gergen,	  and	  Jonathan	  Potter	  –	  to	  name	  a	  few	  of	  those	  introduced	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  –	  take	  
a	  strong	  constructivist	  stance	  according	  to	  which	  emotions	  are	  social	  products	  that	  are	  “shaped	  
by	   language,	   and	   derived	   from	   culture”. 119 	  The	   bodily	   dimension	   of	   emotions	   becomes	  
irrelevant	   for	   attempts	   to	   understand	   them.	   Gergen	   for	   example	   argues	   that	   “physiological	  
indicators	  do	  not	  reflect	  many	  of	  the	  differences	  in	  what	  people	  say	  they	  experience.	  People	  are	  
quite	   capable	   of	   distinguishing	   between	   resentment,	   self-­‐hatred,	   homicidal	   impulses,	   and	  
jealousy,	  and	  yet	  the	  observable	  physiology	  is	  roughly	  similar	  for	  all.”120	  	  
Further,	  the	  constructionist	  perspective	  points	  out	  how	  the	  self	  as	  well	  as	  emotions	  are	  made	  to	  
seem	   natural,	   yet	   they	   thoroughly	   “depend	   on	   social	   experience	   and	   the	   cultivation	   of	   an	  
individual’s	  sensibilities”.121	  It	  comes	  down	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  culture	  creates	  emotions	  
or	  whether	   it	   only	   shapes	  what	   is	   already	   there	   qua	   nature.	   For	   the	   authors	  mentioned,	   it	   is	  
culture	  that	  creates	  emotions	  and	  they	  thoroughly	  deny	  the	  idea	  that	  emotions	  are	  something	  
inside	   the	   mind	   that	   is	   prior	   to	   social	   interaction.	   Harré,	   for	   example,	   argues	   that	  
“[p]sychologists	  have	  always	  had	  to	  struggle	  against	  a	  persistent	  illusion	  that	  in	  such	  studies	  as	  
those	  of	  the	  emotions	  there	  is	  something	  there,	  the	  emotion,	  of	  which	  the	  vocabulary	  we	  have	  
for	  emotions	  are	  a	  mere	  representation.”122	  His	  point	  is	  that	  to	  abstract	  an	  entity	  from	  emotions	  
such	   as	   anger	   or	   love	   is	   a	   persistent	   ontological	   illusion.123	  As	  mentioned	   in	   Chapter	   4,	   this	   is	  
precisely	  what	  sets	  him	  apart	  from	  cognitive	  psychology	  and	  what	  marks	  him	  as	  a	  proponent	  of	  
what	  he	  calls	  the	  second	  cognitive	  revolution.	  And	  this	  is	  also	  the	  general	  position	  taken	  here.	  
According	   to	   Harré,	   an	   emotion	   is	   not	   the	   state	   an	   individual	   is	   in	   and	   not	   primarily	   a	  
physiological	   reaction	   to	   external	   stimuli.124	  As	  we	  have	   seen	   the	   theories	   of	   emotions	   briefly	  
introduced	   above	   always	   put	   the	   physical	   reaction	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   their	   (causal)	   analysis.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  Johnson-­‐Laird	  and	  Oatley,	  'Cognitive	  and	  Social	  Construction	  in	  Emotions',	  459.	  
120	  Gergen,	  The	  Concept	  of	  Self,	  16-­‐17.	  
121	  Johnson-­‐Laird	  and	  Oatley,	  'Cognitive	  and	  Social	  Construction	  in	  Emotions',	  460.	  
122	  Rom	  Harré,	  'An	  Outline	  of	  the	  Social	  Constructionist	  Viewpoint',	  in	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  Emotions,	  ed.	  
Rom	  Harré	   (Oxford:	  Basil	  Blackwell,	  1986),	  4.	  Also	  quoted	   in	   Johnson-­‐Laird	  and	  Oatley,	   'Cognitive	  and	  Social	  
Construction	  in	  Emotions',	  460.	  Compare	  also	  Jeff	  Coulter’s	  view	  who	  argues	  that	  conceptualising	  emotions	  as	  
feelings	   or	   sensations	   is	   “a	   pervasive	   mistake	   in	   the	   history	   of	   philosophical	   and	   psychological	   reflection”.	  
Coulter,	  'Affect	  and	  Social	  Context:	  Emotional	  Definition	  as	  a	  Social	  Task',	  121.	  
123	  Harré,	  'An	  Outline	  of	  the	  Social	  Constructionist	  Viewpoint',	  4.	  
124	  Harré	  and	  Gillett,	  The	  Discursive	  Mind,	  145.	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Similarly,	  Harré	  argues	  that	   in	  most	  cases	  the	  first	  step	  to	  correctly	   identifying	  an	  emotion	  will	  
be	   the	   identification	   of	   a	   “felt	   bodily	   disturbance”;	   however,	   while	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   bodily	  
reaction	  is	  acknowledged,	  ultimately,	  this	  is	  for	  the	  neurophysiologist	  to	  study.125	  It	  is	  part	  of	  the	  
world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐molecules	  ontology	  and	  hence	  not	  relevant	  for	  a	  world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people	  research	  
interest.	  Harré	  points	  out	  how	  the	  “felt	  physical	  state”	  associated	  with	  an	  emotion	  is	  diffuse	  and	  
indeterminate;	  it	  is	  only	  through	  the	  display	  of	  the	  emotion,	  which	  is	  entirely	  guided	  by	  culture,	  
that	  the	  emotion	  becomes	  precise	  and	  determinate.126	  	  
Once	  we	  accept	  this,	  the	  discursive	  aspects	  of	  the	  emotion	  become	  dominant.	  There	  are	  some	  
similarities	   to	   Schachter’s	   cognitive	   theory	   here.	   However,	   Harré	   takes	   it	   further	   in	   that	   he	  
shows	   how	   the	   physical	   aspects	   of	   an	   emotion	   ultimately	   become	   irrelevant	   for	   this	   kind	   of	  
analysis.	  He	  suggests	  starting	  the	  actual	  analysis	  of	  emotions	  with	  how	  words	  for	  emotions	  and	  
other	  discursive	  displays	  of	  emotions	  are	  used	  in	  everyday	  discourse.	  This	  is	  necessary	  because	  
emotions	   cannot	  be	  understood	   in	  an	  abstract	   sense,	   removed	   from	  social	  order,	   culture	  and	  
time	  of	  their	  utterance;	  it	  is	  also	  necessary	  because	  it	  highlights	  how	  in	  some	  cases	  lay	  theories	  
of	  emotions	  have	  made	  their	  way	  into	  scientific	  emotional	  theories.127	  What	  is	  to	  be	  studied	  in	  
the	   first	   instance	   is	   “the	   ways	   the	   people	   in	   a	   particular	   local	   culture	   identify,	   classify,	   and	  
recognise	   emotions	   […]	   one	  must	   try	   to	   discover	   the	   rules	   of	   use	   of	   the	   local	   vocabulary	   of	  
emotion	  words.”128	  From	  that	  a	  “theory	  of	  emotion”	  might	  be	  “abstracted”.	  But	  this	  theory	  will	  
only	  ever	  be	  one	  of	  a	  particular	  culture	  and	  a	  particular	  time.129	  	  	  
If	   the	   biological	   “basis”	   of	   emotions	   is	   questioned	   and	   hence	   we	   accept	   that	   they	   are	   not	  
entirely	  “given”,	  we	  are	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  look	  at	  how	  we	  “acquire”	  emotions.	  In	  studying	  
emotions,	   Harré,	   for	   example,	   suggests	   starting	   by	   looking	   at	   everyday	   discourses	   and	   James	  
and	   Lemay	   point	   out	   that	   a	   close	   relationship	   between	   lay	   conceptions	   of	   emotions	   and	  
scientific	   theories	   can	   be	   identified.	   Further,	   Ronald	   de	   Sousa	   argues	   that	   “emotions	   have	   a	  
semantics	  that	  derives	  from	  ‘paradigm	  scenarios,’	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  our	  emotional	  repertoire	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125	  Ibid.,	  	  149.	  
126	  Ibid.,	  	  150.	  
127	  Harré,	  'An	  Outline	  of	  the	  Social	  Constructionist	  Viewpoint',	  4-­‐5.	  
128	  Harré	  and	  Gillett,	  The	  Discursive	  Mind,	  148.	  The	  result	  of	  such	  a	  study	  is	  an	  “emotionology”,	  a	  term	  coined	  
in	  Carol	  Zisowitz	  Stearns	  and	  Peter	  N.	  Stearns,	  Emotion	  and	  Social	  Change:	  Toward	  a	  New	  Psychohistory	  (New	  
York:	  Holmes	  &	  Meier,	  1988).	  
129	  Harré,	  'An	  Outline	  of	  the	  Social	  Constructionist	  Viewpoint',	  148.	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learned	   and	   the	   formal	   objects	   of	   our	   emotions	   fixed.”130	  These	   paradigm	   scenarios	   specify	  
appropriate	  emotional	  objects,	  expressions	  and	  responses.	  The	  scenarios	  “are	  drawn	  first	  from	  
our	  daily	  life	  as	  small	  children	  and	  later	  reinforced	  by	  the	  stories	  …	  and	  culture	  to	  which	  we	  are	  
exposed.	   Later	   still,	   in	   literate	   cultures,	   they	   are	   supplemented	   and	   refined	   by	   literature”.131	  
Hence,	  we	  are	  socialised	  into	  emotions	  and	  the	  emotional	  repertoire	  available	  to	  us	  can	  become	  
more	  complex	  and	  refined	  over	  time.132	  	  
From	  this	  perspective,	  we	  can	  also	  inquire	  about	  the	  function	  of	  emotions.	  Those	  who	  stress	  the	  
biological	   basis	   of	   emotions	   emphasise	   survival	   and	   see	   emotions	   as	   the	   product	   of	   an	  
evolutionary	  process.133	  This	  view	  can	  be	   said	   to	  originate	  with	  Charles	  Darwin	  who	  described	  
emotions	   such	   as	   fear	   as	   an	   automatic	   response	   to	   circumstances	   that	   cannot	   be	   altered	   by	  
reason	   and	   are	   shared	   across	   humanity.	   Building	   on	   this,	   evolutionary	   psychologists	   explain	  
emotions	  as	  the	  result	  of	  adaptations	  to	  the	  environment	  of	  our	  ancestors.	  For	  them,	  emotions	  
“have	   their	   origins	   in	   the	   adaptations	   of	   our	   forebears	   to	  meet	   the	   exigencies	   of	   their	   lives:	  
individuals	   who	   developed	   emotions	   had	   a	   greater	   chance	   to	   survive	   and	   to	   reproduce”.134	  
These	  views	  represent	  one	  extreme	  end	  of	  the	  nature-­‐nurture	  divide	  with	  regard	  to	  emotions.	  
The	  approach	  taken	  here	  is	  located	  on	  the	  other	  end.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  can	  see	  emotions	  as	  
the	  result	  of	  biological	  adaptation.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  they	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  outcome	  not	  of	  
evolutionary	   biological	   processes	   but	   as	   part	   of	   a	   process	   where	   emotions	   are	   “shaped	   by	  
language	   and	   derived	   from	   culture”. 135 	  If	   we	   accept	   that	   emotions	   are	   acquired	   through	  
socialisation,	   then	   emotions	   are	   no	   longer	   seen	   as	   spontaneous	   biologically	   determined	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130	  Ronald	  de	  Sousa,	  The	  Rationality	  of	  Emotion	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  The	  MIT	  Press,	  1987),	  171.	  
131	  Ibid.,	  	  182.	  
132 	  For	   an	   overview	   compare	   Russell	   and	   Lemay,	   'Emotion	   Concepts',	   498.	   For	   an	   explicit	   Vygotskian	  
explanation	   see	   Rom	   Harré,	   'Subjectivity	   and	   the	   Possibility	   of	   Psychiatry',	   in	   Nature	   and	   Narrative:	   An	  
Introduction	  to	  the	  New	  Philosophy	  of	  Psychiatry,	  ed.	  Bill	  Fulford,	  et	  al.	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  
131-­‐132.	   Also	   Harré,	   The	   Singular	   Self.	   An	   Introduction	   to	   the	   Psychology	   of	   Personhood,	   11-­‐14.	   For	   an	  
overview	  on	  acquiring	  emotions	  and	  further	  development	  of	  an	  emotional	  repertoire	  see	  also	  James	  R.	  Averill,	  
'The	  Acquisition	  of	   Emotions	  During	  Adulthood',	   in	  The	   Social	   Construction	  of	   Emotions,	   ed.	   Rom	  Harré,	   ed.	  
(Oxford:	   Basil	   Blackwell,	   1986).	   Averill	   also	   points	   to	   Elias’	   argument	   on	   civilising	   emotions	   in	   this	   context.	  
Norbert	   Elias,	  The	   Civilizing	   Process.	   Sociogenetic	   and	   Psychogenetic	   Investigations,	   revised	   ed.	   (Oxford	   and	  
Malden,	  MA:	  Blackwell,	  2000	  [1936]).	  
133	  For	  an	  overview	  see	  Johnson-­‐Laird	  and	  Oatley,	  'Cognitive	  and	  Social	  Construction	  in	  Emotions',	  460-­‐461.	  
134	  Ibid.,	  	  461.	  
135	  Ibid.,	  	  459.	  They	  call	  this	  position	  strong	  constructivism.	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reactions	   but	   reflect	   commonly	   held	   beliefs	   about	   acceptable	   and	   unacceptable	   behaviour	   as	  
well	  as	  appropriate	  reactions.136	  	  
Taking	  these	  points	  into	  account,	  emotions	  are	  best	  described	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  knowledge.	  They	  are	  
information	  about	  the	  world,	  about	  the	  behaviour	  of	  others	  and	  one’s	  own	  behaviour.	  “Indeed	  
all	   feelings	   …	   seem	   to	   be	   information,	   or	   knowledge.	   They	   are	   distinguished	   from	   what	   we	  
ordinarily	  think	  of	  as	  knowledge	  only	  by	  our	  inability	  to	  experience	  directly	  the	  sources	  of	  that	  
knowledge.”137	  This	   also	   means	   that	   emotions	   are	   implicit	   moral	   judgements.	   The	   emotions	  
displayed	   in	   a	   certain	   situation	   reflect	   beliefs	   about	  what	   is	   right	   and	  wrong.	   The	  question	  of	  
whether	  or	  not	  an	  emotion	  is	  appropriate	  for	  a	  certain	  situation	  is	  then	  not	  so	  much	  a	  question	  
of	   the	   factual	   features	  of	  a	   situation	  but	  of	   cultural	  beliefs.138	  An	  emotion,	  unlike	  a	   sensation,	  
may	  be	  described	  as	   reasonable	  or	  unreasonable,	  appropriate	  or	   inappropriate.	  139	  To	  have	  an	  
emotion	  in	  that	  sense	  is	  to	  make	  a	  judgement.	  “[T]o	  feel	  some	  emotion	  is	  to	  feel	   in	  some	  way	  
about	  someone	  or	  something.”	  140	  Hence,	  we	  can	  argue	  that	  certain	  emotions	  help	  sustain	  moral	  
rules	  in	  a	  society.	  While	  these	  rules	  can	  also	  be	  upheld	  by	  other	  means,	  and	  emotions	  are	  not	  a	  
necessary	   condition	   for	   upholding	   societal	  moral	   rules,	   the	   relation	   between	  moral	   rules	   and	  
emotions	   is	  not	  arbitrary	  and	  emotions	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  one	  way	  of	  conveying	  these	  rules	  with	  
greater	   immediacy	  and	   impact.141	  It	   is	  worth	  pointing	  out	   that	   this	   stance	   is	  not	  new;	  we	   find	  
similar	  positions	  in	  Aristotle	  and	  in	  David	  Hume,	  for	  example,	  both	  of	  whom	  included	  emotions	  
in	   their	   ideas	   of	  morality.142	  Recent	   scholarship	   from	  within	   constructionist	   psychology	  makes	  
this	  claim	  even	  stronger.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  we	  can	  see	  how	  the	  emotional	  repertoire	  of	  a	  
society	  reflects	  the	  values	  and	  moral	  concepts	  held	  in	  that	  society.	  The	  logic	  implied	  here	  is	  the	  
following:	   “Emotions,	   such	   as	   pride,	   ambition,	   guilt	   and	   remorse,	   imply	   a	   certain	   view	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136	  Compare	  for	  example	  Stearns,	  'Emotion',	  37.	  
137	  James	  D.	   Laird	   and	  Nicholas	  H.	   Apostoleris,	   'Emotional	   Self-­‐Control	   and	   Self-­‐Perception:	   Feelings	  Are	   the	  
Solution,	  Not	  the	  Problem',	  in	  The	  Emotions.	  Social,	  Cultural	  and	  Biological	  Dimensions,	  ed.	  Rom	  Harré	  and	  W.	  
Gerrod	  Parrott	  (Thousand	  Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage,	  1996),	  290.	  	  
138	  Claire	   Armon-­‐Jones,	   'The	   Social	   Functions	   of	   Emotion',	   in	   The	   Social	   Construction	   of	   Emotions,	   ed.	   Rom	  
Harré	  (Oxford:	  Basil	  Blackwell,	  1986),	  67.	  
139	  Coulter,	  'Affect	  and	  Social	  Context:	  Emotional	  Definition	  as	  a	  Social	  Task',	  123.	  
140	  Ibid.,	  	  124.	  
141	  Armon-­‐Jones,	  'The	  Social	  Functions	  of	  Emotion',	  58-­‐59.	  
142	  Sousa,	  The	  Rationality	  of	  Emotion,	  305.	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ourselves.	   They	   are	   probably	   not	   felt	   in	   cultures	   in	   which	   little	   importance	   is	   attached	   to	  
individual	  effort	  and	  responsibility.”143	  
The	   example	   of	   anger	   can	   be	   used	   to	   illustrate	   these	   points.	   James	   Averill	   argues	   that	   “the	  
development	  of	  anger	  –	  or	  of	  any	  other	  emotion	  –	  involves	  the	  acquisition	  of	  many	  components	  
and	  the	  rules	  (of	  appraisal,	  behaviour,	  prognosis	  and	  attribution)	  that	  govern	  their	  organization	  
and	   interpretation.”144	  In	   Western	   societies,	   anger	   can	   be	   used	   to	   re-­‐adjust	   the	   terms	   of	   a	  
relationship.145	  It	  can	  be	  used	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  judgements,	  to	  assign	  responsibility	  or	  to	  add	  
justification.	  Being	  angry	  is	  a	  way	  of	  communicating	  to	  ourselves	  and	  others.	  It	  focuses	  attention	  
and	   prepares	   for	   action.	   Like	   other	   emotions	   it	   can	   be	   used	   to	   bring	   about	   “changes	   in	   the	  
modes	  of	  our	  interactions,	  from	  cooperation,	  to	  withdrawal,	  to	  conflict,	  to	  deference”.146	  
With	   regard	   to	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   accounts,	   approaching	   emotions	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	  
constructionist	  psychology	  seems	  to	  present	  itself	  as	  an	  ideal	  solution.	  States	  don’t	  have	  human	  
bodies	  and	  hence	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  instinctive	  reactions	  that	  form	  part	  
of	  mainstream	  approaches	  to	  emotions.	  If,	  however,	  emotions	  are	  seen	  as	  socially	  shared	  ideas	  
that	   are	   transported	   by	   ideal-­‐type	   scenarios,	   the	   state	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   being	   the	   narrative	  
object	  of	   these	  same	  scenarios	  and	  being	  describable	  using	  the	  same	  emotion-­‐vocabulary	  and	  
paradigm	  scenarios	  that	  are	  used	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  people.	  This	  would	  constitute	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  same	  language	  game	  used	  with	  regard	  to	  people	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  
the	  state.	  However,	   this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  state	  really	  becomes	  a	  person	  because,	  even	  
from	  the	  perspective	  of	  constructionist	  psychology,	  the	  body	  matters	  after	  all.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143	  R.	  Peters,	  'Psychology	  and	  Ethical	  Development',	  	  (London:	  Allan	  and	  Unwin,	  1974),	  402.	  As	  quoted	  in	  Paul	  
Heelas,	   'Emotion	  Talk	   across	  Cultures',	   in	  The	   Social	   Construction	  of	   Emotions,	   ed.	   Rom	  Harré	   (Oxford:	  Basil	  
Blackwell,	  1986),	  236.	  
144	  Averill,	  'The	  Acquisition	  of	  Emotions	  During	  Adulthood',	  113.	  
145	  Keith	   Oatley,	   'Emotions:	   Communications	   to	   the	   Self	   and	   Others',	   in	   The	   Emotions.	   Social,	   Cultural	   and	  
Biological	   Dimensions,	   ed.	   Rom	  Harré	   and	  W.	  Gerrod	   Parrott	   (Thousand	  Oaks,	   CA:	   Sage,	   1996),	   314.	  Oatley	  
cites	  Averill	  for	  this	  insight	  James	  R.	  Averill,	  Anger	  and	  Aggression:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Emotion	  (New	  York:	  Springer,	  
1982).	  The	  fact	  that	  what	  is	  presented	  here	  is	  a	  Western	  conception	  of	  anger	  cannot	  be	  stressed	  enough.	  For	  
this	  point	  Catherine	  Lutz’s	  ethographical	  study	  of	  the	  Ifaluk,	  a	  group	  of	  people	  living	  on	  an	  atoll	  in	  the	  Western	  
Pacific,	   is	   useful.	   In	   their	   society,	   anger	   is	   socially	   taboo	   and	   could	   never	   be	   used	   to	   adjust	   the	   terms	   of	   a	  
relationship.	   Catherine	   A.	   Lutz,	   'The	   Domain	   of	   Emotion	   Words	   on	   Ifakuk',	   in	   The	   Social	   Construction	   of	  
Emotion,	  ed.	  Rom	  Harré	  (Oxford:	  Basil	  Blackwell,	  1986),	  268.	  	  
146	  Oatley,	  'Emotions:	  Communications	  to	  the	  Self	  and	  Others',	  312.	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Yet,	  the	  body	  matters	  after	  all	  
I	   remain	   agnostic	   as	   to	   whether	   or	   not	   constructionist	   psychology	   should	   be	   the	   dominant	  
framework	  used	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  psychology	  of	   individual	  human	  beings.	  Here,	  we	  might	  
need	  an	  investigation,	  maybe	  in	  a	  supplementary	  form,	  into	  the	  material	  world.147	  However,	  it	  is	  
clear	  that	  constructionist	  psychology	  with	  its	  emphasis	  on	  the	  discursive	  construction	  of	  persons	  
offers	  key	  insights	  for	  the	  project	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  	  
It	   is	  important	  to	  stress	  that	  even	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  the	  
state	   is	  not	   really	   a	  person.	  “States	  are	  people	   too”	  only	   in	   the	  sense	   that	   the	  same	   language	  
games	  used	  for	  making	  sense	  of	  people	  and	  their	  interactions	  are	  applied	  to	  the	  state.	  There	  is	  a	  
line	   that	   the	   state	   does	   not	   cross	   –	   even	   in	   a	   framework	   that	   locates	   persons,	   selves,	   and	  
emotions	  in	  discourse.	  Even	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  constructionist	  psychology	  we	  can	  say	  that	  
“the	  body	  matters	  after	  all”	  and	  this	  is	  where	  the	  state	  cannot	  follow.	  As	  pointed	  out	  when	  the	  
distinction	  between	  a	  world-­‐of-­‐molecules	  and	  a	  world-­‐of-­‐people	  was	  introduced	  in	  the	  first	  part	  
of	   this	   chapter,	   the	   state	   only	   ever	   becomes	   a	   person	   notionally.	   In	   the	   following,	   I	   aim	   to	  
elaborate	  this	  further	  while	  keeping	  the	  above	  points	  regarding	  the	  construction	  of	  selves	  and	  
emotions	  in	  mind.	  
The	  perspective	  taken	  here	  argues	  that	  what	  is	  relevant	  for	  understanding	  people’s	  selves	  and	  
emotions	   is	   not	   to	   be	   found	   in	  molecules	   and	   biology.	   The	   argument	   by	   Harré	   that	   the	   two	  
worlds	  ‒	  the	  world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐molecules	  and	  the	  world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people	  ‒	  should	  be	  kept	  separate	  
for	   analytical	   purposes	   is	   followed.148	  Yet,	   despite	   the	   argument	   in	   favour	  of	   a	   constructionist	  
psychology,	  it	  seems	  that	  we	  cannot	  escape	  the	  body	  entirely.	  First,	  the	  person	  understood	  as	  a	  
location	   in	   space	   and	   time	   in	   Harré’s	   framework	   is	   bound	   up	   with	   human	   embodiment.	  
Secondly,	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  task/	  tool	  division	  used	  by	  Harré	  to	  demarcate	  the	  world-­‐seen-­‐
as-­‐people	   from	   the	   world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐molecules	   reminds	   us	   that	   while	   “tasks”	   are	   established	  
discursively,	  “tools”	  are	  part	  of	  the	  material	  world.	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  After	   all,	   this	   is	   what	   Harré’s	   more	   recent	   Cognitive	   Science	   focuses	   on.	   Harré,	   Cognitive	   Science:	   A	  
Philosophical	  Introduction.	  	  
148	  Margaret	   Archer	   for	   example	   criticises	   this	   dichotomy	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   connection	   between	   the	   two-­‐
worlds.	  Archer,	  'Being	  Human:	  The	  Problem	  of	  Agency'.	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We	  have	   seen	   how	   in	  Harré’s	   framework	   the	   embodiment	   of	   the	   person	   provides	   a	   sense	   of	  
location	  in	  time	  and	  space.	  To	  identify	  a	  person	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  person’s	  body.149	  Further,	  the	  
body	  is	  crucial	  as	  a	  tool.	  Harré	  stresses	  that	  “bodies	  and	  their	  organs	  serve	  the	  people	  not	  only	  
necessarily,	   as	   sustainers	   of	   their	   identity	   and	   singularity,	   but	   also	   contingently,	   in	   that	   they	  
serve	   as	   a	   set	   of	   tools	   and	   instruments	   for	   the	   performance	   of	   all	   sorts	   of	   tasks.”150	  This	  
quotation	   stresses	   the	   task/tool	   division	   utilised	   by	   Harré’s	   framework	   once	   again.	   But	   since	  
tasks	  and	   tools	  are	  each	  assigned	   to	  a	  different	  ontology,	   the	  body	  does	  not	   seem	   to	  enter	  a	  
constructionist	  framework.	  We	  can	  use	  an	  analogy	  to	  make	  this	  point	  clearer:	   if	  we	  wanted	  to	  
understand	   the	  content	  and	   intent	  of	  a	  public	   speech,	  what	  aspects	  would	  have	   to	   feature	   in	  
our	  analysis?	  Harré	  argues	  that	  to	  understand	  a	  public	  speech,	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  understand	  
the	  biological	  processes	  that	  enable	  the	  formation	  of	  sounds.	  The	  ability	  to	  form	  sounds	  enables	  
us	   to	  give	  a	   speech	   in	   the	   first	  place.	  However,	   this	  ability	   is	   irrelevant	   for	  understanding	  and	  
interpreting	  the	  content	  of	  the	  speech.	  Similarly,	  while	  there	  are	  often	  physical	  events	  involved	  
in	  “having”	  emotions,	  these	  events	  are	  irrelevant	  for	  formulating	  an	  understanding	  of	  emotions.	  
Rather,	  “[a]n	  emotional	  feeling,	  and	  the	  correlated	  display,	   is	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  discursive	  
phenomenon,	  an	  expression	  of	  judgment	  and	  the	  performance	  of	  a	  social	  act.”151	  
However,	   the	   material	   world	   does	   enter	   in	   at	   least	   two	   key	   aspects.	   Firstly,	   the	   weaker	  
argument	   for	   “why	   the	   body	  matters	   after	   all”	   is	   that	  we	   cannot	   absolutely	   deny	   that	   bodily	  
reactions	  influence	  perception	  and,	  hence,	  can	  enter	  the	  world	  of	  discourse	  at	  least	  to	  a	  limited	  
extent.	  The	  argument	  pursued	  by	  constructionist	  psychologists	  is	  that	  the	  world	  of	  the	  body	  can	  
be	  disregarded	  for	  a	  project	  that	  aims	  at	  making	  sense	  of	  people	  in	  a	  world	  of	  people.	  However,	  
the	  body	  remains	  relevant	  to	  a	  limited	  extent.	  Harré,	  for	  example,	  admits	  that	  physical	  elements	  
can	   influence	   the	  perception	  of	  a	   situation.	  The	  physicality	  of	   the	  body	  does	  enter	   the	  world-­‐
seen-­‐as-­‐people	   after	   all.	   A	   raised	   heart	   rate	   would	   be	   an	   example	   of	   a	   bodily	   influence	   on	  
perception.	   Yet,	   he	   continues	   to	   argue	   that	   for	  our	  understanding	  of	   emotions,	   these	  aspects	  
can	  ultimately	  be	  neglected.	  He	  sees	  physical	  effects	  of	  the	  body	  as	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149	  Compare	   also	   Strawson,	   Individuals.	   An	   Essay	   in	   Descriptive	   Metaphysics,	   15-­‐58.	   As	   well	   as	   Harré,	   The	  
Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Personhood,	  8.	  
150	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Personhood,	  73.	  
151	  Harré	  and	  Gillett,	  The	  Discursive	  Mind,	  147.	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incidental	  to	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  in	  this	  or	  that	  emotional	  state.	  It	  turns	  out	  
that	   the	   dominant	   contribution	   to	   the	   way	   that	   aspect	   of	   our	   lives	  
unfolds	   comes	   from	   the	   local	   social	   world,	   by	   way	   of	   its	   linguistic	  
practices	  and	  the	  moral	  judgments	  in	  the	  course	  of	  which	  the	  emotional	  
quality	  of	  encounters	  is	  defined.152	  	  
Secondly,	  and	  this	   is	   the	  more	   important	  argument,	  constructionist	  psychology	   focuses	  on	  the	  
use	  of	  signs	  and	  symbolic	  meanings	  and	  their	  role	  in	  constructing	  the	  world	  of	  people.	  Yet,	  even	  
constructionist	   psychologists	   concede	   that	   the	   kinds	  of	   sign	   forms	   that	   can	  be	  used	  and	   their	  
shape	  is	  in	  part	  dependent	  on	  the	  body.153	  In	  a	  sense,	  the	  argument	  is	  that	  if	  individual	  human	  
beings	  had	  a	  different	  ethology	  and	  physical	  constitution	  their	  sign	  system	  would	  be	  a	  different	  
one.154	  Harré	  points	  out	  that	  “[p]rimitive	  biological	  reactions	  to	  situations	  provide	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  
kind	   of	   ‘vocabulary’	   of	   sign	   forms,	   in	   much	   the	   same	   way	   that	   our	   nervous	   system	   and	  
musculature	  offer	  us	  the	  wherewithal	  for	  making	  articulated	  sounds.”155	  While	  this	  relationship	  
can	  again	  be	   interpreted	  through	  the	  metaphor	  of	   the	  task/	   tool	  division,	   it	  also	  points	   to	   the	  
more	   fundamental,	   Wittgenstinian,	   point:	   a	   symbolic	   system	   would	   not	   be	   possible	   without	  
“natural	   regularities	  and	  natural	  expressions	  which	   the	  culture	  could	  seize	  and	  build	  upon.”156	  
This	  is	  the	  crucial	  reason	  for	  why	  the	  (individual	  human)	  body	  matters	  after	  all	  for	  the	  metaphor	  
of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person.157	  While	  the	  question	  of	  the	  body	  as	  a	  tool	  and	  the	  question	  
of	   the	   biological	   basis	   for	   the	   development	   of	   a	   sign	   system	   do	   not	   enter	   the	   discussions	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152	  Harré,	  'An	  Outline	  of	  the	  Social	  Constructionist	  Viewpoint',	  5.	  
153	  Harré	  for	  example,	  when	  outlining	  his	  “social	  constructionist”	  stance,	  points	  out	  how	  “human	  ethology”	  is	  a	  
necessary	  condition	  for	  human	  beings	  to	  interact.	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  
Personhood,	  18.	  
154	  This	   is	   based,	   as	  Harré	   argues,	   on	  Wittgenstein’s	   point	   that	   “a	   	   grammar	   of	   expressive	   devices	   could	   be	  
established	  only	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  root	  ethology”.	  Ibid.,	  	  140.	  For	  arguments	  that	  also	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  
the	   body	   for	   developing	   a	   sign	   system	   or	   even	   philosophical	   framework	   compare	   Kövecses,	  Metaphor	   and	  
Emotion.	  Language,	  Culture,	  and	  Body	  in	  Human	  Feeling.	  And	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson,	  Philosophy	  in	  the	  Flesh.	  The	  
Embodied	  Mind	  and	  Its	  Challenge	  to	  Western	  Thought.	  
155	  Harré	  and	  Gillett,	  The	  Discursive	  Mind,	  146.	  
156	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Personhood,	  29.	  
157	  From	   the	  perspective	  of	   philosophical	   realism,	   it	  matters	   to	   specify	   this	   relationship.	  Wendt	   for	   example	  
argues	   how	   the	  mind	   supervenes	   on	   the	   brain	   and	   uses	   supervenience	   in	   a	   similar	  manner	   to	   describe	   the	  
relationship	   between	   agents	   and	   structure.	   Wendt,	   Social	   Theory	   of	   International	   Politics,	   156.	   Similarly,	  
Margaret	   Archer	   conceptualises	   human	  beings	   as	   consisting	   of	   emergent	   strata.	   “Each	   stratum	   is	   emergent	  
from,	  but	  irreducible	  to,	   lower	  levels	  because	  all	  strata	  possess	  their	  own	  sui	  generis	  properties	  and	  powers.	  
Thus,	   schematically,	   mind	   is	   emergent	   from	   neurological	   matter,	   consciousness	   from	   mind,	   selfhood	   from	  
consciousness,	   personal	   identity	   from	   selfhood,	   and	   social	   agency	   from	   personal	   identity.”	   Archer,	   'Being	  
Human:	  The	  Problem	  of	  Agency'.	  For	  the	  concepts	  of	  supervenience	  and	  emergence	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  state-­‐
as-­‐person	  see	  also	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  300-­‐305.	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constructionist	  psychologists,	   they	  are	  both	  presumed	  to	  be	  present.	  This	   is	  a	  crucial	  point	   for	  
the	  project	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  
Accepting	  these	  points,	   it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  body	  matters	  as	  a	  demarcation	  line	  between	  
people	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  states	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  It	  follows	  that	  the	  state	  can	  only	  ever	  be	  
what	  I	  call	  –	  taking	  inspiration	  from	  Harry	  G.	  Frankfurt	  –	  a	  second-­‐order	  person.158	  Harré’s	  point	  
about	  “[p]rimitive	  biological	  reactions	  to	  situations	  provid[ing]	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘vocabulary’	  
of	  sign	  forms”159	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  mean	  that	  if	  we	  had	  different	  primitive	  biological	  reactions,	  
our	  sign	  systems,	  and	  based	  on	  that	  our	  conceptualisation	  of	  ourselves	  and	  our	  emotions,	  would	  
look	   different.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   this	   line	   of	   argument	   is	   different	   from	   the	   one	  
pursued	  by	  Wendt	  who	  argues	  that	  an	  actor’s	  identity	  “always	  has	  a	  material	  base,	  the	  body	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  people,	  many	  bodies	  and	  territory	  for	  states”.160	  The	  “biological	  basis”,	  understood	  
as	   human	   ethology	   here,	  matters	   not	   because	   understanding	   it	   helps	   us	   understand	   persons,	  
selves,	  and	  emotions.	  Rather,	  it	  matters	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  human	  biology	  enables	  and	  constrains	  
possibilities	   of	   a	   sign	   system	   and	   serves	   as	   a	   tool	   for	   expressing	   and	   acting	   upon	   this	   sign	  
system.	   Accordingly,	   an	   accumulation	   of	   individual	   human	   bodies	   and	   a	   territory	   are	   not	  
appropriate	  substitutes	  for	  the	  states’	  missing	  “biological	  basis”.	  Further,	  the	  state,	  missing	  any	  
such	  physical	  attributes	  that	  would	  enable	  the	  generation	  of	  a	  sign	  system,	  can,	  therefore,	  only	  
ever	   be	   a	   person	   by	   virtue	   of	   human	   beings	   bringing	   about	   a	   sign-­‐system	   based	   on	   their	  
primitive	   biological	   reactions	   and	   functions.	   It	   is	   worth	   reminding	   ourselves	   of	   a	   parallel	  
between	   Harré’s	   point	   and	   the	   one	  made	   by	   George	   Lakoff	   and	  Mark	   Johnson	   introduced	   in	  
Chapter	  3	  who	  argue	  that	  part	  of	  the	  basis	  for	  metaphors	  is	  provided	  by	  physical	  experiences.161	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158	  The	   term	   second-­‐order	   person	   is	   used	   in	   loose	   analogy	   to	   Harry	   G.	   Frankfurt’s	   concept	   of	   second-­‐order	  
desire	   from	  the	  essay	  “Freedom	  of	   the	  Will	  and	  the	  Concept	  of	  a	  Person”.	  A	  second-­‐order	  desire	   is	  a	  desire	  
about	  a	  desire.	  Similarly,	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  not	  a	  person	  but	  a	  reflection	  about	  persons.	  For	  Frankfurt	  the	  
ability	  to	  have	  second-­‐order	  desires	  is	  what	  sets	  humans	  apart	  from	  other	  species	  and	  is	  crucially	  linked	  to	  free	  
will.	  Similarly,	  the	  ability	  to	  create	  second-­‐order	  persons	  through	  metaphors	  is	  a	  uniquely	  human	  ability	  linked	  
to	  the	  capacity	  for	  abstract	  thought.	  Compare	  Frankfurt,	  'Freedom	  of	  the	  Will	  and	  the	  Concept	  of	  a	  Person',	  6-­‐
7.	  
159	  Harré	  and	  Gillett,	  The	  Discursive	  Mind,	  146.	  
160	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  225.	  
161	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson,	  Metaphors	  We	  Live	  By,	  19-­‐21	  as	  well	  as	  56-­‐60.	  However,	  in	  Metaphors	  we	  live	  by	  Lakoff	  
and	   Johnson	   are	   quick	   to	   point	   out	   that	   there	   is	   no	   such	   thing	   as	   direct,	   unmediated	   experience.	   	   For	   a	  
stronger	  claim	  regarding	  the	  role	  of	  the	  “body”	  for	  the	  development	  of	  conceptual	  systems,	  see	  George	  Lakoff	  
and	  Mark	   Johnson,	  Philosophy	   in	   the	  Flesh:	  The	  Embodied	  Mind	  and	   Its	  Challenge	  to	  Western	  Thought	   (New	  
York:	   Basic	   Books,	   1999),	   16-­‐44.	   It	   is	   also	   worth	   noting	   how	   Harré	   references	   Lakoff	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  
	  	   	   	  
	  
217	  
To	  summarise,	  the	  idea	  of	  selves	  and	  emotions	  is	  at	  the	  very	  basic	  level	  bound-­‐up	  with	  human	  
physiology.	  Human	  physiology	  matters	  for	  enabling	  us	  to	  take	  part	  in	  discourse	  about	  persons,	  
selves	  and	  emotions	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  It	  does	  this	  in	  two	  key	  ways:	  firstly	  by	  serving	  as	  the	  basis	  
for	  a	  system	  of	  signs;	  and	  secondly	  by	  serving	  as	  the	  tool	  for	  expressing	  these	  signs	  and	  acting	  
upon	  them.	  Even	  a	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  sate	  as	  a	  superorganism	  in	  Wendt’s	  sense	  would	  not	  
solve	   this	   problem	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   the	   state	   would	   actually	   be	   a	   person.162	  Further,	   when	  
considering	  state	  consciousness,	  Wendt	  discusses	   the	  possibility	  of	  an	  “ersatz	   subjectivity”	   for	  
the	  state,	  “in	  which	  individuals	  experience	  a	  state’s	  emotions	  on	  its	  behalf”.163	  This	  suggestion	  it	  
similar	   to	  what	   is	   proposed	   here	   and	  what	   is	  meant	   by	   saying	   that	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐
person	   is	   a	   second-­‐order	   person.	  Wendt	   rejects	   the	   idea	   of	   “ersatz	   subjectivity”	   because	   it	   is	  
“not	   likely	   to	   justify	   a	   realist	   view	  of	   state	   consciousness”.164	  I	   agree	  with	  him	  but	   also	   find	   it	  
worth	   stressing	   that	   while	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐structure	   is	   taken	   to	   be	   real	   in	   the	   account	   of	   the	  
constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   the	   personhood	   of	   the	   state	   is	   argued	   to	   be	   theory-­‐constitutive	  
metaphor.	  	  
This	  underlines	  the	  point	  made	  by	  Colin	  Wight	  in	  response	  to	  Wendt’s	  Social	  Theory	  that	  there	  is	  
an	  ontological	  firewall	  that	  the	  state	  does	  not	  cross.165	  In	  my	  account,	  this	  firewall	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  
biological	  “basis”	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  sign	  system	  and	  that	  provides	  tools	  for	  
the	   usage	   of	   this	   sign	   system.	   Hence,	   the	   state	   can	   only	   be	  made	   into	   a	   person	   by	   speaking	  
about	  it	  as	  a	  person.	  Yet,	  while	  this	  represents	  an	  ontological	  firewall	  for	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  it	  
does	  not	  complicate	  a	  metaphorical	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  States	  are	  and	  can	  
be	  imagined	  as	  persons,	  with	  important	  consequences	  for	  the	  study	  of	  international	  relations.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
question	   of	   how	   language	   constraints	   possibilities	   of	   thought.	   Harré,	   Cognitive	   Science:	   A	   Philosophical	  
Introduction,	  144.	  As	  well	  as	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	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This	   chapter	   outlines	   the	   position	   that	   constructionist	   psychology	   takes	   with	   regard	   to	   the	  
person,	  the	  self,	  and	  emotions.	  Drawing	  on	  Harré,	  a	  first	  key	  distinction	  is	  introduced	  between	  
two	   different	   ontologies:	   a	   world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people	   and	   a	   world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐molecules.	   It	   is	   argued	  
that	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   can	   only	   be	   understood	   from	   within	   the	   first	   framework.	   From	   the	  
world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people	  grammar,	  the	  focus	  rests	  on	  the	  person	  being	  among	  other	  persons,	  not	  
on	   causal	   mechanisms	   or	   supposed	   entities	   inside	   the	   mind.	   Of	   primary	   interest	   are	   “rule-­‐
governed	   sequences	   of	  meanings”	   as	   opposed	   to	   causal	  mechanisms	   and	  material	   factors.166	  
This	   sets	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   building	   on	   constructionists	   insights	   apart	   from	  
Wendt’s	  rump	  materialist	  and	  essentialist	  conception.	  
In	   line	   with	   the	   distinction	   between	   two	   ontologies,	   a	   second,	   Wittgenstinian	   distinction	  
between	   tasks	   and	   tools	   is	   introduced.	   Following	   Harré,	   tasks	   are	   described	   as	   entirely	  
discursively	  structured	  and	  tools	  as	  part	  of	  the	  material	  world	  –	  one	  corresponds	  to	  the	  world-­‐
seen-­‐as-­‐people	  and	  the	  other	  corresponds	  to	  the	  world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐molecules.	  The	  two	  cannot	  be	  
separated	  completely,	  but	  the	  argument	  is	  that	  we	  can	  only	  focus	  on	  one	  of	  these	  worlds	  at	  a	  
time.	  For	  the	  world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people	  and	  for	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	   it	   is	  clear,	  however,	  that	  tasks	  
take	   primacy.	   When	   playing	   a	   game	   of	   tennis,	   for	   example,	   the	   racquets,	   the	   tools,	   do	   not	  
influence	   how	   and	   why	   the	   game	   is	   played	   and	   have	   no	   bearing	   on	   the	   establishment	   and	  
acceptance	  of	  rules.	  	  
Taking	   these	   observations	   as	   a	   starting	   point,	   I	   introduce	   Harré’s	   distinction	   between	   person	  
and	  self.	  In	  his	  framework,	  the	  person	  is	  an	  indication	  of	  a	  specific	  place	  in	  time	  and	  space	  that	  
allows	  for	  person-­‐orientated	  ways	  of	  speaking	  to	  take	  place.	  It	  is	  embodiment	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  
distinguish	   one	   person	   from	   the	   other	   and	   perceive	   each	   person	   as	   a	   singularity	   and	   speak	  
about	  them	  using	  personal	  pronouns.	  However,	  the	  self	  –	  understood	  as	  comprising	  a	  singular	  
point	   of	   view	   from	   which	   to	   perceive	   and	   act	   upon	   the	   world,	   a	   collection	   of	   interests	   and	  
characteristics,	  and	  a	  part	  that	  is	  represented	  in	  interaction	  –	  is	  discursively	  constructed	  and	  can	  
only	   be	   found	   in	   interaction	   between	   persons.	   The	   self	   does	   not	   exist	   prior	   to	   discourse	   and	  
cannot	  somehow	  be	  located	  as	  an	  entity	  inside	  the	  person.	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Further,	  a	  constructionist	  perspective	  on	  emotions	  is	  introduced	  which	  allows	  me	  to	  argue	  that	  
what	  matters	   for	   our	   understanding	   of	   emotions	   is	   to	   be	   located	   in	   discourse.	   Emotions	   are	  
socially	   acquired	   rather	   than	   biological	   given	   and,	   based	   on	   this	   view,	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   they	  
reflect	   commonly	   held	   beliefs	   about	   acceptable	   and	   unacceptable	   behaviour	   as	   well	   as	  
appropriate	   reactions.	   They	   are	   seen	   as	   a	   form	   of	   knowledge,	   their	   expression	   is	   a	   form	   of	  
judgement	  and	  they	  are	  used	  to	  address	  and	  re-­‐dress	  relationships.	  	  
These	  observations	  have	  far-­‐reaching	  consequences	  for	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  I	  argue	  that	  based	  
on	  these	  criteria,	  person-­‐oriented	  discourses	  become	  applicable	  to	  the	  state.	  An	  inside	  test	  for	  
the	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   like	   the	   one	   proposed	   by	   Wendt,	   is	   not	   required	   as	   psychological	  
personhood	   is	   to	   be	   found	   within	   discourse,	   not	   inside	   the	   mind.	   Further,	   utilising	  
Wittgenstinian	   insights,	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   there	   is	  no	  gap	  between	   the	   “feeling”	  of	  an	  emotion	  
and	  its	  expression.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  the	  questions	  of	  how	  the	  state	  can	  be	  said	  to	  feel	  an	  
emotion	  or	  who	  is	  experiencing	  the	  emotion	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  state	  become	  irrelevant.	  Further,	  if	  
self	   and	   emotions	   are	   seen	   as	   fundamentally	   constructed,	   there	   is	   nothing	   essential	   about	  
persons	   and	   we	   cannot	   presuppose	   a	   rump	   materialism	   that	   constrains	   possibilities	   of	  
construction	  as	  it	  is	  done	  in	  Wendt’s	  account.	  
However,	  despite	  this	  emphasis	  on	  discourse,	  the	  state	  only	  ever	  becomes	  what	  I	  call	  a	  second-­‐
order	  person.	  Despite	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  constructed	  nature	  of	  person,	  self,	  and	  emotions,	  the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	   faces	   one	   important	   limitation	   to	   its	   constitution.	   It	   is	   argued	   that	   the	  
development	  of	   any	   symbolic	   system	   is	   bound	  up	  with	  human	  embodiment	   in	   the	   sense	   that	  
basic	  biological	   functions	  enable	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  sign	  system	  by,	   for	  example,	  supporting	  the	  
ability	   to	   speak	   and	   by	   determining	   certain	   ways	   of	   experiencing	   the	   world	   and	   abilities	   to	  
interact	  with	   it.	  Further,	  drawing	  on	  Harré’s	  point	  regarding	  the	  task/tool	  division,	   it	   is	  argued	  
that	  tasks,	  the	  aspects	  that	  matter	  in	  the	  social	  world,	  are	  set	  discursively,	  while	  tools,	  the	  ability	  
to	  accomplish	  these	  tasks,	  depend	  on	  physical	  embodiment.	  The	  tools	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  
bring	   about	   a	   specific	   sign	   system	   rest	  with	  human	  beings.	   This	   is	  why	   the	   state	   as	   a	   second-­‐
order	  person	  depends	  on	  individual	  human	  beings	  who	  think,	  feel,	  speak	  and	  act	  on	  its	  behalf.	  
Yet,	   despite	   this	   constraint	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   I	   argue	   that	   constructionist	  
psychology	  offers	  a	  useful	  way	  to	  develop	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  further.	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Chapter	  6:	  Developing	  the	  
constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
This	  chapter	  develops	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  It	  builds	  on	  the	  critique	  of	  the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	   debate	   outlined	   in	   Chapter	   1	   as	   well	   as	   the	   critique	   of	   Alexander	   Wendt’s	  
approach	   outlined	   in	   Chapter	   2.	   Further,	   the	   position	   regarding	   the	   role	   of	   metaphors	  
developed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  the	  suggestions	  of	  scholars	  of	  the	  emotional	  turn	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  
and	  the	  specific	  elements	  of	  Rom	  Harré’s	  constructionist	  psychology	  elaborated	  in	  the	  previous	  
chapter,	  are	  now	  built	  upon	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  an	  alternative	  conception.	  	  
As	  a	  starting	  point,	   it	   is	  worth	  highlighting	  the	  key	  positions	  developed	   in	  the	  earlier	  chapters.	  
First,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  debate	  so	  far	  was	  built	  on	  a	  problematic	  dichotomy	  between,	  on	  the	  one	  
hand,	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  state	  really	  exists	  and	  really	  is	  a	  person	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  
argument	  that	  it	  is	  only	  a	  metaphor.	  Second,	  I	  am	  critical	  of	  Wendt’s	  approach	  and	  his	  search	  for	  
a	  suitable	  inside	  constitution	  of	  the	  person	  and	  his	  “rump	  materialist”	  commitments	  with	  regard	  
to	   the	   person	   and	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person.1	  Third,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   role	   of	   metaphors	   as	   theory-­‐
constitutive	   elements	   needs	   to	   be	   taken	   seriously.	   Fourth,	   while	   the	   state	   is	   seen	   as	   a	   real	  
structure,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   can	   only	   be	   addressed	   on	   the	   level	   of	   linguistic	  
realism.	  Fifth,	  in	  line	  with	  scholars	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  emotional	  turn,	  I	  maintain	  that	  for	  creating	  a	  
better	  understanding	  of	  people	  in	  a	  world	  of	  people,	  the	  strict	  dichotomy	  between	  emotions	  on	  
the	   one	   hand	   and	  what	   is	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   rationality	   or	   rational	   decision-­‐making	   on	   the	  
other	  needs	  to	  be	  overcome.	  Sixth,	  I	  take	  the	  position	  that	  the	  state	  is	  not	  a	  good	  candidate	  for	  
group	  emotions.	  “State	  emotions”	  have	  to	  be	  addressed	  on	  a	  conceptual	  level	  via	  the	  metaphor	  
of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  This	   is	   in	   line	  with	  the	  metaphorical	  approach	  to	  the	  state-­‐
as-­‐person	  and	  the	  commitment	  to	  linguistic	  realism	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  concept.	  Lastly,	  drawing	  
on	  Harré’s	  constructionist	  psychology,	   I	  am	  able	  to	   locate	  self	  and	  emotions	   in	  discourse	  and	  I	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am	   in	   a	   position	   to	   argue	   against	   “rump	   materialism”	   and	   the	   need	   for	   a	   suitable	   inside	  
constitution	   of	   the	   person.	   As	   suggested	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   best	  
conceived	  of	  as	  what	   I	  call,	  drawing	  on	  Harry	  G.	  Frankfurt,	  a	  second-­‐order	  person.2	  The	  task	  of	  
this	   chapter	   is	   to	   draw	   these	   points	   closer	   together	   in	   suggesting	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐
person	  as	  an	  alternative	  for	  the	  discipline.	  	  
By	  building	  on	  these	  points	  in	  developing	  an	  alternative	  conception	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  the	  
discipline,	   I	  am	  able	   to	  make	  a	  contribution	   that	  avoids	   the	  search	   for	  a	   suitable	   inside	  of	   the	  
person	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  and	  condemnations	  of	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   ideas	  as	   ‘mere	  metaphors’	  on	  
the	  other.	  With	   this	   aim	   in	  mind,	   the	   first	  part	  of	   this	   chapter	  highlights	  how	   the	  constructed	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	  suggested	  here	  differs	  from	  Wendt’s	  approach	  and	  how	  my	  suggestion	  to	  treat	  
the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  as	  a	  metaphor	  also	  differs	  from	  disciplinary	  mainstream	  approaches	  that	  are	  
quick	  to	  admit	  that	  the	  state	  is	  not	  really	  a	  person	  and	  that	  state	  personhood	  and	  state	  agency	  
are	   really	   shorthand	   expressions	   for	   something	   else.	   Further,	   by	   highlighting	   how	   discourses	  
regarding	   persons	   become	   useful	   for	   making	   the	   state	   intelligible	   in	   the	   second	   part	   of	   this	  
chapter,	   I	  enter	   into	  a	  dialogue	  with	  current	  disciplinary	  debates	  regarding	  state	  identities	  and	  
state	   emotions.	   	   However,	   a	  more	   detailed	   engagement	   with	   disciplinary	   debates	   and	   larger	  
philosophy	  of	  social	  science	  questions	  and	  the	  contribution	  that	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
makes	  regarding	  these	  debates	  is	  reserved	  for	  Chapter	  7	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  
To	  address	  these	  points,	  this	  chapter	  makes	  five	  key	  moves.	  The	  first	  section	  takes	  the	  process	  
of	  metaphorical	  mapping	  as	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  3	  and	  makes	  it	  useful	  for	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐
as-­‐person	   by	   drawing	   on	   Harré’s	   constructionist	   psychology.	   Harré	   outlines	   what	   he	   calls	  
minimal	   criteria	   that	   allow	   for	   person-­‐oriented	   discourse	   to	   take	   place	   in	   everyday	  
conversation.3	  The	  task	  it	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  dialogue	  between	  what	  is	  called	  the	  source	  domain	  of	  
the	  metaphor,	  ideas	  about	  the	  person,	  and	  the	  target	  domain	  of	  the	  metaphor,	  ideas	  about	  the	  
state.	  Resulting	   from	  this	   is	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  as	  an	   imagined	  entity	   that	  builds	  on	  everyday	  
discursive	   practices	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   accepted	   international	   practices	   of	   external	  
sovereignty,	  stressing	  territorial	  integrity	  and	  representation,	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  The	  conceptual	  
metaphor	   of	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   emerges	   from	   this	   analysis.	   Based	   on	   this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Frankfurt,	  'Freedom	  of	  the	  Will	  and	  the	  Concept	  of	  a	  Person'.	  
3	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Personhood,	  73.	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perspective,	   the	  second	  section	  addresses	  the	  crucial	  questions	  of	  suitable	   inside	  constitution,	  
embodiment	  and	  “rump	  materialism”	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  person	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  These	  
are	   important	  considerations	  given	  the	  particular	  theoretical	  position	   I	  wish	  to	  take	  within	  the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate	  and	  the	  critique	  issued	  with	  regard	  to	  Wendt’s	  approach.	  The	  final	  three	  
sections	  flesh	  out	  the	  conceptual	  metaphor	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  I	  argue	  that	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
the	  metaphorical	  mapping	  of	  Harré’s	  minimal	  criteria	  for	  person-­‐orientated	  discourse,	  language	  
games	   regarding	   individual	   human	  beings	  used	   in	   everyday	  discourse	   can	  be	  utilised	   to	  make	  
the	   state	   intelligible	   and	   to	   put	   us	   into	   a	   position	   from	  which	   judgements	   about	   appropriate	  
state-­‐behaviour	  become	  possible.	  The	  metaphorical	  nature	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  
important	  to	  stress	  here.	  In	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  state	  in	  IR,	  it	  allows	  for	  the	  utilisation	  of	  
the	   conventions	   developed	   in	   the	   particular	   circumstances	   of	   individual	   human	   beings	   in	  
everyday	  discourse.	  Three	  are	  especially	  relevant:	  language	  games	  regarding	  the	  construction	  of	  
the	  self,	  emotions,	  and	  concepts	  of	  enmity	  and	  friendship.	  The	  last	  three	  sections	  address	  these	  
language	   games	   in	   turn	   and	   bring	   them	   into	   dialogue	   with	   relevant	   IR	   debates.	   In	   sum,	   this	  
chapter	  makes	  a	  suggestion	  that	  takes	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  seriously	  while	  avoiding	  
what	  has	  been	  outlined	  in	  previous	  chapters	  as	  some	  of	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  previous	  debates	   in	  the	  
discipline.	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Mapping	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
I	  start	  from	  the	  position	  that	  that	  the	  prevalence	  of	  the	  discipline	  to	  see	  the	  state	  as	  a	  person	  or	  
agent	   is	   a	   useful	   assumption.	   However,	   based	   on	   a	   critique	   of	   the	   disciplinary	   debate	   and	  
Wendt’s	  specific	  contribution,	   I	  am	  offering	  an	  alternative	  conception	  that	  avoids	  some	  of	   the	  
pitfalls	  identified.	  	  
To	  begin	  with,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  stress	  that	  taking	  a	  metaphor	  approach	  means	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  
dialogue	  between	  insights	  of	  two	  different	  realms	  of	  knowledge	  that	  facilitates	  the	  creation	  of	  
new	  knowledge.	  However,	  while	   this	   exchange	  between	   two	  distinct	   realms	   is	   common	   to	   all	  
metaphors,	  they	  fulfil	  a	  variety	  of	  functions.	  In	  Chapter	  3	  I	  started	  from	  a	  basic	  categorisation	  of	  
metaphors	  that,	  drawing	  on	  I.	  A.	  Richards,	   I	  called	  modes	  of	  metaphors.4	  I	  distinguish	  between	  
three	  modes	  of	  metaphors.	  They	  can	  function	  as	  figures	  of	  speech	  and	  tools	  for	  persuasion,	  as	  
heuristic	  tools	  that	  offer	  orientation	  in	  a	  complex	  world,	  and	  as	  elements	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  
knowledge.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  emphasise	  again	  that	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  as	  I	  wish	  to	  
address	  it	  here	  is	  located	  in	  the	  third	  mode	  of	  metaphor.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	  is,	  to	  borrow	  a	  term	  used	  by	  Richard	  Boyd,	  a	  theory-­‐constitutive	  metaphor.5	  According	  to	  
Boyd,	   theory-­‐constitutive	  metaphors	   are	   “metaphorical	   expressions	   [that],	   at	   least	   for	   a	   time,	  
[constitute]	  an	  irreplaceable	  part	  of	  the	  linguistic	  machinery	  of	  a	  scientific	  theory.”6	  In	  Chapter	  3	  
I	  also	  outlined	  the	  process	  of	  structural	  mapping,	  drawing	  on	  Dedre	  Gentner’s	  work,	  to	  illustrate	  
the	  inner	  workings	  of	  such	  a	  metaphor.7	  Two	  key	  aspects	  of	  this	  process	  of	  metaphor-­‐mapping	  
are	   worth	   recalling	   here.	   First,	   following	   Gentner,	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   stressed	   that	   the	   process	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Richards,	   The	   Philosophy	   of	   Rhetoric,	   94.	   For	   a	   similar	   categorisation	   compare	   Maasen	   and	   Weingart,	  
Metaphors	  and	  the	  Dynamics	  of	  Knowledge,	  3.	  	  
5	  Boyd,	  'Metaphor	  and	  Theory	  Change:	  What	  Is	  "Metaphor"	  a	  Metaphor	  For?',	  486.	  For	  an	  overview	  also	  
compare	  Semino,	  Metaphor	  in	  Discourse,	  130-­‐148.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Boyd,	  in	  line	  with	  his	  scientific	  
realist	  commitments,	  argues	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  process	  that	  would	  see	  a	  theory-­‐constitutive	  metaphor	  eventually	  
replaced	  by	  a	  more	  literal	  explication.	  For	  him,	  this	  is	  part	  of	  the	  scientific	  process	  and	  he	  argues	  that	  
“complete	  explications	  are	  often	  the	  eventual	  result	  of	  the	  attempts	  at	  explication	  which	  are	  central	  to	  
scientific	  inquiry.”	  Boyd,	  'Metaphor	  and	  Theory	  Change:	  What	  Is	  "Metaphor"	  a	  Metaphor	  For?',	  488.	  Further,	  
theory-­‐constitutive	  metaphors	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  process	  of	  	  “the	  accommodation	  of	  language	  to	  as	  yet	  
undiscovered	  causal	  features	  of	  the	  world”.	  Ibid.,	  	  490.	  Note	  how	  Boyd	  speaks	  about	  “the	  accommodation	  of	  
language”.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  position	  taken	  here,	  following	  a	  stronger	  constructivism,	  attributes	  a	  creative	  
function	  to	  metaphors.	  A	  metaphor,	  especially	  when	  the	  social	  realm	  is	  concerned,	  does	  more	  than	  
accommodate.	  It	  creates.	  	  
6	  Boyd,	  'Metaphor	  and	  Theory	  Change:	  What	  Is	  "Metaphor"	  a	  Metaphor	  For?',	  486.	  
7	  Gentner,	  'Are	  Scientific	  Analogies	  Metaphors?'.	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identifies	   key	   nodal	   points	  within	   the	   source	   and	   target	   domains	   of	   the	  metaphor	   and	  maps	  
their	   relationships,	   not	   their	   characteristics.	   In	   Gentner’s	   words,	   structural	   mapping	   “asserts	  
that	  identical	  operations	  and	  relationships	  hold	  among	  non-­‐identical	  objects”.8	  Second,	  drawing	  
on	   the	   seminal	   work	   of	  Max	   Black,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   stress	   that	   this	   is	   not	   a	   one-­‐directional	  
process	  of	  applying	  conceptual	   relationship	   found	   in	   the	   target	  domain	   to	   the	  source	  domain.	  
On	   the	   contrary,	   Black,	   following	  Richards,	  makes	   an	   important	   contribution	  by	   stressing	   that	  
metaphors	   do	   not	   involve	   a	   comparison	   between	   two	   domains,	   but	   an	   interaction	   between	  
them.9	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  through	  a	  metaphor,	  two	  different	  realms	  are	  brought	  in	  contact	  with	  
each	  other.	  The	  one	  that	  is	  more	  familiar,	  less	  abstract	  and	  closer	  to	  direct	  everyday	  experiences	  
is	  utilised	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  realm	  that	  is	   less	  familiar,	  more	  abstract,	  and	  further	  removed	  
from	   everyday	   experiences.	   It	   is	   worth	   pointing	   out	   again	   that	   this	   is	   not	   a	   one-­‐directional	  
process.	  While,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	   in	  Chapter	  3,	   some	  of	   the	   terminology	   related	   to	  conceptual	  
metaphors	  such	  as	  source	  and	  target	  domain	  and	  the	  description	  of	   the	  metaphor	  as	  a	  “lens”	  
through	  which	  we	  perceive	  reality	  make	   it	  seem	  as	   if	   this	  process	  works	   in	  one	  direction	  only,	  
this	   is	   not	   the	   case.	   After	   all,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   remember	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
person	  works	  well	   and	   is	   still	   prevalent	   in	   IR	   theory	   because,	   as	   we	   have	   seen	   in	   Chapter	   1,	  
concepts	  of	  states	  and	  concepts	  of	  persons	  grew	  up	  together	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  
two	  was	  by	  no	  means	  a	  one-­‐directional	  application	  of	  person-­‐related	  ideas	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  
international.10	  
Therefore,	   in	   a	   first	   step,	   source	   and	   target	   domain	   and	   their	   key	   elements	   need	   to	   be	  
identified.	   Two	   things	   are	   important	   to	   stress	   in	   this	   regard.	   First,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   that,	   in	  
contrast	   to	   the	   state,	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   can	   only	   be	   addressed	   on	   the	   level	   of	   linguistic	  
realism.	   This	   means	   that	   the	   following	   mapping	   process	   is	   not	   a	   process	   that	   looks	   for	  
underlying,	  unobservable	  structures	  and	  structural	  relationships	  to	  be	  mapped	  across	  contexts.	  
Rather,	   I	   am	   operating	   at	   the	   discursive	   level	   and	   looking	   at	   conditions	   for	   the	   realisation	   of	  
certain	  discursive	  conventions.	  Second,	  taking	  an	  interaction	  view	  of	  metaphors	  means	  that	  the	  
construction	   of	   the	  metaphor	   itself	   is	   a	   creative	   process	   that	   creates	   similarities	   hitherto	   not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Ibid.,	  	  108.	  
9	  Black,	  Models	  and	  Metaphors.	  Studies	  in	  Language	  and	  Philosophy,	  35.	  
10	  Compare	  Erik	  Ringmar	  for	  example	  and	  his	  point	  about	  the	  concept	  of	   interest	  being	  first	  only	  attached	  to	  
the	  state	  and	  only	  later	  becoming	  applicable	  to	  groups	  and	  individuals.	  Ringmar,	  Identity,	  Interest	  and	  Action.	  
A	  Cultural	  Explanation	  of	  Sweden's	  Intervention	  in	  the	  Thirty	  Years	  War,	  56.	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realised.	  To	  think	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  person	  or	  agent	  is	  a	  common	  thread	  in	  parts	  of	  the	  discipline	  
of	  IR.	  Hence,	  I	  do	  not	  claim	  to	  be	  inventing	  the	  metaphor.	  Rather,	  by	  going	  back	  to	  the	  process	  
of	  metaphor	   construction	   in	   the	   form	  of	   structural	  mapping,	   I	   aim	   to	   stress	   the	  key	  moves	   in	  
establishing	  the	  metaphor.	  This	  builds	  on	  a	  critique	  of	  earlier	  disciplinary	  debates	  and	  aims	  to	  
show	  that	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  can	  be	  maintained	  but	  is	  better	  based	  on	  a	  different	  process	  with	  
different	  outcomes	  than	  previously	  suggested.	  	  
The	  mapping	  process	  for	  the	  metaphor	  or	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  best	  begun	  with	  a	  
closer	   look	   at	   the	   source	   domain.	   In	   Chapters	   4	   and	   5	   I	   gave	   reasons	   for	   a	   commitment	   to	  
constructionist	  psychology	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  person	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  and	  outlined	  key	  
points	  of	  this	  perspective	  by	  drawing	  on	  Harré’s	  work.	  According	  to	  Harré’s	  minimal	  criteria,	  a	  
person	  is	  a	  location	  in	  time	  and	  space	  that	  is	  clearly	  identifiable	  and	  shows	  continuity	  over	  time.	  
This	  is	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  and	  is	  a	  first	  step	  in	  identifying	  the	  
source	  domain.	  	  
Based	  on	  this,	  I	  argue	  that	  we	  can	  identify	  the	  equivalent	  of	  Harré’s	  minimal	  criteria	  in	  the	  state.	  
The	  modern	  state	  fulfils	  the	  minimal	  criteria	  of	  being	  identifiable	  as	  a	  location	  in	  time	  and	  space	  
that	   shows	  continuity	  over	   time.	  The	  key	  principle	  here	   is	  external	   sovereignty	   linked	  with	  an	  
emphasis	   on	   territorial	   integrity.11	  These	   two	   principles	   allow	   for	   the	   application	   of	   person-­‐
oriented	   discourses	   to	   the	   state.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   however,	   that	   I	   am	   not	   arguing	   that	  
based	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  external	  sovereignty	  the	  state	  is	  indeed	  a	  person.	  Rather,	  the	  principle	  
of	   external	   sovereignty	   is	   important	   in	   giving	   the	   state	   a	   location	   in	   time	   and	   space	   with	  
continuity.	  It	  is	  these	  elements	  that	  then	  allow	  for	  person-­‐oriented	  discourses	  to	  function	  with	  
regard	   to	   the	   state.	   Further,	   it	   is	   also	   important	   to	   note	   that	   in	   the	   case	  of	   individual	   human	  
beings,	  our	  key	  reference	  point	  for	  understanding	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  person,	  these	  principles	  
are	   closely	   linked	   with	   human	   embodiment.	   This,	   as	   argued	   in	   more	   detail	   in	   the	   previous	  
chapter,	   is	   why	   the	   state	   is	   only	   ever	   a	   second-­‐order	   person	   and	   why	   it	   is	   dependent	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  I	   take	   the	   principle	   of	   (external)	   sovereignty	   as	   a	   given	   here	   and	   build	   on	   its	   basic	   form	   as	   enshrined	   in	  
international	  law	  (compare	  UN	  Charter,	  Article	  2,	  numbers	  1,	  4,	  and	  7	  for	  example).	  In	  this	  way,	  I	  pretend,	  for	  
the	  moment,	  that	  it	  can	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  permanent,	  uncontested	  concept.	  For	  an	  insightful	  critical	  engagement	  
compare	   R.	   B.	   J.	   Walker,	   Inside/Outside:	   International	   Relations	   as	   Political	   Theory	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  
University	   Press,	   1993),	   159-­‐183.	   For	   the	  evolution	  of	   the	   concept	   compare	  Robert	  H.	   Jackson,	  Sovereignty:	  
Evolution	  of	  an	  Idea	  (Cambridge	  and	  Malden,	  MA:	  polity,	  2007).	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individual	  human	  beings	  acting	  on	   its	  behalf.	  Nevertheless,	  by	  mapping	  these	  minimal	  criteria,	  
person-­‐oriented	  discourses	  can	  be	  made	  useful	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  state.	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   minimal	   criteria,	   Harré’s	   	   work	   also	   implicitly	   suggests	   that	   for	   everyday	  
person-­‐oriented	  discourse	  to	  function,	  we	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  attribute	  a	  flow	  of	  utterances	  and	  
actions	  to	  the	  person.	  Hence,	  we	  need	  to	  wonder	  whether	  this	  flow	  of	  utterances	  and	  actions	  
can	  reasonably	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  state.	  Further	  and	  closely	  related	  to	  this	  first	  point,	  we	  need	  
to	  be	  able	  to	  interpret	  the	  state	  as	  a	  participant	  in	  discourse.	  As	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  
with	   regard	   to	   individual	   human	   beings,	   these	   elements	   are	   linked	   to	   the	   body	  which	  mainly	  
serves	   as	   a	   tool	   for	   producing	   the	   flow	   of	   utterances	   but	   which	   also	   circumscribes	   the	  
possibilities	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  symbolic	  system.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  system	  of	  representation	  
associated	  with	  the	  modern	  state	  potentially	  allows	  for	  the	  attribution	  of	  actions	  and	  utterances	  
to	  the	  state	  and	  for	  it	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  participant	  in	  such	  a	  discourse.	  However,	  this	  also	  means	  
that	   the	   state	  ultimately	  depends	  on	   individual	  human	  beings,	   acting	  alone	  or	   in	  groups	   from	  
their	  particular	  places	  in	  society,	  to	  speak	  and	  act	  on	  its	  behalf.	  	  
Having	   identified	   the	  state	  as	  a	   location	   in	   time	  and	  space	  with	  continuity	  over	   time	  to	  which	  
utterances	   and	  actions	   can	  be	  attributed	  and	  which	   therefore	   can	  be	   seen	  as	   a	  participant	   in	  
discourse,	   constructionist	   psychology	   can	   enter	   the	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  
more	  fully.	  The	  flow	  of	  these	  actions	  and	  utterances	  can	  now	  be	  assembled	  into	  the	  narratives	  
found	  in	  person-­‐oriented	  discourses	  of	  the	  “world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people”,	   including	  narratives	  of	  self	  
and	  narratives	  of	  emotions.	  	  
I	  call	  selves,	  emotions,	  and	  friendship	  and	  enmity	  language	  games	  in	  line	  with	  a	  Wittgenstinian	  
understanding	  of	   the	   role	  of	   language.	  There	  are	   several	  ways	   in	  which	  Wittgenstein	  employs	  
the	  term.	  In	  Philosophical	  Investigations,	  Wittgenstein	  initially	  points	  to	  three	  ways	  in	  which	  he	  
uses	   the	   term	   language	  game:	   the	   learning	  of	  a	   language,	  a	  primitive	   language,	  and	  also	   “the	  
whole”	   understood	   as	   the	   language	   and	   the	   activities	   with	   which	   it	   is	   intertwined.12	  Further	  
examples	   of	   language	   games	   include	   giving	   orders	   and	   acting	   on	   them,	   reporting	   an	   event,	  
guessing	   riddles,	   cracking	   jokes,	   and	   solving	   problems	   in	   applied	   arithmetic. 13 	  Some	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 	  Ludwig	   Wittgenstein,	   Philosophical	   Investigation.	   The	   German	   Text,	   with	   English	   Translation	   by	   G.	   E.	  
Anscombe,	  P.M.S.	  Hacker	  and	  Joachim	  Schulte,	  revised	  4th	  ed.	  (Chichester:	  John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons,	  2009),	  8,	  PI	  7.	  
13	  Ibid.,	  	  15,	  PI	  23.	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interpretations	  understand	  Wittgenstinian	  language	  games	  as	  models,	  tools,	  or	  heuristic	  devices	  
that	   illustrate	  and	  persuade,	   respectively.14	  However,	   this	   view	  can	  be	  broadened	  by	  drawing,	  
for	   example,	   on	   Robert	   Hanna’s	   interpretation	   who	   argues	   that	   “meaningful	   language	   is	  
essentially	   embedded	   in	   basic	   human	   linguistic	   practices	   called	   language-­‐games,	   and	   second,	  
that	   language-­‐games	   in	   turn	  are	  essentially	   embedded	   in	  actual	  historical	  networks	  of	  human	  
activity	  and	  human	  culture	  called	  forms	  of	  life.”15	  Hence,	  using	  this	  very	  broad	  interpretation	  of	  
a	  Wittgenstinian	  perspective	  on	  language	  games,	  I	  argue	  that	  expressions	  of	  the	  self,	  emotions,	  
and	   specific	   conceptions	  of	   the	   relations	  between	   self	   and	  other	   are	   language	  games.	  On	   the	  
basis	   of	   the	  metaphor	   of	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   the	   language	   games	   familiar	   to	   us	  
from	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  “world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people”,	  become	  useful	  for	  the	  state	  by	  being	  utilised	  in	  
making	   sense	   of	   IR	   and	   in	  making	   judgements	   of	   appropriateness.16	  The	   framework	   I	   suggest	  
makes	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   intelligible	   based	   on	   the	   forms	   of	   life	   developed	   with	   regard	   to	  
individual	  human	  beings	  “embedded	  in	  actual	  historical	  networks	  of	  human	  activity	  and	  human	  
culture”.17	  The	  metaphorical	  mapping	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  allows	  for	  the	  application	  of	  these	  
language	   games,	   which	   are	   in	   themselves	   invitations	   for	   further	   exploration	   regarding	   the	  
possibilities	  of	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  though	  that	  while	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  a	  metaphor	  is	  it	  not	  
what	  Wendt	  would	  call	  a	  mere	  metaphor.	  As	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  Wendt’s	  approach	  offers	  a	  
critique	   of	   an	   alternative	   to	   what	   he	   perceives	   as	   the	   tendency	   of	   the	   mainstream	   of	   the	  
discipline	   to	   see	   state	   personhood	   as	   “a	   useful	   fiction,	   analogy,	   metaphor,	   or	   shorthand	   for	  
something	  else”.18	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Wendt,	  the	  approach	  taken	  here	  does	  agree	  
with	  the	  view	  that	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  a	  metaphor.	  However,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  based	  on	  a	  
discussion	   of	   conceptual	   metaphor	   theory,	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   we	   cannot	   escape	  metaphors	   in	  
making	  sense	  of	  the	  world.	  Metaphors	  can	  be	  constitutive	  of	  a	  worldview	  or	  body	  of	  knowledge	  
with	  important	  real-­‐world	  implications.	  Being	  critical	  of	  the	  comparison	  view	  of	  metaphors	  and,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Beth	  Savickey,	  Wittgenstein's	  Art	  of	  Investigation	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1999),	  152-­‐153.	  
15 	  Robert	   Hanna,	   'From	   Referentialism	   to	   Human	   Action:	   The	   Augustinian	   Theory	   of	   Language',	   in	  
Wittgenstein's	  Philosophical	  Investigations.	  A	  Critical	  Guide	  ed.	  Ahmed.	  Arif	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  
Press,	  2010),	  14-­‐15,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
16	  For	  the	  term	  “world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people”	  compare	  Harré,	  'Discourse	  and	  the	  Embodied	  Person',	  107.	  
17	  Hanna,	  'From	  Referentialism	  to	  Human	  Action:	  The	  Augustinian	  Theory	  of	  Language',	  14-­‐15.	  
18	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  289.	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more	   broadly	   speaking	   of	   a	   pure	   reference	   theory	   allows	   me	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	   view	   that	  
metaphors	  are	  only	  figures	  of	  speech	  that	  point	  to	  something	  that	  could	  be	  expressed	  literally.	  	  
In	   this	   regard,	   it	   is	   also	   crucial	   to	   stress	   that	   the	   state	   is	   not	   a	   metaphor.	   The	   state	   is	   a	  
structure.19	  The	  metaphor	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  one	  way	  of	  making	  this	  structure	  intelligible	  
by	   emphasising	   certain	   aspects	   while	   hiding	   others.	   However,	   because	   the	   metaphor	   of	   the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   prevalent	   in	   parts	   of	   the	   discipline	   and	   in	   lay	   discourses,	   it	   has	   important	  
consequences	  for	  enabling	  certain	  ideas	  and	  actions	  while	  discouraging	  others.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  
metaphor,	   while	   only	   being	   able	   to	   make	   parts	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐structure	   intelligible,	   has	  
consequences	  for	  the	  production	  and	  reproduction	  of	  this	  very	  structure.	  This	  is	  also	  the	  point	  
at	   which	   the	   theory-­‐constitutive	   metaphor	   of	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   blurs	   the	   lines	  
between	  epistemology	  and	  ontology.	  While	  being	  a	  device	  that	  makes	  underlying,	  unobservable	  
structures	  partly	  intelligible,	  its	  very	  prominence	  in	  the	  discourses	  of	  scholars,	  practitioners,	  and	  
laypersons	   has	   consequences	   for	   the	   reproduction	   of	   the	   structure	   and	   hence	   becomes	  
ontologically	   relevant.	   This	   last	   point	   is	   crucial	   and	   offers	   an	   alternative	   to	   the	   disciplinary	  
mainstream.	  It	  will	  be	  taken	  up	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  final	  chapter	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Wight,	   Agents,	   Structures	   and	   International	   Relations:	   Politics	   as	   Ontology,	   compare	   chapter	   four	   on	   a	  
discussion	  of	  structure	  and	  224	  especially	  on	  the	  state	  as	  structure.	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Creating	  a	  second-­‐order	  person:	  material	  and	  embodied	  
implications	  
In	   this	   section,	   I	   would	   like	   to	   address	   three	   aspects	   of	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   that	  
highlight	   how	   my	   approach	   is	   different	   from	   Wendt’s	   and	   emerges	   out	   of	   critique	   of	   his	  
conception	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person:	  the	  question	  of	  a	  suitable	  inside	  of	  the	  person	  and	  the	  state-­‐
as-­‐person,	  the	  question	  of	  a	  ‘rump	  materialism’	  of	  the	  person	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  and	  the	  
question	   of	   embodiment.	   In	   the	   previous	   section,	   I	   have	   argued	   that	  Harré’s	  minimal	   criteria	  
which	  are,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  individual	  human	  being,	  intertwined	  with	  embodiment	  are	  crucial	  
for	  the	  possibilities	  of	  using	  person-­‐oriented	  discourses	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  state.	  Further,	  we	  can	  
attribute	  utterances	  to	  the	  state	  based	  on	  a	  system	  of	  representation.	  However,	  the	  state	  lacks	  
the	   human	   embodiment	   that	   would	   allow	   us	   to	   ultimately	   identify	   it	   as	   the	   source	   of	   these	  
utterances.	  It	  can	  hence	  only	  ever	  be	  what	  I	  call	  a	  second-­‐order	  person.	  It	  is	  this	  conundrum	  that	  
needs	  further	  elaboration.	  
Against	   Wendt,	   I	   am	   arguing	   that	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   does	   not	   require	   a	   suitable	   inside	  
constitution.	   This	   follows	   from	  my	   commitment	   to	  Harré’s	   constructionist	   psychology.	   It	   is	   an	  
approach	  that	  questions	  and	  turns	  away	  from	  mainstream	  psychology’s	  tendency	  to	  search	  for	  
qualities	  of	  the	  person	  and	  emotions	  inside	  the	  mind.	  The	  argument	  is	  made	  that	  these	  aspects	  
of	  persons	  only	  develop	  discursively	  and	  are	  only	  expressed	  discursively.	  Part	  of	  the	  argument	  
pursued	   by	  Harré	  makes	   use	   of	   the	   other	  minds	   problem.	   In	   order	   for	   everyday	   discourse	   to	  
function,	  we	  do	  not	  require	  proof	  of	  a	  suitable	  psychological	  inner	  life	  of	  our	  interlocutors.	  We	  
do	   not	   require	   and	   cannot	   gain	   certainty	   about	   whether	   an	   expressed	   emotion	   is	   really	   felt.	  
These	  points	  have	  important	  implications	  for	  an	  engagement	  with	  and	  critique	  of	  Wendt’s	  state-­‐
as-­‐person.	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  with	  this	  construction	  of	  the	  psychology	  of	  the	  state,	  a	  search	  for	  its	  
inside	  constitution	  becomes	  irrelevant.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  constructionist	  psychology	  is	  sceptical	  
of	  proposing	  entities	  inside	  the	  mind	  that	  could	  serve	  as	  the	  location	  of	  the	  self	  or	  the	  source	  of	  
emotions.	   From	   this	   perspective,	   emotions	   for	   example	   are	   not	   first	   felt	   and	   then	   expressed.	  
The	   expression	   of	   the	   emotion	   is	   the	   emotion.	   Further,	   this	   point	   of	   view	   provides	   for	   an	  
interesting	   challenge	   to	  Wendt’s	   conception	   of	   the	   person.	   In	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   I	   argued	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that	   Wendt’s	   inside	   test	   is	   unnecessary	   because	   in	   everyday	   interactions	   we	   operate	   by	  
presuming	   that	   other	   people	   have	   minds	   and	   an	   internal	   psychological	   life	   without	   needing	  
additional	  proof.	  In	  addition,	  the	  other	  minds	  problem	  was	  used	  to	  point	  out	  that	  we	  can	  never	  
be	  sure	   that	  others	  possess	  a	  mind	  and	  have	  an	   inner	  psychological	   life	  similar	   to	   the	  one	  we	  
experience	  from	  our	  subjective	  and	  unique	  point	  of	  view.	  Treating	  others	  as	  psychology	  persons	  
is	  based	  on	  actions	  and	  utterances	  ascribed	  to	  them.	  In	  order	  to	  take	  part	  in	  everyday	  exchanges	  
we	   do	   not	   need	   proof	   of	   the	   inner	   life	   of	   other	   people	   in	   order	   to	  make	   sense	   of	   them	   and	  
address	  them	  from	  within	  the	  person	  grammar.	  All	  we	  need	  to	  do	  is	  to	  have	  reasonable	  grounds	  
to	  presume	  that	  those	  that	  we	  interact	  with	  as	  psychological	  persons	  have	  a	  similar	  internal	  life	  
to	  ours.	  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  about	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  When	  looking	  for	  such	  an	  inside	  test	  
for	  persons,	  Harré	  warns	  against	  reifying	  aspects	  of	  discourse	  and	  treating	  them	  as	  if	  they	  were	  
entities	  of	   the	  mind.	  With	   regard	   to	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   the	   same	  warning	  about	  problematic	  
reifications	  applies.	  	  
If	   we	   accept	   this	   view,	   it	   has	   the	   interesting	   consequence	   that	   the	   state	   as	   a	   psychological	  
person	   is	   in	   a	   sense	   more	   “ideas	   all	   the	   way	   down”	   than	   the	   state	   as	   a	   moral	   person.	   This	  
provides	   for	  a	   crucial	  departure	   from	  Wendt’s	  approach.20	  Wendt	  argues	   that	  moral	  and	   legal	  
personhoods	   are	   social	   conventions	   whereas	   psychological	   personhood	   also	   requires	  
constitution	   from	  the	   inside.21	  He	  chooses	   to	   focus	  on	  psychological	  personhood	  because	  this,	  
for	  him,	  provides	  the	  stricter	  test	  of	  whether	  the	  state	  can	  be	  a	  person.	  	  
It	   is	   interesting	   to	   contrast	   Wendt’s	   view	   with	   others	   who	   study	   moral	   agency	   and	   moral	  
personhood.	  For	  example,	  Toni	  Erskine	  argues	  that	  in	  order	  for	  the	  state	  to	  qualify	  as	  what	  she	  
calls	  an	  “institutional	  moral	  agent”	   it	  needs	   to	  have	  “an	   identity	   that	   is	  more	  than	  the	  sum	  of	  
identities	  of	  constituting	  parts,	  a	  decision-­‐making	  structure,	  an	  executive	  function	  …,	  an	  identity	  
over	  time	  and	  a	  conception	  of	  itself	  as	  a	  unit”.22	  In	  her	  account,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  a	  moral	  agent,	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  For	   the	   distinction	   between	  moral	   and	   psychological	   personhood	   and	   their	   relation	   to	   the	   constructivist	  
principle	  of	   “ideas	   all	   the	  way	  down”	   see	  Wendt,	   'The	   State	   as	  Person	   in	   International	   Theory',	   294.	  As	   the	  
foundation	  for	  this	  Wendt	  is	  referencing	  Vincent,	  'Can	  Groups	  Be	  Persons?'.	  
21	  “Law	   and	  morality	   being	   social	   conventions,	   it	   seems	   clear	   that	   legal	   and	  moral	   persons	   are	   constituted	  
entirely	  by	  social	  recognition.”	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  294.	  
22	  Erskine,	  'Kicking	  Bodies	  and	  Damning	  Souls:	  The	  Danger	  of	  Harming	  "Innocent"	  Individuals	  While	  Punishing	  
"Delinquent"	  States',	  267.	  See	  also	  Erskine,	  'Assigning	  Responsibilities	  to	  Institutional	  Moral	  Agents:	  The	  Case	  
of	   States	   and	   Quasi-­‐States',	   71.	   And	   Erskine,	   'Locating	   Responsibility:	   The	   Problem	   of	   Moral	   Agency	   in	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suitable	   inside,	  as	  Wendt	  would	  put	   it,	   in	   the	   form	  a	  decision-­‐making	   structure	  and	  executive	  
function,	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition.	  	  
In	   contrast	   to	   Wendt,	   I	   argue	   that	   this	   picture	   looks	   radically	   different	   with	   regard	   to	  
psychological	  personhood.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  constructionist	  psychology,	   the	  quest	   for	  a	  
suitable	   inside	   of	   the	   person	   is	   a	   futile	   one.	   As	   outlined,	   constructionist	   psychology	   criticises	  
mainstream	  psychology	  for	  its	  attempts	  to	  investigate	  the	  “inside”	  of	  the	  mind	  –	  be	  that	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  postulating	  entities	  in	  the	  mind	  or	  cognitive	  mechanisms	  modelled	  on	  the	  functioning	  of	  
computers	   or	   presuming	   that	   psychometric	   tests	   revealed	   anything	   beyond	   the	   discourse	   in	  
which	   they	   are	   situated.	   Taking	  Harré’s	   view,	   psychological	   personhood	   is	   defined	   as	   being	   a	  
person,	  understood	  as	  a	   location	   in	   time	  and	   space,	   to	  which	  utterances	  and	   flows	  of	  actions	  
can	  be	  attributed.	  Further,	  it	  is	  only	  in	  discursive	  interactions	  that	  psychological	  properties	  such	  
as	  the	  “self”	  and	  emotions	  come	  about.	  A	  suitable	  inside	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  in	  place	  based	  on	  our	  
own	  experience	  of	  ourselves	  as	  persons	  “from	  the	  inside”.	  This	  inside,	  however,	  is	  linked	  to	  our	  
unique,	   embodied	   point	   of	   view.	   It	   does	   not	   need	   to	   be	   proven	   or	   investigated	   for	   person-­‐
oriented	  discourse	  to	  function.	  It	  is	  this	  perspective	  that	  marks	  the	  psychological	  personhood	  of	  
the	  state,	  as	  it	  is	  understood	  here,	  as	  a	  stronger	  constructivism	  ‘all	  the	  way	  down’	  than	  Wendt’s	  
version.	  	  
This	  debate	  can	  also	  be	  related	  to	  questions	  of	   internal	  and	  external	  sovereignty	  as	  well	  as	   to	  
the	  concept	  of	  quasi-­‐states.23	  Doing	  so	  is	  useful	  in	  further	  elaborating	  what	  I	  call	  the	  constructed	  
state-­‐as-­‐person.	   In	   his	   2004	   article,	   Wendt	   links	   external	   and	   internal	   sovereignty	   to	   his	  
distinction	  between,	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  being	  a	  person	  by	   social	   convention	  and,	  on	   the	  other	  
hand,	  “really”	  being	  a	  person	  based	  on	  a	  suitable	  inside	  constitution.24	  Similarly,	  the	  criteria	  for	  
a	   minimal	   definition	   of	   the	   state	   that	   he	   outlines	   in	   Social	   Theory	   emphasise	   internal	  
sovereignty,	   especially	   the	   points	   he	   borrows	   from	   the	  Weberian	   conception	   of	   the	   state.	   In	  
Social	  Theory,	  Wendt’s	  minimal	  definition	  of	  the	  state	  that	  subsequently	  serves	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
International	   Relations',	   701.	   For	   the	   link	   between	   sovereignty	   and	  moral	   personhood	   emerging	   in	  modern	  
thinking	  on	  the	  state	  see	  also	  Bartelson,	  A	  Genealogy	  of	  Sovereignty,	  195.	  
23	  These	  concepts	  themselves	  deserve	  much	  more	  critical	  attention	  than	  I	  am	  able	  to	  give	  them	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  this	  argument.	  For	  a	  critical	  engagement	  with	  external	  and	  internal	  sovereignty	  see	  Walker,	  Inside/Outside:	  
International	  Relations	  as	  Political	  Theory.	  For	  the	  concept	  of	  quasi-­‐states	  see	  Robert	  H.	  Jackson,	  Quasi-­‐States:	  
Sovereignty,	  International	  Relations,	  and	  the	  Third	  World	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1990).	  
24	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  293-­‐294.	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arguing	  that	  it	  is	  also	  a	  person	  includes	  “an	  institutional	  legal	  order”	  as	  well	  as	  “a	  monopoly	  on	  
the	  legitimate	  use	  of	  organized	  violence	  over	  a	  society	  within	  a	  territory”.25	  	  
However,	   from	  within	   the	   framework	   presented	   here,	   internal	   sovereignty	   is	  not	   a	   necessary	  
criterion	  for	  the	  state	  as	  a	  psychological	  person.	  I	  am	  arguing	  that	  a	  state	  can	  be	  a	  “failed	  state”	  
or	   a	   quasi-­‐state	   and	   still	   be	   a	   psychological	   person	   as	   long	   as	   it	   enjoys	   international	  
recognition.26	  As	   elaborated	   above,	   from	   the	   theoretical	   position	   taken	   here,	   psychological	  
personhood	  can	  only	  be	  located	  within	  discourse.	  As	  long	  as	  a	  state	  can	  reasonably	  be	  seen	  as	  
being	   a	   participant	   in	   such	   a	   discourse	   by	   being	   represented	   accordingly	   and	   by	   that	  
representation	  being	   regarded	   as	   legitimate,	   it	   can	   also	   be	   said	   to	   be	   a	   psychological	   person.	  
This	  brings	  us	  back	  to	  what	  Wendt	  refers	  to	  as	  personhood	  by	  social	  convention.	  In	  other	  words,	  
as	   long	   as	   certain	   social	   conventions,	   for	   example	   the	   membership	   in	   the	   club	   of	   sovereign	  
states,	   are	   seen	   as	   being	   fulfilled	   by	   the	   state,	  we	   are	   also	   able	   to	   treat	   it	   as	   a	   psychological	  
person,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   constructionist	   psychology,	   by	   applying	   person-­‐oriented	   discourses	   to	  
it.27	  
It	   also	  worth	   pointing	   out	   how	   this	   conceptualisation	  of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  does	   not	   require	  
that	   the	   state	   consist	   of	   a	   homogenous	   group	   of	   citizens	   forming	   a	   coherent	  whole	   that	   can	  
clearly	  be	  distinguished	  into	  an	  ‘inside’	  and	  an	  ‘outside.’	  The	  state	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  as	  
opposed	   to	   the	   nation-­‐state	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   century	   would	   struggle	   to	   fulfil	   these	   criteria.	  
While	   the	  metaphor	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   provides	   the	   imagery	   of	   a	   coherent	  whole	   that	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  For	  Wendt’s	  minimal	  definition	  of	  the	  essential	  state	  see	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  213.	  
26	  Robert	   H.	   Jackson	   makes	   a	   useful	   point	   related	   to	   what	   he	   calls	   negative	   sovereignty,	   understood	   as	  
freedom	   from	   external	   interference.	   He	   argues	   that	   quasi-­‐states	   emerged	   from	   the	   process	   of	  
decolonialisation;	   in	   many	   cases	   these	   states	   only	   enjoy	   negative	   sovereignty	   and	   are	   given	   “juridical	  
statehood	  while	  as	  yet	  disclosing	   little	  evidence	  of	  empirical	   statehood”.	  Hence,	   the	  contemporary	  world	  of	  
states	   is	   a	   diverse	   one	   and	   is	   based	   on	   upholding	   a	   principle	   (external	   sovereignty)	   that	   is	   not	   in	   all	   cases	  
reflected	  in	  “reality”.	  Jackson,	  Quasi-­‐States:	  Sovereignty,	  International	  Relations,	  and	  the	  Third	  World,	  25,	  for	  
negative	   sovereignty	   see	   27.	   Psychological	   state-­‐personhood	   as	   it	   is	   understood	   here	   builds	   on	   negative	  
sovereignty.	   Inversely,	   a	   state	   that	   fulfils	   criteria	   of	   internal	   sovereignty	   but	   does	   not	   enjoy	   international	  
recognition	  cannot	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  psychological	  person	  from	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	   presented	   here.	   Compare	   Kingston	   and	   Spears,	   especially	   the	   introduction	   and	   chapter	   one,	   for	   an	  
overview	   of	   what	   they	   call	   states-­‐within-­‐states.	   Paul	   Kingston	   and	   Ian	   S.	   Spears,	   eds.,	   States-­‐within-­‐States:	  
Incipient	   Political	   Entities	   in	   the	   Post-­‐Cold	   War	   Era	   (New	   York	   and	   Houndmills,	   Basingstoke:	   Palgrave	  
Macmillan,	  2004).	  
27	  The	  point	  here	   is	   similar	   to	  Charles	  Manning’s	   idea	  of	   the	  game	  of	   “let’s	  play	   sovereign	   states”.	  Compare	  
Aalberts	  who	  also	  draws	  a	  connection	  with	  Jackson’s	  quasi-­‐states	  (257)	  and	  Wittgenstinian	  insights	  (253-­‐254).	  
Tanja	  E.	  Aalberts,	   'Playing	   the	  Game	  of	  Sovereign	  States:	  Charles	  Manning's	  Constructivism	  Avant-­‐La-­‐Lettre',	  
European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Relations	  16,	  2	  (2010).	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homogenous	   and	   can	   clearly	   be	   divided	   into	   an	   ‘inside’	   and	   an	   “outside”,	   a	   “self”,	   and	   an	  
“other”,	  for	  the	  metaphor	  to	  work	  we	  do	  not	  actually	  require	  the	  state	  to	  be	  homogenous	  or	  a	  
coherent	  whole.28	  The	  metaphor	  is	  based	  on	  the	  minimal	  criteria	  for	  the	  application	  of	  person-­‐
oriented	  discourses	  that	  I	  take	  from	  Harré.	  By	  applying	  such	  person-­‐oriented	  discourses	  to	  the	  
state,	   it	   is	   made	   to	   seem	   like	   a	   homogenous,	   coherent,	   clearly	   identifiable	   entity.	   The	  
heterogeneity,	  diversity	  and	  fuzziness	  of	  what	  we	  call	  the	  state	  are	  hidden	  by	  the	  usage	  of	  the	  
metaphor.	   In	   that	   sense	   the	   metaphor	   does	   not	   require	   the	   state	   to	   be	   homogenous	   and	  
coherent;	  rather,	  it	  creates	  the	  image	  of	  homogeneity	  and	  coherence.29	  	  
Having	  established	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  based	  on	  Harré’s	  minimal	  criteria,	  it	  is	  worth	  
stressing	  the	   implications	  of	  the	  utilisation	  of	  person-­‐orientated	  discourses	  to	  the	  state.	   In	  the	  
following	  this	  will	  be	  done	  with	  a	   focus	  on	  three	  kinds	  of	   language	  games:	   the	  concept	  of	   the	  
self,	  emotions,	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  friends	  and	  enemies.	  	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  It	  needs	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  in	  this	  sense,	  utilising	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  the	  continuation	  of	  a	  
particular	  modern	  interpretation	  of	  the	  state	  that	  allows	  for	   it	  to	  be	  neatly	  distinguished	  in	  an	  inside	  and	  an	  
outside.	   R.B.J.	   Walker	   remarks	   in	   the	   context	   of	   discussing	   external	   and	   internal	   sovereignty,	   inside	   and	  
outside	  of	  the	  state,	  that	  this	  particular	  lens	  on	  the	  state	  “express[es]	  the	  decisive	  demarcation	  line	  between	  
inside	   and	   outside,	   between	   self	   and	   other,	   identity	   and	   difference,	   community	   and	   anarchy	   that	   is	  
constitutive	  of	  our	  modern	  understanding	  of	  political	  space”.	  The	  metaphor	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  works	  to	  re-­‐
affirm	  this	  particular	  understanding	  more	  than	  to	  question	   it.	  Walker,	   Inside/Outside:	   International	  Relations	  
as	  Political	  Theory,	  174.	  
29	  It	  is	  useful	  to	  draw	  a	  parallel	  with	  Benedict	  Anderson’s	  imagined	  communities	  here.	  He	  points	  out	  how	  the	  
nation	   is	   imagined	  as	  a	  community	  of	  people,	  as	  a	  horizontal	  comradeship.	  Glossing	  over	  actual	   inequalities,	  
hierarchies,	  and	  exploitation,	  the	   image	  of	  the	  community	  creates	  that	  very	  community.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  
imagined	  community	  works	  despite	  “empirical”	  evidence	   to	   the	  contrary.	  Anderson,	   Imagined	  Communities.	  
Reflections	  on	  the	  Origin	  and	  Spread	  of	  Nationalism,	  7.	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The	  three	  selves	  of	  the	  state	  
An	   IR	   scholarship	   that	   has	   turned,	   as	  Wendt	   does	   in	   Social	   Theory,	   from	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	  
behaviour	   of	   its	   most	   important	   units	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   identities	   and	   interests,	   also	   has	   to	  
engage	  the	  self.	  Indeed,	  the	  self	  comes	  before	  the	  interest.	  As	  Erik	  Ringmar	  reminds	  us,	  “[i]t	  is	  
only	   as	   some-­‐one	   that	   we	   can	   have	   an	   interest	   in	   some-­‐thing.”30	  Similarly,	   albeit	   with	   a	   very	  
different	   philosophy	   of	   science	   position	   resulting	   in	   a	   distinctly	   different	   vocabulary,	   Wendt	  
argues	   that	   identity	   is	   “an	   actor’s	   self-­‐understanding”	   and	   “generates	   motivational	   and	  
behavioural	  dispositions”.31	  
From	   the	   perspective	   taken	   here,	   accounts	   of	   the	   self	   are	   narrative	   accounts.	   Following	   the	  
Wittgenstinian	  insights	  utilised	  by	  constructionist	  psychology,	  the	  self	  is	  not	  an	  entity	  inside	  the	  
mind;	   it	   only	   comes	   about	   discursively.	   Having	   established	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   that	   fulfils	  
Harré’s	  minimal	  criteria	  for	  the	  functioning	  of	  person-­‐oriented	  discourses,	  narrative	  accounts	  of	  
the	  self	  as	  they	  are	  utilised	  in	  everyday	  discourses	  can	  potentially	  be	  applied	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  
the	  state	  in	  IR.	  Each	  kind	  of	  self	  outlined	  by	  Harré	  fulfils	  a	  specific	  function	  in	  discourse.	  As	  we	  
have	  seen,	  Self	  1	   is	   linked	  to	  having	  a	  specific	  point	  of	  view	  from	  which	  to	  perceive	  the	  world	  
and	  from	  which	  to	  act.	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  self	  delineates	  an	  inside	  and	  outside	  and	  the	  self	  from	  
the	   other.	   Self	   2	   describes	   a	   set	   of	   unique	   characteristics	   and	   includes	   an	   autobiographical	  
account.	  Finally,	  Self	  3	  is	  the	  self	  in	  interaction	  with	  others.	  Elements	  of	  all	  three	  can	  readily	  be	  
identified	   in	   various	   accounts	   of	   the	   state	   in	   IR.	   From	   the	   perspective	   taken	   here,	   the	  
applicability	  of	  these	  narratives	  of	  self	  depends	  on	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  Going	  
back	  to	  the	  three	  modes	  of	  metaphors	  established	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  we	  can	  alternatively	  see	  these	  
narratives	   of	   the	   self	   as	   rhetorical	   instruments	   for	   persuasion,	   as	   a	   useful	   framework	   for	  
orientation	  and	  analysis,	  or,	  and	  this	  would	  be	  the	  strongest	  claim,	  as	  constitutive	  of	  the	  world	  
of	  IR.	  My	  contention	  is	  that	  we	  need	  to	  take	  the	  third	  possibility	  seriously.	  	  
Arguing	  from	  within	  Harré’s	  Self	  1,	  the	  state	  becomes	  an	  agent	  only	  through	  the	  narratives	  told	  
and	  re-­‐told	  by	  individual	  human	  beings	  who	  take	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  state.	  The	  world	  is	  seen	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Ringmar,	   Identity,	   Interest	   and	  Action.	   A	   Cultural	   Explanation	   of	   Sweden's	   Intervention	   in	   the	   Thirty	   Years	  
War,	  76,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
31	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  224.	  “Identity”,	  in	  the	  way	  Wendt	  uses	  the	  term	  in	  this	  
passage,	  is	  close	  to	  Harré’s	  Self	  2.	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as	  a	  world	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  that	  particular	  state.	  The	  differences	  between	  us	  and	  them,	  
between	  inside	  and	  outside,	  are	  emphasised.	  Similarly,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  discursive	  accounts	  of	  Self	  
1,	  the	  state	  is	  narrated	  as	  an	  agent.	  The	  argument	  that	  the	  state	  can	  only	  ever	  be	  a	  second-­‐order	  
person	   also	   implies	   that	   the	   state	   depends	   on	   individual	   human	   beings	   acting	   on	   its	   behalf.	  
Building	  on	   that,	   the	   argument	  put	   forward	  here	   is	   that	   by	   assembling	   these	   actions	   into	   the	  
narratives	  of	  Self	  1	  the	  state	  is	  created	  as	  an	  agent	  by	  allowing	  for	  discourse	  in	  which	  the	  state	  
features	  as	  acting	  from	  its	  particular	  point	  in	  the	  world.	  Further,	  Self	  1	  also	  allows	  for	  actors	  to	  
take	  responsibility	  for	  their	  actions	  by	  associating	  them	  with	  themselves.	  	  	  
If	   we	   follow	   this	   line	   of	   interpretation	   further,	   Harré’s	   Self	   2	   can	   be	   localised	   in	   national	  
biographies	   and	   similar	   accounts.	   It	   is	   worth	   quoting	   Benedict	   Anderson’s	   Imagined	  
Communities	   here.	  With	   regard	   to	  what	   he	   calls	   the	   “biography	   of	   nations”	   he	   remarks	   “[a]s	  
with	  modern	  persons,	   so	   it	   is	  with	  nations”	  and	  he	   sees	  an	  overlap	  between	  how	  we	   tell	   our	  
own	  biographies	  and	  how	  we	  tell	  the	  stories	  of	  the	  life	  of	  the	  state.32	  Similarly,	  Ringmar	  shows	  
how	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  century	  Sweden	  fashioned	  a	  Self	  2	  with	  a	  national	  biography	  linking	  the	  
country	  and	  its	  kings	  to	  ancient	  times,	  specifically	  designed	  to	  gain	  recognition	  at	  home	  as	  well	  
as	  abroad.33	  	  	  
Self	  3	  marks	  the	  self	   in	   interaction.	   It	   is	  worth	  contrasting	  this	  with	  the	  symbolic	   interactionist	  
account	  that	  Wendt	  gives	  of	  the	  hypothetical	  first	  encounter	  between	  two	  states.34	  I	  argue	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Anderson,	  Imagined	  Communities.	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Origin	  and	  Spread	  of	  Nationalism,	  205.	  However,	  in	  the	  
same	  passage	  he	  continues	  to	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  an	  important	  difference	  between	  narratives	  of	  persons	  and	  
narratives	  of	   states.	   In	   the	  case	  of	   the	   story	  of	   the	  person	   there	   is	  a	   clear	  beginning	   (birth)	  and	  a	  clear	  end	  
(death).	  The	  story	  of	  the	  state	  does	  not	  offer	  these	  markers	  and,	  hence,	  Anderson	  argues,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  told	  
slightly	  differently	  with	  regards	  to	  sequences	  of	  events	  and	  the	  timeline	  presented.	  	  
33	  Ringmar,	   Identity,	   Interest	   and	  Action.	   A	   Cultural	   Explanation	   of	   Sweden's	   Intervention	   in	   the	   Thirty	   Years	  
War,	  156-­‐164.	  
34	  Compare	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  328ff.	  Indeed,	  the	  symbolic	  interactionist	  account	  of	  
a	  First	  Encounter	  between	  two	  states,	  Ego	  and	  Alter,	  starts	  with	  what	  I	  would	  read	  as	  an	  analogy	  between	  the	  
materiality	  of	  individual	  human	  beings	  given	  through	  their	  embodiment	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  “bodies”	  of	  
states	  created	  by	  “shared	  ideas	  supervening	  on	  biology”	  on	  the	  other.	  In	  the	  same	  passage	  Wendt	  argues	  that	  
despite	  the	  differences	  between	  people	  and	  states,	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  material	  body	   in	  the	  case	  of	  the	   latter,	  
the	  result	  is	  the	  same:	  “exogenously	  given,	  self-­‐organizing	  facts	  –	  personal	  and	  corporate	  identities	  –	  that	  act	  
upon	  and	  resist	  the	  world”.	  This	  makes	  it	  seem	  as	  if	  the	  First	  Encounter	  between	  states	  is	  a	  special	  case	  of	  an	  
abstract	   idea	   of	   “First	   Encounters”	   that	   can	   be	   applied	   to	   both	   states	   and	   people	   and	   maybe	   even	   other	  
entities.	  Yet,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  understanding	  of	  a	  First	  Encounter	  is	  inevitably	  bound-­‐up	  with	  the	  world-­‐
seen-­‐as-­‐people;	   it	   is	   not	   an	   abstract	   principle	   that	   applies	   to	   both	   people	   as	   well	   as	   states.	   We	   can	   only	  
conceive	  of	   it	   by	   relating	   it	   to	   individual	   human	  beings	   in	   interaction.	  Hence,	   I	   argue,	  we	  do	  not	   follow	   the	  
principle	  of	  deduction	  but	  of	  metaphorical	  thinking.	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this	  hypothetical	  encounter	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  by	  recourse	  to	  the	  background	  knowledge	  
of	  similar	  encounters	  between	  individual	  human	  beings.	  The	  perspective	  taken	  here	  reminds	  us	  
that	  the	  narrations	  of	  these	  are	  not	  culturally	  or	  historically	  neutral.	  But,	  most	  importantly,	  the	  
account	   of	   a	   hypothetical	   encounter	   does	   not	  work	  without	   implicit	   recourse	   to	   an	   idealised	  
image	  of	   individual	  human	  beings	  in	   interaction.	  Processes	  such	  as	  role-­‐taking	  and	  altercasting	  
outlined	   by	  Wendt	   can	   only	   be	   understood	   and	   known	   in	   the	   first	   place	   by	   reference	   to	   the	  
behaviour	   of	   individual	   human	   beings.	   Insights	   from	   constructivist	   psychology	   serve	   as	   a	  
reminder	  that,	  firstly,	  selves	  are	  only	  created	  in	  interaction,	  and,	  secondly,	  that	  we	  need	  to	  start	  
conceptualising	  states-­‐as-­‐persons	  by	  looking	  at	  individual	  human	  beings	  in	  interaction.	  	  
	  




With	   regard	   to	   emotions,	   two	   familiar	   themes	   re-­‐emerge.	   First,	   utilising	   constructionist	  
psychology	  and	  Wittgenstinian	  insights,	  emotions	  are	  seen	  as	  something	  that	  is	  not	  first	  felt	  and	  
only	   then	   expressed.	   Second,	   emotions	   are	   understood	   as	   being	   constructed	   discursively	   and	  
serving	  specific	  functions	  in	  discourse;	  their	  “biological	  basis”	  can	  be	  neglected.	  With	  regard	  to	  
the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   these	   insights,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   allow	   us	   to	   shift	   the	   focus	  
away	  from	  the	  question	  of	  who	  feels	  the	  emotions	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  state.	  In	  contrast,	  from	  the	  
perspective	  taken	  here,	  the	  expression	  of	  emotions	  and	  the	  social	  function	  served	  by	  emotion-­‐
discourse	  are	  key.	  	  
It	   is	   also	   worth	   highlighting	   two	   key	   arguments	   from	   Chapter	   4	   that	   were	   made	   as	   part	   of	  
introducing	  the	  emotional	  turn	  in	  IR.	  First,	  the	  emotions	  of	  states	  are	  neither	  understood	  as	  the	  
emotions	  of	  state	  leaders	  or	  representatives	  nor	  are	  they	  understood	  as	  emotions	  of	  a	  group.35	  
The	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   understood	   to	   be	   a	   metaphorical	   construction	   and	   the	   focus	   shifts	  
towards	  the	  question	  of	  how	  emotions	  can	   legitimately	  be	  attributed	  to	   it	  and	  away	   from	  the	  
question	   of	  who	   is	   feeling	   the	   emotion.	   Second,	   by	   focusing	   on	   the	   emotional	   turn	   in	   IR,	   the	  
argument	   is	  made	   that	   it	   is	  problematic	   to	   sharply	  distinguish	  between	   rationality	  on	   the	  one	  
hand	  and	  emotions	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  One	  of	  the	  key	  insights	  of	  this	  development	  in	  IR	  is	  that	  
the	  ideal	  of	  a	  purely	  rational	  approach	  towards	  world	  politics	  is	  a	  problematic	  stance	  that	  should	  
be	  overcome.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  new	  stance	  but	  one	  well	  worth	  bringing	  back	  into	  the	  spotlight	  again	  
–	  as	  the	  emotional	  turn	  in	  IR	  does.	  For	  example,	  a	  similar	  insight	  can	  already	  be	  found	  in	  Arnold	  
Wolfers’	  seminal	  text	  Discord	  and	  Collaboration.	  After	  acknowledging	  that	  parts	  of	  the	  discipline	  
seek	  a	  “dispassionate	  assessment	  of	  the	  national	  interest”,	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  	  
this	   dissociation	   between	   the	   cold-­‐blooded	   pursuit	   of	   the	   national	  
interest	  and	  human	  feelings	  is	  never	  complete.	  Only	  as	  a	  first	  step	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  For	  example,	  Nicolas	  Wheeler	  and	  Ken	  Booth	  who	  comment	  on	  the	  Palestine-­‐Israel	  conflict	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  
trust.	  They	  argue	  that	  “[i]t	  was	  a	  ‘king’s	  peace’	  not	  a	  ‘people’s	  peace’;	  in	  other	  words,	  it	  was	  temporary	  trust	  
between	   leaders	  not	  embedded	   trust	   between	   societies.”	   They	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	   the	   trust	   at	   the	  
level	  of	  leaders	  and	  the	  trust	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  population.	  From	  the	  perspective	  taken	  here	  the	  focus	  lies	  on	  
narratives	  about	  states-­‐as-­‐persons	  and	  the	  role	  of	  trust	  in	  these	  narratives.	  Nicholas	  J.	  Wheeler	  and	  Ken	  Booth,	  
The	   Security	   Dilemma:	   Fear,	   Cooperation	   and	   Trust	   in	   World	   Politics	   (Houndmills,	   Basinstoke:	   Palgrave	  
Macmillan,	  2008),	  251.	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analysis	  of	  the	  problem	  does	  it	  make	  sense	  to	  treat	  interstate	  relations	  
as	  if	  they	  were	  immune	  to	  human	  sentiment.36	  
From	   the	   perspective	   taken	   here,	   emotions	   are	   a	   form	   of	   knowledge;	   they	   represent	   a	  
judgement	  of	  a	  situation	  and	  highlight	  what	  is	  deemed	  appropriate	  and	  inappropriate.	  They	  are	  
socially	   acquired	   via	   paradigm	   scenarios.	   The	   metaphor	   of	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  
allows	  for	  the	  application	  of	  these	  paradigm	  scenarios	  to	  the	  state.	  In	  that	  way,	  it	  allows	  for	  the	  
application	  of	  the	  same	  culturally	  specific	  knowledge	  of	  appropriateness	  and	  inappropriateness	  
of	   actions	   to	   the	   world	   of	   inter-­‐state	   relations.	   Emotions,	   understood	   in	   this	   way,	   are	   also	  
expressions	  of	  moral	  judgements.37	  	  
A	  critique	  like	  the	  one	  put	  forward	  by	  Janice	  Stein	  that	  the	  attribution	  of	  emotions	  to	  the	  state	  
“is	  a	  difficult	  argument,	  because	   it	   attributes	   to	   the	  collective	  what	   is	  an	  embodied	   individual	  
experience,”	   is	   not	   relevant	   to	   the	   account	   suggested	   here.38	  First,	   emotions	   are	   not	   seen	   as	  
embodied	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  constructionist	  psychology.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  how	  many	  
arguments	  on	  emotions	   at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   state	   focus	  on	   the	   relationship	  between	  emotions	  
and	  the	  body	  and	  draw	  their	  key	  conclusions	  about	  ideas	  of	  states-­‐as-­‐persons	  from	  this	  relation.	  
We	  have	  seen	  how	  Wendt	  works	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  superorganism	  and	  discusses	  the	  possibility	  
of	  ersatz	  subjectivity.	  Todd	  H.	  Hall	  makes	  a	  similar	  point	  when	  he	  argues	  that	  “[b]ecause	  states	  
are	  collective,	  institutional	  actors,	  one	  cannot	  claim	  that	  they	  feel	  angry	  –	  …	  they	  do	  not	  have	  a	  
coherent	  body	  capable	  of	  feeling	  anything.”39	  The	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  
does	  not	  require	  embodiment	  and	  the	  state	   is	  not	  seen	  as	  a	  unitary	  actor.	  Secondly,	  while	  my	  
account	  draws	  on	  the	  emotion	  discourses	  at	  the	  level	  of	  individual	  human	  beings,	  these	  are	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Wolfers	  is	  given	  prominence	  here	  because	  he	  is	  cited	  as	  one	  of	  the	  few	  direct	  engagements	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  
the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  by	  Wendt.	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	   International	  Politics,	  290-­‐291.	  For	  the	  quotation	  see	  
Wolfers,	  Discord	  and	  Collaboration,	  26.	  
37	  Compare	  Rom	  Harré	  and	  Grant	  Gillette’s	  conclusion	   in	   this	   regard.	  They	  argue	   that	  an	  “emotional	   feeling,	  
and	  the	  correlated	  display,	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  discursive	  phenomenon,	  an	  expression	  of	  judgement	  and	  
the	  performance	  of	  a	  social	  act”.	  Harré	  and	  Gillett,	  The	  Discursive	  Mind,	  147.	  
38 	  Janice	   Stein,	   'Psychological	   Dimensions	   of	   International	   Decision	   Making	   and	   Collective	   Behaviour',	  	  
(Toronto:	  unpublished	  manuscript,	  2001),	  24.	  As	  cited	  in	  Todd	  H.	  Hall,	  'We	  Will	  Not	  Swallow	  This	  Bitter	  Fruit:	  
Theorizing	  a	  Diplomacy	  of	  Anger',	  Security	  Studies	  20,	  4	  (2011),	  530.	  
39	  Hall,	   'We	  Will	  Not	   Swallow	  This	   Bitter	   Fruit:	   Theorizing	   a	  Diplomacy	  of	  Anger',	   532.	  A	   similar	   argument	   is	  
made	   by	   P.	   E.	   Digeser	   who	   points	   out	   that	   “states	   are	   ontologically	   incapable	   of	   having	   emotional	  
commitments.”	   P.	   E.	   Digeser,	   'Public	   Reason	   and	   International	   Friendship',	   Journal	   of	   International	   Political	  
Theory	  5,	  1	  (2009),	  30,	  my	  emphasis.	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attributed	  to	  a	  collective	  but	  to	  an	  abstract	  concept,	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐
person.	  	  
To	   tell	   emotional	   stories	   about	   states	   by	   drawing	   on	   the	   discursive	   conventions	   utilised	   by	  
individual	   human	   beings	   in	   everyday	   conversations	   is,	   from	   the	   perspective	   taken	   here,	   to	  
express	   judgements	   about	   a	   situation	   or	   actor.	   Emotion	   stories	   about	   states-­‐as-­‐persons	  
represent	  knowledge	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  attempts	  to	  change	  the	  dynamic	  of	  a	  situation	  or	  to	  re-­‐
negotiate	  the	  terms	  of	  a	  relationship.	  Albeit	  coming	  from	  a	  different	  perspective,	  Hall	  comes	  to	  
a	  similar	  conclusion	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  diplomacy	  of	  anger	  when	  he	  argues	  that	  “[t]he	  strategic	  
value	  of	  the	  diplomacy	  of	  anger	  lies	  in	  the	  image	  state	  actors	  convey	  to	  others	  about	  what	  they	  
will	  or	  will	  not	  tolerate,	  where	  the	  red	  lines	  of	  acceptable	  behaviour	  are	  drawn,	  and	  what	  is	  the	  
strength	  of	  their	  commitments.”40	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Hall,	  'We	  Will	  Not	  Swallow	  This	  Bitter	  Fruit:	  Theorizing	  a	  Diplomacy	  of	  Anger',	  534.	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States	  as	  friends	  and	  enemies,	  systemic	  cultures	  of	  enmity	  
and	  friendship	  
One	  of	  the	  central	  themes	  of	  Wendt’s	  Social	  Theory	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  interactions	  between	  states	  
can	  produce	  and	  re-­‐produce	  features	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  Having	  proclaimed	  “anarchy	  is	  
what	  states	  make	  of	  it”,41	  Wendt	  aims	  to	  show	  in	  Social	  Theory	  how	  the	  system	  of	  states	  can	  be	  
transformed	   from	  being	  dominated	  by	   enmity	   to	  being	  dominated	  by	   friendship.	  While	   being	  
sympathetic	   to	   the	  same	  basic	   ideal,	  namely	  an	   investigation	   into	  possibilities	  of	   transforming	  
the	   international	   system	   into	   a	   Kantian	   culture	   of	   friendship,	   two	   questions	   come	   into	   focus	  
from	  the	  perspective	  taken	  here.	  First,	  how	  can	  we	  gain	  an	  understanding	  of	  what	  enmity	  and	  
friendship	   mean?	   And	   second,	   how	   does	   systemic	   transformation	   come	   about?	   The	   first	  
question	  will	  be	  addressed	  here	  while	  the	  second	  question	  will	  be	  reserved	  for	  Chapter	  7.	  	  	  
In	   the	   following	   discussion,	   the	   focus	  will	   be	   on	   friendship	   rather	   than	   enmity.	   Although,	   the	  
observations	   made	   below	   apply	   to	   both,	   friendship	   seems	   to	   be	   the	   more	   interesting	   case.	  
While	  we	   can	   identify	   a	  number	  of	   scholars	  who	  point	   to	  a	   lack	  of	   serious	  engagements	  with	  
friendship	   in	   international	   politics,	   there	   is	   also	   some	   very	   recent	   scholarship	   on	   friendship	  
between	  states	  that	  is	  well	  worth	  considering.42	  	  
Friendship	  and	  enmity	  have	  been	  central	  to	  politics,	  and	  not	  just	  since	  Carl	  Schmitt’s	   infamous	  
proclamation	   that	   political	   actions	   can	   be	   reduced	   to	   the	   distinction	   between	   friend	   and	  
enemy.43	  The	   concepts	   of	   friend	   and	   enemy	   can	   often	   be	   seen	   to	   “function	   as	   a	   convenient,	  
seemingly	  ‘natural’	  classification	  for	  the	  relations	  of	  states	  as	  sovereign	  equals”.44	  Parallel	  to	  the	  
observation	  made	  in	  Chapter	  1	  that	  modern	  ideas	  of	  states	  and	  ideas	  of	  individual	  persons	  grew	  
up	   together,	  we	  can	  point	   to	  a	  similar	   link	  between	  the	  state	  and	   the	   individual	  human	  being	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Wendt,	  'Anarchy	  Is	  What	  States	  Make	  of	  It:	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  Power	  Politics'.	  
42	  For	  example	  Alexander	  Wendt	  and	  Felix	  Berenskoetter	  observe	  a	  lack	  of	  serious	  or	  systematic	  scholarship	  on	  
friendship	   in	   IR	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   aiming	   to	   rectify	   this	   situation.	   See	   Wendt,	   Social	   Theory	   of	  
International	  Politics,	  298.	  And	  Felix	  Berenskoetter,	  'Friends,	  There	  Are	  No	  Friends?	  An	  Intimate	  Reframing	  of	  
the	   International',	  Millennium	   35,	   3	   (2007),	   647.	   Further,	   a	   recent	   edition	   of	   the	   Journal	   of	   International	  
Political	   Theory	   was	   devoted	   almost	   entirely	   to	   ideas	   of	   friendship	   between	   states	   and	   peoples.	   See	   for	  
example	   the	   introduction	   by	   Nicholas	   Onuf.	   Nicholas	   Onuf,	   'Friendship	   and	   Hospitality:	   Some	   Conceptual	  
Preliminaries',	  Journal	  of	  International	  Political	  Theory	  5,	  1	  (2009).	  	  
43	  Carl	   Schmitt,	   The	   Concept	   of	   the	   Political,	   expanded	   edition	   ed.	   (London	   and	   Chicago:	   The	   University	   of	  
Chicago	  Press,	  2007	  [1932]),	  26.	  
44	  Onuf,	  'Friendship	  and	  Hospitality:	  Some	  Conceptual	  Preliminaries',	  1.	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with	  regard	  to	  concepts	  of	  friendship	  and	  enmity.	  Evgeny	  Roshchin	  links	  the	  idea	  of	  public	  and	  
private	   friendship,	   being	   introduced	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   modernity	   by	   legal	   thinkers	   such	   as	  
Hugo	   Grotius,	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   external	   and	   internal	   sovereignty.45	  He	   argues	   that	   “the	  
political	   reality	  of	   the	  emerging	  sovereign	  state	  coincided	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  an	  analytical	  
distinction	  between	  private	  friendships	  and	  public,	  political	  or	  international,	  friendship.”46	  	  
Similarly,	  drawing	  on	  ancient	  Greek	   thought,	  Nicholas	  Onuf	  points	   to	   the	  connection	  between	  
the	   idea	  of	   friendship	  among	   individual	  human	  beings	  and	   friendship	  among	  political	   entities.	  
He	  quotes	  Aristotle	  with	  the	  observation	  that	  “just	  as	  cities	  are	  friends	  to	  one	  another,	  so	  in	  the	  
like	  way	  are	  citizens.”47	  Although	  these	  examples	  can	  only	  serve	  as	  a	  tentative	   illustration,	   the	  
persisting	   prevalence	   of	   concepts	   of	   enmity	   and	   friendship	   in	   efforts	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   the	  
relations	  between	  states	  is	  rendered	  less	  surprising	  when	  we	  keep	  these	  links	  in	  mind.	  However,	  
how	  to	  define	  enmity	  and	  friendship	  remains	  up	  for	  debate.	  	  
Within	  IR	  scholarship,	  we	  find	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  terms	  enemy	  and	  friend	  are	  used	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
does	  not	  problematise	   their	  meaning	  and	   the	  analysis	   is	   either	  based	  on	   the	  assumption	   that	  
these	  concepts	  can	  be	  used	  in	  a	  neutral	  fashion	  or	  implicitly	  starts	  from	  everyday	  knowledge	  of	  
what	   it	   means	   to	   be	   an	   enemy	   or	   a	   friend.48	  In	   other	   cases,	   a	   specific	   thinker	   is	   invoked	   to	  
provide	   a	   framework	   for	   the	   concepts	   of	   friend	   and	   enemy.49	  In	   the	   first	   case,	   I	   argue,	   the	  
conceptions	   of	   enmity	   and	   friendship	   are	   inevitably	   inter-­‐twined	   with	   culturally	   specific	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Evgeny	   Roshchin,	   'The	   Concept	   of	   Friendship:	   From	   Princes	   to	   States',	   European	   Journal	   of	   International	  
Relations	  12,	  4	  (2006),	  609-­‐611.	  
46	  Ibid.,	  	  610.	  
47 	  Aristotle,	   'Eudemian	   Ethics',	   in	   The	   Complete	   Works	   of	   Aristotle,	   ed.	   J.	   Barnes	   (Princeton:	   Princeton	  
University	  Press,	  1984),	  1968.	  As	  cited	  in	  Onuf,	  'Friendship	  and	  Hospitality:	  Some	  Conceptual	  Preliminaries',	  7.	  
The	  concept	  of	  friendship	  underlying	  this	  is	  the	  Aristotelian	  concept	  of	  civic	  friendship	  that	  is	  based	  on	  equality	  
as	  well	  as	  utility.	   It	   is	  also	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  analogy	  seems	  to	  start	  from	  the	  state	  and	  is	  then	  also	  
applied	  to	  the	  relations	  between	  persons	  and	  not	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  
48	  Compare	  for	  example	  Wolfers,	  Discord	  and	  Collaboration,	  chapter	  two.	  While	  he	  sounds	  a	  note	  of	  caution	  at	  
the	  beginning	  of	  the	  chapter	  (25),	  he	  then	  proceeds	  to	  treat	  the	  terms	  as	  a	  given.	  	  
49 	  As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   Nicholas	   Onuf	   invokes	   Aristotle.	   P.	   E.	   Digeser	   draws	   on	   Jennifer	   E.	   Whiting’s	  
Aristotelian	   account	   of	   interpersonal	   friendship	   to	   argue	   that	   self-­‐concern	   does	   not	   preclude	   concern	   for	  
others.	   Catherine	   Lu	   also	   takes	   her	   starting	   point	   from	   Aristotle	   arguing	   that	   he	   provides	   an	   “account	   of	  
political	  friendship	  as	  distinct	  from	  but	  analogous	  to	  personal	  friendship”.	  Felix	  Berenskoetter	  draws	  on	  Martin	  
Heidegger’s	  notion	  of	  anxiety	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  friend	  as	  a	  significant	  other	  is	  important	  in	  controlling	  anxiety	  
(but	   invokes	   also	   an	  Aristotelian	   concept	  of	   friendship).	  Onuf,	   'Friendship	   and	  Hospitality:	   Some	  Conceptual	  
Preliminaries'.	   P.	   E.	   Digeser,	   'Friendship	   between	   States',	   British	   Journal	   of	   Political	   Science	   39,	   2	   (2009),	  
compare	   especially	   325.	   Catherine	   Lu,	   'Political	   Friendship	   among	   Peoples',	   Journal	   of	   International	   Political	  
Theory	   5,	   1	   (2009),	   41.	   Berenskoetter,	   'Friends,	   There	   Are	   No	   Friends?	   An	   Intimate	   Reframing	   of	   the	  
International',	  655	  and	  664.	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assumptions	   that	   need	   to	   be	   made	   explicit.	   The	   reservoir	   of	   knowledge	   that	   these	   scholars	  
implicitly	   draw	   on	   is	   specific	   to	   their	   culture	   and	   their	   time.	   Even	   the	   claim	   to	   a	   neutral	  
definition	  of	  enemy	  and	  friend	  cannot	  avoid	  starting	  from	  or	  implicitly	  invoking	  how	  these	  terms	  
are	   used	   in	   everyday	   conversations.50	  In	   the	   second	   case,	   the	   justification	   of	   why	   a	   specific	  
thinker	  is	  utilised	  is	  often,	  unsurprisingly,	  tied	  up	  with	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  project;	  but	  most	  of	  the	  
time	  it	  remains	  unclear	  why	  a	  particular	  perspective	  is	  preferred	  to	  another.	  In	  this	  context,	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  remember	  that	  the	  concepts	  of	  enemy	  and	  friend	  have	  been	  through	  considerable	  
reformulations;	  they	  are	  not	  fixed	  but	  moving	  targets.51	  Further,	  I	  agree	  with	  Felix	  Berenskoetter	  
who	  points	  out	  that	  “[w]here	  friendship	  [in	  IR	  scholarship]	  is	  discussed	  it	  is	  treated	  thinly.”52	  
To	  illustrate	  these	  points,	  three	  examples	  of	  scholarly	  treatments	  of	  friendship	  between	  states	  
can	   be	   invoked.	  Wolfers,	   starting	   from	  a	   concept	   of	   friendship	   that	   remains	   unproblematised	  
and	   seems	   to	  be	  based	  on	   an	   everyday	  understanding,	  maintains	   that	   “[a]s	   long	   as	   there	   are	  
conflicting	  aims,	  there	  will	  be	  instances	  of	  enmity”	  and	  with	  regards	  to	  friendship	  he	  argues	  that	  
“[n]ations	  defending	  common	  values	  and	  interests	  may	  come	  to	  form	  …	  bonds	  of	  friendship.”53	  
In	   contrast	   to	   that,	   Felix	   Berenskoetter	   starts	   from	   an	   Aristotelian	   concept	   of	   friendship	   and	  
builds	  on	  Hannah	  Arendt’s	   idea	  of	   the	  political,	   understood	  as	   a	   plurality	   of	   being.	  He	   argues	  
that	   “[a]llowing	   for	   plurality	   and	   difference	   in	   friendship	   certainly	   is	   unavoidable	   for	   a	  
meaningful	   treatment	   of	   intimate	   relations	   in	   international	   politics.”54	  Both	   of	   these	   accounts	  
have	  very	  different	  implications.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  we	  have	  Wolfers	  who	  cites	  conflicting	  aims	  as	  
an	   obstacle	   for	   friendship;	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   Berenskoetter	   sees	   plurality,	   which	   we	   might	  
interpret	   as	   also	   including	   a	   plurality	   of	   aims,	   as	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   friendship.	   One	   concept	  
seems	   to	   be	   based	   on	   an	   everyday	   understanding	   of	   friendship;	   the	   other	   evokes	   specific	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  Schmitt	  for	  example	  argues	  that	  “[t]he	  friend	  and	  enemy	  concept	  are	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  their	  concrete	  and	  
existential	   sense,	   not	   as	   metaphors	   or	   symbols,	   not	   mixed	   and	   weakened	   by	   economic,	   moral,	   and	   other	  
conceptions,	  least	  of	  all	  in	  a	  private-­‐individualistic	  sense	  as	  a	  psychological	  expression	  of	  private	  emotions	  and	  
tendencies.”	  Schmitt,	  The	  Concept	  of	  the	  Political,	  27-­‐28.	  
51	  Roshchin,	   for	  example,	  points	  out	  how	  the	  medieval	   concept	  of	  political	   friendship	  described	  as	  a	  vertical	  
relationship	  among	  non-­‐equals	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  political	   instrument	   (in	  relation	  to	  subordinates	  and	  as	  part	  of	  
the	  political	  vassal	  or	  patronage	  systems)	  that	  would	  later	  be	  replaced	  by	  internal	  sovereignty.	  He	  argues	  that	  
only	   with	   the	   emergence	   of	   internal	   sovereignty	   does	   the	   idea	   of	   public	   friendship	   as	   a	   vertical	   model	  
disappear	  (602	  and	  607-­‐608).	  Political	  (international)	  friendship	  as	  a	  relationship	  between	  equals	  emerges	  with	  
Hobbes	  (613-­‐614).	  Roshchin,	  'The	  Concept	  of	  Friendship:	  From	  Princes	  to	  States'.	  
52	  Berenskoetter,	  'Friends,	  There	  Are	  No	  Friends?	  An	  Intimate	  Reframing	  of	  the	  International',	  650.	  
53	  Wolfers,	  Discord	  and	  Collaboration,	  30	  and	  100.	  
54	  Berenskoetter,	  'Friends,	  There	  Are	  No	  Friends?	  An	  Intimate	  Reframing	  of	  the	  International',	  668.	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thinkers	   who	   link	   their	   understanding	   of	   public	   friendship	   to	   a	   specific	   understanding	   of	   the	  
political.	  
As	   a	   third	   example	   regarding	   friendship	   between	   states,	  Wendt	   can	   be	   invoked	   as	   a	   theorist	  
who	   aims	   at	   presenting	   a	   “neutral”	   conceptualisation.	   Yet,	   despite	   taking	   a	   definition	   of	  
friendship	  as	  his	  starting	  point	  that	  is	  tailored	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  national	  security	  and	  linked	  to	  
the	  formation	  of	  a	  system	  of	  collective	  security,	  I	  argue	  that	  Wendt	  does	  not	  avoid	  building	  his	  
idea	  of	   friendship	  on	  an	  understanding	   that	   is	  embedded	   in	  everyday	  discourses	  of	   friendship	  
and	  enmity.55	  This	  is	  best	  exemplified	  when	  he	  points	  to	  homogeneity,	  understood	  as	  alikeness,	  
as	   an	   efficient	   cause	   for	   friendship	   between	   states	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   Kantian	   system	  
characterised	  by	  friendship.56	  For	  Wendt,	  the	  importance	  of	  alikeness	  is	  based	  on	  the	  rationale	  
that	  seeing	  others	  as	  similar	  to	  oneself	  fosters	  identification	  and	  hence	  a	  deeper	  internalisation	  
of	   friendship.57	  I	   see	   this	   as	   an	   assumption	   based	   more	   in	   the	   world-­‐of-­‐people-­‐in-­‐interaction	  
than	  in	  the	  world-­‐of-­‐states-­‐engaged-­‐in-­‐collective-­‐security.	  	  
In	   the	   midst	   of	   these	   opposing	   proposals	   for	   conditions	   of	   friendship	   based	   on	   a	   variety	   of	  
thinkers	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   unproblematised	   assumptions	   about	   friendship	   based	   on	  
everyday	  conceptions	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  I	  suggest	  to,	  once	  more,	  follow	  Harré	  who	  argues	  that	  
the	  starting	  point	  for	  any	  such	  project	  should	  be	  the	  question	  how	  a	  word	  is	  used	  in	  everyday	  
conversations.58	  Put	   differently,	  we	  need	   to	   ask	   how	   the	   terms	   enemy	  and	   friend	   are	   used	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  Wendt	  defines	  friendship	  as	  “a	  role	  structure	  within	  which	  states	  expect	  each	  other	  to	  observe	  two	  simple	  
rules”.	   The	   first	   rule	   is	   non-­‐violence	   and	   the	   second	   rule	   stipulates	  mutual	   support	   if	   threatened	  by	   a	   third	  
party.	  When	  states	  expect	  each	  other	  to	  observe	  these	  two	  rules	  and	  when	  this	  expectation	  and	  commitment	  
is	   temporally	   open-­‐ended,	   friendship	  between	   states	   exists.	   From	   the	  perspective	  of	   the	  macro-­‐structure,	   a	  
system	  of	  collective	  security	  is	   in	  place.	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  298-­‐299.	  For	  the	  focus	  
on	  national	  security	  compare	  ibid.,	  	  298,	  fn	  136.	  
It	   is	  useful	  to	  read	  this	   in	  connection	  with	  Wendt’s	  distinction	  between	  personal	   identity	  and	  role	   identity	   in	  
mind;	  he	  points	  out	  how	  role	  identity	  exists	  only	  in	  relation	  to	  others.	  Ibid.,	  	  227.	  Similarly,	  he	  points	  out	  that	  in	  
a	  culture	  of	  friendship	  that	  is	  not	  fully	  internalised	  states	  hold	  a	  conception	  of	  friendship	  “that	  most	  individuals	  
might	  think	  hardly	  worth	  the	  name”.	  Ibid.,	  	  305.	  
56	  Ibid.,	  	  353ff.	  Alikeness	  is	  focused	  on	  corporate	  identity,	  understood	  as	  fulfilling	  the	  formal	  criteria	  of	  what	  it	  
means	   to	   be	   a	   state,	   as	   well	   as	   type	   identity,	   understood	   as	   regime	   type.	   In	   this	   context	   democracy	   and	  
capitalism	  are	  specifically	  mentioned	  as	  key	  factors	  for	  alikeness.	  	  
57	  For	   this	   rationale	   see	   ibid.,	   	   354.	   For	   possible	   degrees	   of	   internationalisation	   with	   regards	   to	   friendship	  
compare	  ibid.,	  	  302-­‐307.	  
58	  While	  acknowledging	  it	  as	  a	  common	  practice,	  those	  sceptical	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  states	  as	  enemies	  and	  friends	  
see	  the	  suggestion	  that	  the	  concepts	  might	  be	  drawn	  from	  “everyday	  talk”	  as	  one	  of	  the	  problematic	  points	  
that	   are	   to	   be	   criticised.	   Compare	   Simon	   Keller,	   'Against	   Friendship	   between	   Countries',	   Journal	   of	  
International	  Political	  Theory	  5,	  1	  (2009),	  59.	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everyday	  discourse.	  Parallel	   to	   the	   investigation	   into	   the	   self	   and	  emotions	  elaborated	  above,	  
this	  provides	  the	  elements	  of	  a	  narrative	  of	  friends	  and	  enemies	  in	  which	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐
as-­‐person	  can	  feature.	  By	  drawing	  on	  how	  the	  concepts	  are	  utilised	  in	  everyday	  conversations,	  
the	  approach	  proposed	  here	  allows	  for	  making	  culturally	  specific	  assumptions	  explicit.	  Following	  
insights	   from	   constructionist	   psychology,	   it	   is	   the	   everyday	   discursive	   exchange	   that	   offers	  
insights	   into	   our	   psychology.59	  Further,	   this	   investigation	   builds	   on	   common	   practices	   in	   lay	  
conversations	  as	  well	  as	  academic	  approaches.	   Instead	  of	   looking	  for	  definitions	  of	  enemy	  and	  
friend	  that	  are	  removed	  from	  their	  social	  and	  historical	  context,	  this	  very	  context	  is	  taken	  as	  the	  
starting	  point.	  	  	  
This	   leads	   to	  an	  account	   in	  which,	  based	  on	   the	  metaphor	  of	   the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  
the	  state	  can	  be	  imagined	  as	  a	  person	  and	  the	  language	  games	  of	  enmity	  and	  friendship	  that	  are	  
used	   in	  everyday	  discourses	  can	  be	  applied	  to	   it.	  From	  this	  perspective,	   friendship	  and	  enmity	  
are	  neither	  related	  to	  group-­‐level	  feelings	  nor	  inter-­‐personal	  relations	  but	  to	  narrative	  accounts	  
in	   which	   the	   state	   features.	   The	   narratives	   of	   states	   as	   enemies	   and	   friends	   are	   to	   be	  
understood	  as	  knowledge	  about	  what	  is	  deemed	  acceptable	  and	  unacceptable.	  They	  are	  moral	  
judgements	  as	  well	  as	  ways	  of	  defining	  relations.	  As	  Ringmar	  puts	  it,	  narratives	  of	  enemies	  and	  
friends	  create	  “an	  affective	  geography	  of	  friends	  and	  enemies”.60	  Based	  on	  the	  distinction	  made	  
in	  Chapter	  3	  regarding	  the	  three	  modes	  of	  metaphors,	  these	  narratives	  of	  enemies	  and	  friends	  
can	  serve	  as	  tools	  for	  persuasion,	  and	  as	  frameworks	  of	  orientation,	  but	  also	  as	  the	  very	  ideas	  
that	  constitute	  characteristics	  of	  the	  system	  of	  states.	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  This	   is	   the	   insight	  of	  what	  Harré	  calls	   the	  second	  cognitive	   revolution.	  Rom	  Harré,	   'Emotion	  and	  Memory:	  
The	   Second	   Cognitive	   Revolution',	   in	   Philosophy,	   Psychology	   and	   Psychiatry,	   ed.	   A.	   Phillips	   Griffiths	  
(Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1994).	  
60	  Ringmar,	   Identity,	   Interest	   and	  Action.	   A	   Cultural	   Explanation	   of	   Sweden's	   Intervention	   in	   the	   Thirty	   Years	  
War,	  164.	  




This	  chapter	  presents	  an	  alternative	   to	  Wendt’s	   conception	  of	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  based	  on	  a	  
metaphorical	  account	   that	  draws	  on	   insights	   from	  constructionist	  psychology.	   I	  argue	   that	   the	  
metaphor	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   based	   on	   the	   possibility	   of	  making	   the	  minimal	   criteria	   of	  
personhood	   suggested	   in	   Harré’s	   account,	   especially	   from	   his	   The	   Singular	   Self,	   useful	   to	  
understand	   the	   state.	   These	  minimal	   criteria	   for	   the	   functioning	   of	   person-­‐oriented	   discourse	  
are	   as	   follows:	   having	   a	   location	   in	   time	   and	   space	   and	   showing	   continuity	   over	   time.	   In	  
addition,	  we	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  attribute	  a	  flow	  of	  utterances	  and	  actions	  to	  the	  state	  and	  need	  
to	  be	  able	  to	  perceive	  it	  as	  a	  participant	  in	  interaction.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  state	  does	  fulfil	  these	  
minimal	  criteria	  based	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  external	   sovereignty	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  territorial	  
integrity.	   These,	   together	   with	   the	   appropriate	   representation,	   allow	   for	   the	   application	   of	  
person-­‐oriented	   discourses	   to	   the	   state.	   A	   suitable	   inside	   of	   the	   state,	   such	   as	   an	   internal	  
decision-­‐making	  structure	  and	  self-­‐organising	  qualities	  do	  not	  matter	  for	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐
as-­‐person	   suggested	   in	   this	   thesis.	   Hence,	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   suggested	   here	  
includes	  quasi-­‐states	  in	  the	  circle	  of	  potential	  state	  persons	  while	  it	  excludes	  states	  and	  entities	  
that	  do	  not	  enjoy	  international	  recognition.	  	  
In	   addition,	   in	   order	   to	   enable	  me	   to	   challenge	   some	   of	   the	   ontological	   and	   epistemological	  
assumptions	   of	   Wendt’s	   notion	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   constructionist	   psychology	   has	   been	  
utilised	   to	   provide	   insights	   into	   the	   construction	   of	   selves	   and	   emotions	   as	  well	   as	   regarding	  
cultural	  specific	  concepts	  of	  friend	  and	  enemy.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  underlying	  assumption	  that	  the	  
way	   we	  make	   sense	   of	   ourselves	   as	   persons	   is	   also	   how	  we	  make	   sense	   of	   states	   in	   IR,	   the	  
constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   presented	   as	   the	   metaphorical	   link	   that	   enables	   us	   to	   apply	  
person-­‐oriented	  discourses	   to	   the	  state.	   It	   is	   through	  this	  process	   that	   IR	   is	  given	  meaning	   for	  
practitioners,	  scholars,	  and	  lay	  persons.	   It	   is	  a	  way	  of	  humanising	  the	  relations	  between	  states	  
and	  offers	   the	  possibility	   to	  utilise	   a	   vast	   repertoire	  of	   judgements	   regarding	  appropriate	   and	  
inappropriate	   behaviour	   and	  morality.	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	   chapter	   has	   presented	   narratives	   of	  
emotions	  as	  well	  as	  narratives	  about	  friends	  and	  enemies,	   interpreted	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  
constructionist	   psychology,	   as	   being	   based	   on	   paradigm	   scenarios	   and	   containing	   knowledge	  
with	  regard	  to	  appropriate	  behaviour	  and	  moral	  judgements.	  However,	  these	  cannot	  be	  defined	  
in	  the	  abstract	  but	  are	  cultural	  specific.	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While	   this	   chapter	  has	   fleshed	  out	   the	   idea	  of	   the	  constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   by	  engaging	   in	  
metaphor-­‐mapping,	  discussing	  material	  and	  embodied	   implications	  of	  the	  metaphor	  and	  using	  
three	   instances	   of	   person-­‐oriented	   language	   games	   as	   illustrative	   examples,	   the	   following	  
chapter	   is	   tasked	  with	   further	   addressing	   disciplinary	   implications	   of	   the	   approach	   suggested	  
here.	   Among	   other	   things,	   this	   concerns	   addressing	   the	   disciplinary	   divide	   between	   ways	   of	  
making	   the	   state	   intelligible,	   the	   agent-­‐structure	   debate,	   forms	   of	   systemic	   interaction,	   and	  
possibilities	  for	  systemic	  change.	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Chapter	  7:	  The	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	  –	  implications	  for	  IR	  theory	  
For	  the	  discipline	  of	  IR,	  the	  state	  is	  the	  most	  central	  point	  of	  departure	  and	  the	  debate	  regarding	  
its	  intelligibility	  remains	  a	  key	  theme.	  A	  lot	  of	  work	  focuses	  on	  the	  state,	  its	  scientific	  ontology	  as	  
well	  as	  ontological	  status.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  questions	  of	  what	  the	  state	   is	  and	  whether	   it	   is	  
real	  are	  still	  very	  much	  alive.	  Yet,	  some	  of	  the	  moves	  that	  the	  discipline	  makes	  as	  part	  of	  these	  
debates	  need	  further	  probing	  and	  questioning.	  Accepting	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  state	  and	  taking	  
the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   debate	   in	   the	   discipline	   as	   my	   starting	   point,	   I	   have	   engaged	   with	   these	  
questions	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   previous	   chapters,	   culminating	   in	   the	   suggestion	   of	   an	  
alternative	  position	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  	  
This	   final	   chapter	  offers	   the	  opportunity	   to	   return	   to	   some	  of	   the	   fundamental	  questions	  and	  
debates	  regarding	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  the	  discipline	  of	  IR.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  aim	  
to	   clarify	   the	  position	   I	   take	  with	   the	  constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   further	   in	  order	   to	  highlight	  
how	   it	   differs	   from	   other	   approaches	   in	   the	   debate	   and	   to	   illustrate	   the	   added	   value	   of	   my	  
suggestion	  and	   its	   implications	   for	   the	   study	  of	   IR.	   In	  doing	   so,	   four	  particular	  points	  emerge.	  
First,	  I	  point	  out	  how	  the	  approach	  taken	  here,	  although	  metaphorical	  in	  nature,	  does	  not	  lend	  
itself	   to	   support	   the	  assumption	   that	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	  merely	   a	  metaphor	  and	  also	  does	  
not	  endorse	  an	   instrumental	  treatment	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  My	   insistence	  on	  
the	  theory-­‐constitutive	  nature	  of	  metaphors	  and	  the	  role	  of	  structural	  mapping	  in	  developing	  a	  
metaphor	  provide	  the	  grounds	  for	  taking	  this	  position.	  Further,	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
debate	   was	   framed	   in	   terms	   of	   asking	   questions	   about	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   state.	   Two	  
opposing	  positions,	  one	  insisting	  on	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  state	  and/or	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  and	  the	  
other	   locating	   the	   state	   and	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   on	   the	   level	   of	   language	   and	   practice,	   have	  
been	   outlined.	   With	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   I	   disrupt	   this	   dichotomous	   view	   of	   the	  
intelligibility	  of	  the	  state.	  Based	  on	  this	  concept,	  I	  am	  in	  a	  position	  to	  argue	  that	  a	  sharp	  dividing	  
line	   between	   those	   scholars	   who	   are	   interested	   in	   advancing	   arguments	   in	   favour	   of	   the	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ontological	  reality	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  
investigate	  the	  social	  practices	  and	  processes	  that	  constitute	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
on	   the	  other	  hand	  cannot	  and	   should	  not	  be	  drawn.	   From	   the	  perspective	  of	   the	  constructed	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	  these	  are	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  suggestion	  made	  here	  
is	  that	  scholars	  of	  IR	  need	  to	  work	  with	  those	  aspects	  of	  the	  state	  that	  are	  structural	  and	  located	  
at	  a	  deeper	  level	  of	  social	  reality	  and	  those	  aspects	  of	  the	  state	  that	  are	  based	  in	  language	  and	  
shared	   practices	   at	   the	   same	   time.1	  It	   is	   the	   interplay	   between	   the	   two	   that	   yields	   the	  most	  
insightful	  results	  for	  IR	  scholars	  as	  it	  gives	  due	  recognition	  to	  actors’	  perceptions	  and	  concepts	  
while	  acknowledging	  the	  larger	  structural	  context.	  	  
Second,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  highlight	  how	  my	  engagement	  with	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
speaks	  to	  wider	  disciplinary	  debates,	  especially	  the	  agent-­‐structure	  debate.	  Alexander	  Wendt’s	  
body	   of	   work	   is	   generally	   regarded	   as	   a	   profound	   contribution	   to	   this	   debate	   and	   he	   is	  
sometimes	  credited	  with	  introducing	  the	  agent-­‐structure	  debate	  to	  IR.2	  By	  offering	  a	  critique	  of	  
his	  approach	  with	  regard	  to	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	   I	  also	  offer	  an	  alternative	  position	  within	   the	  
agent-­‐structure	   debate.	   This	   position	  was	   already	   advanced	   implicitly	  when	   I	   argued	   that	   the	  
state	   is	  a	   really	  existing	   structure	  but	   that	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   to	  be	   located	  on	   the	   level	  of	  
linguistic	  realism.	  Further,	  in	  my	  account	  agency	  firmly	  rests	  with	  individual	  human	  beings	  acting	  
alone	  or	   in	  groups.	   It	   is	   this	  acceptance	  of	  human	  agency,	  as	  opposed	  to	   locating	  agency	  with	  
the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  that	  opens	  up	  convincing	  possibilities	  for	  systemic	  change.	  Part	  of	  the	  task	  
of	  this	  chapter	  will	  be	  to	  make	  this	  contribution,	  which	  might	  seem	  contradictory	  at	  first	  glance,	  
more	  explicit	  and	  to	  outline	  its	  implications	  for	  studying	  IR.	  	  	  
Third,	   having	   identified	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   in	   the	   discipline	   as	   being	   strangely	   devoid	   of	  
emotions,	  part	  of	  the	  task	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  build	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  on	  
a	  conception	  of	  the	  person	  that	  includes	  an	  explicit	  acknowledgement	  of	  emotions.	  In	  line	  with	  
the	  aims	  of	  the	  scholars	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  emotional	  turn,	  this	  addition	  is	  in	  itself	  a	  contribution.	  
However,	  beyond	  that	  emotions	  play	  two	  important	  functions.	  First,	  as	  outlined	  in	  the	  previous	  
chapter,	   they	   are	   the	   basis	   for	   judgements	   of	   appropriateness	   of	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  With	  regard	  to	  “a	  deeper	  level	  of	  social	  reality”,	  I	  am	  drawing	  on	  the	  scientific	  realist	  critique	  of	  some	  of	  the	  
debates	   in	   IR.	   A	   good	   overview	   that	   illustrates	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘levels’	   of	   social	   reality	   can	   be	   obtained	   from	  
Patomäki	  and	  Wight,	  'After	  Postpositivism?	  The	  Promises	  of	  Critical	  Realism'.	  
2	  Adler,	   'Constructivism	   in	   International	   Relations'.	   For	   a	   more	   critical	   perspective	   regarding	   Wendt's	   role	  
compare	  Wight,	  Agents,	  Structures	  and	  International	  Relations:	  Politics	  as	  Ontology,	  138ff.	  
	  	   	   	  
	  
249	  
behaviour	  in	  IR.	  Second,	  a	  focus	  on	  emotions	  allows	  for	  explanations	  of	  ‘irrational’	  constructed	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	  behaviour	  understood	  as	  actions	  that	  do	  not	  follow	  the	  overall	  logic	  of	  the	  state	  
system.	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  this	  irrationality	  that	  opens	  up	  possibilities	  for	  systemic	  change.	  	  	  
Fourth,	  the	  approach	  suggested	  here	  offers	  an	  alternative	  perspective	  on	  questions	  of	  systemic	  
interactions	   of	   states	   and	   possibilities	   for	   change	   in	   the	   systemic	   culture.	   In	   this	   regard,	   this	  
chapter,	  once	  more,	  stresses	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  departure	  from	  Wendt’s	  approach	  takes	  place.	  
The	  particular	  vantage	  point	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  has	  profound	  consequences	  for	  
how	  we	   theorise	   possibilities	   for	   systemic	   change.	   In	   Social	   Theory,	  Wendt	   sought	   to	  make	   a	  
contribution	   to	   the	   discipline	   by	   suggesting	   how	   a	   transformation	   towards	   a	   Kantian	  
international	  culture,	  a	  culture	  of	  other-­‐help,	  could	  be	  achieved.	   In	  very	  general	  terms,	   I	  share	  
his	   normative	   motivation	   regarding	   an	   international	   culture	   of	   other-­‐help,	   but	   based	   on	   my	  
critical	  engagement	  with	  him	  and	  the	  wider	  disciplinary	  debate,	  I	  arrive	  at	  a	  different	  suggestion	  
regarding	   how	   we	   could	   bring	   about	   this	   transformation.	   If	   the	   state	   is	   conceived	   of	   as	   a	  
structure	   that	   is	   personified	  on	   the	   level	   of	   linguistic	   realism,	   it	   is	   no	   longer	   “anarchy	   is	  what	  
states	  make	  of	  it”.3	  Rather,	  anarchy	  becomes	  what	  we	  make	  of	  it.	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Wendt,	  'Anarchy	  Is	  What	  States	  Make	  of	  It:	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  Power	  Politics'.	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Making	  the	  state	  intelligible:	  overcoming	  a	  disciplinary	  
divide	  	  
The	  question	  of	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  still	  crucial	  for	  the	  discipline.	  
One	   way	   of	   framing	   this	   debate	   is	   by	   identifying	   two	   opposing	   camps,	   as	   it	   is	   done	   by	   Jens	  
Bartelson	  as	  well	  as	  some	  of	  the	  other	  participants	  in	  the	  debate	  and	  as	  it	  has	  been	  echoed	  in	  
the	  overview	  provided	  in	  Chapter	  1.4	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  find	  scholars	  such	  as	  Wendt	  and	  Colin	  
Wight	  who	   insist	   that	  we	   need	   to	   accept	   that	   the	   state	   really	   exists	   and	   that	   our	   disciplinary	  
engagement	  with	  it	  needs	  to	  take	  ontological	  questions	  as	  its	  starting	  point.5	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
scholars	  such	  as	  Iver	  B.	  Neumann	  and	  Patrick	  T.	  Jackson	  locate	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
on	   the	   level	  of	   language	  and	   intersubjective	  practice	  and	  argue	   that	   an	   investigation	  of	   these	  
practices	  should	  be	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  scholars	  interested	  in	  understanding	  the	  state	  in	  IR.6	  We	  
can	  identify	  this	  particular	  framing	  of	  the	  debate	  at	  the	  core	  of	  Wendt’s	  writing	  and	  behind	  his	  
motivation	   to	   engage	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	   Given	   his	   philosophy	   of	   science	  
commitment	  to	  a	  scientific	  realist	  position,	  Wendt	  argues	  that	  we	  need	  to	  take	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  
state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  seriously.	  In	  his	  2004	  article,	  he	  frames	  the	  debate	  by	  highlighting	  
two	  dichotomous	  positions.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  he	  argues,	  there	  are	  those	  scholars	  that	  use	  the	  
idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  an	  as-­‐if	  fashion,	  as	  a	  useful	  metaphor	  or	  analogy.	  With	  Wight,	  he	  
argues	  that	  these	  IR	  scholars,	  and	  for	  Wendt	  they	  hold	  the	  majority,	  treat	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	  
instrumentalist	   terms. 7 	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   there	   are	   those	   scholars	   that	   engage	   harder	  
ontological	   questions	   about	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   state	   and	   the	   reality	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	  
Wendt	   associates	   himself	   with	   the	   latter	   group	   and	   argues	   that	   to	   engage	   these	   kinds	   of	  
questions	   is	   the	  only	  way	  to	  ensure	  disciplinary	  progress.	  Wight,	  also	  arguing	  that	  we	  need	  to	  
accept	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  state	  while,	   in	  contrast	  to	  Wendt’s	  position,	   insisting	  that	  we	  need	  to	  
let	   go	   of	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   in	   order	   to	   make	   progress,	   introduces	   a	   slightly	  
different	  perspective.	  Wight	  also	  distinguishes	  between	  scholars	  that	  stress	  the	  need	  to	  accept	  
that	   the	   state	   really	   exists	   and	   those	   scholars	   that	   locate	   the	   state	   in	   language	   and	   social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Bartelson,	  'Second	  Natures:	  Is	  the	  State	  Identical	  with	  Itself'.	  
5	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory'.	  
6	  Jackson,	  'Hegel's	  House,	  or	  'People	  Are	  States	  Too''.	  Neumann,	  'Beware	  of	  Organicism:	  The	  Narrative	  Self	  of	  
the	  State'.	  
7	  Wendt,	   'The	   State	   as	   Person	   in	   International	   Theory'.	  Wight,	   'State	   Agency:	   Social	   Action	   without	   Human	  
Activity'.	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practices.	   However,	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   latter,	   he	   distinguishes	   between	   an	   instrumentalist	  
treatment	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   a	   metaphorical	   account	   on	   the	   other.8	  Both	   face	   similar	  
problems	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   ontology	   and,	   Wight	   argues,	   both	   “allow	   the	   theorist	   off	   the	  
ontological	  hook.”9	  The	  instrumentalist	  treatment	  allows	  the	  theorist	  to	  use	  theoretical	  terms	  as	  
if	   they	   existed	   in	   order	   to	   advance	   a	   theory.	   The	   problem,	   for	   Wight,	   is	   that	   this	   impedes	  
disciplinary	   progress	   by	   shying	   away	   from	   harder	   ontological	   questions.	   The	   metaphorical	  
treatment,	  Wight	  points	  out,	   also	   shies	   away	   from	  harder	  ontological	   questions	  by	  neglecting	  
the	  fact	  that	   in	  order	  for	  metaphors	  to	  do	  any	  useful	  work,	  they	  need	  to	  be	  based	  on	  the	  real	  
qualities	  of	  aspects	  of	  the	  real	  world.	   	   In	  other	  words,	  Wight	  stresses	  that,	  while	  the	   language	  
we	  use	  to	  convey	  reality	  is	  metaphorical,	  the	  structure	  of	  this	  reality	  itself	  is	  not	  and	  this	  is	  what	  
IR	  scholars	  need	  to	  pay	  attention	  to.10	  	  	  
This	  brief	  reminder	  of	  the	  key	  points	  of	  the	  debate	  serves	  as	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  highlighting	  
the	  specific	  contributions	  that	  this	  thesis	  makes	  regarding	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  
idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  “harder”	  ontological	  questions.	  From	  the	  vantage	  
point	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  the	  distinction	  between	  addressing,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  
ontological	  reality	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  metaphorical	  treatments	  is	  a	  false	  dichotomy	  which	  I	  
aim	   to	   unpack	   in	   the	   following.	   I	   take	   the	   position	   that	   regardless	   of	   how	   we	   answer	   the	  
question	   of	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   state,	  metaphors	   play	   a	   key	   role	   in	   the	   process.	   This	  was	   the	  
argument	   advanced	   in	   Chapter	   3	   and	   brought	   to	   bear	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   in	  
Chapter	   6.	   However,	   an	   important	   distinction	   needs	   to	   be	  made	   between	   the	   state	   and	   the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person.	   It	   is	   Wight	   who	   stresses	   this	   distinction	   for	   advancing	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  
debate	  and	   it	   is	   this	  distinction	  that	   forms	  a	  key	  part	  of	   the	  critical	  engagement	  with	  Wendt’s	  
work	   undertaken	   in	   Chapter	   2	   of	   this	   thesis.11	  As	   detailed	   in	   previous	   chapters,	   based	   on	   the	  
distinction	   between	   the	   state	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  on	   the	   other,	   I	   argue	  
that	  the	  former	  is	  a	  really	  existing	  structure	  while	  the	  latter	  is	   located	  on	  the	  level	  of	  linguistic	  
realism.	  In	  this	  sense,	  I	  agree	  with	  Wight’s	  position	  in	  the	  debate	  that	  “the	  state	  is	  real,	  but	  that	  
it	  is	  not	  [really]	  a	  person”.12	  This	  also	  sets	  me	  apart	  from	  Neumann	  and	  Jackson’s	  position,	  both	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Wight,	  'State	  Agency:	  Social	  Action	  without	  Human	  Activity',	  271-­‐273.	  
9	  Ibid.,	  	  272.	  
10	  Ibid.	  
11	  Ibid.	  
12	  Ibid.,	  	  270.	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of	  whom	   do	   not	   see	   this	   commitment	   to	   the	   reality	   of	   the	   state	   as	   a	   necessity.	   Yet,	   despite	  
accepting	  the	  point	  that	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  to	  be	  located	  at	  the	  level	  of	  linguistic	  realism,	  in	  
contrast	  to	  deeper	  levels	  of	  reality,	  the	  approach	  I	  wish	  to	  advance	  with	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐
as-­‐person	   is	   neither	   a	   mere	   metaphor	   approach	   nor	   can	   it	   be	   charged	   with	   being	   an	  
instrumentalist	  treatment	  of	  theoretical	  terms.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  move	  as	  it	  allows	  me	  to	  give	  
metaphors	   their	   long	   overdue	   recognition	   in	   the	   discipline	   while	   also	   making	   suggestions	  
towards	  overcoming	  problematic	  disciplinary	  divides.	  	  
The	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   suggested	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	   both	   real	   and	   fictitious	   and	   both	  
aspects	  are	  intertwined	  in	  important	  ways.	  There	  are	  two	  sides	  to	  the	  story	  to	  tell,	  but	  there	  is	  
no	  point	  in	  separating	  them	  or	  even	  using	  them	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  disciplinary	  divides.	  It	  is	  actually	  
not	   the	  case	   that	   there	  are	   two	  separate	  stories	   to	   tell,	  using,	  but	  arguing	  against,	   the	  phrase	  
popularised	   by	   Martin	   Hollis	   and	   Steve	   Smith.13	  Rather,	   the	   two	   stories,	   one	   story	   being	   an	  
investigation	   of	   the	   real	   existing	   structures	   of	   IR	   (explaining)	   and	   one	   story	   looking	   at	   the	  
linguistic	  elements	  relating	  to	  these	  structures	  (understanding),	  are	  closely	  intertwined.	  	  
As	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  locating	  the	  position	  that	  I	  take	  with	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  it	  is	  
worth	   highlighting	   what	   I	   understand	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐structure	   to	   be	   and	   to	   re-­‐iterate	   what	  
linguistic	  realism	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  entails.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  state	  is	  a	  structure	  
and	  tie	  this	  understanding	  of	  structure	  to	  the	  position	  advanced	  by	  scientific	  realist	  scholars.14	  In	  
this	  sense,	  I	  take	  the	  side	  of	  Wendt	  and	  Wight.	  While	  scientific	  realist	  and	  critical	  realist	  scholars	  
do	  not	  offer	  a	  uniform	  account	  of	  structure,	  certain	  common	  elements	  can	  be	  identified:	  
• a	   commitment	   to	   argue	   against	   a	   flat,	   individualistic	   ontology	   and	   tendencies	   of	  
reductionism,	  
• a	  position	  that	  locates	  structure	  at	  deeper,	  not	  directly	  observable	  levels	  of	  social	  reality	  
and	  argues	  that	  reality	  is	  stratified,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Martin	   Hollis	   and	   Smith	   Steve,	   Explaining	   and	   Understanding	   International	   Relations	   (Oxford:	   Clarendon	  
Press,	   1990).	   For	   a	   discussion	   compareWight,	   Agents,	   Structures	   and	   International	   Relations:	   Politics	   as	  
Ontology,	   72	   and	   88.	   For	   this	   argument	   also	   compare	   Margaret	   S.	   Archer,	   Realist	   Social	   Theory:	   The	  
Morphogenetic	  Approach	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  149-­‐150.	  
14	  Given	  Wendt’s	  detailed	  engagement	  with	  scientific	  realism	  in	  Social	  Theory,	  this,	  at	  first	  glance,	  seems	  like	  
an	   endorsement	   of	   his	   position.	   	   However,	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case.	   First,	   the	   state	   is	   an	   agent	   in	   Wendt’s	  
framework.	  Second,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  his	  account	  of	  structure	  does	  not	  leave	  the	  plain	  of	  a	  flat	  
ontology	  that	  scientific	  realist	  scholars	  wish	  to	  argue	  against.	  Compare	  footnote	  16.	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• a	   position	   that	   includes	   both	   ideational	   and	  material	   factors	   in	   any	   understanding	   of	  
structure,	  and	  
• a	  determination	  to	  argue	  against	  the	  reduction	  of	  an	  investigation	  of	  the	  social	  world	  to	  
the	  investigation	  of	  language.15	  	  
Most	   importantly,	   a	   structure,	   such	   as	   the	   state,	   exists	   independently	   of	   individual	   human	  
beings	  and	  their	  awareness	  and	  conceptualisations	  of	   it.	  The	  structure	   is	  also	  not	   reducible	   to	  
the	   actions	  of	   individual	   human	  beings.	   This	   opposes	  Wendt’s	   position	   in	   later	  parts	  of	   Social	  
Theory	  where	  he	  veers	  towards	  a	  more	  idealist	  conception	  of	  structure	  by	  arguing	  that	  “[s]ocial	  
structures	   do	   not	   exist	   apart	   from	   their	   instantiation	   in	   practices.”16	  In	   contrast,	   following	  
scientific	   realist	   scholars,	   I	   argue	   that	   parts	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐structure	   are	   to	   be	   located	   at	   a	  
deeper,	   non-­‐observable	   level	   of	   social	   reality;	   it	   includes	   both	   ideational	   and	  material	   factors	  
and	  is	  not	  exhausted	  by	  investigating	  the	  language	  associated	  with	  it	  or	  related	  language	  games.	  	  
Moving	   to	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   distinguish	   its	   linguistic	   realism	   from	   the	  
deeper	   realism	   I	   attributed	   to	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐structure.	   As	   we	   have	   seen	   in	   Chapter	   3,	   we	   can	  
distinguish	   between	   three	   kinds	   of	   realism:	   empirical,	   linguistic,	   and	   critical	   realism.	   In	   their	  
article	  “After	  Postpositivism?”	  Heikki	  Patomäki	  and	  Colin	  Wight	  introduce	  this	  distinction	  into	  IR	  
debates	   and	   argue	   that	   both	   empirical	   and	   linguistic	   realism	   suffer	   from	   the	   problem	   of	   not	  
getting	  at	  deeper	  levels	  of	  social	  reality.	  The	  key	  point	  of	  their	  contribution	  is	  the	  argument	  that	  
reality	  is	  neither	  captured	  entirely	  by	  what	  can	  be	  perceived,	  as	  empirical	  realism	  would	  argue,	  
nor	  by	  what	  can	  be	  spoken	  of,	  as	  linguistic	  realism	  would	  maintain.	  A	  social	  structure	  such	  as	  the	  
state	   has	   an	   intransitive	   dimension	   that	   is	   neither	   directly	   observable	   nor	   entirely	   located	   in	  
language.	   In	  other	  words,	  reality	  and	  the	  knowledge	  we	  have	  of	   it	  are	  not	  the	  same;	  the	  state	  
and	  the	  concepts	  we	  have	  of	  the	  state	  are	  not	  the	  same.	  Yet,	  our	  social	  theories	  are	  language-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Wight,	  Agents,	  Structures	  and	  International	  Relations:	  Politics	  as	  Ontology,	  Chapter	  4.	  Patomäki	  and	  Wight,	  
'After	  Postpositivism?	  The	  Promises	  of	  Critical	  Realism'.	  Colin	  Wight	  and	   Jonathan	  Joseph,	   'Scientific	  Realism	  
and	   International	  Relations',	   in	  Scientific	  Realism	  and	   International	  Relations,	   ed.	   Jonathan	   Joseph	  and	  Colin	  
Wight	  (Houndmills,	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2010).	  	  	  
16	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  313.	  Another	  quotation	  is	  useful	  to	  put	  this	  into	  context	  as	  it	  
provides	  a	  more	  balanced	  view	  to	  the	  strong	  statement	  that	  social	  structures	  only	  exist	  when	  instantiated	  in	  
practice.	  Wendt	  argues	  that	  for	  example	  “[d]istributions	  of	  ideas	  are	  social	  structures.	  Some	  of	  these	  ideas	  are	  
shared	  and	  some	  are	  not.	  I	  focused	  on	  the	  former,	  which	  make	  up	  the	  part	  of	  social	  structure	  known	  as	  culture	  
...	  [T]herefore,	  the	  shared	  ideas	  or	  culture	  of	  an	  anarchic	  system	  is	  its	  structure,	  although	  in	  reality	  there	  is	  
more	  to	  its	  social	  structure	  than	  that.”	  Ibid.,	  	  309.	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born	   which	   means	   that	   “scientific	   activity	   relies	   on	   socially	   produced	   conceptual	   systems.”17	  
Similarly,	   the	   conceptions	   that	   agents	   have	   of	   the	   social	   world	   are	   language-­‐born	   and	   their	  
actions	   are	   influenced	   by	   these	   conceptions	   and	   those	   aspects	   of	   the	   structure	   that	   remain	  
hidden	   by	   a	   particular	   concept.	   This	   has	   important	   consequences	   for	   social	   sciences	   and	   the	  
position	   I	   take	   with	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   in	   response	   is	   that	  metaphors	   are	   a	   key	  
element	  in	  mediating	  between	  these	  two	  dimensions.	  	  
As	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  following	  a	  scientific	  realist	  critique	  of	  Wendt’s	  approach	  regarding	  the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person,	   I	  argued	  that	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  can	  only	  be	   located	  at	   the	   level	  of	   linguistic	  
realism.	   In	   other	  words,	   the	   state	   is	   not	   really	   a	   person.	   In	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   I	   identified	  
elements	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐structure	   –	   the	   principle	   of	   external	   sovereignty,	   territorial	   integrity	  
and	  diplomatic	  representation	  –	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  speak	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  person.18	  The	  metaphor	  
of	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  has	  been	  suggested	  as	   the	  result	  of	   this	   interplay	  between	  elements	  of	  
the	   state-­‐as-­‐structure	   and	   linguistic	   devices	   (language	   games)	   commonly	   used	   in	   everyday	  
person-­‐oriented	  discourse.	  In	  other	  words,	  I	  showed	  that	  the	  state	  can	  be	  spoken	  of	  as	  a	  person	  
and	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  emerges	  from	  this	  debate.	   It	   is	  this	  point	  that	  bridges	  
the	   disciplinary	   divide	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   question	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   state	   and	   that	  
stands	   as	   a	   barrier	   against	   the	   argument	   that	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   a	  mere	   metaphor	   or	   an	  
instrumental	  theoretical	  device.	  	  
The	   last	  part	  of	   this	   section	   is	  devoted	   to	  making	   this	  move	   clearer	  by	   stressing	   three	  points.	  
First,	  it	  useful	  to	  issue	  a	  reminder	  regarding	  the	  difference	  between	  social	  and	  physical	  sciences.	  
Social	   structures	   need	   to	   be	   distinguished	   from	  natural	   ones.	  With	   regard	   to	   the	   former,	   the	  
conceptions	  that	  agents	  have	  of	  structures	  matter	  a	  great	  deal	  more.	  Second,	  while	  structures	  
are	  never	  fully	  captured	  by	  only	  looking	  at	  the	  concepts	  held	  and	  actions	  undertaken	  by	  agents,	  
social	  structures	  depend	  on	  agents	  for	  their	  production	  and	  reproduction.	  From	  the	  perspective	  
of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  emphasise	  that	  shared	  ideas	  and	  concepts,	  
many	  of	  which	  are	  metaphorical	   in	  nature,	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  process	  of	  production	  and	  
reproduction.	  In	  this	  sense,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  
(re-­‐)production	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐structure.	  Third,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  not	  all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  José	   López,	   'Metaphors	  of	   Social	   Complexity',	   in	  After	  Postmodernism.	  An	   Introduction	   to	  Critical	  Realism,	  
ed.	  José	  López	  and	  Gary	  Potter	  (London:	  Athlone	  Press,	  2001),	  91.	  
18	  Though,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  that	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐structure	  is	  not	  fully	  captured	  by	  only	  these	  aspects.	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social	  structures	  are	  the	  same.	  The	  state	  in	  IR	  is	  a	  special	  kind	  of	  social	  structure	  that,	  more	  than	  
other	  social	  structures,	  depends	  on	  representation.	  This	   last	  point	  draws	  a	  connection	  back	  to	  
Hobbes’s	  perspective	  on	  the	  state	  as	  a	  fictitious	  person	  and	  his	  account	  of	  personification	  and	  
representation	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  1	  as	  well	  as	  the	  emphasis	  on	  processes	  of	  personation.19	  It	  is	  
these	  three	  points	  that	   I	  aim	  to	  clarify	   further	   in	  the	  following	  and	  that,	   taken	  together,	  allow	  
me	  to	  make	  the	  case	  for	  a	  greater	  appreciation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  metaphors	  and	  against	  overstated	  
disciplinary	  divides.	  	  
Illuminating	  these	  three	  points	  further,	  it	  is	  best	  to	  begin	  by	  stressing	  that	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  
existence	   of	   social	   structures	   does	   not	   provide	   an	   understanding	   of	   these	   structures.20	  The	  
difference	   between	   the	   state	   and	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   between	   philosophical	   and	   scientific	  
ontology,	   is	   important	   to	   acknowledge.	   One	   is	   a	   really	   existing	   social	   structure,	   the	   other	   a	  
conceptualisation	   of	   it.	   It	   can	   reasonably	   be	   assumed	   that,	   given	   the	   non-­‐observable,	  
intransitive	   nature	   of	   social	   structures,	   there	   are	   better	   conceptualisations	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
structure	  than	  those	  that	  we	  currently	  hold	  as	  scholars	  and	  practitioners.21	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  
previous	   chapters,	   one	   of	   the	   key	   commitments	   of	   scientific	   realist	   scholars	   is	   to	   uncover	  
understandings	   that	   get	   ever	   closer	   to	   the	   unobservable	   nature	   of	   social	   structures.	   Science,	  
whether	   of	   the	   natural	   or	   social	   variety,	   is	   understood	   as	   the	   “progressive	   approximations	   to	  
reality”.22	  Related	  to	  this	  process	  of	  approximation	  of	  our	  theories	  to	  the	  unobservables	  of	  the	  
social	  world,	  is	  a	  second	  task	  specific	  to	  the	  social	  sciences	  that	  critical	  realists	  emphasise.	  From	  
this	  perspective,	  social	  science	  also	  always	  has	  a	  “critical	  impulse”	  because	  agents	  might	  not	  be	  
aware	  of	  the	  role	  that	  social	  structures	  play	  in	  shaping	  them	  and	  their	  actions,	  particularly	  as	  far	  
as	   the	   intransitive	   dimension	   of	   social	   structures	   is	   concerned.	   It	   is	   the	   possibility	   of	   social	  
science	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  these	  more	  hidden	  aspects	  of	  social	  structures	  that	  gives	  it,	  potentially,	  
an	   “emancipatory	   role”.23	  This	   second	  goal	  of	   social	   sciences	   clearly	   sets	   them	  apart	   from	   the	  
physical	  sciences.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  social	  sciences	  have	  the	  much	  harder	  task	  of	  navigating	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Compare	  Skinner,	  'Hobbes	  and	  the	  Purely	  Artificial	  Person	  of	  the	  State'.	  And	  Runciman,	  'What	  Kind	  of	  Person	  
Is	   Hobbes's	   State?	   A	   Reply	   to	   Skinner'.	  With	   regard	   to	   processes	   of	   personation	   compare	   Jackson,	   'Hegel's	  
House,	  or	  'People	  Are	  States	  Too''.	  
20	  López,	  'Metaphors	  of	  Social	  Complexity',	  89.	  
21	  Note	  how	  intransitivity	  is	  a	  term	  introduced	  by	  scientific	  realists	  such	  as	  Colin	  Wight,	  Jonathan	  Joseph,	  Milja	  
Kurki,	  and	  Heikki	  Patomäki	  into	  IR	  debates,	  drawing	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Roy	  Bhaskar.	  For	  a	  similar	  point	  regarding	  
the	  problem	  of	  'correct'	  representation	  compare	  Suganami,	  'Wendt,	  IR,	  and	  Philosophy'.	  
22	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  66.	  
23	  Wight	  and	  Joseph,	  'Scientific	  Realism	  and	  International	  Relations',	  16.	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only	   the	   language-­‐born	  nature	  of	   their	  own	  theories	  but	  also	  the	   language-­‐born	  nature	  of	   the	  
concepts	   that	   agents	   hold	   of	   social	   structures.	   However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   stress	   that	   it	   is	  
problematic	  to	  mark	  lay	  theories	  and	  those	  theories	  held	  by	  practitioners	  as	  simply	  an	  obstacle	  
to	   be	   overcome,	   a	   block	   in	   the	   road	   towards	   discovering	   the	   intransitive	   nature	   of	   the	   social	  
world.	  The	  concepts	  held	  by	  agents,	  although	  they	  only	  ever	  capture	  social	  structures	  partially	  
and	  imperfectly,	  might	  still	  matter	  for	  the	  production	  and	  reproduction	  of	  social	  structures	  –	  a	  
process	   that	   only	   happens	   through	   agents.	   I	   argue	   that	   even	   ‘wrong’	   concepts	   can	   begin	   to	  
matter	  when	  they	   form	  the	  basis	   for	  perceptions,	   judgements,	  and	  actions.	  By	  shaping	  actors’	  
perceptions,	  judgements	  and	  possibilities	  for	  action,	  actors’	  conceptions	  of	  the	  structure	  shape	  
in	  important	  ways	  how	  the	  structure	  is	  produced	  and	  reproduced.	  The	  concepts	  held	  by	  agents,	  
regardless	  of	  how	  accurately	  they	  reflect	  the	  structure,	  matter.24	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  
any	   concept	   goes.	   The	   commitment	   to	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐structure	   implies	   a	   commitment	   to	   an	  
ontological	  reality	  that	  resists	  certain	  interpretations.	  	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  this	  thesis	  emphasises	  that	  metaphors	  are	  especially	  relevant	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
exploring	  intransitive	  truths.	  For	  the	  scientific	  and	  critical	  realist,	  metaphors	  usually	  play	  the	  role	  
of	   bridging	   the	   gap	   between	   the	   scholar	   and	   the	   intransitive	   dimension	   of	   social	   structures.	  
Richard	  Boyd	  was	  utilised	  to	  this	  end	  in	  Chapter	  3.25	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  same	  chapter,	  Wendt	  and	  
Wight	   and	   Patomäki	   pay	   respect	   to	   the	   role	   of	   metaphors	   in	   limited	   ways.	   However,	   what	  
emerges	  here	   and	  what	  needs	   to	  be	   strongly	   emphasised	   is	   a	   perspective	  on	  metaphors	   that	  
locates	   them	   with	   agents	   and	   makes	   them	   relevant	   for	   the	   production	   and	   reproduction	   of	  
structure.	  The	  process	  of	  structural	  mapping	  of	  metaphors,	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  3	  and	  brought	  to	  
bear	  on	  the	  state	   in	   the	  previous	  chapter	  becomes	   important	  here.	  The	  structural	  mapping	  of	  
the	   metaphor	   of	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   illustrates	   what	   aspects	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
structure	  are	  drawn	  upon	  for	  the	  metaphor	  to	  do	  useful	  work	  and	  for	  person-­‐oriented	  language	  
games	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  state.	  It	  is	  these	  aspects	  of	  the	  structure	  that	  facilitate	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	  perspective.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  process	  also	  points	  to	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Note	  how	  this	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  critique	  of	  Wendt’s	  approach	  offered	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  In	  Social	  Theory	  Wendt	  
argues	   that	   our	   current	   concepts	   of	   states,	   having	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   in	  mind	   in	   particular,	  mean	   that	  we	  
must	  have	  gotten	  something	  right	  in	  the	  past.	  Otherwise,	  the	  concept	  would	  have	  been	  rejected	  a	  long	  time	  
ago.	   I	   follow	  upon	  Hidemi	  Suganami’s	  critique	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  concept	   is	  still	  prominent	  does	  
not	  allow	  us	   to	  draw	  any	   conclusions	   regarding	   its	   accuracy	   in	   getting	  at	  deeper	   structures	  of	   social	   reality.	  
Suganami,	  'Wendt,	  IR,	  and	  Philosophy'.	  
25	  Boyd,	  'Metaphor	  and	  Theory	  Change:	  What	  Is	  "Metaphor"	  a	  Metaphor	  For?'.	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structure	  that	  are	  not	  drawn	  upon	  for	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  metaphor	  and	  that,	  hence,	  resist	  such	  
an	  interpretation.	  	  
This	   is	   not	   the	   space	   to	  offer	   a	   theory	  of	   the	  production	   and	   reproduction	  of	   social	   structure	  
based	   on	   agents’	   concept.	   However,	   it	   is	   worth	   pointing	   out	   that	   within	   critical	   realist	  
scholarship	  Margaret	  Archer’s	  morphogenetic	  approach	  offers	  a	  useful	  theoretical	  perspective.	  
She	   suggests	   a	   way	   of	   theorising	   the	   interplay	   between	   agents	   and	   structures	   that	   avoids	  
reducing	  one	   to	   the	  other,	   that	   locates	  causal	  powers	   in	  both	  agents	  and	  structures,	  and	   that	  
allows	  us	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  production	  and	  reproduction	  of	  structure	  in	  a	  temporal	  fashion.	  While	  
structure	  is	  not	  reducible	  to	  agents,	  their	  actions,	  or	  concepts,	  structures	  depend	  on	  agents	  for	  
their	  production	  and	  reproduction.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  agents	  are	  always	  located	  in	  and	  shaped	  
by	   existing	   structures	   that	   have	   been	   produced	   by	   past	   agents.	   Archer	   points	   out	   that	   her	  
account	  calls	  for	  analytical	  dualism	  which	  means	  that	  we	  need	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  agents	  and	  
structures	  are	  not	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin	  but	  radically	  different.26	  At	  first	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  
very	  close	  to	  Hollis	  and	  Smith’s	  position,	  mentioned	  earlier,	  that	  maintains	  that	  there	  are	  always	  
two	   stories	   to	   tell.	   It	   also	   seems	   to	   give	   support	   to	   the	   scholarly	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   rift	   in	   the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate.	  However,	  Archer	  also	  argues	  that	   in	  addition	  to	  analytical	  dualism	  the	  
social	   scientist	   also	   needs	   to	   put	   the	   interplay	   between	   agents	   and	   structures	   into	   sharper	  
focus.27	  To	  this	  end	  she	  suggests	  her	  morphogenetic/morphostatic	  approach.	  It	  is	  precisely	  this	  
point	   at	   which	   possibilities	   for	   change	   can	   be	   located.	   Society	   is	   an	   open	   system	   that	   is	  
“peopled”.	  Archer	  points	  out	  that	  this	  means	  that	   it	  “can	  always	  be	  re-­‐shaped	  through	  human	  
innovativeness”. 28 	  However,	   this	   does	   not	   take	   place	   in	   vacuum	   and	   of	   course	   not	   all	  
interpretations	  or	   innovations	  are	  supported	  by	  social	  reality.	  Hence,	  action	  results	  from	  both,	  
the	   situations	   people	   find	   themselves	   in	   (structure)	   and	   people’s	   reasoning	   about	   these	  
situations.29	  	  
It	   needs	   to	   be	   stressed	   that	   only	   certain	   parts	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐structure	   are	   illuminated	   and	  
“active”	   in	   the	   metaphor	   of	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	   The	   approach	   of	   structural	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Archer	   specifically	   comments	   on	   Roy	   Bhaskar's	   Transformational	  Model	   of	   Social	   Activity	   (TSMA)	   Archer,	  
Realist	  Social	  Theory:	  The	  Morphogenetic	  Approach,	  151.	  
27	  Ibid.,	  	  152.	  
28	  Ibid.	  
29	  Ibid.,	  	  208-­‐209.	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mapping	   of	   the	  metaphor	   allows	   us	   to	   pinpoint	   these	   parts.	   This	  means	   that	   we	   know	  what	  
elements	  of	  the	  structure	  are	  drawn	  upon	  when	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  metaphor	  guides	  actions.	  It	  
also	  highlights	  what	  aspects	  of	  the	  structure	  can	  potentially	  be	  changed	  through	  changes	  in	  this	  
particular	   metaphor.	   And	   conversely,	   it	   highlights	   what	   aspects	   of	   the	   structure	   remain	  
untouched	  but	  might	  still	   influence	  actions.	  Hence,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  the	  importance	  of	  social	  
science	   in	   illuminating	   the	   intransitive	  dimension	  of	   social	   structures	   –	   those	  aspects	   that	   are	  
not	   expressed	   in	   concepts	   and	   practices.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   this	   aspect	   of	   the	   metaphorical	  
mapping	   process	   is	   also	   a	   defence	   against	   the	   charge	   of	   instrumentalism.	   It	   is	   clear	   that	   the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	  does	  not	  exist.	  It	  is	  a	  concept	  that	  connects	  with	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐structure	  in	  certain	  
points	  and	  these	  points	  of	  contact	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  realm	  of	  intransitive	  ontological	  
existence	  and	  concepts	  at	  the	  level	  of	  linguistic	  realism.	  It	  is	  in	  these	  points	  of	  contact	  between	  
the	  social	  structure	  and	  the	  concepts	  of	  the	  structure	  that	  action	  emerges	  and	  production	  and	  
reproduction	  of	  the	  structure	  takes	  place.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  structures	  only	  influence	  action	  
when	  they	  are	  “reflected”	   in	  concepts.	  This	   is	  also	  not	  to	  deny	  that	  structures	  are	  reproduced	  
without	  being	  reflected	  conceptually.	  However,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  interplay	  between	  concepts	  and	  
structure	  is	  especially	  important	  for	  the	  state	  in	  IR	  because	  the	  state	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  social	  structure	  
that	  depends	  on	  representation	  more	  than	  other	  social	  structures	  such	  as	  modes	  of	  production	  
or,	   to	   use	   a	   very	   different	   example,	   gender.	  Hence,	   I	   argue	   that	   even	  more	   than	  other	   social	  
structures,	  the	  state	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  concepts	  used	  by	  agents.	  That	  is	  why	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
ideas	   deserve	   serious	   attention.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   state	   in	   IR,	   agents	   not	   only	   produce	   and	  
reproduce	  structure.	  Rather,	  in	  those	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  state	  is	  seen	  from	  the	  outside,	  agents,	  
in	  certain	  positions,	  are	  also	  asked	  to	  represent	  the	  structure.	  While	  the	  structure	  resists	  certain	  
representations,	  I	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  considerable	  leeway	  for	  agents’	  representations	  to	  take	  
on	  a	  variety	  of	  forms.	  This	  brings	  me	  back	  to	  a	  quotation	  taken	  from	  Ringmar	  that	  stands	  at	  the	  
beginning	  of	  Chapter	  1	  and	  that	  is	  worth	  repeating	  here.	  	  
Although	   the	   state	   can	   be	   described	   in	   many	   different	   ways,	   when	  
viewed	  from	  the	  outside	  –	  as	  one	  entity	  among	  others	  in	  world	  politics	  
–	   it	   is	   almost	   invariably	   talked	   about	   in	   anthropomorphic	   terms.	   It	   is	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seen	  as	  an	   ‘actor’	  or	   ‘a	  person’;	   it	   is	   ‘someone’	  or	  a	   ‘subject’	   to	  whom	  
intentions,	  memories,	  rights	  and	  obligations	  are	  attached.30	  
However,	  we	  also	  need	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  conceptual	  changes	  might	  occur	  that	  are	  resisted	  
by	  structures	  and	  do	  not	  have	  structural	  consequences.	  Archer	  uses	  feminism	  as	  an	  example	  of	  
conceptual	   changes	   that	   did	   not	   lead	   to	   comparable	   structural	   changes.31	  In	   other	  words,	  we	  
might	  think	  of	  the	  state	  in	  any	  way	  we	  want,	  but	  not	  every	  conceptualisation	  will	  stick.	  The	  key	  
difference	  here,	   I	   argue,	   is	   that	   the	   state	   in	   IR	   is	   a	   structure	   that	   depends	  on	   representation,	  
because	   of	   that	   it	   is	   more	   amenable	   to	   conceptual	   changes,	   while	   still	   being	   able	   to	   resist	  
certain	   concepts.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   a	   call	   for	   a	   thorough	  
investigation	   into	   the	   concepts	   held	   by	   those	   agents	   that	   are	   of	   key	   importance	   for	   the	  
production	  and	  reproduction	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐structure.	  	  
The	  points	   developed	   so	   far	   can	  now	  be	  drawn	   together	   to	   identify	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐
person	  with	   a	   specific	   position	   in	   the	   agent-­‐structure	  debate.	   	   I	   outlined	  how	   locating	   agency	  
with	  individual	  human	  beings	  can	  be	  squared	  with	  talk	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  and	  how	  this	  talk	  
connects	   with	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐structure	   in	   important	   ways.	   I	   showed	   how	   treating	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
person	   does	   not	   necessarily	   degrade	   human	   agency	   and	   how	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   can	   be	  
combined	   with	   a	   position	   in	   the	   agent-­‐structure	   debate	   that	   locates	   agency	   with	   individual	  
human	   beings,	   acting	   alone	   or	   in	   groups,	   and	   is	   committed	   to	   treating	   the	   state	   as	   a	   social	  
structure.	  	  
The	   focus	   is	   on	   the	   interplay	   between	   agents	   and	   structures.	   It	   is	   this	   process	   that	   the	  
constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  getting	  at	  and	  that	  is	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  IR.	  Focusing	  on	  the	  
interplay	  between	  the	  two	  means	  to	  reject	  a	  disciplinary	  divide	  between	  Erklären	  and	  Verstehen	  
à	   la	   Hollis	   and	   Smith	   and	   the	   disciplinary	   divide	   identified	   at	   the	   core	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  
debate.	  	  
Similarly,	  the	  account	  developed	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  transcends	  the	  
philosophical	   wagers	   and	   resulting	   positions	   regarding	   how	   to	   do	   science	   introduced	   to	   IR	  
debates	  by	  Jackson	  in	  his	  The	  Conduct	  of	  Inquiry	  in	  International	  Relations.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Ringmar,	  'On	  the	  Ontological	  Status	  of	  the	  State',	  443.	  	  
31	  Archer,	  Realist	  Social	  Theory:	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Chapter	  3,	  Jackson	  combines	  two	  philosophical	  wagers	  into	  a	  two-­‐by-­‐two	  table,	  resulting	  in	  four	  
possible	  positions.	  One	  wager	  entails	  a	  decision	  about	  subscribing	  to	  either	  a	  mind-­‐world	  monist	  
position	   or	   a	   mind-­‐world	   dualist	   one.	   The	   other	   wager	   entails	   a	   decision	   on	   the	   question	   of	  
whether	  or	  not	   things	  beyond	  our	  direct	   experience	   can	  be	   known.	  Resulting	   from	   this	   is	   the	  
following	  two-­‐by-­‐two	  table.32	  	  
	   	   Relationship	   between	   knowledge	   and	  
observation	  
	   	   phenomenalism	   transfactualism	  
Relationship	   between	  




neopositivism	   critical	  realism	  
mind-­‐world	  
monism	  
analyticism	   reflexivity	  
	  
In	  Chapter	  3,	  I	  used	  these	  four	  positions	  to	  highlight	  the	  different	  roles	  metaphors	  play	  as	  part	  
of	   each.	  Here,	   rather	   than	   offering	   a	   critique	   of	   Jackson,	   I	   argue	   that	   some	   research	   projects	  
need	  to	  oscillate	  between	  positions.	  With	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  I	  make	  a	  commitment	  
to	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐structure.	  I	  argue,	  following	  scientific	  realist	  commitments,	  that	  
the	   state-­‐as-­‐structure	   exists	   independent	   of	   it	   being	   known,	   conceptualised	   or	   instantiated	   in	  
practice.	  This	  puts	  me	  firmly	  in	  the	  upper	  right	  corner.	  However,	  I	  also	  argue	  that,	  in	  contrast	  to	  
the	  state-­‐as-­‐structure,	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  to	  be	  located	  at	  the	  level	  of	  linguistic	  realism.	  This	  
puts	   me	   in	   one	   of	   the	   two	   bottom	   categories.	   I	   argue	   that	   both	   aspects	   need	   to	   be	   taken	  
seriously	  and	  can	  be	  studied	  on	   their	  own	  –	  as	   the	  dividing	   line	   in	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate	  
illustrates.	  However,	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  calls	  for	  taking	  both	  of	  them	  into	  view	  at	  
the	  same	  time.	  By	  referring	  back	  to	  structural	  mapping	  outlined	   in	  Chapter	  3,	   I	  have	  aimed	  to	  
show	  how	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  connects	  with	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐structure	  in	  important	  
ways.	   It	   is	  this	  connection	  that	  allows	  for	  person-­‐oriented	  discourse	  of	  states	  to	  take	  place.	  At	  
the	  same	  time,	  by	  pointing	  to	  the	  role	  of	  agents	  in	  producing	  and	  reproducing	  social	  structures,	  
the	   concept	  does	  more	   than	  highlighting	   certain	  aspects	  of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐structure.	   It	   becomes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Jackson,	  The	  Conduct	  of	  Inquiry	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  and	  Its	  Implications	  for	  the	  
Study	  of	  World	  Politics,	  37.	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constitutive	  of	  it.	  If	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  processes	  of	  structural	  change	  of	  the	  state	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
international	   system,	   the	   interplay	   between	   the	   two	   becomes	   of	   utmost	   importance	   and	  we	  
need	  to	  transcends	  Jackson’s	  categories	  in	  our	  research	  if	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  these	  processes	  
of	  change.	  	  
Lastly,	  taking	  this	  suggestion	  on	  board,	  one	  might	  wonder	  about	  the	  emancipatory	  commitment	  
of	   scientific	   realist	   scholarship	   in	   light	   of	   the	   account	   of	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	   The	  
constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	   itself	  does	  not	  represent	  an	  investigation	  into	  those	  aspects	  of	  the	  
structure	   that	  escape	  conceptual	   “representation”	  and	  belong	   to	   the	   intransitive	   realm	  of	   the	  
social.	   However,	   an	   investigation	   into	   the	   intransitive	   dimension	   of	   social	   structures,	   critical	  
realist	  scholars	  argue,	  is	  precisely	  where	  the	  emancipatory	  potential	  of	  the	  social	  sciences	  is	  to	  
be	   located.	   While	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   cannot	   fulfil	   this	   ideal,	   I	   argue	   that	   it,	  
nevertheless,	   does	   more	   than	   confirming	   the	   status	   quo.	   First,	   as	   already	   mentioned,	   by	  
engaging	  in	  structural	  mapping	  of	  the	  metaphor,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  highlight	  the	  metaphor’s	  blind	  
spots.	  Second,	  and	  most	   importantly,	  potential	   for	  change	   is	   located	  within	  metaphor	  change.	  
Parts	   of	   Chapters	   4	   and	   5	   have	   made	   suggestions	   towards	   an	   alternative	   conception	   of	   the	  
person.	   This	   alternative	   conception	   of	   the	   person	   questions	   materialistic	   and	   individualistic	  
accounts	  and	  opens	  up	  potential	  for	  reframing	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  person	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  
construction	  of	  selves	  and	  emotions.	  Based	  on	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  
this	  can	  have	  consequences	  for	  how	  the	  relations	  between	  states	  are	  conceived.	  This	  aligns	  the	  
constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   with	  Wendt’s	   Social	   Theory	   project	   in	   some	   ways.	   Patomäki,	   for	  
examples,	  argues	  that	  “Wendt’s	  point	  is	  to	  replace	  the	  capitalist	  conception	  of	  man	  with	  a	  socio-­‐
psychological	   conception.”33	  Similarly,	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   to	   be	   understood	   as	  
the	  attempt	  to	  question	  taken	  for	  granted	  assumptions	  about	  the	  formation	  of	  self	  and	  the	  role	  
of	   emotions	   and	   to	   offer	   an	   avenue	   towards	   alternative	   conceptions	   of	   the	   person	   and	   the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person.	   This	   is	   where	   an	   emancipatory	   potential,	   though	   not	   in	   the	   stricter	   sense	  
employed	  by	  scientific	  realist	  scholars,	  is	  to	  be	  located.	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  Patomäki,	   After	   International	   Relations.	   Critical	   Realism	   and	   the	   (Re)Construction	   of	   World	   Politics,	   87.	  
However,	   at	   the	   same	   time	  he	   critisises	   this	   aspect	  of	  Wendt’s	  work	   for	  not	   transcending	  what	  he	   calls	   the	  
“international	   problematic”.	   In	   other	   words,	  Wendt	   does	   not	   go	   far	   enough.	   Compare	   also	  Marjo	   Koivisto,	  
'State	   Theory	   in	   International	   Relations:	   Why	   Realism	   Matters',	   in	   Scientific	   Realism	   and	   International	  
Relations,	  ed.	  Jonathan	  Joseph	  and	  Colin	  Wight	  (Houndmills,	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2010),	  78.	  
	  	   	   	  
	  
262	  
To	   summarise,	   what	   I	   have	   outlined	   here	   offers	   an	   important	   corrective	   and	   clarification	  
regarding	  the	  role	  of	  metaphors	  and	  the	  interplay	  between	  structures	  and	  agents.	  It	  should	  now	  
be	  clear	  that	  the	  dichotomy	  that	  Wendt	  opens	  up	  between	  a	  mere	  metaphor	  approach	  on	  the	  
one	  hand	  and	  an	   investigation	   into	   the	  ontological	   reality	  of	   the	   state	  and	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  on	  
the	   other	   represents	   an	   unhelpful	   dividing	   line.	   If	   we	   are	   serious	   about	   disciplinary	   progress,	  
both	   need	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   view	   at	   the	   same	   time	   and	   it	   is	   their	   interplay	   that	   deserves	  
attention.	   Further,	  while	  Wendt	   and	  Wight’s	  warning	   against	   an	   instrumentalist	   treatment	   of	  
theoretical	  terms	  is	  a	  crucial	  point	  in	  the	  debate,	  the	  problem	  of	  instrumentalism,	  understood	  as	  
treating	  theoretical	  terms	  as	  if	  they	  existed,	  does	  not	  arise	  for	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  
By	   distinguishing	   between	   the	   deeper	   ontological	   reality	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐structure	   on	   the	   one	  
hand	  and	  the	  linguistic	  realism	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  on	  the	  other,	  it	  is	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	   highlights	   only	   certain	   aspects	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐structure.	   However,	   it	   is	   also	  
argued	  that	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  should	  be	  part	  of	  IR	  theories	  not	  because	  it	  offers	  a	  useful	  as-­‐if	  
treatment	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐structure	  in	  IR,	  but	  because	  it	  guides	  actors’	  perceptions,	  judgements,	  
and	  actions	  and	  therefore	  acquires	  constitutive	  status	  for	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐structure.	  To	  what	  extend	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	  ideas	  play	  such	  a	  role	  is	  an	  empirical	  question.	  In	  other	  words,	  as	  long	  as	  we	  can	  
show	   that	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   has	   relevance	   for	   shaping	   actors’	   understandings,	   judgements,	  
and	   actions	   and	   hence,	   plays	   potentially	   a	   role	   in	   the	   reproduction	   of	   the	   structure,	   the	  
discipline	  needs	  to	  engage	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  and	  disciplinary	  progress	  can	  indeed	  be	  made	  in	  
this	   area.	   The	   process	   of	   metaphor-­‐mapping	   illustrates	   how	   elements	   of	   person-­‐oriented	  
discourse	  can	  be	  utilised	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  state	  and	  what	  elements	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐
structure	   are	   drawn	   upon	   as	   part	   of	   this	   process.	   The	   account	   I	   give	   in	   the	   form	   of	   the	  
constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  therefore,	  gives	  structure	  its	  due,	  acknowledging	  both	  its	  material	  
and	   ideational	  elements.	   In	   this	   sense,	   it	   is	  not	  as	   ideational	  as	  Wendt’s	  account	  presented	   in	  
later	  parts	  of	  Social	  Theory	  where	  he	   tends	   to	   reduce	  structures	   to	  shared	   ideas.	  At	   the	  same	  
time,	  as	  arguments	  presented	   in	  Chapter	  5	   illustrate,	  the	  conception	  of	  the	  person	  utilised	  for	  
the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   more	   “ideas	   all	   the	   way	   down”	   than	   Wendt’s	   rump	  
materialism	  would	   allow	   for.	   In	   this	   sense,	   I	   am	   also	   being	   a	  more	   radical	   constructivist	   than	  
Wendt.34	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  locating	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The	  observations	  of	  this	  section	  aim	  to	  clarify	  my	  “middle	  position”	  in	  the	  debate	  regarding	  the	  
intelligibility	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  specific	  position	  within	  the	  agent-­‐structure	  debate	  that	  results	  
from	  this.	  Based	  on	   this,	   suggestions	   for	   the	  study	  of	   IR	  can	  be	  made.	  A	   research	  programme	  
that	   is	   interested	   in	  working	  with	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   needs	   to	   study	  
three	  things:	  aspects	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐structure,	  the	  concepts	  of	  persons,	  including	  socially	  shared	  
ideas	  about	  the	  self	  and	  emotions,	  and	  the	  interplay	  between	  the	  two	  that	  is	  conceptualised	  via	  
metaphor	   structure-­‐mapping	  Further,	   if	   the	   specific	   interest	   lies	  with	   studying	  possibilities	   for	  
change,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  case	  with	  Wendt’s	  systemic	  project,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  international	  system	  
also	   needs	   to	   be	   put	   into	   greater	   focus	   as	   an	   element	   that	   makes	   certain	   interpretations	  
possible	  while	  acting	  as	  a	  barrier	  to	  others.	  The	  following	  section	  will	  pay	  particular	  attention	  to	  
this.	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Rethinking	  systemic	  interactions	  and	  systemic	  change	  
Wendt,	  from	  his	  particular	  position	  in	  the	  agent-­‐structure	  debate,	  argues	  that	  “it	  is	  only	  through	  
the	   interaction	   of	   state	   agents	   that	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   international	   system	   is	   produced,	  
reproduced,	   and	   sometimes	   transformed.” 35 	  As	   outlined	   in	   greater	   detail	   in	   the	   previous	  
section,	  I	  take	  a	  fundamentally	  different	  perspective.	  In	  the	  account	  given	  with	  the	  constructed	  
state-­‐as-­‐person,	   the	   state	   is	   a	   structure	   and	   agency	   is	   located	   firmly	   with	   individual	   human	  
beings.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  the	  state	  only	  ever	  becomes	  what	  I	  call	  a	  second-­‐order	  
person	  in	  the	  framework	  presented	  here.	  The	  state	  depends	  on	  individual	  human	  beings	  acting,	  
alone	   or	   in	   groups,	   on	   its	   behalf.	   This	   point	   has	   important	   implications	   for	   how	   systemic	  
interactions	  are	  accounted	  for	  and	  how	  process	  is	  theorised.	  I	  share	  the	  ideal	  of	  what	  Wendt’s	  
Kantian	   culture	   of	   anarchy	   in	   which	   relations	   among	   states	   are	   characterised	   by	   friendship,	  
understood	   as	   other-­‐help.	   However,	   building	   on	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   the	  
possibilities	  for	  the	  realisation	  of	  a	  Kantian	  culture	  are	  conceptualised	  in	  fundamentally	  different	  
ways.	   This	   section	   aims	   to	   clarify	   this	   position	   further	   and	   highlighting	   its	   consequences	   for	  
studying	  the	  relations	  between	  states	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  transformation	  of	  these	  relations.	  	  
When	  dealing	  with	  process,	  Wendt	  describes	  a	  symbolic	  interactionist	  model	  of	  the	  interactions	  
between	  states	  whereby	  “[o]n	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  representations	  of	  Self	  and	  Other,	  Alter	  and	  Ego	  
each	  construct	  a	  ‘definition	  of	  the	  situation’.”36	  A	  process	  of	  acting	  and	  reacting	  based	  on	  self-­‐
concepts	  and	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  other’s	  actions	  is	  seen	  as	  leading	  to	  a	  shared	  definition	  of	  
the	  situation	  which	   includes	  alter-­‐casting	  the	  other	  and	  role	   taking	  on	  both	  sides.	  Wendt	  uses	  
the	  thought	  experiment	  of	  a	  First	  Encounter,	  a	  situation	  of	  a	  hypothetical	  “world	  without	  shared	  
ideas”,	   to	   illustrate	   how	   assumptions	   about	   self	   and	   other	   lead	   to	   specific	   interpretations	   of	  
actions,	  reactions,	  and	  ultimately	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  certain	  conception	  of	  self	  and	  other	  and	  
thereby	   a	   certain	   systemic	   culture.37	  Wendt	   argues	   that	   “the	   basic	   idea	   is	   that	   identities	   and	  
their	   corresponding	   interests	   are	   learned	   and	   then	   reinforced	   in	   response	   to	   how	   actors	   are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  366,	  emphasis	  added.	  
36	  Ibid.,	  	  329.	  
37	  For	   an	   overview	   of	   this	   thought	   experiment	   –	   that	   Wendt	   elaborates	   on	   as	   part	   of	   the	   idea	   that	   social	  
learning	   is	   one	   of	   the	   key	   mechanisms	   for	   “cultural	   selection”	   and	   hence	   the	   formation	   of	   international	  
systemic	  features	  –	  see	  ibid.,	  	  324-­‐335.	  For	  the	  term	  “world	  without	  shared	  ideas”	  compare	  ibid.,	  	  328.	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treated	   by	   significant	  Others.”38	  This	   allows	  Wendt	   to	   argue	   that,	   for	   example,	   self-­‐interest	   is	  
neither	   intrinsic	   to	  states,	  nor	  an	   inevitable	  outcome	  of	  an	  anarchic	   state	  system.	  Rather,	   it	   is	  
constituted	  relationally	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  symbolic	  interactionist	  exchange.39	  
One	  important	  difference	  between	  Wendt’s	  account	  and	  the	  position	  taken	  in	  this	  thesis	  needs	  
to	   be	   highlighted	   from	   the	   outset.	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   constructed-­‐state-­‐as-­‐person	   it	  
can	   only	   ever	   be	   human	   beings	   that	   are	   developing	   assumptions	   about	   the	   self	   and	   other	   of	  
states,	  interpreting	  actions	  and	  reactions	  of	  states,	  and	  therefore	  contributing	  to	  the	  formation	  
of	   a	   systemic	   culture.	   With	   regard	   to	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   being	   based	   on	   a	  
conceptual	  metaphor,	   it	  can	  only	  ever	  be	  individuals,	  acting	  alone	  or	   in	  groups,	  who	  are	  doing	  
the	  acting	  and	  thinking.	  Alter	  and	  Ego	  need	  to	  be	   imagined	  by	   individual	  human	  beings.	  From	  
this	   perspective,	   Wendt’s	   First	   Encounter	   and	   the	   consequent	   systemic	   features	   are	   not	   the	  
result	  of	  states	  interacting,	  but	  rather	  the	  result	  of	  the	  narratives	  told	  about	  states	  and	  on	  their	  
own	  or	   in	   interaction,	   the	  meaning	   this	   interaction	   is	   given	   through	   these	  narratives,	   and	   the	  
actions	  these	  narratives	   inspire	   in	   individual	  human	  beings	  and	  groups	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	   the	  
second-­‐order	   person	   of	   the	   state.	   Crucially,	   this	  means	   that	   the	   three	   cultures	   of	   anarchy	   are	  
“produced,	  reproduced,	  and	  sometimes	  transformed”	  through	  the	  stories	  told	  about	  states	  and	  
stories	  acted	  upon	  under	  systemic	  constraints.40	  	  
This	  insistence	  on	  locating	  agency	  with	  individual	  human	  beings,	  acting	  alone	  or	  in	  groups,	  has	  
the	  important	  consequence	  that	  culturally	  specific	  narratives	  about	  self	  and	  other	  are	  then	  also	  
the	   location	  of	  possibilities	   for	   change	  of	   a	   state	   systemic	   culture.	   This	   is	  why	   I	   conclude	   that	  
Wendt’s	   famous	   phrase,	   “anarchy	   is	   what	   states	   make	   of	   it”,	   needs	   to	   be	   adapted	   to	   say	  
“anarchy	  is	  what	  we	  make	  of	  it.”41	  	  
However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   this	   point	   does	   not	   mark	   this	   approach	   as	   a	  
methodological	  individualist	  one.	  The	  “we”	  in	  my	  rephrasing	  of	  Wendt’s	  catch-­‐phrase	  does	  not	  
mean	  to	  imply	  that	  IR	  is	  reducible	  to	  individual	  human	  beings.	  First,	  persons	  are	  conceptualised	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Ibid.,	  	  327.	  
39	  Ibid.,	  	  322.	  
40	  Ibid.,	  	  366.	  
41	  Compare	  Wendt,	  'Anarchy	  Is	  What	  States	  Make	  of	  It:	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  Power	  Politics'.	  
	  	   	   	  
	  
266	  
as	  fundamentally	  social,	  in	  truly	  holistic	  fashion.42	  The	  concepts	  of	  self	  and	  emotions	  as	  well	  as	  
of	   friend	   and	   enemy	   are	   seen	   as	   being	   constituted	   discursively	   and	   do	   not	   exist	   outside	   of	  
discourse.	  Self	  and	  emotions	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  the	  properties	  of	   individuals.	  Secondly,	  the	  
account	  of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐structure	   elaborated	  on	   in	   the	   first	   section	  of	   this	   chapter	  works	   as	   a	  
defence	   against	   ontological	   and	   methodological	   individualism.	   Understanding	   the	   state	   as	   a	  
structure	   in	   scientific	   realist	   terms	  makes	   it	   irreducible	   to	   individual	   human	   beings	   and	   their	  
conceptions.	  Yet,	  as	  elaborated	   in	  the	  previous	  section,	  these	  conceptions	  matter	  especially	   in	  
the	  crucial	  moments	  of	  production	  and	  reproduction	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐structure.	  	  	  
From	  this	  perspective	  two	  points	  of	  critique	  emerge	  with	  regard	  to	  Wendt’s	  First	  Encounter,	  his	  
hypothetical	   assumption	   of	   “a	   world	   without	   shared	   ideas”.43	  Although	   this	   is	   a	   hypothetical	  
situation	  without	   shared	   ideas,	   in	  Wendt’s	   account	   each	   state	   actor	   already	   comes	  with	   two	  
kinds	   of	   “baggage”	   to	   the	   encounter.44	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	  Wendt’s	   state	   actors	   have	  material	  
characteristics	   and	   needs	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   they	   hold	   representations	   in	   the	   “form	   of	  
some	   a	   priori	   ideas	   about	   who	   they	   are”.45 	  In	   contrast,	   based	   on	   Harré’s	   constructionist	  
psychology,	   I	   argue	   that	   an	   idea	   of	  who	   “I	   am”	   does	   not	   exist	   prior	   to	   interaction	   and	   social	  
learning.	   In	   other	  words,	   social	   structure	  precedes	   the	   agents.	  However,	  most	   importantly,	   in	  
my	  account	  the	  second-­‐order	  person	  of	  the	  state	  comes	  with	  a	  significant	  “baggage”	  of	  another	  
kind.	   This	   baggage	   consists	   of	   shared	   ideas	   that,	   in	   contrast	   to	   Wendt’s	   account,	   are	   to	   be	  
located	   within	   the	   cultures	   and	   societies	   of	   those	   agents	   whose	   narratives	   bring	   about	   the	  
constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  	  
Having	   highlighted	   these	   fundamental	   differences	   between	   Wendt’s	   approach	   and	   the	   one	  
suggested	   here,	   there	   are	   two	   additional	   moves	   that	   this	   section	   needs	   to	   make.	   First,	   by	  
looking	   at	   processes	   of	   change	   of	   the	   state	   systemic	   culture	   and	   by	   contrasting	   Wendt’s	  
approach	   and	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   approach	   proposed	   in	   this	   thesis,	   it	   becomes	  
clearer	  how	  culturally	  specific	   ideas	  held	  by	  agents	  become	  relevant	   for	  systemic	   interactions.	  
Most	  importantly,	  by	  looking	  at	  Wendt’s	  suggestions	  regarding	  a	  possible	  transformation	  from	  a	  
Lockean	   international	   culture,	   our	   current	   system,	   to	   a	   Kantian	   culture	   of	   other-­‐help,	   I	   can	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  holism	  and	  the	  conception	  of	  the	  person	  in	  IR	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  Wendt	  compare	  Hidemi	  
Suganami,	  'On	  Wendt's	  Philosophy:	  A	  Critique',	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies	  28,	  1	  (2002),	  35-­‐36.	  
43	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  328.	  
44	  Ibid.	  
45	  Ibid.	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illustrate	   how	   the	   same	   transformation	   potentially	   looks	   like	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	  
constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  Second,	  in	  light	  of	  these	  observations,	  further	  implications	  for	  the	  
study	  of	   IR	  are	  outlined.	  While	  studying	  the	  conceptions	  held	  by	  agents	   is	  not	  sufficient	  on	   its	  
own,	  I	  will	  make	  a	  strong	  case	  for	  their	  relevance	  and	  the	  need	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  impact	  that	  
‘domestic’	  culture	  has	  on	  the	  second-­‐order	  person	  of	  the	  state	  in	  IR.46	  
With	  regard	  to	  processes	  of	  change,	  Wendt	  argues	  that	  “[s]tructural	  change	  occurs	  when	  actors	  
redefine	   who	   they	   are	   and	   what	   they	   want.”47	  This	   redefinition	   can	   lead,	   through	   symbolic	  
interactions,	   to	   changes	   in	   the	   shared	  believes	   about	  who	  Ego	   and	  Alter	   are	   and	   the	   rules	   of	  
their	   relationship.48	  In	   other	   words,	   their	   collective	   identity	   changes	   and	   this,	   ultimately,	   can	  
change	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   international	   system.49	  Four	   constraints	   on	   this	   constructivist	  
account	   are	  mentioned	   by	  Wendt.	   First,	   the	   redefinition	   of	   identities	   and	   interests	   has	   to	   be	  
shared	   to	  have	  structural	  effects.50	  Second,	  power	  plays	  a	   role	   in	   the	  sense	   that	   ideas	  held	  by	  
more	   powerful	   states	   have	   greater	   impact.51	  Third,	   the	   international	   systemic	   culture	   enables	  
and	  constrains	  certain	  redefinitions.52	  And	   fourth,	   international	  systemic	  culture	  only	  becomes	  
unstable	  and	  amenable	  to	  change	  when	  enough	  important	  actors	  change	  their	  conceptions	  and	  
their	  behaviour	  accordingly	  so	  that	  a	  tipping	  point	  is	  crossed.53	  
Keeping	  these	  four	  points	  in	  mind,	  we	  can	  look	  at	  how	  Wendt	  describes	  the	  process	  of	  change	  
from	  a	  Lockean	  to	  a	  Kantian	  culture.	  A	  Lockean	  international	  culture	  is	  characterised	  by	  rivalry.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 	  I	   use	   the	   term	   “domestic”	   with	   great	   caution	   here.	   It	   is	   used	   to	   highlight	   the	   difference	   between	  
international	   culture	   and	   the	   culture	   that	   is	   most	   relevant	   for	   structuring	   people’s	   concept	   of	   self	   and	  
emotions.	   It	  also	  follows	  general	   IR	  terminology	  and	  established	  distinctions.	  Yet,	   I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  imply	  that	  
cultures	  neatly	  conform	  to	  state	  borders.	  Depending	  on	  the	  case	  at	  hand,	   it	  might	  be	  very	  difficult	   to	  assign	  
one	  specific	  culture	  to	  a	  state	  or	  even	  identify	  a	  dominant	  culture	  within	  a	  given	  state.	  Similarly,	  one	  culture	  
might	  be	  shared	  across	  states.	  Ultimately,	  this	  is	  an	  empirical	  question.	  	  
47	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  336-­‐337.	  This	  constructivist	  position	  is	  put	  in	  contrast	  to	  what	  
Wendt	   calls	   a	   rationalist	   position	  described	   as	   the	   assumption	   that	   identities	   and	   interests	   are	   exogenously	  
given	  and	  that	  change	  occurs	  based	  on	  changes	  in	  expected	  utility	  functions.	  	  
48	  Ibid.,	  	  335.	  
49	  Wendt	  distinguishes	  between	  collective	  identity	  change	  and	  structural	  change.	  He	  argues	  that	  “the	  main	  
point	  I	  want	  to	  make	  here	  is	  that	  because	  the	  structure	  of	  any	  internalised	  culture	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  
collective	  identity,	  a	  change	  in	  that	  structure	  will	  involve	  a	  change	  in	  collective	  identity,	  involving	  the	  
breakdown	  of	  an	  old	  identity	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new.	  Identity	  change	  and	  structural	  change	  are	  not	  
equivalent,	  since	  identity	  formation	  happens	  ultimately	  at	  the	  micro-­‐level	  and	  structural	  change	  happens	  
ultimately	  at	  the	  macro,	  but	  the	  latter	  supervenes	  on	  the	  former.”	  Ibid.,	  	  338.	  
50	  Ibid.,	  	  335.	  
51	  Ibid.,	  	  331.	  
52	  Ibid.,	  	  339.	  
53	  Ibid.,	  	  340.	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States	  cast	  each	  other	  in	  the	  role	  of	  rival	  which	  means	  that,	  while	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  for	  the	  
absence	  of	  conflict	  or	  even	  the	  absence	  of	  violence,	  there	  are	  international	  rules	  and	  institutions	  
which	  pose	  limits	  to	  conflict	  and	  violence.54	  States	  “expect	  each	  other	  to	  act	  as	  if	  they	  recognize	  
their	   sovereignty,	   their	   ‘life	   and	   liberty,’	   as	   a	   right,	   and	   therefore	   not	   to	   try	   to	   conquer	   or	  
dominate	   them”.55	  In	   contrast,	   a	   Kantian	   culture	   is	   characterised	   by	   friendship	   understood	   as	  
other-­‐help.	  States	  engage	  in	  pro-­‐social	  behaviour,	  “treating	  others	  as	  if	  one	  not	  only	  respected	  
their	   individual	   security	   concerns	   but	   also	   ‘cared’	   for	   them,	   a	   willingness	   to	   help	   them	   even	  
when	   this	   serves	   no	   narrowly	   self-­‐interested	   purpose”.56	  In	   this	   sense,	   a	   Kantian	   culture	   goes	  
beyond	   a	   Lockean	   one	   as	   the	   conception	   of	   self	   includes	   a	   regard	   for	   others	   that	   is	   not	  
instrumentally	  related	  to	  concerns	  for	  the	  self.57	  Two	  points	  are	  worth	  noting.	  First,	  as	  part	  of	  a	  
Lockean	  culture,	  states	  engage	  in	  pro-­‐social	  behaviour	  but	  out	  of	  egoistic	  concerns.	  Yet,	  Wendt	  
argues	  that	  this,	  over	  time,	  might	  help	  create	  identities	  that	  include	  a	  regard	  for	  the	  other	  that	  
is	  non-­‐instrumental.58	  In	  other	  words,	  treating	  the	  other	  instrumentally	  as	  a	  friend	  might	  lead	  to	  
actual	   friendship	   over	   time.	   Second,	  Wendt	   identifies	   four	  master	   variables	   that	   facilitate	   the	  
transition	   towards	   a	   Kantian	   culture	   because	   they	   “undermine	   egoistic	   identities	   and	   help	  
create	   collective	   ones”. 59 	  The	   master	   variables	   are	   interdependence,	   common	   fate,	  
homogeneity,	   and	   self-­‐restraint.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   the	   first	   three,	   called	   efficient	  
causes	  by	  Wendt,	  are	  systemic	  factors	  and	  the	  fourth	  master	  variable	  concerns	  state	  behaviour.	  
Together,	   they	   support	   the	   formation	  of	   Kantian	   international	   culture.	   The	  more	   of	   them	  are	  
present,	   the	  more	   likely	  a	  Kantian	   international	  culture	  becomes.	  However,	  Wendt	  also	  points	  
out	  that	  “all	  that	   is	  necessary	  for	  [structural	  change	  towards	  a	  Kantian	  culture]	  to	  occur	  is	  one	  
efficient	  cause	  combined	  with	  self-­‐restraint.”60	  Hence,	  we	  can	  point	  out	   that	   the	  shift	   towards	  
an	   identity	  of	  other-­‐help	  which	   is	  central	   to	  bringing	  about	  a	  Kantian	   international	  culture	  has	  
basically	  two	  sources	  in	  Wendt’s	  account.	  First,	  repeated	  pro-­‐social	  behaviour	  or	  behaviour	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Ibid.,	  	  280-­‐282.	  
55	  Ibid.,	  	  279.	  
56	  Ibid.,	  	  341.	  
57	  However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  note	   that	  Wendt	  argues	   that	  when	  a	   Lockean	   international	   culture	   is	   strongly	  
internalised,	  the	  sense	  of	  self	  already	  includes	  a	  sense	  the	  group	  of	  states	  that	  the	  self	  is	  a	  member	  of.	  In	  this	  
sense,	  a	  Lockean	  international	  culture	  paves	  the	  way	  for	  a	  Kantian	  one	  –	  albeit	  only	   in	  “the	  passive	  sense	  of	  
self-­‐restraint”.	   Ibid.,	   	   293.	   Yet,	   a	   Kantian	   culture	   in	   Wendt’s	   sense	   has	   to	   go	   beyond	   self-­‐restraint	   and	   an	  
instrumentally	  treatment	  of	  the	  other	  as	  a	  friend.	  Compare	  ibid.,	  	  305.	  
58	  Ibid.,	  	  342.	  
59	  Ibid.,	  	  343.	  
60	  Ibid.,	  	  343-­‐344.	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facilitates	   pro-­‐social	   attitudes	   leads	   to	   Kantian	   identities.	   Second,	   facilitation	   via	   systemic	  
characteristics,	   namely	   interdependence,	   common	   fate	   and	   homogeneity,	   is	   also	   important.	  
These	   conditions	   can	   be	   seen	   to	   nudge	   a	   state	   towards	   Kantian	   identities	   and	   ultimately	   can	  
bring	  about	  a	  Kantian	  international	  culture.	  	  
My	  main	  point	  of	  contention	  here	  is	  that	  after	  the	  First	  Encounter,	  ideas	  seem	  to	  play	  little	  or	  no	  
role	   in	   bringing	   about	   systemic	   change.	   Further,	   the	   international	   culture	   of	   friendship	   that	  
Wendt	  describes,	  pointing	  out	  his	  alignment	  with	  neofunctionalist	  scholars	  such	  as	  Karl	  Deutsch	  
and	  Ernst	  Haas,	   is	  based	  on	  a	  very	   thin	  conception	  of	   friendship,	  based	  more	  on	   instrumental	  
behaviour	   and	   systemic	   factors	   than	   an	   agreement	   about	   corresponding	   values	   and	   ideas	   of	  
friendship.61	  As	   pointed	   out	   earlier,	   Wendt	   emphasises	   that	   identity	   change	   and	   structural	  
change	   are	   closely	   intertwined.	  However,	   how	   identities	   are	   re-­‐conceptualised	   as	   part	   of	   this	  
process	   of	   moving	   towards	   a	   Kantian	   culture	   remains	   unclear.	   Most	   importantly,	   in	  Wendt’s	  
account,	   it	   remains	   unclear	   how,	   after	   a	   push	   towards	   more	   Kantian	   behaviour,	   ideas	   of	  
friendship	  come	  about.	  
With	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	   I	  am	  able	  to	  point	  to	  the	  “domestic”	  source	  of	  the	  ideas	  
that	   accompany	   structural	   change	  at	   the	   international	   level.62	  This	   has	   two	   consequences.	  On	  
the	   one	   hand,	   I	   argue	   that	   while	   instrumental	   friendship	   might	   arise	   based	   on	   systemic	  
“nudging”,	   an	   internalisation	   of	   corresponding	   norms	   can	   only	   go	   hand	   in	   hand	   in	   with	   a	  
negotiation	  between	  various	  culturally	  specific	  concepts.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   I	  am	  also	  able	   to	  
question	  the	  general	  applicability	  of	  Wendt’s	  master	  variables.	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  showed	  
how	   friendship	   and	   enmity	   can	   only	   be	   understood	   within	   a	   specific	   cultural	   context.	   I	   also	  
criticised	   Wendt	   for	   presenting	   friendship,	   at	   least	   when	   it	   refers	   to	   deeper	   levels	   of	  
internalisation	  and	  goes	  beyond	  an	  instrumental	  treatment,	  as	  a	  neutral	  concept.	  I	  was	  able	  to	  
question	   the	   assumption	   that	   alikeness,	   Wendt’s	   heterogeneity	   master	   variable,	   breeds	  
friendship.	   Depending	   on	   the	   specific	   conceptualisation	   of	   friendship,	   alikeness	   might	   not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  For	  Wendt's	  reference	  to	  these	  scholars	  compare	  ibid.,	  	  343.	  
62	  Wendt	   speculates	  about	   such	  a	   ’domestic’	   source	  only	  with	   regard	   to	  his	   fourth	  master	  variable	  when	  he	  
argues	  that	  democratic	  states	  might	  be	  more	  inclined	  to	  show	  self-­‐restraint.	  He	  argues	  that	  “[f]or	  reasons	  of	  
cognitive	  consistency,	  habit,	  and/	  or	  societal	  pressure,	  and	  if	  the	  international	  environment	  permits,	  states	  will	  
tend	   to	   externalise	   or	   transpose	   domestic	   ways	   of	   doing	   things	   –	   resolving	   conflict,	   organising	   economic	  
relationships,	   observing	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   and	   so	   on	   –	   in	   their	   foreign	   policy	   behavior.”	   Ibid.,	   	   361.	   In	   the	  
introduction	   to	  Social	   Theory	   he	  explicitly	   states	   that	  domestic	   factors	   also	   influence	   state	   identities	  heavily	  
but	  adds	  that	  this	  aspect	  is	  not	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  book.	  Ibid.,	  	  11.	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necessarily	  play	  a	   role.	  While	  many	  historic	  examples	   seem	  to	   suggest	   that	   the	   recognition	  of	  
alikeness	  in	  some	  respects	  has	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  transformation	  towards	  peaceful	  
relations	   between	   states,	   this	   does	   not	   rule	   out	   the	   assumption	   that	   friendship	   might	   be	  
possible	  in	  the	  face	  of	  heterogeneity.63	  	  
The	  argument	  presented	  so	  far	  can	  be	  illustrated	  by	  drawing	  on	  Democratic	  Peace	  Theory	  as	  a	  
point	  of	  comparison.	  Wendt’s	  theory	  of	  systemic	  change	  is	  in	  line	  with	  and	  builds	  on	  Democratic	  
Peace	  Theory	  and	  Kant’s	  arguments	  regarding	  the	  establishment	  of	  perpetual	  peace.	  Discussing	  
his	  four	  master	  variables,	  Wendt	  makes	  this	  explicit	  and	  argues	  that	  “much	  of	  Kant's	  reasoning	  
about	  why	  republicanism	  would	  lead	  to	  ‘perpetual	  peace’	  is	  replicated,	  but	  he	  leaves	  the	  social	  
theory	  underlying	  his	  argument	  implicit.”64	  	  
Wendt	   agrees	   that,	   given	   their	   internal	   structure	   of	   decision-­‐making,	   democratic	   states	   are	  
more	  likely	  to	  show	  self-­‐restraint.65	  First,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  though	  that	  Kant’s	  Perpetual	  Peace	  is	  
not	  built	  on	   friendship	  among	  states	   in	   the	  sense	  that	  Wendt	  employs	   the	  term	  and	  does	  not	  
require	  them	  to	  be	  “friends”,	  understood	  as	  a	  concern	  for	  the	  other	  being	  part	  of	  a	  definition	  of	  
the	  self.	  For	  Kant	  peace	  follows	  from	  the	  logic	  of	  Republican	  government.	  In	  the	  first	  definitive	  
article	  of	  Toward	  Perpetual	  Peace	  he	  argues	  that	  	  
[t]he	   republican	   constitution	   also	   offers	   the	   prospect	   of	   the	   desired	  
consequences,	   namely,	   perpetual	   peace	   …	   if	   the	   agreement	   of	   the	  
citizens	   is	   required	   to	   decide	  whether	   or	   not	   one	  ought	   to	  wage	  war,	  
then	   noting	   is	   more	   natural	   than	   they	   would	   consider	   very	   carefully	  
whether	  to	  enter	  such	  a	  terrible	  game,	  since	  they	  would	  have	  to	  resolve	  
to	  bring	  the	  hardship	  of	  war	  upon	  themselves.66	  	  
Second,	   Democratic	   Peace	   Theory	   builds	   on	   a	   wealth	   of	   empirical	   evidence	   that	   shows	   that	  
democratic	  states	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  fight	  each	  other.67	  However,	  both	  Democratic	  Peace	  Theory	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  The	   argument	   that	   alikeness	   is	   important	   for	   peaceful	   relations	   can	   for	   example	   be	   found	   in	   Bruce	   M.	  
Russett,	   Grasping	   the	   Democratic	   Peace:	   Principles	   for	   a	   Post-­‐Cold	   War	   World	   (Princeton,	   NJ:	   Princeton	  
University	  Press,	  1993),	  8.	  
64	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  343.	  
65	  Ibid.,	  	  344	  and	  364.	  	  
66	  Immanuel	   Kant,	   'Toward	   Perpetual	   Peace:	   A	   Philosophical	   Sketch',	   in	   Toward	   Perpetual	   Peace	   and	   Other	  
Writings	  on	  Politics,	  Peace,	  and	  History,	  ed.	  Pauline	  Kleingeld	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2006	  [1795]),	  
75.	  
67	  Russett,	  Grasping	  the	  Democratic	  Peace:	  Principles	  for	  a	  Post-­‐Cold	  War	  World.	  Obviously,	  much	  depends	  on	  
the	  definition	  and	  operationalisation	  of	  the	  key	  terms,	  democracy	  and	  war.	  Also,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  that	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and	   Kant’s	   argument	   amount	   to	   what	   can	   be	   called	   a	   negative	   peace,	   understood	   as	   the	  
absence	  of	  war.	  Identification	  with	  the	  other	  in	  Wendt’s	  sense	  of	  friendship	  among	  states	  is	  not	  
required.	   By	   introducing	   the	   importance	   of	   identity	   and	   interest	   formation	   and	   symbolic	  
interactions,	   Wendt	   provides	   a	   sophisticated	   social	   theory	   account	   of	   systemic	   interactions.	  
However,	   while	   Wendt	   can	   point	   to	   symbolic	   interactions	   as	   the	   source	   of	   an	   international	  
culture,	   he	   can	   explain	   cultural	   change	   towards	   a	   Kantian	   culture	   only	   through	   systemic	  
“nudging”	   and	   self-­‐restraint.	   Neither	   Democratic	   Peace	   Theory	   nor	   Kant’s	   perpetual	   peace	   is	  
interested	   in	   this	  kind	  of	   transformation	  towards	  non-­‐instrumental	   friendship	  and	  a	  system	  of	  
other-­‐help.	  However,	  Wendt’s	  account	  with	  its	  social	  theory	  underpinnings	  needs	  to	  be.	  I	  argue	  
that	   the	   look	   towards	   culturally	   specific	   notions	   of	   self	   and	   emotions	   is	   indispensible	   to	  
understand	  non-­‐instrumental	  friendship	  and	  other-­‐help.	  Indeed,	  the	  normative	  interpretation	  of	  
Democratic	   Peace	   Theory	   does	   just	   that.	   The	   argument	   here	   is	   that	   shared	   values	   and	   a	  
commitment	   to	   norms	   of	   peaceful	   conflict	   resolution	   explain	   the	   absence	   of	   war	   between	  
democracies.68	  However,	  because	  agency	   is	   located	  with	  states	   in	  Wendt’s	  account,	  he	  cannot	  
take	   this	   point	   further.	   In	   this	   context,	   a	   look	   towards	   culturally	   specific	   notions	   of	   self	   and	  
emotions	   is	   crucial	   for	   three	   reasons:	   pin-­‐pointing	   potential	   sources	   of	   conflict	   and	  
misunderstanding,	   locating	   specific	   needs	   such	   as	   the	   need	   for	   recognition	   and	   taking	   these	  
needs	   into	  account,	   and	  building	  upon	   these	  notions	   to	  work	   towards	   a	  Kantian	   international	  
culture.	  	  
In	  conclusion,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  account	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  does	  
not	   challenge	   Wendt’s	   basic	   premises,	   symbolic	   interactions,	   and	   his	   four	   constraints	   on	  
systemic	  change	  as	  outlined.	  The	  big	  difference	  is,	  of	  course,	  the	  location	  of	  agency.	  However,	  
based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  as	  a	  metaphor	  and	  second-­‐order	  person,	  the	  basic	  logic	  
remains	  in	  place.	  Whether	  Wendt’s	  four	  master	  variables	  ‒	  in	  other	  words	  systemic	  factors	  and	  
one	   characteristic	   of	   his	   state	   actors	   ‒	   or	   indeed	   culturally	   specific	   ideas	   of	   self	   and	   emotion	  
matter	   more	   for	   bringing	   about	   systemic	   change	   is	   an	   empirical	   question	   that	   cannot	   be	  
answered	  in	  the	  abstract.	  However,	  with	  regard	  to	  systemic	  changes,	  as	  we	  have	  already	  seen,	  I	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
the	   empirical	   evidence,	   within	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   studies	   undertake,	   unmitakably	   points	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  
democracies	  do	  not	  fight	  each	  other.	  Yet,	  they	  cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	  generally	  more	  peaceful	  in	  their	  relations	  
with	  other	  states.	  	  
68	  Miriam	   F.	   Elman,	   'The	   Need	   for	   a	   Qualitative	   Test	   of	   Democratic	   Peace	   Theory',	   in	   Paths	   to	   Peace:	   Is	  
Democracy	  the	  Answer?,	  ed.	  Miriam	  F.	  Elman	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  The	  MIT	  Press,	  1997),	  11-­‐12.	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argue	  that	  cultural	  specific	  conceptions	  of	  self	  and	  emotions	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  
state	  actors’	  identities.	  Wendt	  describes	  incentives	  to	  move	  from	  a	  Lockean	  culture	  to	  a	  Kantian	  
one.	  But	  he	  does	  not	  give	  a	  source	  for	  changed	  conceptions	  that	  would	  transform	  rival	  identities	  
to	  friend	  identities.	  Is	   it	  enough	  to	  have	  self-­‐restraint	  and	  encounter	  an	  international	  structure	  
that	  is	  conducive	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  collective	  identities?	  I	  argue	  that	  is	  it	  not	  and	  leads,	  at	  best,	  
to	  a	  negative	  peace.	  While	  helpful	   in	  understanding	  democratic	  peace,	  we	  are	   still	  missing	  an	  
important	  dimension	  of	  the	  potential	  of	  international	  structural	  transformation.	  
For	  the	  study	  of	  IR	  and	  its	  transformation,	  this	  calls	  for	  a	  focus	  on	  three	  aspects:	  the	  structure	  of	  
the	   state	   systems,	   the	   culturally	   specific	   ideas	   about	   self	   and	   emotions,	   and	   their	   potential	  
interplay.	  The	  first	  aspect	  pays	  respect	  to	  Wendt’s	  master	  variables	  while	  the	  third	  aspect	  pays	  
tribute	   to	   Wendt’s	   four	   constraints	   on	   systemic	   change.	   However,	   I	   argue	   that,	   in	   addition,	  
understanding	   the	   concepts	   that	   form	   the	   basis	   of	   narratives	   about	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐
person	   is	  crucial.	  The	  next	  two	  sections	  will	  explore	  this	  point	  further	  by	   looking	  specifically	  at	  
the	  potential	  role	  of	  emotions	  and	  concepts	  of	  self	  in	  bringing	  about	  systemic	  change.	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Bringing	  emotions	  in	  to	  understand	  “irrational”	  behaviour	  
and	  the	  potential	  for	  systemic	  change	  
In	   this	   section	   I	   argue	   that	   culturally	   specific	   concepts	   of	   emotions	   play	   an	   important	   role	   as	  
potential	   sources	   for	   international	   systemic	   change	   because	   they	   point	   to	   perceptions	   and	  
behaviour	   that	   seem	  “irrational”	   from	  the	  perspective	  of	   the	   international	   system.	  This	  opens	  
up	   an	   avenue	   to	   act	   in	   discord	   with	   systemic	   rules	   and	   if	   such	   behaviour	   reaches	   a	   certain	  
tipping	  point,	  international	  systemic	  cultures	  can	  change.	  
In	   the	   previous	   section,	   I	   argued	   that	   states	   enter	   what	   Wendt,	   in	   a	   thought	   experiment	  
presented	   in	   Social	   Theory,	   calls	   the	   First	   Encounter	   with	   a	   certain	   “baggage”.	   In	   contrast	   to	  
Wendt,	   the	   baggage	   suggested	   in	   connection	   with	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   takes	   the	  
form	  of	  established	  conceptions	  about	  self	  and	  emotions	  that	  are	  to	  be	  located	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
“domestic”	  cultures.	  Hence,	  I	  argue	  that	  studying	  culturally	  specific	  notions	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  
be	  a	  person	  and	   the	  paradigm	  scenarios	  associated	  with	  emotion-­‐concepts	   is	  of	   relevance	   for	  
understanding	   the	   relations	   between	   states.	   In	   Chapter	   6,	   I	   highlighted	   the	   added	   value	   of	  
“bringing	   emotions	   in”.	   In	   this	   section,	   having	   outlined	   my	   specific	   position	   in	   the	   agent-­‐
structure	  debate	  and	  my	  alternative	  account	  of	  processes	  of	  systemic	  change	  above,	  I	  focus	  on	  
the	   potential	   role	   played	   by	   emotions	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   and	  
systemic	  change.	  	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	   this	   thesis	  aligns	   itself	  with	   the	  so-­‐called	  emotional	   turn	   in	   the	  discipline.	   In	  
this	  sense,	  one	  contribution	  of	   the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	  an	  added	  focus	  on	  emotions	  
and	   a	   more	   explicit	   theorisation	   of	   the	   role	   of	   emotions	   in	   shaping	   social	   encounters	   and	  
judgements	  of	  appropriateness.	   In	   this	  sense,	  Wendt’s	   focus	  on	   identity	  and	   interests	   is	   taken	  
further	  by	  adding	  an	  explicit	  account	  of	  emotions.	  By	  locating	  emotions	  thoroughly	  and	  almost	  
exclusively	   in	   the	   social	   realm,	   as	   it	   is	   done	   in	   this	   thesis	   by	   drawing	   on	   constructionist	  
psychology,	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   emotions	   are	   based	   on	   shared	   ideas	   and	   are	   culturally	   specific.	  
Emotions	  are	  learned	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  paradigm	  scenarios	  and	  can	  be	  refined	  over	  time.69	  Some	  
cultures	  repress	  some	  emotions	  while	  cultivating	  others.	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  a	  culturally	  specific	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Sousa,	  The	  Rationality	  of	  Emotion,	  184.	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repertoire	  of	   emotions	   and	   related	   appropriate	  behaviour.70	  For	   example,	   as	  we	  have	   seen	   in	  
Chapter	  5,	  using	  anger	  to	  re-­‐address	  the	  terms	  of	  a	  relationship	  is	  common	  practice	  in	  Western	  
cultures	  while	  considered	  inappropriate	  in	  others.71	  With	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐
as-­‐person,	  I	  suggest	  an	  avenue	  to	  explain	  how	  emotions	  become	  relevant	  for	  the	  state	  in	  IR.	  In	  
the	   previous	   chapter,	   I	   have	   shown	   how	   this	   demarcates	  my	   account	   from	  Wendt’s	   remarks	  
regarding	  state	  emotions	  and	  avoids	  certain	  aspects,	  such	  as	  the	  question	  of	  the	  location	  of	  the	  
experience	   of	   the	   emotion,	   that	   have	   been	   identified	   as	   problematic	   in	   his	   work.	   I	   have	   also	  
brought	   my	   suggestions	   regarding	   the	   role	   of	   emotions	   into	   debate	   with	   a	   number	   of	   IR	  
scholars,	   including	   Arnold	  Wolfers,	   Richard	   Ned	   Lebow,	   Janice	   Stein,	   and	   Todd	   H.	   Hall.	  Most	  
importantly,	  the	  account	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  allows	  me	  to	  reject	  individualism	  on	  
the	   one	   hand	   and,	   on	   the	   other,	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐group	   and	   related	   attempts	   of	  
making	   social	   psychology	   applicable	   to	   understanding	   the	   relations	   between	   states.	   It	   also	  
allows	  me	  to	  question	  the	  strict	  dividing	  line	  between	  rationality	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  emotions	  
on	   the	   other.	   Based	   on	   these	   observations	   and	   my	   position	   in	   the	   agent	   structure-­‐debate	  
introduced	   in	   the	   previous	   two	   sections,	   I	   am	   now	   able	   to	   add	   an	   account	   of	   “irrational”	  
perceptions	  and	  behaviour	  and,	  resulting	  from	  that,	  highlight	  potential	  for	  systemic	  change.	  	  
One	   of	   the	   key	   driving	   forces	   of	   the	   emotional	   turn	   in	   the	   discipline	   of	   IR	   is	   to	   question	   and	  
overcome	   the	   separation	   between	   rationality	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   emotions	   on	   the	   other.72	  
This	   point	   can	   be	   found	   in	   Jonathan	  Mercer’s	  work,	   for	   example,	  who	   argues	   that	   an	   explicit	  
acknowledgement	   of	   emotions	   leads	   to	   better	   explanations.73	  It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	  
rationality	  and	  “irrationality”	  are	  context-­‐specific	  labels	  that	  always	  carry	  normative	  weight	  and	  
are	  always	  used	  from	  a	  certain	  perspective.	  To	  speak	  about	  rationality	  as	  such	  is	  unhelpful,	  yet	  it	  
is	  easy	  to	  slip	  into	  this	  kind	  of	  talk.74	  However,	  more	  precisely,	  it	  is	  the	  rational	  actor	  assumption	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Harré,	  Cognitive	  Science:	  A	  Philosophical	  Introduction,	  101.	  
71	  Averill,	  Anger	  and	  Aggression:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Emotion.	  Averill,	  'The	  Acquisition	  of	  Emotions	  During	  Adulthood'.	  
72	  Crawford,	  'The	  Passion	  of	  World	  Politics:	  Propositions	  on	  Emotion	  and	  Emotional	  Relationships',	  119.	  
73	  Mercer,	  'Rationality	  and	  Psychology	  in	  International	  Politics'.	  Compare	  also	  Crawford,	  'The	  Passion	  of	  World	  
Politics:	  Propositions	  on	  Emotion	  and	  Emotional	  Relationships'.	  
74	  Robert	  O.	  Keohane	  for	  example	  can	  be	  found	  arguing	  that	  "much	  of	  my	  own	  work	  has	  deliberately	  adopted	  
Realist	  assumptions	  of	  egoism,	  as	  well	  as	  rationality."	  Robert	  O.	  Keohane,	  'Empathy	  and	  International	  
Regimes',	  in	  Beyond	  Self-­‐Interest,	  ed.	  Jane	  J.	  Mansbridge	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1990),	  227.	  As	  
quoted	  in	  Crawford,	  'The	  Passion	  of	  World	  Politics:	  Propositions	  on	  Emotion	  and	  Emotional	  Relationships',	  117,	  
fn	  4.	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that	   scholars	  of	   the	  emotional	   turn	   take	   issue	  with.75	  It	   holds	   that	   actors	  engage	   in	  purposive	  
action,	   have	   consistent	   preferences,	   and	   are	   utility	   maximisers. 76  The	   important	   work	   of	  
scholars	   of	   the	   emotional	   turn	   is	   to	   point	   to	   alternative	   sources	   of	   decision-­‐making	   and	  
behaviour.	  
What	   I	   would	   like	   to	   add	   here	   is	   another	   perspective	   on	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   debate	  
between	   rationality	   and	   emotions.	   I	   maintain	   that	   acting	   rationally	   can	   only	   be	   understood	  
when	   it	   is	   put	   in	   the	   context	   of	   certain	   structural	   conditions,	   including	   expressed	   norms	   and	  
rules	   that	   define	   what	   is	   rational.	   The	   three	   cultures	   of	   anarchy	   outlined	   by	  Wendt	   are	   well	  
suited	   to	   illustrate	   this	   point.	   What	   seems	   like	   rational	   behaviour	   in	   a	   Lockean	   or	   Kantian	  
international	   system	   is	   “irrational”	   in	   a	   Hobbesian	   culture.	   It	   is	   the	   system	   and	   its	   rules	   that	  
determine	  what	  is	  deemed	  rational.	  Therefore,	  “irrational”	  behaviour	  describes	  actions	  that	  are	  
in	  discord	  with	  systemic	  constraints.	  We	  have	  seen	   that	  such	  “irrational”	  behaviour	   is	  entirely	  
possible,	  though	  it	  will	  incur	  a	  punishment	  or	  disadvantage.	  Wendt,	  for	  example,	  points	  out	  that	  
in	   a	   Lockean	   international	   culture,	   characterised	   by	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   “irrational”	   behaviour	   is	  
possible	   because	   the	   deviation	   does	   not	   have	   serious	   consequences.	   In	   contrast,	   “irrational”	  
behaviour	   in	   a	   Hobbesian	   world	   is	   a	   question	   of	   survival	   and	   can	   be	   fatal.77	  If	   “irrational”	  
behavior	   is	   indeed	   possible	   in	   a	   Lockean	   system,	   exploring	   the	   reasons	   and	   sources	   for	   such	  
behavior	  becomes	  important.	  IR	  scholarship	  that	  is	  wedded	  to	  the	  rational	  actor	  assumption	  will	  
typically	  point	  to	  misperceptions,	  incomplete	  information,	  or	  the	  cognitive	  limits	  of	  reasoning.	  In	  
contrast,	   scholars	   of	   the	   emotional	   turn	   point	   to	   alternatives.	   The	   alternative	   source	   for	  
“irrationality”	   of	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   to	   be	   found	   in	   the	   culturally	   specific	  
emotions	   and	   associated	   paradigm	   scenarios.	   This	   is	   where	   the	   “baggage”	   of	   the	   domestic	  
culture	  that	  is	  brought	  to	  symbolic	  interactionist	  encounters	  becomes	  crucial.	  Because	  the	  state	  
is	  only	  ever	  a	  second-­‐order	  person	  that	  depends	  on	  being	  sustained	  by	  narratives	  that	  draw	  on	  
the	   conventions	   of	   person-­‐oriented	  discourses,	   perceptions,	   and	   reasoning	  have	   two	   sources:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Neta	  Crawford	  for	  example	  points	  out	  that	  “[e]motion	  virtually	  dropped	  from	  the	  radar	  screen	  of	  
international	  relations	  theorists	  in	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century	  when	  the	  rational	  actor	  paradigm	  became	  
dominant.”	  Crawford,	  'The	  Passion	  of	  World	  Politics:	  Propositions	  on	  Emotion	  and	  Emotional	  Relationships',	  
122.	  
76	  These	   three	   points	   make	   up	   the	   rationality	   assumptions	   of	   Rational	   Choice	   Theory.	   Compare	   Paul	   K.	  
MacDonald,	   'Useful	  Fiction	  of	  Miracle	  Maker:	  The	  Competing	  Epistemological	  Foundations	  of	  Rational	  Choice	  
Theory',	  The	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review	  97,	  4	  (2003),	  552.	  
77	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  323.	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the	  international	  system	  and	  its	  culture	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  “domestic”	  culture	  on	  the	  other.	  
To	  which	  side	  the	  balance	  tilts	  is	  an	  empirical	  question.	  However,	  since	  a	  Lockean	  culture	  allows	  
deviation	   from	   systemic	   constraints	   without	   suffering	   severe	   punishment,	   perceptions	   and	  
behaviour	  that	  are	  “irrational”	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  state	  system	  have	  a	  greater	  chance	  
of	  being	  relevant	  for	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  
Building	  on	  this,	  the	  suggestion	  for	  IR	  scholarship	  is	  clear.	  Studying	  culturally	  specific	  notions	  of	  
self	   and	   emotions	   is	   indispensible	   for	   understanding	   the	   kind	   of	   state	   behaviour	   that	   is	  most	  
interesting	  –	  behaviour	  that	  seems	  “irrational”	  and	  behaviour	  that	  ultimately	  might	  be	  a	  source	  
of	   systemic	   change.	   However,	   in	   contrast	   to	   those	   scholars	   who	   either	   focus	   on	   individual	  
decisions-­‐makers	  or	  use	  aspects	  of	  social	   identity	  theory	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐group	  
hypothesis,	  the	  suggestion	  here	  is	  to	  study	  the	  notion	  of	  self	  and	  emotions	  as	  they	  are	  typically	  
held	   in	   a	   specific	   culture.	   Based	   on	  Wittgenstinian	   commitments	   and	   Harré’s	   constructionist	  
psychology,	   this	   entails	   studying	   the	   expressions	   of	   emotions	   on	   the	   linguistic	   level	   and	   the	  
kinds	  of	  paradigm	  scenarios	  that	  are	  fundamental	  to	  specific	  emotion	  concepts.	  These	  provide	  
alternative	   sources	   of	   reasoning	   to	   the	   rationality	   of	   the	   international	   system	   by	   providing	   a	  
different	  set	  of	  self-­‐definitions	  and	  preferences.	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Processes	  of	  radical	  change:	  re-­‐thinking	  persons,	  re-­‐thinking	  
states	  
In	   this	   final	   section,	   I	   would	   like	   to	   make	   a	   more	   radical	   point	   regarding	   the	   idea	   of	   the	  
constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  I	  differ	  fundamentally	  from	  Wendt	  in	  that	  I	  argue	  
that	   it	   is	  not	  “anarchy	  is	  what	  states	  make	  of	   it” but	  “anarchy	  is	  what	  we	  make	  of	   it.”78 Simply	  
put,	   if	   the	  concept	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  fundamentally	  depends	  on	  how	  we	  see	  ourselves	  as	  
persons,	  a	  re-­‐thinking	  of	  person-­‐oriented	  concepts	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  re-­‐thinking	  of	  states	  and	  most	  
importantly	   the	   system	  of	   states.	  Building	  on	   the	  observations	  made	   in	   the	  previous	   sections,	  
here	   I	   take	   the	   suggested	   potential	   for	   systemic	   transformations	   further	   by	   focusing	   at	   the	  
concept	  of	  the	  self.	  The	  suggestion,	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  is	  that	  
a	   conception	   of	   the	   self	   that	   is	   based	   on	   a	   different	   balance	   between	   the	   individual	   and	   the	  
group	  and	  that	  draws	  less	  firm	  boundaries	  between	  self	  and	  other,	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  re-­‐thinking	  of	  	  
IR.	  	  
To	  begin,	  five	  points	  of	  caution	  need	  to	  be	  expressed	  that	  highlight	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  suggestions	  
made	   in	   the	   following	  and	  pay	   respect	   to	   the	  position	   that	   it	   is	  not	  “ideas	  all	   the	  way	  down”.	  
First,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   a	   change	   in	   constitutive	   metaphors,	   which	   is	   essentially	   what	   I	   am	  
suggesting	   here	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   does	   not	   occur	   often	   and	   cannot	   be	  
engineered	  or	  planned.79	  Such	  a	  shift	   is	  a	  social	  process	   in	  which	  certain	  key	   individuals	  play	  a	  
more	  important	  role	  than	  others.	  I	  do	  not	  offer	  a	  theorisation	  of	  such	  processes	  here.	  Rather,	  I	  
wish	  to	  point	  out	  that	  such	  processes	  are	  possible,	  as	  highlighted	  for	  instance	  by	  the	  discussion	  
in	   Chapter	   1	   regarding	   the	   history	   of	   relations	   between	   concepts	   of	   persons	   and	   concepts	   of	  
states.	  It	  is	  this	  possibility	  that	  has	  important	  consequences	  for	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  
Secondly,	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   modern	   ideas	   of	   states	   and	   modern	   ideas	   of	   persons	   grew	   up	  
together.80	  As	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  the	  state	  as	  an	  institution	  of	  IR	  –	  especially	  the	  principles	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Wendt,	  'Anarchy	  Is	  What	  States	  Make	  of	  It:	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  Power	  Politics'.	  
79	  In	  this	  instance,	  a	  change	  in	  (root)	  metaphor	  can	  be	  likened	  to	  Kuhnian	  paradigm	  shifts.	  For	  an	  explicit	  link	  
between	  Pepper’s	   root	  metaphors	   and	  Kuhn’s	   paradigm	   shifts	   compare	  Eric	   C.	   Scheffield,	   'Root	  Metaphors,	  
Paradigm	   Shifts,	   and	   Democratically	   Shared	   Values:	   Community	   Service-­‐Learning	   as	   a	   Bridge-­‐Building	  
Endeavour',	   Philosophical	   Studies	   in	   Education	   38	   (2007).	   Thomas	   S.	   Kuhn,	   The	   Structure	   of	   Scientific	  
Revolutions	   (Chicago:	   Chicago	   University	   Press,	   1970).	   Stephen	   C.	   Pepper,	   World	   Hypotheses:	   A	   Study	   in	  
Evidence	  (Berkeley.	  CA:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1942).	  
80	  Skinner,	  Visions	  of	  Politics.	  Volume	  2.	  Renaissance	  Virtues.	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external	   sovereignty	   and	   territorial	   integrity	   and	   the	   system	   of	   diplomatic	   representation	   –	  
facilitates	  a	   certain	   reading	  of	   the	   state	   that,	   in	   turn,	   facilitates	   the	  metaphor	  of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
person.	   However,	   this	   also	  means	   that	   any	   fundamental	   re-­‐thinking	   of	   states	   has	   to	   struggle	  
with	   institutional	   inertia	   and	   the	   durability	   of	   established	   practices.	   Third,	   this	   suggestion	   of	  
possibilities	   for	   change	   implies	   a	   one-­‐directional	   relationship	   between	   the	   two	   concepts.	   It	  
implies	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  person	  shapes	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  in	   important	  
ways.	   However,	   as	   outlined	   in	   detail	   in	   Chapter	   3,	   a	   metaphorical	   relationship	   is	   a	   two-­‐way	  
process	  between	  concepts.	  The	  process	  of	  structural	  mapping	  outlined	   in	  Chapter	  6	   illustrates	  
this	   further.	   Hence,	   it	   is	   worth	   issuing	   a	   reminder	   that	   a	   metaphorical	   process	   is	   not	   one	  
directional.	   Fourth,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   keep	   in	   mind	   that	   the	   potential	   for	   change	   that	   I	   am	  
suggesting	  here	  only	  touches	  upon	  those	  aspects	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐structure	  that	  are	  reflected	  in	  
the	  metaphor.	  In	  other	  words,	  interpretations	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  external	  sovereignty,	  territorial	  
integrity,	  and	  processes	  of	  diplomatic	  representation	  are	  open	  to	  re-­‐adjustments	  through	  a	  re-­‐
thinking	  of	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  These	  re-­‐adjustments	  might	  have	  far-­‐reaching	  
consequences	   for	   the	   international	   system.	   However,	   the	   potential	   for	   change	   through	  
metaphor	  change	  clearly	  meets	  its	  limits	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  state	  capabilities	  and	  
the	  power	  inequalities	  inherent	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  not	  ideas	  “all	  the	  
way	  down”.	  	  
Fifth,	   there	   is	   another	   limit	   to	   possibilities	   for	   construction	   of	   the	   person	   and	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐
person	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  acknowledged.	  As	  mentioned,	  the	  basic	  premise	  behind	  this	  section	  is	  
that	  a	  re-­‐thinking	  of	  how	  we	  understand	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  person,	  especially	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  
relation	  between	  self	  and	  other	  and	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  self,	  can	  lead	  to	  re-­‐thinking	  the	  state	  
and	   its	   relations	   to	   other	   states.	   However,	   keeping	   with	   the	   perspective	   of	   constructionist	  
psychology,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  our	  ability	  to	  develop	  concepts	  is	  bound	  up	  with	  
our	  ability	  to	  form	  a	  symbolic	  system	  that,	   in	  turn,	   is	   limited	  by	  human	  ethology.	  As	  argued	  in	  
Chapter	  5,	  this	  circumscribes	  what	  can	  be	  imagined	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  it	  circumscribes	  how	  
we	   can	  make	   sense	  of	   ourselves	   as	   persons.81	  Yet,	  while	   the	   symbolic	   system,	  bound	  up	  with	  
human	  ethology,	   limits	  possibilities	  for	  social	  construction,	  this	  still	   leaves	  ample	  possibility	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  See	  Harré	  and	  Gillett,	  The	  Discursive	  Mind,	  146.	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variations	  and	  opens	  up	  opportunities	  for	  exploring	  how	  things	  could	  be	  otherwise.82	  However,	  
constructionist	   psychology	   is	   also	   helpful	   in	   pointing	   out	   how	   person-­‐related	   discourse	   and	  
hence	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   person	   is	   bound	   up	  with	   a	   particular	   culture	   and	   a	   particular	   time.	  
Constructionist	  psychologists	  typically	   look	  to	  different	  cultures	  and	  historical	  periods	  to	  argue	  
that	   concepts	   of	   persons	   and	   emotions	   are	   not	   given	   but	   made	   and	   that	   nurture	   takes	  
precedent	  over	  nature.	   In	  the	  writings	  of	   these	  scholars,	  examples	   from	  non-­‐Western	  cultures	  
are	  used	  to	   illustrate	  that	  certain	  emotions	  are	  either	  not	  universally	  shared	  or	  take	  on	  a	  very	  
different	  shape	  and	  are	  associated	  with	  a	  different	  set	  of	  socially	  appropriate	  behaviour	  across	  
cultures.83	  The	   same	   can	   be	   said	   for	   concepts	   of	   persons.	   This	   is	   where	   space	   for	   potential	  
change,	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  human	  ability	  to	  develop	  symbolic	  systems,	  opens	  up.	  	  
Having	   added	   these	   five	   points	   of	   caution,	   suggestions	   towards	   potentially	   re-­‐thinking	   the	  
concept	  of	  the	  person	  with	   implications	  for	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  can	  now	  be	  made	  Throughout	  
Chapter	  5,	  I	  have	  drawn	  on	  Wittgenstinian	  insights,	  as	  utilised	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  Harré,	  to	  argue	  
against	   some	   of	   the	   prevalent	   ideas	   regarding	   persons	   and	   especially	   states-­‐as-­‐persons	   in	   IR.	  
The	   Cartesian	  world-­‐view	   of	  mind-­‐body-­‐dualism	   and	   the	   entativity-­‐account	   of	   the	  mind	   have	  
been	  challenged.	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  many	  ideas	  fundamental	  to	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐
as-­‐person	   are	   inevitably	   bound	   up	   with	   Western	   individualism.	   The	   idea	   of	   the	   person	  
commonly	  held,	  and	  reflected	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  is	  in	  a	  lot	  of	  ways	  a	  Western	  idea	  
with	   ancient	   Greek	   origins	   that	   is	   strongly	   based	   on	   a	   Judeo-­‐Christian	   perspective.84	  Yet,	   it	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  This	  exploration	  of	  “how	  things	  could	  be	  otherwise”,	  is	  outlined	  by	  Ian	  Hacking	  as	  one	  of	  the	  central	  aims	  of	  
constructivist	  scholarship.	  Hacking,	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  What?	  ,	  6.	  	  
83	  Harré	  often	  refers	  to	  the	  work	  of	  anthropologist	  Catherine	  Lutz	  and	  her	  work	  on	  the	  emotions	  of	  the	  Ifaluk.	  
Harré	  and	  Gillett,	  The	  Discursive	  Mind,	  146.	  Harré,	   'An	  Outline	  of	   the	  Social	  Constructionist	  Viewpoint'.	  Lutz,	  
'The	  Domain	  of	  Emotion	  Words	  on	  Ifakuk'.	  Catherine	  A.	  Lutz,	  Unnatural	  Emotions.	  Everyday	  Sentiments	  on	  a	  
Micronesian	  Atoll	  and	  Their	  Challenge	  to	  Western	  Theory	  (Chicago,	  IL:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1988).	  
84	  Compare	  Mauss,	  'A	  Category	  of	  the	  Human	  Mind:	  The	  Notion	  of	  Person;	  the	  Notion	  of	  Self',	  14	  and	  20.	  More	  
specifically	   it	   seems	   to	   be	   Protestant	   Christianity	   that	   brings	   about	   the	   focus	   on	   the	   individual.	   See	   Louis	  
Dumont,	  'A	  Modified	  View	  of	  Our	  Origins:	  The	  Christian	  Beginnings	  of	  Modern	  Individualism',	  in	  The	  Category	  
of	   the	   Person.	   Anthropology,	   Philosophy,	   History,	   ed.	   Michael	   Carrithers,	   Steven	   Collins,	   and	   Steven	   Lukes	  
(Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1985	  (1982)),	  113-­‐119.	  And	  Martin	  Hollis,	  'Of	  Masks	  and	  Men',	  in	  The	  
Category	  of	  the	  Person.	  Anthropology,	  Philosophy,	  History,	  ed.	  Michael	  Carrithers,	  Steven	  Collins,	  and	  Steven	  
Lukes	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1985),	  217.	  However,	   it	  also	  useful	   to	  keep	   in	  mind	   that	  any	  
culture	  will	   carry	  a	  diverse	   set	  of	   concepts	  of	   self.	  Carrithers	   reminds	  us	   that	   in	   complex	   societies	  disparate	  
theories	  of	  the	  self	  can	  flourish.	  Carrithers,	  'An	  Alternative	  Social	  History	  of	  the	  Self',	  255.	  In	  addition	  compare	  
also	   the	   following	   anthropological	   account	   C.	   Geertz,	   '"From	   the	  Native's	   Point	   of	   View":	  On	   the	  Nature	   of	  
Anthropological	   Understanding',	   in	   Local	   Knowledge:	   Further	   Essays	   in	   Interpretative	   Anthropology,	   ed.	   C.	  
Geertz	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  1983).	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helpful	  to	  remind	  ourselves,	  as	  Louis	  Dumont	  for	  example	  argues,	  that	  “modern	  individualism,	  
when	  seen	  against	  the	  background	  of	  the	  other	  great	  civilisations	  that	  the	  world	  has	  known,	  is	  
an	   exceptional	   phenomenon.”85	  Similarly,	   Harré’s	   three	   selves,	   elaborated	   in	   Chapter	   5	   and	  
utilised	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	   in	  Chapter	  6,	  can	  be	   identified	  across	  most	  cultural	  
contexts.	  Yet,	  they	  take	  on	  different	  forms	  in	  different	  cultures.	  For	  example,	  Harré	  points	  out	  
how	  Self	  2	  and	  Self	  3,	  encompassing	  personal	  characteristics	  and	  the	  self	  in	  interaction,	  seem	  to	  
be	  less	  unified	  in,	  for	  instance,	  Japan.	  He	  argues	  that	  Japanese	  culture	  allows	  for	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  
the	  sense	  of	   the	  self	   that	  would	  be	  seen	  as	  pathological	   in	  a	  Western	  culture.86	  And	  he	  points	  
out	  that	  “[t]he	  case	  of	  Japanese	  selfhood	  is	  invaluable	  both	  in	  helping	  us	  to	  free	  ourselves	  from	  
the	  illusion	  that	  only	  the	  self-­‐structure	  of	  Protestant	  individualism	  is	  normal,	  and	  in	  illustrating	  
one	  of	  the	  ways	  that	  multiplicity	  in	  selfhood	  is	  a	  cultural	  norm.”87	  
In	  that	  sense,	  constructionist	  psychology	  invites	  us	  to	  speculate	  how	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  and	  the	  
international	   system	   would	   look	   if	   non-­‐Western,	   non-­‐individualistic	   concepts	   were	   the	  
dominant	  ones.	  Going	  back	  to	  the	  three	  characteristics	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  identity,	  distinctiveness,	  
continuity,	   and	   autonomy,	   developed	   by	   Michael	   J.	   Apter	   and	   utilised	   by	   Harré	   for	   his	   The	  
Singular	  Self,	  we	  can	  easily	   imagine	  a	  conceptualisation	  of	  persons	   that	  puts	   less	  emphasis	  on	  
these	   characteristics	   or	   at	   least	   partially	   challenges	   them.88	  With	   regard	   to	   concepts	   of	   self,	   a	  
look	  to	  the	  East	  can	  again	  be	   instructive.	  For	  example,	  regarding	  the	  central	  Hinduist	  text,	   the	  
Bhagavad-­‐Gita,	  we	  can	  observe	  that	  “characteristics	  usually	  essential	  to	  modern	  concepts	  of	  the	  
self	  are	  presented	   in	   the	  Gita	   as	  defining	   the	  constitution	  of	  a	   false	  or	   illusory	   self.”89	  We	  can	  
take	  this	  observation	  as	  an	  invitation	  to	   imagine	  how	  the	  state	  and	  IR	  would	  look	  if	  they	  were	  
based	  on	  a	  fundamentally	  different	  conception	  of	  persons	  and	  selves.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Dumont,	  'A	  Modified	  View	  of	  Our	  Origins:	  The	  Christian	  Beginnings	  of	  Modern	  Individualism',	  93.	  
86	  For	  an	  overview	  compare	  Mara	  Miller,	  'Views	  of	  Japanese	  Selfhood:	  Japanese	  and	  Western	  Perspectives',	  in	  
Culture	   and	   Self:	   Philosophical	   and	   Religious	   Perspectives,	   East	   and	   West,	   ed.	   Douglas	   Allen	   (Boulder,	   CO:	  
Westview	  Press,	  1997).	  
87	  Harré,	  The	  Singular	  Self.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Personhood,	  159.	  Compare	  also	  Frank	  Johnson,	  
'The	  Western	  Concept	  of	  Self',	   in	  Culture	  and	  Self:	  Asian	  and	  Western	  Perspectives,	  ed.	  Anthony	   J.	  Marsella,	  
George	  A.	  DeVos,	  and	  Francis	  L.	  K.	  Hsu	  (New	  York:	  Tavistock	  Publications,	  1985).	  	  
88	  For	  the	  three	  characteristics	  compare	  Apter,	  'Negativism	  and	  the	  Sense	  of	  Identity',	  75	  and	  for	  an	  overview	  
of	  potential	  challenges	  to	  these	  accounts	  compare	  77.	  
89	  Douglas	   Allen,	   'Social	   Constructions	   of	   Self:	   Some	   Asian,	   Marxist,	   and	   Feminist	   Critiques	   of	   Dominant	  
Western	   Views	   of	   Self',	   in	   Culture	   and	   Self:	   Philosophical	   and	   Religious	   Perspectives,	   East	   and	   West,	   ed.	  
Douglas	  Allen	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  Westview	  Press,	  1997),	  9,	  ephasis	  in	  original.	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In	   the	   remaining	   part	   of	   this	   section,	   this	   more	   radical	   suggestion	   needs	   to	   be	   brought	   into	  
dialogue	  with	  Wendt’s	  writings	  and	  larger	  disciplinary	  debates.	  First,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  
Wendt’s	   person	   and	   Wendt’s	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   are	   profoundly	   individualistic	   and	   “Western”	  
when	   compared	   to	   non-­‐Western	   examples	   in	  which	   the	   “I”	   already	   includes	   a	   “we”.	   This	   has	  
consequences	  for	  how	  Wendt	  describes	  possibilities	  for	  developing	  a	  system	  of	  other-­‐help,	  the	  
Kantian	   international	   culture	   described	   in	   more	   detail	   in	   early	   parts	   of	   this	   chapter.	   A	   deep	  
internalisation	   of	   the	   Kantian	   culture,	   described	   by	   Wendt	   as	   a	   position	   from	   which	   actors	  
define	   the	   security	   of	   the	  other	   as	   “literally	   being	   their	   own”	   is	   easier	   to	   achieve,	   or	   perhaps	  
only	  possible	  at	  all,	   if	   the	  conception	  of	  “I”	  already	   includes	  a	  ”we”	  to	  a	  much	  stronger	  extent	  
than	  Western	   individualistic	   conceptions	   of	   the	   person	   allow	   for.	   Second,	   the	   possibilities	   for	  
change	  that	  I	  am	  suggesting	  here	  can	  potentially	  concern	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
as	   such.	   Apter’s	   sense	   of	   identity	   –	   consisting	   of	   distinctiveness,	   continuity,	   and	   autonomy	   –	  
fundamentally	  shapes	  understandings	  of	  the	  person.	  A	  world	  of	  states	  which	  puts	  less	  emphasis	  
on	   distinctiveness	   and	   autonomy	   would	   look	   fundamentally	   different.	   However,	   this	   goes	  
beyond	  what	  Wendt	  suggests,	  or	  even	  can	  suggest,	  as	  part	  of	  his	  symbolic	  interactionist	  account	  
between	   two	   states.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   Alter	   and	   Ego	   are	   already	   established	   prior	   to	   their	  
hypothetical	  First	  Encounter.	  In	  my	  account,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  above,	  they	  are	  already	  shaped	  by	  
ideas	   of	   selves	   and	   emotions	   present	   in	   their	   respective	   cultures.	   Given	   the	   influence	   of	  
Western	  states	  and	  current	  international	  power	  structures,	  Western	  ideas	  of	  individualism	  are,	  
unsurprisingly,	  prominent	  across	  the	  international	  system.	  It	  is	  these	  ideas	  that	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  
of	  a	  deeper	  internalisation	  of	  a	  Kantian	  culture.	   In	  contrast	  to	  Wendt,	  who	  argues,	  as	  we	  have	  
seen	  in	  this	  chapter,	  that	  change	  in	  the	  international	  culture	  towards	  a	  Kantian	  ideal	  can	  come	  
from	  repeated	  pro-­‐social	  and	  self-­‐restrained	  behaviour	  and	  favourable	  systemic	  factors,	  I	  argue	  
that	   the	  potential	   for	  change	   lies	  within	  cultures	  that	  emphasise	  a	  different	  conception	  of	   the	  
self.	  Based	  on	   this,	   it	   can	  be	   suggested	   that	   if	   the	  emphasis	  on	  distinctiveness	  and	  autonomy	  
was	  weaker	   than	   it	   is	   in	  Western	   individualistic	   cultures,	  a	  more	   internalised	  system	  of	  other-­‐
help	  can	  be	   imagined.	  As	  a	  historic	  example,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  notions	  of	  distinctiveness	  and	  
autonomy,	   we	   can	   point	   to	   the	   system	   of	   European	   states	   during	   the	   Middle	   Ages,	   the	  
respublica	   Christiana.	   A	   current	   example	   might	   be	   found	   in	   the	   collective	   identity	   formation	  
	  	   	   	  
	  
282	  
among	   Asian	   states	   and	   how	   it	   differs	   from	   the	   collective	   identity	   of	   European	   or	   Western	  
states.90	  	  
To	   support	   this	   point,	   a	   detailed	   study	   of	   culturally	   important	   conceptions	   of	   persons,	   the	  
regional	  structures,	  and	  their	  interplay,	  on	  the	  back	  of	  key	  agents,	  is	  required.	  Working	  with	  the	  
metaphor	   of	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   allows	   me	   to	   point	   to	   possibilities	   for	   a	  
fundamental	   reshaping	   of	   the	   system	   of	   states	   by	   re-­‐thinking	   conceptions	   of	   persons.	   In	   this	  
regard,	  the	  five	  points	  of	  caution	  elaborated	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  section	  have	  to	  be	  kept	  in	  
mind.	   However,	   the	   very	   possibility	   of	   re-­‐thinking	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   that	  
becomes	   possible	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   metaphorical	   mapping	   processes,	   offers	   an	   exciting	  
opportunity.	  Even	   if	   this,	   for	  now,	  only	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  being	  able	  to	  point	   to	  the	  possibility	  
that	   things	  could	  be	  otherwise.	   	   In	   this	  sense,	   it	   is	  “anarchy	   is	  what	  we	  make	  of	   it”,	  albeit	  not	  
under	  the	  conditions	  of	  our	  own	  choosing.	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This	  chapter	  draws	  the	  themes	  of	  this	  thesis	  together	  to	  highlight	  how	  the	  account	  given	  here	  
differs	   from	  Wendt’s	   approach,	   especially	   regarding	   systemic	   interactions	   and	  agent-­‐structure	  
accounts,	  and	  to	  pin-­‐point	  the	  larger	  contributions	  that	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  makes	  
to	  disciplinary	  debates	  and	  understanding	  and	  studying	  the	  relations	  between	  states.	  	  
I	  address	  the	  disciplinary	  divide	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  state	  by	  
suggesting	  that	  the	  question	  of	  the	  ontology	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  narratives	  and	  practices	  that	  
sustain	  the	  state	  need	  to	  be	  studied.	  This	  leads	  me	  to	  argue	  that	  for	  certain	  research	  projects	  ‒	  
and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  one	  of	  these	  ‒	  scholars	  need	  to	  occupy	  various	  positions	  in	  Jacksons’	  
two-­‐by-­‐two	   table	   of	   philosophical	  wagers.	   In	   other	  words,	  we	   need	   to	   be	  mind-­‐world	  monist	  
and	  mind-­‐world	  dualist	  at	  different	  points	  of	  the	  project.	  The	  researcher	  interested	  in	  the	  idea	  
of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  needs	  to	  oscillate	  between	  two	  perspectives:	  understanding	  the	  structure	  
of	   the	   state	   but	   also	   studying	   the	   concepts	   used	   to	  make	   this	   structure	   intelligible.	   Based	   on	  
this,	   I	   clarified	   the	  position	  within	   the	  agent-­‐structure	  debate	   that	   I	   take	  with	   the	  constructed	  
state-­‐as-­‐person.	   From	   the	   position	   taken	   in	   this	   thesis,	   the	   state	   is	   a	   really	   existing	   structure	  
while	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   to	   be	   understood	   at	   the	   level	   of	   linguistic	   realism.	  
Resulting	  from	  this	  is	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  as	  a	  second-­‐order	  person	  that	  is	  based	  on	  
a	  process	  of	  structural	  metaphor	  mapping	  between	  person-­‐oriented	  discourses	  and	  elements	  of	  
the	   state-­‐as-­‐structure.	   This	   also	   means	   that	   agency	   is	   firmly	   located	   with	   individual	   human	  
beings,	   acting	   alone	   or	   in	   groups.	   In	   this	   account,	   narratives	  matter,	   especially	   at	   the	   crucial	  
moments	   of	   production	   and	   reproduction	   of	   the	   structure.	   Yet,	   it	   is	   not	   the	   case	   that	   any	  
narrative	  goes	  as	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐structure	  enables	  and	  constraints.	  	  
Based	   on	   these	   observations,	   I	   was	   able	   to	   give	   an	   alternative	   perspective	   on	   systemic	  
interactions	   and	   systemic	   change.	   I	   followed	   Wendt’s	   symbolic	   interactionist	   account.	   Yet,	  
because	   agency	   is	   not	   located	  with	   the	   state	   but	  with	   individual	   human	   beings,	   the	   symbolic	  
interactionist	   account	   is	   faced	   with	   a	   “domestic”	   baggage	   in	   the	   form	   of	   culturally	   specific	  
concepts	  of	   self	  and	  emotions.	  This	  also	  means	   that	  narratives,	   informed	  by	  culturally	   specific	  
emotional	  paradigm	  scenarios	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  person,	  become	  relevant	  for	  
the	   state	   in	   interaction.	   There	  are	   structural	   constraints	  on	   these	  narratives.	   Yet,	   for	   the	   shift	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from	  a	   Lockean	   international	   culture	  of	   rivalry,	   our	   current	   system,	   to	   a	  Kantian	   international	  
culture	  of	  other-­‐help,	   this	  domestic	  baggage	  and	   the	   related	  narratives	  matter.	  When	  making	  
suggestions	  towards	  a	  Kantian	  international	  culture,	  Wendt	  presents	  a	  case	  whereby	  states	  are	  
nudged	  towards	   instrumental	   friendship.	  The	  assumption	   is	   that	   this,	  over-­‐time,	  might	   lead	  to	  
actual	  friendship	  understood	  as	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  self-­‐definitions	  include	  a	  concern	  and	  care	  
for	   others.	   However,	   because	  Wendt	   locates	   agency	   with	   states,	   he	   cannot	   explain	   this	   shift	  
beyond	  and	  instrumental	  account	  of	  friendship.	  In	  contrast,	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  where	  culturally	  
specific	   concepts	   of	   emotions	   and	   notions	   of	   the	   self	   become	   important.	   Further,	   from	   my	  
perspective,	   Wendt’s	   Kantian	   peace	   remains	   a	   negative	   peace	   and	   only	   by	   engaging	   various	  
culturally	  specific	  concepts	  can	  it	  be	  transformed	  into	  a	  positive	  one.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  also	  point	  
out	  how	  this	  is	  as	  an	  important	  consideration	  for	  democratic	  peace	  arguments.	  	  
Looking	  at	  the	  role	  of	  emotions	  concepts	  and	  their	  paradigm	  scenarios,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  suggest	  a	  
source	   for	   perceptions	   and	   behaviour	   that	   seems	   “irrational”	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	  
international	   system.	   Rationality	   is	   argued	   to	   be	   context-­‐specific	   and	   by	   studying	   culturally	  
specific	   concepts	   of	   emotions,	   an	   understanding	   of	   “irrational”	   behaviour	   can	   be	   gained.	   It	   is	  
important	   to	  note	   that	   this	   is	   fundamentally	  different	   from	  suggestions	   that	   locate	  deviations	  
from	   rationality	   with	  misperceptions,	   cognitive	   biases,	   or	   cognitive	   limits	   to	   decision-­‐making.	  
Further,	  it	  calls	  not	  for	  the	  study	  of	  individual	  decision-­‐makers	  or	  group	  process	  but	  for	  studying	  
concepts	  and	  their	  associated	  paradigm	  scenarios	  prevalent	  in	  a	  specific	  culture.	  Ultimately,	  the	  
argument	   is	   that	   “irrational”	   perceptions	   and	   behaviour	   are	   especially	   important	   if	   one	   is	  
interested	   in	   the	  potential	   of	   systemic	   change	  as	   they	  provide	  alternatives	   to	   the	   logic	  of	   the	  
international	  system.	  
Lastly,	   and	   in	   stark	   contrast	   to	  Wendt,	   the	   perspective	   developed	   in	   this	   thesis	   allows	  me	   to	  
question	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  more	  fundamentally.	   I	  suggest	  that	  a	  metaphor	  change,	   indeed	  a	  
paradigm	   change,	   is	   potentially	   possible	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   re-­‐thinking	   of	   person-­‐oriented	  
concepts,	   such	   as	   Apter’s	   sense	   of	   identity	   consisting	   of	   distinctiveness,	   continuity,	   and	  
autonomy.91	  Generally	  speaking,	  Asian	  conceptions	  that	  are	  less	  individualistic	  come	  to	  mind	  as	  
an	   alternative	   to	   the	  Western	   conception	  of	   the	  person.	   Based	  on	   the	  metaphorical	  mapping	  
process,	   this	   re-­‐thinking	   concerns	   external	   sovereignty,	   territorial	   integrity,	   and	   diplomatic	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  'Negativism	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  the	  Sense	  of	  Identity'.	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representation.	   Relations	   between	   states	   that	   emphasise	   distinctiveness,	   continuity,	   and	  
autonomy	  to	  a	  lesser	  degree	  are	  at	  least	  thinkable	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  alternative	  perspective.	  	  
However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  that	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  ideas	  “all	  the	  way	  down”.	  
The	  two	  previous	  points	  regarding	  emotions	  and	  conceptions	  of	  the	  self	  are	  faced	  with	  systemic	  
constraints.	  Yet,	  I	  maintain	  that	  if	  change	  is	  possible	  at	  all,	  its	  source	  is	  to	  be	  located	  in	  culturally	  
specific	  concepts	  of	  emotions	  and	  self.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  change	  in	  conceptions	  of	  persons	  and	  a	  
better	   understanding	   of	   the	   role	   of	   emotions	   in	  making	   judgements	   of	   appropriateness	   are	   a	  
necessary,	   although	  not	   sufficient	   part	   in	   the	   transformation	   towards	   a	   system	  of	   other-­‐help.	  
Therefore,	  anarchy	  is	  what	  we	  make	  of	  it,	  but	  not	  under	  the	  conditions	  of	  our	  own	  choosing.	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Conclusion:	  The	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	  in	  IR	  theory	  
This	   thesis	   critically	   engages	   with	   Alexander	   Wendt’s	   conception	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   and	  
develops	   an	   alternative	   based	   on	   a	   conception	   of	   persons	   that	   draws	   on	   how	   people	   make	  
sense	  of	  themselves	  in	  everyday	  discourse.	  I	  call	  this	  alternative	  to	  Wendt’s	  “states-­‐are-­‐people-­‐
too”	  position	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person.1	  The	  prevalence	  of	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  state	  
is	  like	  a	  person	  in	  contemporary	  IR	  theory	  and	  Wendt’s	  strong	  statement	  are	  an	  important	  part	  
of	  the	  motivation	  behind	  this	  thesis.	  Further,	  in	  2004	  Wendt	  suggested	  that	  “if	  we	  want	  to	  have	  
states	  then	  it	  is	  better	  they	  take	  the	  form	  of	  persons	  rather	  than	  something	  more	  amorphous.”2	  
I	  follow	  him	  in	  this	  conviction	  and	  his	  focus	  on	  psychological	  personhood.	  
While	  Wendt	  is	  not	  the	  only	  one	  with	  an	  interest	  in	  conceptualising	  states	  in	  relation	  to	  people,	  
he	  is	  the	  most	  prominent	  proponent	  in	  IR.	  With	  “anarchy	  is	  what	  states	  make	  of	  it”	  and	  “states	  
are	  people	  too”	  he	  makes	  two	  of	  the	  strongest	  statements	  in	  the	  discipline	  in	  this	  regard.3	  With	  
the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	   I	  am	  responding	  to	  what	  I	  perceive	  as	  problematic	  in	  Wendt’s	  
work.	  This	  critique	  mainly	  concerns	  his	  via	  media	  constructivist	  approach	  to	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
and	   related	   to	   that	   his	   essentialism	   and	   materialism	   with	   regard	   to	   persons,	   selves,	   and	  
emotions,	   his	   insistence	   on	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   being	   real,	   his	   position	   in	   the	   agent-­‐structure	  
debate,	  and	  his	  stance	  on	  the	  role	  of	  metaphors	   in	   the	  process	  of	  making	  sense	  of	   the	  world,	  
including	  the	  scientific	  process.	  	  
This	   thesis	   also	   needs	   to	   be	   understood	   in	   the	   larger	   context	   of	  making	   a	   contribution	   to	   IR	  
scholarship	   at	   a	   time	  when	   the	   fundamental	   role	   of	   the	   state	   in	   the	   discipline’s	   theorising	   is	  
increasingly	  questioned.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  those	  who	  argue	  that	  the	  state	  is	  undergoing	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  For	  this	  phrase	  see	  Wendt,	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  215.	  
2	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  316.	  
3 	  Alexander	   Wendt,	   'Anarchy	   Is	   What	   States	   Make	   of	   It:	   The	   Social	   Construction	   of	   Power	   Politics',	  
International	  Organization	  46,	  2	  (1992).	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decline	   in	   terms	   of	   power	   and	   relevance	   in	   the	   face	   of	   globalisation,	   it	  must	   seem	   strangely	  
anachronistic	  to	  be	  working	  with	  the	  proclamation	  that	  “states	  are	  people	  too”.	  	  
Here,	   an	   interesting	   dichotomy	   opens	   up	   which	   I	   point	   to	   in	   the	   introduction	   and	   further	  
articulate	   in	   the	   first	   chapter.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   self-­‐understanding	   of	   the	   discipline	   is	  
fundamentally	  tied	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  state.	  International	  relations,	  in	  its	  current	  form,	  would	  
have	   no	   raison	   d'être	   were	   the	   state	   to	   disappear	   from	   its	   research	   programme.4	  However,	  
following	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  state	  cannot	  easily	  be	  identified	  anymore	  with	  the	  nation,	  itself	  
a	   controversial	   term,	   or	   territory,	   an	   argument	   is	  made	   that	   previous	  ways	  of	   identifying	   and	  
imagining	   the	   state	   have	   to	   be	   transformed.5	  Hence,	   IR	   theory’s	   concept	   of	   the	   state	   is	  more	  
than	   ever	   in	   need	   of	   re-­‐conceptualisation.	   It	   is	   precisely	   with	   this	   context	   in	   mind	   that	   the	  
“states-­‐are-­‐people-­‐too”	  position	   is	   reformulated	  and	  becomes	   the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
in	  this	  thesis.	  	  
The	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   emerges	   out	   of	   questioning	   some	   of	   the	   core	   philosophy	   of	  
science	   assumptions	  made	   by	  Wendt.	   Hence,	   in	   the	   first	   instance,	   it	   is	   a	   suggestion	   for	   a	   re-­‐
conceptualisation	  of	  Wendt’s	   idea.	  However,	   in	  a	  further	  step,	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  
offers	   the	   potential	   for	   a	   fundamental	   re-­‐imagining	   of	   the	   state	   in	   IR.	   This	   thesis	   argues	   that	  
recourse	  to	  conceptual	  metaphor	  theory	  and	  constructionist	  psychology	  paves	  the	  way	  for	  such	  
a	   re-­‐conceptualisation.	   The	   former	   allows	  me	   to	  question	   the	   relationship	  between	  mind	  and	  
world	   that	   underlies	   accounts	   of	   the	   state	   and	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person.	   The	   latter	   is	   useful	   in	  
developing	   a	   non-­‐material,	   non-­‐individualistic	   understanding	   of	   how	   people	   make	   sense	   of	  
themselves	  and	  how	  self	  and	  emotions	  are	  created	  discursively.	  Eventually,	  the	  suggestion	  that	  
stands	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	   final	   chapter	   is	   that	   it	   is	  not	   “anarchy	   is	  what	   states	  make	  of	   it”	  but	  
“anarchy	  is	  what	  we	  make	  of	  it.”	  	  	  
In	   the	   following,	   first,	   I	   will	   summarise	   the	  main	   points	   of	   the	   argument	   presented	   over	   the	  
course	  of	  the	  six	  chapters	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Second,	  I	  will	  highlight	  the	  specific	  contribution	  that	  this	  
thesis	  makes	  to	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate	  by	  suggesting	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  as	  an	  
alternative	   to	  Wendt’s	   approach;	   I	  will	   also	  highlight	   the	  more	   general	   contributions	   that	   this	  
thesis	  makes	  to	  IR	  theory.	  Here,	  the	  role	  of	  metaphors	  in	  the	  scientific	  process	  that	  is	  advocated	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Compare	  Wight,	  Agents,	  Structures	  and	  International	  Relations:	  Politics	  as	  Ontology,	  177.	  
5	  Compare	  for	  example	  Sørensen,	  'The	  Transformation	  of	  the	  State'.	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in	   this	   thesis	   and	   the	   potential	   for	   introducing	   constructionist	   psychology	   to	   IR	   will	   be	  
highlighted	  as	  key	  contributions.	  Lastly,	  I	  will	  point	  to	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  approach	  followed	  in	  this	  
thesis	  and	  make	  suggestions	  for	  further	  research.	  	  
Chapter	  1	  provides	  reasons	  for	  engaging	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  by	  illustrating	  how	  the	  
tendency	  to	  anthropomorphise	  or	  personify	  the	  state	  is	  prevalent	  in	  the	  discipline.	  It	   is	  argued	  
that	   because	   the	   state	   is	   ubiquitous	   in	   the	   discipline,	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   opaque,	   a	   key	  
disciplinary	   task	   is	   to	  make	   the	   state	   intelligible.	   Depending	   on	  whether	   one	   argues	   that	   the	  
state	   really	   exists	   or	  whether	  one	   locates	   it	   in	  discourse	   and	   shared	  practices,	   this	   process	  of	  
making	  the	  state	  intelligible	  will	  take	  on	  fundamentally	  different	  forms.	  However,	  I	  argue	  that	  in	  
either	   case,	   the	   state	   needs	   to	   be	   imagined	   and	   the	   image	  we	   encounter	   prominently	   in	   the	  
discipline	  is	  that	  of	  the	  person.	  This	  prevalence	  is	  taken	  as	  the	  motivation	  to	  further	  investigate	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	  ideas.	  
Looking	  more	   specifically	   at	  what	   I	   call	   the	   recent	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  debate	  between	  Alexander	  
Wendt,	   Iver	   B.	   Neumann,	   Patrick	   T.	   Jackson,	   Colin	  Wight,	   and	   others,	   the	   same	   fundamental	  
dichotomy	   between	   two	   different	   ways	   of	   making	   the	   state	   intelligible	   is	   identified	   –	   with	  
Neumann	  and	  Jackson	  subscribing	  to	  narrativist	  accounts	  and	  Wight	  and	  Wendt	  arguing	  that	  we	  
need	  to	  engage	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  can	  be	  said	  to	  
really	  exist.	  A	  second	  line	  of	  contention	  in	  the	  debate	  is	  identified	  in	  arguments	  regarding	  what	  
kind	   of	   person	   the	   state	   is.	   Here,	   a	   distinction	   between	   moral,	   legal,	   and	   psychological	  
personhood	  is	  crucial.	  Following	  Wendt,	  the	  question	  of	  psychological	  personhood	  of	  the	  state	  
is	  chosen	  as	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Further,	  building	  on	  Jackson’s	  suggestions,	  Hobbes’s	  idea	  of	  
the	   state	   as	   a	   fictitious	   person	   which	   is	   established	   in	   a	   process	   of	   authorisation	   and	  
representation	  and	  is	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  separate	  from	  both	  the	  ruler	  and	  the	  ruled	  is	  introduced	  
in	  Chapter	  1.	  Hobbes’s	  argument	  is	  especially	  useful	  for	  a	  systemic	  approach	  that	  is	  interested	  in	  
developing	  ideas	  of	  states-­‐as-­‐persons	  further	  because	  it	  is	  part	  of	  the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  state	  
eventually	  came	  to	  seen	  as	  an	  independent	  agent.	  	  	  	  
Chapter	   2	   focuses	   on	   Wendt’s	   specific	   conception	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   and	   his	   via	   media	  
constructivist	  and	  philosophical	  realist	  premises	  in	  more	  detail.	  As	  a	  result,	  four	  main	  points	  of	  
critique	   are	   outlined.	   First,	   questioning	   Wendt’s	   scientific	   realist	   position	   with	   regard	   to	   the	  
state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  we	  can	  assert	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  state	  without	  also	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needing	   to	   argue	   that	   it	   is	   indeed	   a	   person.	   I	   argue,	   by	   drawing	   a	   distinction	   between	  
philosophical	  ontology	  and	  scientific	  ontology,	   that	   the	  state	   is	  a	   really	  existing	  structure	  with	  
causal	  impact	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  state	  really	  exists.	  	  Personifying	  it	  is	  a	  prevalent	  way	  of	  making	  it	  
intelligible.	   However,	   this	   is	   not	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   state	   indeed	   is	   a	   person	   from	   a	   scientific	  
realist	   perspective.	   Second,	   Chapter	   2	   argues	   that	   we	   can	   and	   should	   take	   the	   social	  
construction	  of	  persons	  and	  selves	  further	  than	  Wendt	  does.	  Third,	   I	  maintain	  that	  the	  role	  of	  
metaphors	  in	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  needs	  to	  be	  made	  more	  explicit.	  
And	   fourth,	   the	   chapter	   suggests	   processes	   of	   personation	   as	   a	   fruitful	   approach	   towards	  
generating	  an	  understanding	  of	  persons	  and	  hence	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  	  
Chapter	  3	  focuses	  specifically	  on	  the	  role	  of	  metaphors	  with	  two	  aims:	  first,	  to	  make	  a	  general	  
contribution	  by	  arguing	  the	  case	  for	  their	  role	  in	  the	  scientific	  process	  and,	  second,	  to	  argue	  that	  
the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  metaphor.	  It	  maintains	  that	  confining	  metaphors	  to	  
the	  role	  as	  figures	  of	  speech	  derives	  from	  a	  neopositivistic	  understanding	  of	  science	  that	  builds	  
on	  an	  outdated	  conception	  of	  a	  metaphor	  understood	  as	  a	  comparison.6	  The	  chapter	  introduces	  
the	   interaction	   view	   of	  metaphor,	  whereby	   a	  metaphor	   is	   seen	   as	   an	   interaction	   of	   thoughts	  
which	  brings	  two	  different	  ideas	  in	  contact	  with	  each	  other	  and	  thereby	  produces	  new	  insights,	  
which	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  creating	  new	  knowledge.7	  Second,	  concerning	  the	  role	  of	  metaphors	  in	  
science,	   a	   distinction	   is	   introduced	   between	   pedagogical	   metaphors	   that	   are	   useful	   for	  
explaining	   a	   theory,	   and	   theory-­‐constitutive	   metaphors	   that	   are	   at	   the	   core	   of	   theoretical	  
assumptions	   about	   the	   world. 8 	  From	   this	   perspective,	   I	   argue	   that	   a	   theory-­‐constitutive	  
metaphor	   lies	   at	   the	   core	   of	   Wendt’s	   “states-­‐are-­‐people-­‐too”	   position.	   To	   illustrate	   the	  
interaction	   of	   thoughts	   present	   in	   a	  metaphor,	   I	   draw	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   structural	   mapping	  
between	  the	  source	  and	  target	  domain	  of	  a	  metaphor.9	  Taking	  these	  points	  together,	  I	  suggest	  a	  
working	   definition	   of	   what	   I	   call	   a	   “scientific	   metaphor”	   which	   describes	   a	   potentially	   open-­‐
ended	   research	  process	   that	   explores	   the	   connection	  between	   source	   and	   target	  domain	   and	  
can	  potentially	   function	   to	   facilitate	  exchanges	  between	  different	  disciplines	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  
and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   concepts	   and	   social	   structures.	   Hence,	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   state	   as	   a	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  Jackson,	  The	  Conduct	  of	   Inquiry	   in	   International	  Relations:	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  and	  Its	   Implications	  for	  the	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  of	  World	  Politics.	  
7	  Black,	  Models	  and	  Metaphors.	  Studies	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  Language	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  Philosophy.	  And	  Black,	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  About	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psychological	   person	   is	   developed	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   possibilities	   of	   an	   interanimation	   of	  
thoughts	  between	  concepts	  of	  persons	  and	  concepts	  of	  states	  and	  between	  concepts	  of	  person	  
in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐structure.	  	  
Given	  Wendt’s	   assertion	   that	   the	   state	   really	   exists,	  we	   also	   need	   to	   ask	  whether	   or	   not	   it	   is	  
possible	  to	  address	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  from	  a	  scientific	  realist	  perspective	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  
such	  a	  perspective	  fits	  with	  the	  particular	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis	  on	  psychological	  personhood.	  It	  is	  
argued	  that	  a	  useful	  metaphorical	   relationship	  can	  be	  developed	  between	  states	  and	  persons.	  
However,	  ultimately,	  a	  decision	  is	  taken	  to	  do	  this	  at	  the	  level	  of	  linguistic	  realism	  which	  means	  
that	   relationships	   between	   concepts	   of	   states	   and	   concepts	   of	   persons	   are	   explored	   in	   the	  
context	  of	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐structure.	  Suggestions	  that	   the	  metaphor	  of	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	  also	  
useful	   in	  addressing	  a	  deeper	  reality	  of	  IR	  are	  not	  pursued.	  I	  argue	  that,	  analogous	  to	  Wendt’s	  
miracle	   argument,	   the	   prevalence	   of	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   ideas	   in	   the	   discipline	   suggests	   that	   we	  
must	   have	   gotten	   something	   right.	   This	   is	   taken	   to	   justify	   an	   engagement	   with	   the	   concept.	  
Hence,	  developing	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  psychological	  person	  further	  is	  justified	  as	  long	  as	  
we	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  this	  is	  conceptual	  work	  and	  does	  not	  speak	  to	  deeper	  social	  realities.	  	  
Keeping	  these	  points	  in	  mind,	  Chapter	  4	  presents	  an	  account	  of	  how	  people	  develop	  a	  sense	  of	  
self	  and	  other	  typical	  psychological	  characteristics.	  It	  introduces	  the	  so-­‐called	  emotional	  turn	  in	  
the	  discipline	  and,	  following	  suggestions	  made	  as	  part	  of	  these	  interventions,	  discusses	  ways	  of	  
utilising	   findings	   from	   psychology.	   After	   having	   identified	   IR’s	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   as	   a	   person	  
strangely	  devoid	  of	  emotions	   in	  the	  first	  chapter,	  one	  of	  the	  key	  aims	  of	  the	  recent	  emotional	  
turn	  –	  overcoming	  the	  strict	  dichotomy	  between	  rationality	  and	  emotions	  –	   is	   taken	  on	  board	  
for	   the	   idea	  of	   the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  This	  connects	   the	  endeavour	  undertaken	  here	  
with	  Wendt’s	  notion	  of	   the	  state	  as	  a	  psychological	  person,	  which	   is	  defined	  as	   the	  ability	   for	  
subjective	   experience	   of	   the	   world,	   including	   having	   the	   capacity	   for	   emotions.10	  In	   order	   to	  
work	  towards	  this	  notion	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  psychological	  person,	  a	  reductionist	  understanding	  of	  
the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   that	   would	   theorise	   states’	   emotions	   through	   recourse	   to	   individuals	   is	  
rejected.	  Similarly,	  treating	  the	  state	  as	  a	  group	  and	  utilising	  insights	  from	  social	  identity	  theory	  
to	   talk	   about	   group	   emotions,	   and	   ultimately	   the	   emotions	   of	   the	   state,	   is	   also	   rejected.	   In	  
contrast,	   the	  conclusion	  of	  Chapter	  3	   is	   re-­‐affirmed	  here	  by	  deciding	   to	  undertake	   the	   task	  of	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theorising	   about	   psychological	   state	   personhood	  on	   a	   conceptual	   level	   through	   an	   analysis	   of	  
the	  role	  that	  person-­‐oriented	  discourse	  that	  is	  utilised	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  state	  in	  IR.	  	  
Building	   on	   these	   points,	   Chapter	   5	   draws	   on	   constructionist	   psychology	   to	   outline	   an	  
alternative	   understanding	   of	   persons,	   one	   that	   emphasises	   the	   role	   of	   language	   in	   the	  
construction	  of	  self	  and	  emotions,	  and	  places	  this	  approach	  in	  contrast	  to	  Wendt’s.	  By	  drawing	  
on	  constructionist	  psychology,	  the	  assumption	  that	  how	  we	  make	  sense	  of	  ourselves	  is	  also	  how	  
we	  make	   sense	   of	   the	   state	   is	   transformed	   into	   arguing	   that	  we	   can	   and	   do	   apply	   the	   same	  
language	  games	  we	  use	  for	  making	  sense	  of	  people	  to	  the	  state.	  Indeed,	  inspired	  by	  the	  work	  of	  
Rom	  Harré,	  who	   in	   turn	  draws	   substantially	   on	   Ludwig	  Wittgenstein’s	   theory	  of	   language,	  we	  
can	   understand	   aspects	   generally	   defined	   as	   psychological	   phenomena,	   such	   as	   the	   self	   and	  
emotions,	  as	  language	  games.	  In	  this	  sense,	  this	  thesis	  argues,	  states	  can	  become	  people	  too.	  	  
We	  need	  to	  note	  that	   from	  the	  constructionist	  account,	   the	  researcher	  does	  not	   look	  “inside”	  
the	  mind	   to	   generate	   an	   understanding	   of	   people.	   This	   thesis	   rejects	   an	   exploration	   of	   what	  
Wendt	  would	  call	  the	  inside	  constitution	  of	  the	  psychological	  person.11	  From	  the	  constructionist	  
perspective,	  the	  person	  is	  a	  location	  in	  time	  and	  space	  that	  exists	  prior	  to	  discourse	  and	  makes	  
discourse	   possible	   in	   the	   first	   place.	  However,	   the	   self	   (including	   identities	   and	   interests)	   and	  
emotions	   are	   established	   discursively.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   self	   is	   realised	   through	   narrative	  
conventions	  and	  discursive	  practices.	  Drawing	  on	  constructionist	  psychology	  allows	  me	  to	  argue,	  
in	  contrast	  to	  Wendt’s	  physicalist	  commitments	  in	  “The	  state	  as	  person”,	  that	  what	  matters	  for	  
understanding	   people	   can	   be	   located	   entirely	   in	   discourse.	   The	   physical	   is	   transformed	   to	   a	  
mere	  location	  for	  the	  narrated,	  the	  self.	  	  	  
The	   chapter	   also	   introduces	   a	   discussion	   of	   emotions	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   constructionist	  
psychology.	  A	  perspective	  is	  developed	  that	  defines	  emotions	  as	  social	  products	  that	  are	  shaped	  
by	   language	   and	   culture.12	  Again,	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   stressed	   that,	   similar	   to	   the	   constructionist	  
conception	   of	   the	   self,	   emotions	   are	   not	   located	   inside	   the	   mind.	   Rather	   than	   being	   given	  
emotions,	  qua	  nature,	  we	  are	  socialised	  into	  them.	  Further,	  emotions,	  understood	  in	  this	  way,	  
are	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  knowledge.	  They	  reflect	  a	  judgement	  about	  what	  is	  reasonable,	  what	  
is	  appropriate	  and	  what	  is	  right;	  the	  emotional	  repertoire	  of	  a	  society	  reflects	  values	  and	  moral	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concepts	  held	  in	  that	  society.	  This	  also	  means	  that,	  similar	  to	  the	  specific	  expressions	  of	  the	  self,	  
emotions	  are	  culturally	  specific.	  Conceptualising	  emotions	  as	  separable	  from	  their	  material	  basis	  
does	  away	  with	   the	  problem	  of	  physicalism	  with	   regard	   to	   state	   consciousness	  as	  outlined	  by	  
Wendt.	   It	   addresses	   Wendt’s	   point	   that	   the	   state	   might	   hold	   an	   “an	   ersatz	   subjectivity”,	  
whereby	   people	   are	   experiencing	   the	   emotions	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   state. 13 	  From	   the	  
constructionist	   perspective,	   it	   is	   not	   the	   felt	   experience	   of	   emotions	   that	   matters	   for	  
understanding	  them,	  but	  rather,	  their	  discursive	  expression.	  	  
Yet,	  Chapter	  5	  also	  shows	  that,	  even	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  constructionist	  psychology,	  we	  do	  
not	  escape	  the	  material	  body	  after	  all.	  As	  outlined,	  the	  “biological	  basis”	  of	  emotions	  is	  seen	  as	  
irrelevant	  for	  understanding	  human	  emotion.	  However,	  human	  physiology	  still	  matters	  in	  some	  
way	   because	   it,	   first,	   enables	   the	   development	   of	   the	   very	   sign	   system	   we	   use	   to	   generate	  
meaning.	  The	  argument	  developed	  here,	  based	  on	  Wittgenstinian	  insights	  as	  utilised	  by	  Harré,	  is	  
that	  if	  we	  had	  a	  different	  physiology,	  our	  sign	  system	  would	  be	  a	  different	  one.	  Second,	  human	  
physiology	  matters	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  expressing	  this	  sign	  system	  and	  acting	  upon	  it.	  Keeping	  this	   in	  
mind,	   I	  argue	  that	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  can	  only	  ever	  be	  a	  second-­‐order	  person	  because	   it	  does	  
not	   escape	   the	   dependence	   on	   individual	   human	   beings	   to	   speak	   and	   act	   on	   its	   behalf.	   This	  
means	  that	  even	  from	  within	  a	  more	  radical	  constructed	  account	  of	  the	  person,	  there	  is	  still	  an	  
ultimate	   ontological	   firewall	   that	   the	   state	   does	   not	   cross.14	  In	   my	   account,	   the	   firewall	   is	  
constituted	  by	  the	  state’s	  lack	  of	  a	  physiological	  basis	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  sign	  system	  and	  
the	  lack	  of	  tools	  for	  using	  a	  sign	  system.	  The	  state	  is	  made	  into	  a	  person	  by	  speaking	  about	  it	  as	  
a	  person.	  But	  for	  this,	  it	  fundamentally	  depends	  on	  individual	  human	  beings	  as	  its	  agents.	  	  
Having	   outlined	   the	   constructionist	   account,	   this	   thesis	   turns	   to	   developing	   an	   alternative	   to	  
Wendt’s	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  position	   fully	  and	  highlights	   its	  potential	   implications	   for	   IR	   theory	   in	  
Chapter	   6.	   The	   resulting	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   an	   imagined	   entity	   that	   emerges	   by	  
bringing	   internationally	   accepted	   practices	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   state	   –	   recognition,	   territorial	  
integrity,	  and	  representation	  –	  into	  contact	  with	  discourses	  about	  persons.	  An	  interanimation	  of	  
thoughts	   between	   these	   two	   domains	   is	   suggested.	   Hence,	   in	   a	   first	   step,	   Harré’s	   minimal	  
criteria	   for	   the	  application	  of	  person-­‐orientated	  discourses	  are	  made	  useful	   for	   thinking	  about	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  313-­‐314.	  
14	  Wight,	  Agents,	  Structures	  and	  International	  Relations:	  Politics	  as	  Ontology,	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states.	   These	  minimal	   criteria	   of	   the	   person	   are	   the	   following:	   having	   a	   location	   in	   time	   and	  
space	  and	  showing	  continuity	  over	  time.	  By	  drawing	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  external	  sovereignty,	  we	  
can	   argue	   that	   the	   state	   can	   be	  mapped	   onto	   these	  minimal	   criteria.	   To	   relate	   this	   point	   to	  
Jackson’s	   critique	  of	  Wendt,	   it	   is	   the	  minimal	   criteria	   that	   allow	   for	   a	   process	  of	   personation,	  
understood	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis	  as	  the	  application	  of	  person-­‐oriented	  discourses	  to	  the	  
state.15	  Based	   on	   this,	   three	   specific	   person-­‐related	   discourses	   regarding	   the	   three	   senses	   of	  
self,	  emotions,	  and	  relations	  of	  enmity	  and	  friendship	  are	  made	  useful	  for	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐
as-­‐person	  and	  are	  brought	  into	  dialogue	  with	  current	  IR	  literature.	  	  
Chapter	  7	  draws	   these	  points	   together	   to	  stress	   the	  departure	   from	  Wendt’s	  account	  and	   the	  
contribution	   to	   disciplinary	   debates	   that	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   makes.	   The	   chapter	  
develops	   a	   clear	   position	   regarding	   the	   fundamental	   disciplinary	   divide	   in	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  
debate	  between	  those	  scholars	  who	  seek	  to	   investigate	  the	  ontological	   reality	  of	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	  and	  those	  who	  locate	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  at	  the	  level	  of	  discourse	  and	  social	  practices.	  
The	  suggestion	  is	  that	  those	  interested	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  need	  to	  occupy	  both	  
positions	  at	  different	  points	  of	  the	  research	  project.	  In	  this	  sense,	  this	  thesis	  argues	  that	  those	  
interested	   in	   the	   idea	  of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	  need	   to	  occupy	  both	  a	  mind-­‐world	  monist	  and	  a	  
mind-­‐world	   dualist	   position,	   using	   Jackson’s	   framework,	   at	   different	   points	   in	   the	   research	  
project.	   Following	   from	   this,	   a	   clear	   position	   within	   the	   agent-­‐structure	   debate	   is	   articulated	  
that	   locates	   agency	   firmly	   with	   individual	   human	   beings,	   acting	   alone	   or	   in	   groups,	   and	  
subscribes	   to	   the	   view	   of	   the	   state	   as	   a	   structure.	   The	   state-­‐as-­‐person,	   located	   the	   level	   of	  
linguistic	   realism,	  mediates	   between	   the	   two	  based	  on	   the	  process	   of	  metaphorical	  mapping.	  
The	  metaphor	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  represents	  a	  way	  of	  making	  the	  structure	  intelligible.	  Yet,	  it	  
is	   constrained	   by	   structural	   factors	   while,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   plays	   a	   crucial	   role	   for	   the	  
production	  and	  reproduction	  of	  the	  structure.	  This	  position	  also	  allows	  me	  to	  propose	  a	  theory	  
of	  international	  systemic	  change	  that	  differs	  from	  Wendt’s	  approach	  and	  is	  able	  locate	  sources	  
of	  change	   in	  culturally	  specific	  concepts	  of	  self	  and	  emotions.	  Finally,	  a	   tentative	  suggestion	   is	  
made	  that	  re-­‐thinking	  the	  ideas	  we	  hold	  about	  persons	  can	  lead	  to	  re-­‐thinking	  ideas	  about	  the	  
state	  with	  potentially	  systemic	  consequences.	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In	  addition	  to	  the	  key	  points	  developed	  in	  Chapter	  7,	  this	  thesis	  makes	  a	  number	  of	  significant	  
contributions	   to	   both	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   debate	   and	   to	   IR	   theory	   more	   generally	   over	   the	  
course	  of	  the	  first	  six	  chapters	  that	  deserve	  to	  be	  highlighted	  again.	  By	  critically	  engaging	  with	  
Wendt’s	  suggestion	  that	  “states	  are	  people	  too”	  and	  putting	  forward	  an	  alternative	  conception	  
in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	   this	  thesis	  offers	  an	  account	  of	  the	  person	  and	  
the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  that	   is	   fundamentally	  non-­‐material	  and	  non-­‐individualistic.	  As	  an	  outcome	  
of	  the	  critique	  of	  Wendt’s	  approach,	  an	  account	  is	  put	  forward	  that	  avoids	  Wendt’s	  essentialism	  
and	  offers	  a	  solution	  to	  what	  Wendt	  calls	  the	  problem	  of	  ersatz	  subjectivity,	  understood	  as	  the	  
focus	  on	  the	  location	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  emotion.16	  
Further,	  based	  on	  insights	  from	  constructionist	  psychology,	  I	  am	  able	  to	  argue	  that	  an	  inside	  test	  
of	  personhood,	  as	  suggested	  by	  Wendt	  in	  2004	  for	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person,	  is	  unnecessary	  because	  
in	  everyday	  interactions	  with	  other	  people	  we	  can	  operate	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  they	  are	  
persons	  based	  on	   the	   flow	  of	   actions	   and	  utterances	  emanating	   from	   them	  without	   requiring	  
proof	  of	  their	  suitable	  psychological	  inside	  constitution.	  Hence,	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  search	  for	  a	  
suitable	  inside	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  	  
However,	  as	  summarised,	  the	  suggested	  constructed	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  is	  to	  be	  located	  at	  the	  level	  
of	  language	  first	  and	  foremost.	  Hence,	  another	  outcome	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  an	  argument	  about	  
the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	  cannot	  be	  sustained	  at	  a	  deeper	  level	  of	  social	  reality.	  This	  outcome	  stands	  
in	  contrast	   to	  Wendt’s	   insistence	  that	   the	  state-­‐as-­‐person	   is	   real.	   It	  also	  supports	   the	  criticism	  
that	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐person	   concept	   held	   by	  mainstream	   IR	   is	   not	   helpful	   in	   exploring	   a	   deeper	  
social	   reality,	   in	   the	   critical	   realist	   sense,	   of	   IR.	   What	   is	   presented	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	   not	   an	  
argument	  for	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  However,	  the	  argument	  pursued,	  by	  drawing	  
on	   constructionist	   psychology,	   is	   that	   a	  meaningful	   understanding	  of	   individual	   human	  beings	  
located	   in	   a	   “world-­‐seen-­‐as-­‐people”	   does	   not	   need	   to	   draw	   on	   this	   deeper	   level	   of	   reality.17	  
While	   the	   person	   marks	   a	   location	   in	   space	   and	   time	   that	   shows	   continuity,	   a	   meaningful	  
understanding	   of	   selves	   and	   emotions	   is	   to	   be	   located	   in	   discursive	   practices.	   The	   self	   and	  
emotions	  are	  not	  to	  be	  sought	  inside	  the	  mind	  but	  at	  the	  level	  of	  discourse.	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  Wendt,	  'The	  State	  as	  Person	  in	  International	  Theory',	  311-­‐314.	  
17	  Harré,	  'Discourse	  and	  the	  Embodied	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The	  two	  key	  moves	  that	  this	  thesis	  introduces	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  critique	  of	  Wendt’s	  state-­‐as-­‐
person	  conception	  ‒	   the	  argument	   for	   taking	  metaphors	   seriously	   for	   theorising	   in	   IR	  and	   the	  
turn	  to	  constructionist	  psychology	  ‒	  should	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  more	  general	  contributions	   to	   the	  
discipline.	   First,	   this	   thesis	  argues	   that	  metaphors	  are	   to	  be	  understood	  as	  potentially	   theory-­‐
constitutive	  elements	  that	  can	  operate	  from	  either	  a	  mind-­‐world	  dualist	  or	  a	  mind-­‐world	  monist	  
perspective.	   Focusing	  on	   the	   role	  of	  metaphors,	  understood	  as	  an	   interanimation	  of	   thoughts	  
that	   can	   be	   made	   explicit	   through	   engaging	   in	   structural	   mapping,	   shifts	   attention	   from	   the	  
question	  of	  “what”	  to	  the	  question	  of	  “how”.	  This	  allows	  us	  to	  focus	  specifically	  on	  the	  process	  
of	   how	  new	   insights	   are	   created	   by	  making	   the	   relation	   between	   the	   source	   domain	   and	   the	  
target	  domain	  of	  a	  metaphor	  explicit	  and	  thereby	  being	  able	  to	  actively	  engage	   in	  tracing	  and	  
initiating	  changes	  in	  our	  most	  important	  concepts.	  Given	  nascent	  approaches	  that	  engage	  with	  
the	   theory-­‐constitutive	   role	   of	   metaphors	   in	   connection	   with	   key	   IR	   concepts,	   such	   as	   the	  
respective	  works	  of	  Richard	  Little	  and	  Michael	  Marks,	  potential	   for	   further	  research	   is	  opened	  
up	  by	  the	  suggestions	  made	  in	  Chapter	  3.18	  Second,	  a	  key	  result	  of	  the	  discussion	  in	  Chapter	  4	  is	  
that	  we	  should	  be	  wary	  of	  making	  the	  assumption	  that	  findings	  from	  psychology	  are	  of	  greater	  
scientific	   rigour	   than	   those	   delivered	   by	   the	   social	   sciences	   and	   especially	   post-­‐positivist	  
accounts.	  Doing	  so	  would	  be	  to	  blindly	  accept	  a	  neopositivistic	  understanding	  of	  science,	  which	  
is	   highly	   debated	   in	   IR.	   Further,	   this	   thesis	   argues	   that	   if	   we	   utilise	   psychology,	   we	   need	   to	  
carefully	   look	  at	   the	  ontological	  and	  epistemological	  assumptions	  of	   the	   findings	  on	  which	  we	  
are	  drawing.	  Moreover,	  by	  engaging	  current	  attempts	  to	  bring	  psychology	  to	  bear	  on	  IR’s	  most	  
important	  concept,	  this	  thesis	  presents	  an	  argument	  for	  firmly	  rejecting	  the	  application	  of	  social	  
psychology	   to	   the	   state	   and	   its	   systemic	   interactions.	   Lastly,	   by	   turning	   to	   constructionist	  
psychology,	   a	   point	   of	   caution	   is	   added	   that	   we	   should	   be	   critical	   of	   those	   psychological	  
approaches	  which	  operate	  by	  postulating	  entities	  “inside”	  the	  mind.	  	  
Based	   on	   this	   outline,	   four	   suggestions	   for	   further	   research	   are	   made,	   each	   of	   which	   is	  
suggested	  in	  order	  to	  take	  further	  the	  contributions	  made	  in	  this	  thesis.	  First,	  the	  usage	  of	  state-­‐
as-­‐person	  ideas	  needs	  to	  be	  analysed	  in	  practice	  with	  a	  specific	  focus	  on	  not	  only	   instances	  of	  
anthropomorphisation	   or	   personification	   of	   the	   state	   but	   also	   with	   a	   focus	   on,	   first,	   the	  
relationship	  between	  socially	  accepted	  concepts	  of	  persons	  and	  concepts	  of	  states	  and,	  second,	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the	  possibilities	  for	  culturally	  specific	  ideas	  of	  self	  and	  emotions	  to	  influence	  conceptions	  of	  the	  
state-­‐as-­‐person	   under	   the	   constraints	   of	   the	   state-­‐as-­‐structure.	   Second,	   taking	   this	   a	   step	  
further,	   we	   need	   to	   ask	   whether	   the	   suggestions	   made	   as	   part	   of	   the	   constructed	   state-­‐as-­‐
person	   are	   also	   applicable	   to	   other	   key	   entities	   in	   IR.	   In	   principle,	   the	   strong	   constructivist	  
account	   given	   here	   would	   allow	   for	   such	   applications,	   as	   long	   as	   Harre’s	  minimal	   criteria	   for	  
personhood	  are	  fulfilled.	  Hence,	  the	  usage	  of	  the	  concept	  might	  be	  extended	  to	  other	  corporate	  
actors	   that	   IR	   finds	   relevant.	  Third,	   looking	  at	   the	  more	  general	  contribution	   to	   IR	   theory	   that	  
this	   thesis	  makes,	   it	   is	   suggested	   that	   an	   investigation	   into	   the	   role	   of	  metaphors	   in	   selected	  
mind-­‐world	  monist	   and	  mind-­‐world	  dualist	   approaches	   in	   IR	   can	   create	  new	   insights.	  What	   is	  
missing	   from	   the	   general	   debate	   is	   an	   account	   that	   is	   able	   to	   show	  explicitly	   how	  metaphors	  
play	  a	   role	  beyond	   figures	  of	   speeches	  and	  heuristic	  devices	   in	   various	   IR	  accounts.	   Following	  
suggestions	   made	   in	   Chapter	   3,	   the	   theory-­‐constitutive	   role	   of	   metaphors	   in	   critical	   realism,	  
analyticism,	   and	   reflexive	   approaches	   should	   be	   researched	   in	   a	   comparative	   fashion.	   Fourth,	  
this	  thesis	  suggests	  constructionist	  psychology	  as	  a	  useful	  addition	  to	  IR	  theorising	  and	  utilises	  it	  
to	   argue	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   process	   of	   personation	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   state.	   In	   addition,	  
constructionist	   psychology	   can	   be	   applied	   to	   specific	   cases	   of	   either	   corporate	   or	   individual	  
actors.	   In	   this	   regard,	   we	   can	   ask	   how	   the	   discursive	   construction	   of	   selves	   and	   emotions	  
influences	  policy	  and	  behaviour	  in	  IR.	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